1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Robert A Valenzuela, No. CV-21-00442-TUC-JGZ
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Ruby J Farms LLC, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is a Motion in Limine filed by Defendants Ruby J Farms 16 LLC (RJF), Anthony Comella, and Norma Comella. (Doc. 63.) Defendants request that the 17 Court preclude specific topics of testimony for Plaintiff Robert Valenzuela’s witnesses 18 under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Id.) Valenzuela filed a 19 Response. (Doc. 68.) The Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion. 20 DISCUSSION 21 Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act” admitted for the 22 purpose of proving a person’s character and showing the person acted, on a particular 23 occasion, in accordance with that character. If not admitted to prove a person acted in 24 accordance with her character, other-act evidence may be admissible for another purpose, 25 including to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 26 absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The Ninth Circuit has 27 also set forth a four-part test for the admissibility of other-act evidence under Rule 404(b): 28 “(1) there must be sufficient proof for the jury to find that the defendant committed the 1 other act; (2) the other act must not be too remote in time; (3) the other act must be 2 introduced to prove a material issue in the case; and (4) the other act must, in some cases, 3 be similar to the offense charged.” Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 4 (9th Cir. 2000). After the proponent makes a showing under Rule 404(b), the court must 5 consider, under Rule 403, whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 6 probative value of the other-act evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403; Duran, 221 F.3d at 1133. 7 In their Motion in Limine, Defendants request that the Court, under Rules 404(b) 8 and 403, prohibit Valenzuela’s witnesses from testifying about (1) alleged debts 9 Defendants owe them and alleged mistreatment they suffered from Defendants; (2) their 10 work relationships with Defendants; and (3) Valenzuela’s signing of contracts as a 11 management employee of RJF and the lack of involvement of Tri-Val LLC in Valenzuela’s 12 work with Defendants. (Doc. 63 at 1–7.) The Court will address each in turn. 13 I. Other Debts and Mistreatment 14 Valenzuela argues his witnesses can testify about compensation Defendants have 15 failed to pay them and mistreatment they experienced from Defendants to establish 16 Defendants’ state of mind—that is, whether they intentionally, knowingly, or in bad faith 17 refused to pay Valenzuela the compensation owed to him. (Doc. 68 at 7.) This proffered 18 testimony does not pass Rule 404(b)’s muster. Valenzuela does not explain how other debts 19 and acts of mistreatment would prove Defendant’s intent, plan, or knowledge here. Rather, 20 Valenzuela implies that Defendants’ failure to pay other persons proves that Defendants 21 intentionally failed to pay him. (See Doc. 68 at 7.) This propensity evidence is prohibited 22 by Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1020 (2d Cir. 1986) (past 23 failure to pay debts is inadmissible if offered to prove that a person failed to pay debts on 24 a particular occasion); see also 22B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 25 Practice and Procedure Evidence § 5253 (2d ed. 2023) (the need to avoid the forbidden 26 inference to propensity is particularly acute when a party seeks to show that a person gained 27 knowledge from repetitive acts). Rule 404(b) similarly precludes any testimony about 28 Defendants’ alleged mistreatment of others if proffered by Valenzuela to prove Defendants 1 mistreated or failed to pay him. 2 II. Other Relationships with Defendants 3 Defendants argue that Rule 404(b) prohibits Valenzuela’s witnesses from testifying 4 about their own work relationships with Defendants, which are “completely unrelated” to 5 the disputed agreement between Valenzuela and Defendants. (See Doc. 63 at 5.) 6 Valenzuela contends this testimony is admissible to prove he was an employee rather than 7 an independent contractor. (Doc. 68 at 5, 7.) 8 Arizona courts consider a variety of factors when determining whether a person was 9 an employee, including: 10 1. The extent of control exercised by the master over details of the work 11 and the degree of supervision; 12 2. The distinct nature of the worker’s business; 13 3. Specialization or skilled occupation; 14 4. Materials and place of work; 15 5. Duration of employment; 16 6. Method of payment; 17 7. Relationship of work done to the regular business of the employer; 18 8. Belief of the parties. 19 Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 794 P.2d 138, 142 (Ariz. 1990). Testimony about 20 the work relationships between other persons and Defendants, to the extent it relates to 21 these or similar factors, is relevant. This includes, for example, testimony from a witness 22 about his work with Defendants and his personal knowledge of Defendants’ business, daily 23 operations, or industry of work. Provided that Valenzuela does not solicit this testimony as 24 propensity evidence to show Defendants mistreated or failed to pay him, it is admissible, 25 under Rule 404(b), and highly probative, under Rule 403, as to whether he was an 26 employee. 