Valeo North America, Inc. v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
• Decided: August 12, 2025
• Docket: 24-1189
• Status: Published

Opinion

Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 1 Filed: 08/12/2025

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, ALERIS ROLLED PRODUCTS, INC., ARCONIC CO., COMMONWEALTH ROLLED PRODUCTS INC., CONSTELLIUM ROLLED PRODUCTS RAVENSWOOD, LLC, JUPITER ALUMINUM CO., JW ALUMINUM COMPANY, NOVELIS CORPORATION, ALUMINUM ASSOCIATION COMMON ALLOY ALUMINUM SHEET TRADE ENFORCEMENT WORKING GROUP, Defendants-Appellees ______________________

2024-1189 ______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:21-cv-00581-MAB, Chief Judge Mark A. Barnett. ______________________

Decided: August 12, 2025 ______________________

PIERCE LEE, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by DANIEL CANNISTRA; WERONIKA BUKOWSKI, New York, NY. Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 2 Filed: 08/12/2025

KYLE SHANE BECKRICH, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States. Also represented by REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.

JOHN M. HERRMANN, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees Aleris Rolled Products, Inc., Arconic Co., Commonwealth Rolled Products Inc., Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC, Jupiter Aluminum Co., JW Aluminum Company, Novelis Corporation, Aluminum Association Common Al- loy Aluminum Sheet Trade Enforcement Working Group. Also represented by JOSHUA MOREY, PAUL C. ROSENTHAL. ______________________

Before TARANTO, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. STOLL, Circuit Judge. This case involves the scope of antidumping and coun- tervailing duty orders on common alloy aluminum sheets from the People’s Republic of China. Valeo North America appeals the Court of International Trade’s affirmance of the United States Department of Commerce’s ruling on the scope of those orders. Specifically, Commerce determined that the scope of the orders encompassed Valeo’s product, T-series aluminum sheets imported from China. For the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND When Commerce finds that “foreign merchandise is . . . sold in the United States at less than its fair value,” and the United States International Trade Commission deter- mines that a domestic industry is, or is threatened to be, materially injured, Commerce must impose an antidump- ing duty “equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export price) for the [foreign] merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 3 Filed: 08/12/2025

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Similarly, countervailing duties shall be imposed if “a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervaila- ble subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States,” and a United States domestic industry is, or is threatened to be, materially injured. Id. § 1671. Antidumping and countervailing duty orders contain narrative descriptions defining the merchandise covered. These orders “must be written in general terms.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a) (2020). 1 And as Commerce has acknowledged, sometimes “[i]ssues arise as to whether a particular prod- uct is included within the scope of an of an antidumping or countervailing duty order.” Id. When such questions arise, Commerce’s regulations—specifically 19 C.F.R. § 351.225—direct it to issue “scope rulings” that clarify whether the product is within the scope. Id. Interested parties may apply for a scope ruling, or Commerce may self-initiate a scope inquiry. Id. § 351.225(b)–(c). Commerce begins its analysis with the language of the order that is subject to interpretation. ArcelorMittal Stain- less Belg. N.V. v. United States, 694 F.3d 82, 84 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This step is “sometimes referred to as the ‘(k)(0)’ in- quiry because it precedes the” regulatory framework set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k). Vandewater Int’l Inc. v. United States, 130 F.4th 981, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Un- der its regulations, if Commerce finds the meaning of the scope language at issue clear, the proceedings terminate. Id. at 984–85. On the other hand, if Commerce finds the scope language ambiguous, it looks to two sets of factors spelled out in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) and (k)(2).

