Kavanagh, J.
This action requires the construction of certain portions of section 22 of the employment security act, as then last amended by PA 1955, No 281, being CLS 1956, § 421.22 (Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp § 17.524).
This section of the act deals with a transfer of the assets in whole or in part by one business to another by any means other than in the ordinary course of trade. It also provides for a determination by the commission and the assignment
of a portion of the transferor’s rating account to the transferee and deals with the method of computing and determining the portion of the rating account, transferred.
On August 22, 1956, Valley Metal Products Company (hereinafter referred to as “Vampco”), a Michigan corporation, doing business at Plainwell, Michigan, purchased certain assets from Industrial Machine Tool Company (hereinafter called “Industrial”), another Michigan corporation, engaged in manufacturing at its plant in Fenton, Michigan.
On March 20, 1957, the Michigan employment security commission mailed to Vampco its determination that a “transfer of business” within section 22 (a) had taken place. Under that section the commission determined that the assets so acquired accounted for 40% of the total payroll of the seller, Industrial. Accordingly, the rating account balance of the transferor, Industrial, was transferred to Vampco together with a 40% share of the taxable wages allocable to that portion of the business so transferred. The purpose of the determination is to allocate between the transferor and the transferee a proper amount of responsibility for unemployment compensation benefits that might be charged against an employer, so that any benefit payment based on wages earned prior to transfer of the business would be charged to Vampco’s Michigan employment security commission new rating account.
Upon receipt of notice of the determination, Vampco’s attorneys asked for a redetermination. Review was made and the original determination was affirmed. Notice of the affirmation was mailed to Vampco on April 25, 1957.
Vampco requested a hearing and such hearing was held on June 27, 1957, and concluded on July 15, 1957. The referee found, following testimony, that there had been a transfer of business within section
22 and that the transfer of rating accounts and allocated wages was proper. Vampco appealed. The .appeal board affirmed the referee’s decision. Certiorari was granted for review of the decision. The circuit judge filed a written opinion affirming the decision of the appeal board.
Vampco appealed to this Court, alleging it was denied due process of law by the commission’s original determination. It claims it was entitled to notice .and hearing before any determination was made, .since the determination was made from data and facts supplied
ex parte
by the seller, Industrial. Vampco alleges that once a determination is made
ex parte,
it is difficult to overturn. The difficulty is said to be so fundamental as to involve a denial of due process.
Vampco’s principal charge is that it purchased only certain assets of Industrial’s business and not "the business itself. It claims that, even if there were such a transfer of business, it could not be responsible for unemployment compensation benefits paid to the ex-employees of Industrial. Such burden is said to lie on the employer who created the unemployment.
The facts as found by the referee are that Industrial had 2 divisions of operation at Fenton, Michigan - — one was the manufacture of windows, the other of tools. Vampco did buy all of the window business, excluding receivables and license agreements. Further, Industrial assigned to Vampco its window trademark and agreed not to compete in the window business. Vampco moved all of the window operation from Fenton to its plant at Plainwell and began the manufacture of windows. These facts form the "basis of the referee’s finding that there had been a transfer of business to Vampco under section 22. These facts as found are supported in the record by
the testimony of witnesses and by various exhibits, including the sales agreement.
A reading of the testimonial record and the exhibits leads ns to the conclusion that the decision reached by the referee with reference to the fact sit-
nation, and affirmed by the appeal board and the circuit judge, is not contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
We are then brought squarely to the point of determining what the legislature intended by the portion of subsection (b)(2) of section 22 reading as follows:
“Such transferred account shall be liable to be charged for all benefit payments based on employment in the business or portion thereof transferred.”
Appellant Vampco contends that though intending a pro rata division of the experience rating account and of the wages paid, the legislature did not intend the same disposition of benefit charges; but rather it intended to limit the benefit charges to the dollar amount of the balance transferred.
Although much could be said with respect to who caused the layoffs, Industrial or Vampco, particularly in view of the fact that Vampco transferred the operation to Plainwell and did not continue the' business in the community in which it had previously been operated, we do not believe an answer to this question would control this case. We believe the legislature had in mind devising a pro rata formula which would, as between the’ parties, divide all the rate-making factors involved on an identical basis. The legislature no doubt realized that a division on this basis might or might not be advantageous to one or the other of the parties, depending on the varying circumstances of each case. The purpose of the act is to create and maintain a fund so that those unemployed may receive the benefits of the act. The legislative intent must certainly be in keeping with this end. The unfavorable experience cannot be translated into increased contributions against Industrial since it has disposed of the business. The increased contributions which necessarily must be made in order to meet the benefit payments must of necessity fall upon the transferee, who is presumably operating the business. Neither party
could know at the time of the transfer the exact future experience. The party purchasing may protect itself by contract or by adjustment of the purchase price against such a contingency.
We think the trial court was correct in its finding that “such transferred account” means the rating account which the transferee has after the transferred account has been merged with his prior rating account.
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Kavanagh, J.
This action requires the construction of certain portions of section 22 of the employment security act, as then last amended by PA 1955, No 281, being CLS 1956, § 421.22 (Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp § 17.524).
This section of the act deals with a transfer of the assets in whole or in part by one business to another by any means other than in the ordinary course of trade. It also provides for a determination by the commission and the assignment
of a portion of the transferor’s rating account to the transferee and deals with the method of computing and determining the portion of the rating account, transferred.
On August 22, 1956, Valley Metal Products Company (hereinafter referred to as “Vampco”), a Michigan corporation, doing business at Plainwell, Michigan, purchased certain assets from Industrial Machine Tool Company (hereinafter called “Industrial”), another Michigan corporation, engaged in manufacturing at its plant in Fenton, Michigan.
