1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 STEPHEN CHARLES VALDEZ, Case No. 24-cv-01087-TSH
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 10 SALAR NADERI, et al., IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 11 Defendants. 12(b)(6)
12 Re: Dkt. Nos. 67, 69
13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiff Stephen Charles Valdez filed a complaint against Defendants City and County of 16 San Francisco, Officer Salar Naderi, and Officer Marc Jimenez (collectively, “Defendants”), 17 alleging civil rights violations stemming from the use of excessive force during a detention. ECF 18 No. 66 (Third Amended Complaint). Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 19 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 67 (“Mot.”). The Court finds this 20 matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES the August 21, 2025, 21 hearing. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and 22 DENIES IN PART the motion.1 23 II. BACKGROUND 24 A. Factual Background 25 Valdez—who was a California resident when the events giving rise to this suit took 26 place—moved to Mount Vernon, Washington in February 2024, where he remains today. Third 27 1 Amended Complaint (“TAC”) ¶ 1. Defendant City and County of San Francisco (the “City”) is a 2 California public entity that operates the San Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”) and wields 3 authority over SFPD’s policies and practices. Id. ¶ 2. Defendants Officer Salar Naderi (“Naderi”) 4 and Officer Marc Jimenez (“Jimenez”), both California citizens, are sworn law enforcement 5 officers employed by the City as SFPD police officers. Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 8, 11. 6 Overall, Valdez alleges that Naderi and Jimenez “abruptly stopped and physically 7 assaulted [him] without cause” and under pretext, and “used excessive force to restrain [him] 8 which resulted in significant and life-altering injuries.” Id. at 2. Valdez underwent “significant 9 surgery” for these injuries and continues to live with “discomfort, pain, and limitations on his day- 10 to-day activities.” Id. 11 1. Valdez’s Allegations Of Excessive Force And Resulting Injuries 12 Valdez alleges the following in his TAC which the Court accepts as true for the purposes 13 of this Motion. On January 1, 2023, Valdez was walking down Market Street in San Francisco, 14 California, when Naderi “aggressively darted” toward Valdez to detain him—Naderi grabbed 15 Valdez’s left arm “with unnecessary force.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 15. Although Valdez had not littered, 16 Naderi told Valdez he was being detained for littering and, with the assistance of Jimenez, 17 physically pushed Valdez to a police vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. Because he was panicked by Naderi’s 18 “aggressive questioning,” Valdez gave Naderi his brother’s name when asked to identify himself. 19 Id. ¶ 17. Valdez complied with the officers’ instructions “[d]espite the officers’ unwarranted 20 hostility,” and was forced down to sit on the sidewalk ground by Naderi. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. 21 While Naderi was running a warrant search, Valdez “got up from the sidewalk ground as 22 he believed he had done nothing wrong and could not be lawfully detained.” Id. ¶¶ 20–21. When 23 Valdez attempted to leave, Jimenez grabbed Valdez. Id. ¶ 21. Naderi then grabbed Valdez by the 24 ears, dragged him to the ground, twisted his neck into an awkward position and slammed his left 25 temple into the concrete while applying his weight to Valdez’s neck and spine. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. 26 Valdez was in and out of consciousness due to the force of the blow to his head. Id. ¶ 23. Valdez 27 did not resist while on the ground, and Jimenez did not intervene in Naderi’s “use of excessive 1 the ground. Id. ¶ 27. 2 At one point, Naderi stopped exerting pressure and looked at Valdez’s neck, which was 3 “red and swollen,” then “placed [Valdez’s] hoodie back and pressed down even harder on his 4 neck.” Id. ¶ 28. Naderi repeatedly threatened to punch Valdez if he moved and continued to 5 apply pressure to Valdez’s neck while he lay on his stomach with his hands behind his back. Id. 6 ¶¶ 27–28. Valdez was not moving and was in and out of consciousness. Id. ¶ 28. Jimenez then 7 handcuffed Valdez. Id. Naderi “used a technique called positional asphyxia” which “compressed 8 [Valdez’s] respiratory airway on the concrete sidewalk, impairing his ability to breathe.” Id. ¶ 29. 