1 We cite to the 2020 version of this regulation for the remainder of this opinion. The 2020 version applied during the proceedings below. Commerce has since amended this regulation. Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 4 Filed: 08/12/2025

Commerce first considers the (k)(1) factors, including “[t]he descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the initial investigation, and the determinations of the Sec- retary (including prior scope determinations) and the Com- mission” at (k)(1) to resolve the scope inquiry. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1). If these “criteria are not dispositive,” Com- merce then considers the (k)(2) factors: (1) “[t]he physical characteristics of the product”; (2) “[t]he expectations of the ultimate purchasers”; (3) “[t]he ultimate use of the prod- uct”; (4) “[t]he channels of trade in which the product is sold”; and (5) “[t]he manner in which the product is adver- tised and displayed.” Id. § 351.225(k)(2). I Here, Valeo sought a scope ruling on whether its T-se- ries aluminum sheet is within Commerce’s 2019 Orders 2 on common aluminum alloy sheet imported from China. The Orders cover: [A]luminum common alloy sheet (common alloy sheet), which is a flat-rolled aluminum product having a thickness of 6.3 mm or less, but greater than 0.2 mm, in coils or cut-to-length, regardless of width. Common alloy sheet within the scope of this order includes both not clad aluminum sheet, as well as multi-alloy, clad aluminum sheet. With re- spect to not clad aluminum sheet, common alloy sheet is manufactured from a 1XXX-, 3XXX-, or 5XXX-series alloy as designated by the Alumi- num Association. With respect to multi-alloy,

2 Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet From the People’s Republic of China, 84 Fed. Reg. 2813 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 8, 2019) (antidumping duty order); Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet From the People’s Republic of China, 84 Fed. Reg. 2157 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 6, 2019) (counter- vailing duty order) (collectively, the “Orders”). Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 5 Filed: 08/12/2025

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clad aluminum sheet, common alloy sheet is pro- duced from a 3XXX-series core, to which cladding layers are applied to either one or both sides of the core. 84 Fed. Reg. at 2815; 84 Fed. Reg. at 2158 (emphasis added to indicate disputed language in scope order). Much of the dispute in this appeal involves the lan- guage “3XXX-. . . series alloy as designated by the Alumi- num Association.” Thus, some background on the Aluminum Association is helpful. The Aluminum Associa- tion is a private organization that publishes an industry standard in the form of “a numerical designation system for wrought aluminum and wrought aluminum alloys” known as the “Teal Sheets.” Appellant’s Br. 6; Oral Arg. at 7:40–8:25, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/de- fault.aspx?fl=24-1189_05052025.mp3. The Teal Sheets “is the defining source for designations and chemical composi- tion limits for wrought aluminum and wrought aluminum alloys and is relied upon in a number of standards and specifications worldwide.” Appellant’s Br. 6. The Teal Sheets uses a four-digit numerical code that conveys infor- mation about the alloy where “[t]he first digit in the grade number indicates the general family, which share a major alloying component.” Id. When referring to the family col- lectively, “the last three digits are shown as the letter X.” Id. The last three digits “contemplate a unique, registered alloy.” Id. (emphasis added). Registering an alloy with the Aluminum Association is voluntary but provides potential customers with infor- mation about the composition of an alloy so customers can know what they are getting and if the alloy is suitable for their particular purposes. See Oral Arg. at 7:40–8:25; J.A. 867. The dispute here involves the 3XXX-series alloy, which has a major alloying component of manganese. Valeo acknowledges that “the aluminum core of [its] T-series Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 6 Filed: 08/12/2025

sheet has a major alloying element of manganese” but con- tends it is not designated a 3XXX-series alloy by the Alu- minum Association because it is not registered with the Association. Appellant’s Br. 7. On October 15, 2021, Commerce issued a final scope ruling determining “that the scope of the Orders includes T-series aluminum sheet imported by Valeo.” J.A. 1246 (italics removed). Commerce explained that “the descrip- tion of the subject merchandise, the scope language, and prior rulings, are, together, dispositive as to whether the product at issue is subject merchandise, in accordance with 19 CFR [§] 351.225(k)(1),” and therefore it is “unnecessary to consider the additional factors specified in 19 CFR [§] 351.225(k)(2).” J.A. 1255. Commerce rejected Valeo’s argument that a product must be registered with the Aluminum Association to fall within the scope of the Orders, reasoning that “the phrase ‘as designated’ refers to the series of the aluminum alloy because, without this phrase, the scope language would be unclear as to what is meant by a 1xxx, 3xxx, or 5xxx-series alloy.” J.A. 1259. To support its position, Commerce ex- plained that “[t]he plain scope language uses the term ‘se- ries alloy’ rather than ‘specific alloy,’” therefore the Orders referred to an alloy series rather than a specific registered four-digit alloy. J.A. 1260. Valeo also argued its T-series products should be ex- cluded from the Orders because the T-series sheets are heat-treated, and the Aluminum Association classifies 3XXX-series alloys as non-heat-treatable. Commerce disa- greed, concluding “Valeo has not demonstrated that the phases of diffused alloys within T-series aluminum sheet are not separate layers of a composite clad product.” J.A. 1258. Continuing, Commerce explained that Valeo had not “supported its claim that heat-treatability would preclude an aluminum alloy with a principal alloying agent Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 7 Filed: 08/12/2025