27 // 28 // 1 III. Work Relationship of the Parties 2 Defendants also request that the Court preclude witness testimony about RJF 3 directing Valenzuela to sign agreements as a management employee of RJF, (Doc. 63 at 4 4), and the lack of involvement or mention of Tri-Val LLC (Valenzuela’s company) related 5 to Valenzuela’s work for Defendants, (Id. at 7). According to Defendants, Valenzuela’s 6 authorization to execute contracts is irrelevant to whether Valenzuela was an employee 7 because such authority is also consistent with Valenzuela working as an independent 8 contractor. (Id. at 4.) And whether Tri-Val LLC was involved in or mentioned during 9 Valenzuela’s work with Defendants is unrelated to any of the “discrete factors” courts 10 consider when identifying whether a worker was an employee. (Id. at 7.) Such testimony, 11 Defendants argue, is therefore irrelevant and should be precluded. (Id.) 12 The testimony Defendants seek to preclude, although not dispositive, is relevant to 13 a central issue in this case: whether Valenzuela was an employee. To be sure, none of the 14 factors listed above specifically address whether a worker has the authority to execute 15 agreements or whether a worker is held out to the public as an employee. See Santiago, 16 794 P.2d at 142. But this list of factors is not discrete; it is nonexhaustive. See, e.g., id. 17 (fact finders must evaluate “a number of criteria,” “include[ing]” eight specific factors); 18 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 1958) (Section 220’s list of ten 19 factors is nonexhaustive); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) 20 (same). In addition to these nonexhaustive factors, Arizona courts also consider community 21 belief and custom.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Robert A Valenzuela, No. CV-21-00442-TUC-JGZ
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Ruby J Farms LLC, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is a Motion in Limine filed by Defendants Ruby J Farms 16 LLC (RJF), Anthony Comella, and Norma Comella. (Doc. 63.) Defendants request that the 17 Court preclude specific topics of testimony for Plaintiff Robert Valenzuela’s witnesses 18 under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Id.) Valenzuela filed a 19 Response. (Doc. 68.) The Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion. 20 DISCUSSION 21 Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act” admitted for the 22 purpose of proving a person’s character and showing the person acted, on a particular 23 occasion, in accordance with that character. If not admitted to prove a person acted in 24 accordance with her character, other-act evidence may be admissible for another purpose, 25 including to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 26 absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The Ninth Circuit has 27 also set forth a four-part test for the admissibility of other-act evidence under Rule 404(b): 28 “(1) there must be sufficient proof for the jury to find that the defendant committed the 1 other act; (2) the other act must not be too remote in time; (3) the other act must be 2 introduced to prove a material issue in the case; and (4) the other act must, in some cases, 3 be similar to the offense charged.” Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 4 (9th Cir. 2000). After the proponent makes a showing under Rule 404(b), the court must 5 consider, under Rule 403, whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 6 probative value of the other-act evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403; Duran, 221 F.3d at 1133. 7 In their Motion in Limine, Defendants request that the Court, under Rules 404(b) 8 and 403, prohibit Valenzuela’s witnesses from testifying about (1) alleged debts 9 Defendants owe them and alleged mistreatment they suffered from Defendants; (2) their 10 work relationships with Defendants; and (3) Valenzuela’s signing of contracts as a 11 management employee of RJF and the lack of involvement of Tri-Val LLC in Valenzuela’s 12 work with Defendants. (Doc. 63 at 1–7.) The Court will address each in turn. 13 I. Other Debts and Mistreatment 14 Valenzuela argues his witnesses can testify about compensation Defendants have 15 failed to pay them and mistreatment they experienced from Defendants to establish 16 Defendants’ state of mind—that is, whether they intentionally, knowingly, or in bad faith 17 refused to pay Valenzuela the compensation owed to him. (Doc. 68 at 7.) This proffered 18 testimony does not pass Rule 404(b)’s muster. Valenzuela does not explain how other debts 19 and acts of mistreatment would prove Defendant’s intent, plan, or knowledge here. Rather, 20 Valenzuela implies that Defendants’ failure to pay other persons proves that Defendants 21 intentionally failed to pay him. (See Doc. 68 at 7.) This propensity evidence is prohibited 22 by Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1020 (2d Cir. 1986) (past 23 failure to pay debts is inadmissible if offered to prove that a person failed to pay debts on 24 a particular occasion); see also 22B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 25 Practice and Procedure Evidence § 5253 (2d ed. 2023) (the need to avoid the forbidden 26 inference to propensity is particularly acute when a party seeks to show that a person gained 27 knowledge from repetitive acts). Rule 404(b) similarly precludes any testimony about 28 Defendants’ alleged mistreatment of others if proffered by Valenzuela to prove Defendants 1 mistreated or failed to pay him. 2 II. Other Relationships with Defendants 3 Defendants argue that Rule 404(b) prohibits Valenzuela’s witnesses from testifying 4 about their own work relationships with Defendants, which are “completely unrelated” to 5 the disputed agreement between Valenzuela and Defendants. (See Doc. 63 at 5.) 