9 Valdez, who was short of breath, said to Naderi, “I’m done dude, please stop.” Id. Jimenez 10 “continued to pin [Valdez] down to the ground and [Valdez] pleaded, ‘I didn’t do anything wrong, 11 you guys stopped me for no reason!’” Id. ¶ 30. 12 At least five additional patrol cars and ten police officers then arrived on scene and 13 surrounded Valdez. Id. ¶ 31. A bystander yelled, “All I see is two cops beating the shit out of a 14 guy!,” to which Naderi responded, “All I see is a loser with no life, alright get the hell out of 15 here!” Id. The officers “noticed a large gash on the left temple of [Valdez’s] head” but did not 16 immediately provide Valdez with medical attention. Id. ¶ 32. Later, one officer asked Valdez if 17 he needed an ambulance, and Valdez “replied yes because his head was in severe pain.” Id. ¶ 35. 18 An ambulance ultimately arrived on scene, and two EMTs from the San Francisco Fire 19 Department examined Valdez. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. While being examined, Valdez “felt a severe 20 burning sensation and pain and asked to go to the hospital.” Id. ¶ 40. The EMTs placed Valdez in 21 a neck brace and transported him to San Francisco General Hospital and Trauma Center (“SFGH”) 22 where medical staff determined he had sustained spinal cord injuries including spinal canal 23 stenosis. Id. ¶¶ 41–44. Valdez arrived at SFGH “approximately three hours after [Naderi and 24 Jimenez] initially stopped [Valdez].” Id. ¶ 42. 25 After arriving at SFGH, Valdez was visited by several government officials, including an 26 investigator from the San Francisco Department of Police Accountability (“SF DPA”), for an 27 interview. Id. ¶ 52. During the interview, which Valdez believes was recorded, Valdez stated he 1 [Valdez] for the attack, and promised to hold the police officers responsible for the attack 2 accountable for their actions.” Id. ¶ 53. 3 During his hospitalization, Valdez underwent multiple surgeries and procedures to treat 4 injuries to his spine, including an anterior cervical discectomy at C5–C6; bilateral foraminotomies 5 at C5–C6; interbody graft and fusion at C5–C6; and placement of anterior cervical plate. Id. ¶¶ 6 55–59. Valdez continues to suffer from numbness in both of his hands and feet and carpal tunnel 7 syndrome because of these injuries—his continuing impairments prevent him “from working full- 8 time as a welder.” Id. ¶¶ 74–77. Valdez also “continues to suffer from anxiety, depression, 9 paranoia, and post-traumatic stress caused by the attack on January 1, 2023.” Id. ¶ 78. 10 On January 9, 2023, Valdez was discharged from SFGH and taken into custody by the 11 City. Id. ¶ 60. Valdez was held in San Francisco County Jail until mid-March 2023, when he was 12 released. Id. ¶¶ 61–62. 13 2. Activities Occurring After The Alleged Incident 14 The parties agree that the following actions occurred following Valdez’s encounter with 15 Naderi and Jimenez. Valdez filed written claims against Defendant City on June 2, June 27, and 16 June 29, 2023, which were rejected by Defendant City on July 13, 2023. See Defendants’ Request 17 for Judicial Notice at 2–3 (ECF No. 35); Opp. at 9:25–10:2 (citing ECF Nos. 34-1, 34-2, 34-3, 46 18 at 5); see also ECF No. 46 at 5 (Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice). 19 Valdez alleges the following in his TAC which the Court accepts as true for the purposes 20 of this Motion. In mid-July 2023, while living in San Francisco, Valdez became employed at 21 Urban Alchemy in San Francisco. TAC ¶¶ 62, 73. Between June and December 2023, Naderi 22 “taunted and harassed” Valdez on at least five separate instances while Valdez was in San 23 Francisco. Id. ¶¶ 63–68. First, in early June 2023, Naderi, who was in a patrol car, passed Valdez 24 near the Civic Center and said to Valdez, “Valdez, I got you, I see you.” Id. ¶ 64. Second, in 25 early August 2023, Naderi, who was with five unknown police officers near UN Plaza, said to 26 Valdez, “Valdez, why don’t you leave San Francisco, nobody wants you here.” Id. ¶ 65. Third, 27 around Fall 2023, Naderi pointed Valdez out to a crowd of unknown police officers near Market 1 Davies Symphony Hall, “Look, it’s the man of the hour,” while staring at Valdez with an 2 intimidating expression. Id. ¶ 67. Finally, around December 2023, Naderi, who was in a patrol 3 car with an unknown police officer, drove past Valdez while Valdez was at Urban Alchemy for 4 work and said to Valdez, “Valdez, Valdez, Valdez,” while shaking his head. Id. ¶ 68. Valdez 5 reported this incident to the SF DPA by leaving a voicemail for the investigator there. Id. 6 Due to Naderi’s “continued harassment and threats,” Valdez “feared for his well-being and 7 safety in San Francisco.” Id. ¶ 69. Valdez refused to leave his apartment in San Francisco, left 8 only for essential purposes, and “feared for his life every time he saw a police officer.” Id. 9 Valdez was also “ostracized and humiliated by his co-workers,” and he was “eventually forced to 10 quit his job at Urban Alchemy out of safety concerns, mental anguish, and humiliation.” Id. ¶ 70. 