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of manganese from being considered a 3xxx-series alumi- num.” J.A. 1262. In accordance with its decision, Commerce instructed Customs and Border Protection to suspend liquidation and to require a cash deposit of estimated duties at the appli- cable rate for the T-series aluminum sheet pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.225. II Valeo appealed Commerce’s determination to the Court of International Trade. Valeo argued Commerce: (1) ex- ceeded the bounds of a (k)(1) analysis; and (2) failed to ad- equately support its findings that the term 3XXX-series covers unregistered alloys, that the T-series aluminum sheet is a clad product rather than a heat-treated product, or that any heat-treatment does not prevent the T-series aluminum sheet from being classified as a 3XXX-series al- loy. Valeo N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 610 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1333 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2022) (“Valeo I”). The Trade Court agreed with Valeo’s first argument, concluding “Commerce’s scope interpretation exceeded the limits of a (k)(1) analysis and is unsupported by substantial evi- dence.” Id. at 1335. The Trade Court first acknowledged “[t]he phrase ‘3XXX-series’ is not defined in the scope except in reference to the phrase ‘as designated by the Aluminum Association,’ which is also undefined.” Id. In light of this, the Trade Court concluded “[t]he scope is ambiguous” because it is unclear if “Commerce intended the scope to cover any alloy [corresponding to a series] . . . (including unregistered al- loys).” Id. The Trade Court then criticized Commerce’s treatment of the (k)(1) sources, specifically for “fail[ing] to account for the Teal Sheets as a whole,” because “Com- merce has not identified anything in the Teal Sheets that indicates the Aluminum Association applies th[e series] framework to unregistered alloys.” Id. at 1335–36. The Trade Court concluded that Commerce’s interpretation Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 8 Filed: 08/12/2025

lacked substantial evidence support, vacated Commerce’s scope order, and remanded for Commerce to reconsider and further explain its ruling in line with 19 C.F.R. § 351.225. The Trade Court held that Commerce’s determination that Valeo’s T-series aluminum sheet is a clad product is supported by substantial evidence. Valeo I, 610 F. Supp. 3d at 1339. Nevertheless, the court explained “the key question is whether a heat-treated (or heat-treat- able) clad sheet can be classified as having a 3XXX-series core and therefore be in-scope.” Id. at 1341. On remand, the Trade Court directed Commerce to consider “evidence that Valeo’s product undergoes heat-treatment . . . and rec- oncile such evidence with evidence indicating that 3XXX- series alloys are non-heat-treatable.” Id. III On remand, Commerce again considered the language of the scope order and whether the language “as designated by the Aluminum Association” excluded unregistered al- loys. Explaining that “‘3XXX-series’ is an industry-specific term defined only by the industry publication Teal Sheets,” Commerce acknowledged that the “as designated by” lan- guage was susceptible to two “differing but plausible inter- pretations.” J.A. 80–81 (emphasis omitted). Commerce further explained that the “Teal Sheets, as a whole, uses the word ‘designation’ to refer to alloys with a four-digit designation from the Aluminum Association [i.e., regis- tered alloys]” but that “the dictionary definition of the term ‘designate’ does not require the term to be used in reference to a four-digit alloy.” J.A. 80. Therefore, Commerce con- cluded that “the scope is ambiguous” and proceeded to con- sider the (k)(1) factors. J.A. 81. As part of its (k)(1) analysis, Commerce considered a prior rate determination (which was confidential and in- volved a different party). Commerce concluded that the prior rate determination supported that 3XXX-series “cover[s] any alloy that contains a major alloying element Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 9 Filed: 08/12/2025