On March 20, 1957, the Michigan employment security commission mailed to Vampco its determination that a “transfer of business” within section 22 (a) had taken place. Under that section the commission determined that the assets so acquired accounted for 40% of the total payroll of the seller, Industrial. Accordingly, the rating account balance of the transferor, Industrial, was transferred to Vampco together with a 40% share of the taxable wages allocable to that portion of the business so transferred. The purpose of the determination is to allocate between the transferor and the transferee a proper amount of responsibility for unemployment compensation benefits that might be charged against an employer, so that any benefit payment based on wages earned prior to transfer of the business would be charged to Vampco’s Michigan employment security commission new rating account.
Upon receipt of notice of the determination, Vampco’s attorneys asked for a redetermination. Review was made and the original determination was affirmed. Notice of the affirmation was mailed to Vampco on April 25, 1957.
Vampco requested a hearing and such hearing was held on June 27, 1957, and concluded on July 15, 1957. The referee found, following testimony, that there had been a transfer of business within section
22 and that the transfer of rating accounts and allocated wages was proper. Vampco appealed. The .appeal board affirmed the referee’s decision. Certiorari was granted for review of the decision. The circuit judge filed a written opinion affirming the decision of the appeal board.
Vampco appealed to this Court, alleging it was denied due process of law by the commission’s original determination. It claims it was entitled to notice .and hearing before any determination was made, .since the determination was made from data and facts supplied
ex parte
by the seller, Industrial. Vampco alleges that once a determination is made
ex parte,
it is difficult to overturn. The difficulty is said to be so fundamental as to involve a denial of due process.
Vampco’s principal charge is that it purchased only certain assets of Industrial’s business and not "the business itself. It claims that, even if there were such a transfer of business, it could not be responsible for unemployment compensation benefits paid to the ex-employees of Industrial. Such burden is said to lie on the employer who created the unemployment.
The facts as found by the referee are that Industrial had 2 divisions of operation at Fenton, Michigan - — one was the manufacture of windows, the other of tools. Vampco did buy all of the window business, excluding receivables and license agreements. Further, Industrial assigned to Vampco its window trademark and agreed not to compete in the window business. Vampco moved all of the window operation from Fenton to its plant at Plainwell and began the manufacture of windows. These facts form the "basis of the referee’s finding that there had been a transfer of business to Vampco under section 22. These facts as found are supported in the record by
the testimony of witnesses and by various exhibits, including the sales agreement.
A reading of the testimonial record and the exhibits leads ns to the conclusion that the decision reached by the referee with reference to the fact sit-
nation, and affirmed by the appeal board and the circuit judge, is not contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
We are then brought squarely to the point of determining what the legislature intended by the portion of subsection (b)(2) of section 22 reading as follows:
“Such transferred account shall be liable to be charged for all benefit payments based on employment in the business or portion thereof transferred.”
Appellant Vampco contends that though intending a pro rata division of the experience rating account and of the wages paid, the legislature did not intend the same disposition of benefit charges; but rather it intended to limit the benefit charges to the dollar amount of the balance transferred.
Although much could be said with respect to who caused the layoffs, Industrial or Vampco, particularly in view of the fact that Vampco transferred the operation to Plainwell and did not continue the' business in the community in which it had previously been operated, we do not believe an answer to this question would control this case. We believe the legislature had in mind devising a pro rata formula which would, as between the’ parties, divide all the rate-making factors involved on an identical basis. The legislature no doubt realized that a division on this basis might or might not be advantageous to one or the other of the parties, depending on the varying circumstances of each case. The purpose of the act is to create and maintain a fund so that those unemployed may receive the benefits of the act. The legislative intent must certainly be in keeping with this end. The unfavorable experience cannot be translated into increased contributions against Industrial since it has disposed of the business. The increased contributions which necessarily must be made in order to meet the benefit payments must of necessity fall upon the transferee, who is presumably operating the business. Neither party
could know at the time of the transfer the exact future experience. The party purchasing may protect itself by contract or by adjustment of the purchase price against such a contingency.
We think the trial court was correct in its finding that “such transferred account” means the rating account which the transferee has after the transferred account has been merged with his prior rating account.
The remaining question raised by appellant deals with whether or not Yampco has been deprived of property without due process of law by its alleged failure to have a reasonable opportunity to submit testimony and have a hearing prior to the original determination by the 'commission. The original determination contained the following statement:
“This determination will become final unless within 15 days after the date of mailing of this determination, as shown above, a written application for a review and redetermination is filed with this commission.”
The redetermination of April 25, 1957, contained the following:
“This redetermination shall become final unless within 15 days after the date of mailing, as shown above, a written appeal is filed for a hearing on this redetermination before a referee.”
Yampco took advantage of the provisions above set forth in both instances; it sought redetermination after it received the first notice and upon redetermination sought a full hearing before the referee and received it. Appellant cites numerous authorities, particularly
Morgan
v.
United States,
304 US 1 (58 S Ct 773, 82 L ed 1129), for the proposition that due process requires notice and hearing to the party to be so deprived of property before
the final order
becomes effective. We agree with the au
thorities cited; however, in the instant case the language of the determination and the redetermination specifically provides they do not become finally effective until 15 days had elapsed or until reviewed on appeal.
Vampco has had a fair hearing before the referee, at which issues Were framed and facts.brought out in evidence and, under the provisions of the act, it has appealed even to this Court.
Vampco was not deprived of due process of law but, on the contrary, received fair consideration and was given ample opportunity at hearing to have testimony presented and the issues determined.
The order and judgment.of the circuit court affirming the appeal board is affirmed. Appellees shall have costs.
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, Kelly, Edwards, Souris, and Otis M. Smith, JJ., concurred.
Black, J., did not sit.