11 Valdez feared the consequences if he filed a formal lawsuit against Naderi and Jimenez and feared 12 retaliation from his co-workers at Urban Alchemy who told him that “he would be ok” if he did 13 not file a formal lawsuit. Id. ¶¶ 70–71. In mid-February 2024, Valdez moved from San Francisco 14 to Mount Vernon, Washington because he “could no longer live with the constant fear of living in 15 San Francisco.” Id. ¶ 73. On or around the same day that he moved, Valdez filed the original 16 complaint in this case. Id., see generally Compl. 17 B. Procedural Background 18 On February 22, 2024, Valdez filed a pro se action in this Court based on federal question 19 jurisdiction. Compl. ¶ 3 (ECF No. 1). On May 1, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 20 original complaint. ECF No. 22. On May 30, 2024, Valdez filed a first amended complaint 21 (“FAC”), which superseded his original complaint, against Defendants City, Naderi, Jimenez, and 22 Does 1–10. ECF No. 29. In his FAC, Valdez alleged six causes of action: (1) excessive force in 23 violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against Defendants Naderi and 24 Jimenez pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth 25 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against Defendants Jimenez and Does pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 26 § 1983; (3) Monell claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Naderi, Jimenez, 27 and Does; (4) violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civil Code § 52.1, against Defendants City, Naderi, 1 Jimenez, and Does; and (6) battery against Defendants Naderi, Jimenez, and Does. FAC ¶¶ 23– 2 48. On September 25, 2024, the Court dismissed several claims from the FAC and granted Valdez 3 leave to amend some of the claims. ECF No. 46. Valdez then filed a second amended complaint 4 on November 25, 2024, again as a pro se litigant. ECF No. 51. 5 On December 16, 2024, the Court stayed the case and referred Valdez to the Federal Pro 6 Bono Project. ECF No. 55. On April 10, 2025, the Court appointed Valdez counsel to represent 7 him in this action. ECF No. 57. 8 On May 21, 2025, with the assistance of counsel, Valdez filed the operative Third 9 Amended Complaint (“TAC”) against Defendants City, Naderi, and Jimenez. ECF No. 66. In his 10 TAC, Valdez brings ten causes of action: (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth 11 Amendment against Defendants Naderi and Jimenez pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) failure to 12 intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Naderi and Jimenez pursuant 13 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) failure to train and supervise in violation of the Fourth Amendment 14 against Defendant City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) Monell claim for unconstitutional 15 custom or policy against Defendant City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) violation of the Bane 16 Act, Cal. Civil Code § 52.1, against Defendants City, Naderi, and Jimenez; (6) intentional 17 infliction of emotional distress against Defendants City, Naderi, and Jimenez; (7) battery against 18 Defendants City, Naderi, and Jimenez; (8) negligent hiring, training, and retention against 19 Defendant City; (9) negligence against Defendants City, Naderi, and Jimenez; and (10) false arrest 20 and false imprisonment against Defendants City, Naderi, and Jimenez. TAC ¶¶ 79–134. Valdez 21 seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. Id. ¶¶ 135–41. 22 On June 20, 2025, Defendants filed their instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 23 12(b)(6), arguing that dismissal is warranted—on all but one of Valdez’s claims—for failing to 24 state a cognizable claim. ECF No. 67 (“Mot.”). On July 21, 2025, Valdez filed an Opposition. 25 ECF No. 68 (“Opp.”). Valdez also filed a Request for Judicial Notice in support of his 26 Opposition. ECF No. 69. On August 4, 2025, Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 70 (“Reply”). 