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corresponding to the Aluminum Association’s alloy groups (including unregistered alloys).” J.A. 82–83. But Com- merce explained “the (k)(1) sources are contradictory and the respective weight of the (k)(1) sources is not sufficient to clearly demonstrate preeminence over the other availa- ble (k)(1) sources,” so it found “the (k)(1) sources on the rec- ord are not dispositive in resolving the scope ambiguity.” J.A. 86. Therefore, on February 15, 2023, Commerce initiated a broader scope inquiry under 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2), which is necessary when the (k)(1) criteria are not disposi- tive. After considering the (k)(2) factors, Commerce “con- tinue[d] to find that the scope of the Orders covers Valeo’s T-series Sheet.” J.A. 44 (italics removed). Valeo does not challenge Commerce’s analysis of the (k)(2) factors on ap- peal. Rather, Valeo contends that Commerce should have never reached (k)(2) and should have resolved the scope in its favor based on the language of the Orders or the (k)(1) factors. IV Valeo again appealed to the Trade Court. The Trade Court sustained Commerce’s scope redetermination that Valeo’s products fall within the Orders’ scope. See Valeo N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1355– 56 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2023) (“Valeo II”). Valeo appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). DISCUSSION We review the Trade Court’s rulings de novo, “stepping into its shoes and applying the same standard of review.” JTEKT Corp. v. United States, 642 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “[T]he question of whether the unambiguous terms of a scope control the in- quiry, or whether some ambiguity exists, is a question of law that we review de novo.” Meridian Prods., LLC Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 10 Filed: 08/12/2025

v. United States, 851 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We review Commerce’s analysis of the (k)(1) and (k)(2) factors against the product in question for substantial evidence. Id. Valeo challenges Commerce’s scope order based on three arguments. First, Valeo contends that the language of the Orders and the Teal Sheets “unambiguously ex- cludes Valeo’s T-series Aluminum Sheet.” Appellant’s Br. 23 (capitalization normalized). Valeo would thus end the scope determination here at (k)(0). But, even if this court disagrees with Valeo on the (k)(0) analysis, Valeo as- serts that Commerce’s (k)(1) analysis cannot stand because Commerce erred when it relied on the prior confidential rate determination. Separate from its challenge to the scope determination, Valeo asserts that (1) Commerce’s de- termination that the T-series is within scope of the Orders is unsupported by substantial evidence because the T-se- ries is heat-treated; and (2) Commerce unlawfully failed to revoke its previous Customs instructions after the Trade Court vacated and remanded Commerce’s initial scope de- termination. We address the scope determination argu- ments first, followed by Valeo’s challenges based on heat treatment and the liquidation instructions. I Valeo argues Commerce erred in failing to resolve the scope determination in its favor at (k)(0). According to Valeo, “the scope language of the Orders unambiguously excludes Valeo’s T-series aluminum sheet.” Appellant’s Br. 23 (capitalization normalized). Scope terms are “unambiguous if they have a single clearly defined or stated meaning.” Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1381 n.7 (internal quotation marks and cita- tion omitted). We agree with the Trade Court that the scope of the Orders does not unambiguously resolve whether Commerce intended the scope to cover unregis- tered alloys, like Valeo’s, at the (k)(0) phase. Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 11 Filed: 08/12/2025