6 Valenzuela contends this testimony is admissible to prove he was an employee rather than 7 an independent contractor. (Doc. 68 at 5, 7.) 8 Arizona courts consider a variety of factors when determining whether a person was 9 an employee, including: 10 1. The extent of control exercised by the master over details of the work 11 and the degree of supervision; 12 2. The distinct nature of the worker’s business; 13 3. Specialization or skilled occupation; 14 4. Materials and place of work; 15 5. Duration of employment; 16 6. Method of payment; 17 7. Relationship of work done to the regular business of the employer; 18 8. Belief of the parties. 19 Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 794 P.2d 138, 142 (Ariz. 1990). Testimony about 20 the work relationships between other persons and Defendants, to the extent it relates to 21 these or similar factors, is relevant. This includes, for example, testimony from a witness 22 about his work with Defendants and his personal knowledge of Defendants’ business, daily 23 operations, or industry of work. Provided that Valenzuela does not solicit this testimony as 24 propensity evidence to show Defendants mistreated or failed to pay him, it is admissible, 25 under Rule 404(b), and highly probative, under Rule 403, as to whether he was an 26 employee. 27 // 28 // 1 III. Work Relationship of the Parties 2 Defendants also request that the Court preclude witness testimony about RJF 3 directing Valenzuela to sign agreements as a management employee of RJF, (Doc. 63 at 4 4), and the lack of involvement or mention of Tri-Val LLC (Valenzuela’s company) related 5 to Valenzuela’s work for Defendants, (Id. at 7). According to Defendants, Valenzuela’s 6 authorization to execute contracts is irrelevant to whether Valenzuela was an employee 7 because such authority is also consistent with Valenzuela working as an independent 8 contractor. (Id. at 4.) And whether Tri-Val LLC was involved in or mentioned during 9 Valenzuela’s work with Defendants is unrelated to any of the “discrete factors” courts 10 consider when identifying whether a worker was an employee. (Id. at 7.) Such testimony, 11 Defendants argue, is therefore irrelevant and should be precluded. (Id.) 12 The testimony Defendants seek to preclude, although not dispositive, is relevant to 13 a central issue in this case: whether Valenzuela was an employee. To be sure, none of the 14 factors listed above specifically address whether a worker has the authority to execute 15 agreements or whether a worker is held out to the public as an employee. See Santiago, 16 794 P.2d at 142. But this list of factors is not discrete; it is nonexhaustive. See, e.g., id. 17 (fact finders must evaluate “a number of criteria,” “include[ing]” eight specific factors); 18 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 1958) (Section 220’s list of ten 19 factors is nonexhaustive); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) 20 (same). In addition to these nonexhaustive factors, Arizona courts also consider community 21 belief and custom. See Santiago, 794 P.2d at 145 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency 22 § 220 cmt. h (Am. L. Inst. 1958)). Testimony about whether Valenzuela executed 23 agreements that required a management employee’s signature speaks to the perception of 24 the parties’ work relationship within their community. So too does testimony on whether 25 Valenzuela’s company was mentioned or involved in RJF’s interactions with the 26 community. 27 // 28 // 1 CONCLUSION 2 Consistent with the above, Valenzuela must not introduce evidence about debt or 3|| compensation Defendants allegedly owe to other persons and other alleged acts of 4|| mistreatment by Defendants. Valenzuela may introduce evidence about work relationships || between other persons and Defendants that relates to Defendants’ business, daily || operations, or industry of work, or other factors relevant to whether Valenzuela was an employee. Valenzuela may also introduce evidence about his signing of agreements on 8 || behalf of RJF and the lack of involvement or mention of his company during his work for 9|| Defendants. 10 Motion-in-limine rulings are preliminary. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 11 || 758 n.3 (2000). The Court may revise these rulings at trial as necessary, for example, if 12 || Defendants open the door to previously precluded evidence. See, e.g., United States v. 13 || Curtis, 781 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2015) (defendant opened the door to the relevance of 14]| his taxpaying behavior when he implied that his recent payments demonstrated good faith 15 || compliance). Should that occur, the parties must be prepared to present their positions on || the admissibility of such evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the four-part 17 || test set forth in Duran. See 221 F.3d at 1132-33. 18 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion in Limine || (Doc. 63) is granted in part and denied in part consistent with this Order. 20 Dated this 5th day of July, 2023. 21 22 □ 23 pote Soipe >A Honoral le Jennife ve Zfpps United States District Judge 25 26 27 28
_5-