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Valeo argues that “[r]ead in conjunction with the Teal Sheets, the scope language itself defines what is meant by ‘as designated.’” Appellant’s Br. 25. According to Valeo, the language “as designated by the Aluminum Association” refers only to alloys registered with the Aluminum Associ- ation. We disagree. As a threshold matter, the Orders do not define what is meant by “as designated by the Aluminum Association.” Because the text of the Orders themselves provides little guidance, we consider the source of the des- ignations: the Teal Sheets. The Teal Sheets also does not unambiguously define what is meant by “as designated” because the Teal Sheets refers both to designated alloys as well as registered alloys. See, e.g., J.A. 900 (“To be elig[i]ble for registration, an alu- minum or aluminum alloy shall be offered for sale . . . .”); J.A. 899 (“Deactivation of registered alloys” (capitalization normalized)); J.A. 897 (“Variations of wrought aluminum and wrought aluminum alloys registered in accordance with this Recommendation . . . .”). But see J.A. 897 (“A nu- merical designation assigned in conformance with this Rec- ommendation should only be used to indicate an aluminum or aluminum alloy having chemical composition limits identical to those registered with [the Aluminum Associa- tion].”); id. (specifying that “[t]he alloy designation in the 2xxx through 8xxx groups is determined by the alloying el- ement . . . present in the greatest mean percentage”); J.A. 899 (“Use of designations” and “Assignment of desig- nations” (capitalization normalized)). Analogous to princi- ples guiding statutory interpretation, we commonly understand that “the same term usually has the same meaning and different terms usually have different mean- ings.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024) (citing A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 170–71 (2012)). For at least this reason, a strong argument can be made that the Teal Sheets uses the phrase “designated” to mean something different from “registration,” Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 12 Filed: 08/12/2025

undermining Valeo’s argument that “designated” unam- biguously means registered. Moreover, the Orders’ language, “as designated by the Aluminum Association,” could use “designated” in a com- mon sense manner 3 simply to refer to the Teal Sheets. As Commerce explained, “the term ‘designate’ is a general term that may be used in the common vernacular,” J.A. 80, or the Orders could use “designated” to refer to specific reg- istrations made by the Aluminum Association. We there- fore reject Valeo’s argument that the language of the Orders unambiguously excludes its product because the Orders’ language and the Teal Sheets does not establish “a single clearly defined or stated meaning.” Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1381 n.7 (citation omitted). Therefore, we hold that the term “as designated by the Aluminum Association” is ambiguous. II Having rejected Valeo’s argument that the language of the scope order unambiguously excludes its product, we turn to Valeo’s (k)(1) arguments. Valeo challenges Com- merce’s reliance on the separate rate determination as a (k)(1) source, asserting that (k)(1) sources must be public, and, in any event, the separate rate determination is not a proper interpretive source, as “it lacks any discussion about a scope issue.” Appellant’s Br. 38. We decline to re- solve this question because, even assuming Commerce erred in considering this separate rate determination, Commerce acknowledged the “minimal analysis regarding whether companies were exporters of subject merchandise” in the separate rate determination and agreed the lack of

3 See, e.g., Designation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“The act of choosing someone or something for a particular purpose or of giving the person or thing a particular description.”). Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 13 Filed: 08/12/2025

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analysis “detracts from the weight that should be given to this (k)(1) source.” J.A. 85–86. In other words, Commerce considered the limited discussion in determining how much weight to assign this source before concluding “the respec- tive weight of the (k)(1) sources is not sufficient to clearly demonstrate preeminence.” J.A. 86. Because Commerce concluded the (k)(1) sources are “not dispositive,” any al- leged error is likely harmless. Id.; Intercargo Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 F.3d 391, 394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well settled that principles of harmless error apply to the review of agency proceedings.”). We find Valeo’s argu- ments related to the separate rate determination unper- suasive. Given Valeo does not challenge Commerce’s analysis at the (k)(2) stage and we are not persuaded that Commerce’s determinations at the (k)(0) and (k)(1) stages are unlawful, harmful, or unsupported by substantial evidence, we af- firm the Trade Court’s decision sustaining Commerce’s scope ruling. III We are also unconvinced by Valeo’s argument that its T-series aluminum sheet falls outside the Orders’ scope be- cause it is heat-treated. “The question of whether the prod- uct at issue meets the unambiguous scope terms is a question of fact that we review for substantial evidence.” Vandewater, 130 F.4th at 991. Valeo does not challenge the scope of the Orders in this regard, but rather disputes Commerce’s determination that the T-series are within the Orders’ scope. Valeo challenges “whether [the] T-series sheet is man- ufactured from a 3xxx-series core,” which implicates heat- treatment “because the term ‘3xxx-series’ refers to non- heat-treatable alloys.” Appellant’s Br. 43; see also J.A. 1251 (Commerce’s Final Scope Ruling) (Valeo arguing its “T-series aluminum sheet is heat-treated multiple times which precludes classification as a 1xxx, 3xxx, or 5xxx Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 14 Filed: 08/12/2025

series aluminum, as those aluminum alloys are not heat- treatable”). Commerce concluded that “Valeo’s T-series sheet does not undergo solution heat-treatment, and that the tempering processes used on Valeo’s T-series sheet are inconsistent with those of a heat-treatable alloy.” J.A. 66– 67. Although Valeo points us to evidence supporting a broader definition of heat-treatment and evidence that the 3XXX-series alloys are non-heat-treatable, Valeo does not explain why the evidence Commerce relied on in reaching its conclusion is not substantial evidence. Commerce ex- plained it “adopt[ed] the narrower definition of heat-treat- ment to mean a synonym for solution heat-treatment” because “the broader definition of ‘heat-treatment,’ which includes several types of thermal treatments including an- nealing, is inconsistent with the statement in Aluminum Alloys 101 that only certain series of aluminum are heat- treatable.” J.A. 65; see also J.A. 62–65 (analyzing the rec- ord evidence regarding heat-treatment). As Valeo fails to explain why this evidence is not “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” substantial evidence supports Commerce’s finding. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1381. IV Finally, Valeo asserts Commerce must revoke the in- structions to Customs directing suspension of liquidation. Valeo contends that when Commerce initiates a broader scope inquiry “under [§ 351.225] subsection (e), it may only issue Customs instructions when the [subsection (e) scope] inquiry has been initiated.” Appellant’s Br. 46. Valeo es- sentially contends that because Commerce initiated a sub- section (e) inquiry in February 2023, following remand from the Trade Court, Commerce was required to revoke the suspension instructions it had issued to Customs in Oc- tober 2021. Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 15 Filed: 08/12/2025

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The provisions of the regulation governing when the Secretary should initiate a (k)(2) inquiry are relevant here: (d) Ruling based upon the application. If the Sec- retary can determine, based solely upon the appli- cation and the descriptions of the merchandise referred to in paragraph (k)(1) of this section, whether a product is included within the scope of an order or a suspended investigation, the Secre- tary will issue a final ruling as to whether the prod- uct is included within the order or suspended investigation. . . . (e) Ruling where further inquiry is warranted. If the Secretary finds that the issue of whether a product is included within the scope of an order or a suspended investigation cannot be determined based solely upon the application and the descrip- tions of the merchandise referred to in para- graph (k)(1) of this section, the Secretary will notify by mail all parties on the Department’s scope service list of the initiation of a scope inquiry. 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.225(d)–(e) (emphasis added). Commerce issued the October 2021 final scope ruling only with re- spect to the (k)(1) factors—i.e., in accordance with § 351.225 subsection (d). J.A. 1267. Valeo then appealed that decision to the Trade Court, which simply remanded the matter, after which, on February 15, 2023, Commerce initiated the broader scope inquiry into the (k)(2) factors, under subsection (e). With this in mind, the most relevant portion of the reg- ulation governing the suspension of liquidation states that: (3) If the Secretary issues a final scope ruling, under either paragraph (d) or (f)(4) of this section, to the effect that the product in question is included within the scope of the order, any suspension of liq- uidation under paragraph (l)(1) or (l)(2) of this Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 16 Filed: 08/12/2025

section will continue. Where there has been no sus- pension of liquidation, the Secretary will instruct the Customs Service to suspend liquidation and to require a cash deposit of estimated duties, at the applicable rate, for each unliquidated entry of the product entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date of initiation of the scope inquiry. If the Secretary’s final scope ruling is to the effect that the product in question is not included within the scope of the order, the Secre- tary will order any suspension of liquidation on the subject product ended and will instruct the Cus- toms Service to refund any cash deposits or release any bonds relating to this product. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(3) (emphases added). Here, Com- merce issued a final scope ruling pursuant to subsection (d) in October 2021. J.A. 1267. Commerce instructed Cus- toms to suspend liquidation, see J.A. 1268, and Valeo has made no argument to us against the propriety of Commerce suspending liquidation when it issues a scope ruling, see Appellant’s Br. 46–47. Valeo’s argument is that “§ 351.225(l) ‘does not allow suspension of liquidation before a scope inquiry’” and Com- merce “may only issue Customs instructions when the [subsection (e) scope] inquiry has been initiated.” Appel- lant’s Br. 46 (quoting United Steel & Fasteners, Inc. v. United States, 947 F.3d 794, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“USF”)). The initiation date Valeo invokes is the Febru- ary 2023 date after remand. But this argument is belied by the language of subsection (l), which unambiguously states that: (1) When the Secretary conducts a scope inquiry under paragraph (b) or (e) of this section, and the product in question is already subject to suspension of liquidation, that suspension of liquidation will be continued, pending a preliminary or a final Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 17 Filed: 08/12/2025

VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. US 17

scope ruling, at the cash deposit rate that would apply if the product were ruled to be included within the scope of the order. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(1) (emphasis added). At the time Commerce conducted the scope inquiry—initiated in Feb- ruary 2023 to consider the (k)(2) factors pursuant to sub- section (e)—Valeo’s products were “already subject to suspension of liquidation.” Commerce’s October 2021 final scope ruling concluded Valeo’s products were within the scope of the Orders and ordered suspension of liquidation, reflecting the recognition that “Commerce may render a scope ruling with or without a ‘scope inquiry.’” USF, 947 F.3d at 799 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(e)). The Octo- ber 2021 suspension was in place in February 2023, so the regulation provided for it to be continued. Valeo points to the fact that the Trade Court remanded Commerce’s October 2021 scope ruling for further consid- eration. But Valeo does not and cannot show that the Trade Court’s remand decision—not a final judgment—va- cated the suspension. See Valeo I, 610 F. Supp. 3d at 1322–43. And Valeo identifies no authority holding that Commerce’s decision to initiate a broader scope inquiry on remand requires revocation of the existing suspension of liquidation. With no such requirement, the regulation on continuation of suspension applies by its terms. We are thus unpersuaded Commerce erred in not revoking its liq- uidation instructions to Customs and affirm the Trade Court’s decision holding the same. Valeo II, 663 F. Supp. 3d at 1355 (explaining that “when Commerce initiated the scope inquiry, Valeo’s product was ‘already subject to suspension of liquidation’ and, as such, ‘that sus- pension of liquidation [was] continued, pending a prelimi- nary or a final scope ruling’” (alteration in original) (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(1))). Valeo’s reliance on USF for support is also unpersua- sive. In USF, Commerce issued instructions suspending Case: 24-1189 Document: 61 Page: 18 Filed: 08/12/2025

liquidation retroactively to “the date the [antidumping duty] Order was issued.” 947 F.3d at 798. The Trade Court held retroactive suspension of liquidation was in ex- cess of Commerce’s authority, and on remand, “Commerce issued new instructions to suspend liquidation on or af- ter . . . the date when Commerce issued the final scope rul- ing.” Id. We affirmed suspension of liquidation from the date of the final scope ruling. We reasoned that subsec- tion (l)(3) operated on a prospective, not retroactive, basis, despite subsection (l)(3)’s silence “as to how far back sus- pension of liquidation can go when there has been no scope inquiry.” Id. at 800–01. Here, Commerce issued instruc- tions with its final scope ruling, which is in accord with our holding in USF. CONCLUSION We have considered Valeo’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af- firm the Trade Court’s decision sustaining Commerce’s re- mand determination that Valeo’s T-series sheets are within the scope of the Orders. AFFIRMED Costs No costs.