27 III. LEGAL STANDARD 1 sufficiency of a claim. A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 2 can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Cook v. 3 Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Rule 8 provides that a complaint must 4 contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 6 is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility does 7 not mean probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 8 unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must therefore provide a 9 defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. 10 at 555 (citation omitted). 11 In considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as 12 true and construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Manzarek v. 13 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 14 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 15 allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of 16 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 18 If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 19 request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 20 be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 21 banc) (cleaned up). A court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue 22 delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 23 amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . ., [and] futility of 24 amendment.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) 25 (alterations in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Courts have broader 26 discretion in denying motions for leave to amend after leave to amend has already been granted. 27 See Rich v. Shrader, 823 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen the district court has already 1 refusing leave to amend after the first amendment, and only upon gross abuse will its rulings be 2 disturbed.”) (cleaned up); Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen 3 a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent 4 motions to amend is particularly broad.”) (cleaned up). 5 IV. DISCUSSION 6 Defendants move to dismiss nine of Valdez’s claims for failing to state a cognizable claim: 7 Failure to Intervene Claim against Defendant Naderi (Claim 2); section 1983 and Monell Claims 8 against Defendant City (Claims 3–4); and all state law claims against all Defendants (Claims 5– 9 10). Mot. at 2:3–9. However, in their Reply, Defendants state that they do not seek dismissal of 10 Claim 2 against Defendant Naderi. Reply at 9:10–17. 11 In sum, the Court concludes that Valdez fails to allege cognizable claims for failure to train 12 and supervise, Monell liability, and negligent hiring, training, and retention. Therefore, dismissal 13 of Claims 3, 4, and 8 is warranted. However, the Court concludes that Valdez alleges cognizable 14 claims for failure to intervene, violation of the Bane Act, IIED, battery, negligence, and false 15 arrest and false imprisonment. Therefore, dismissal of Claims 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 is not 16 warranted. 17 A. Request For Judicial Notice 18 Valdez asks the Court to take judicial notice of four facts:
19 1. Valdez submitted a formal complaint to the San Francisco Department of Police Accountability (“SF DPA”) on February 14, 20 2023, to investigate the January 1, 2023, incident and the officers involved in the incident (the “complaint”). 21 2. The case number assigned to the complaint was 00053729-23. 22 3. Valdez was assigned investigator, Ellen Dolese, to investigate the 23 complaint.
24 4. The SF DPA issued findings for the complaint on January 14, 2025. 25 See ECF Nos. 69 (Request for Judicial Notice), 68-1 (Declaration of Chardaie C. Charlemagne), 26 68-2 (Charlemagne Decl., Ex. A (SF DPA Webpage)). Defendants do not object to the request in 27 their Reply. See generally Reply. 1 subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources 2 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Courts may consider 3 “matters of public record” in deciding a motion to dismiss. Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. 4 Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 5 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010)). 6 The Court takes judicial notice of Valdez’s complaint submitted to SF DPA on February 7 14, 2023, the case number assigned to the complaint, the investigator assigned to the complaint, 8 and that SF DPA issued findings regarding the complaint on January 14, 2025, because they are 9 matters of public record that are not subject to reasonable dispute. See Rollins v. Dignity Health, 10 338 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“because of their perceived reliability, courts have 11 often admitted records taken from websites maintained by government agencies”). 12 B. Failure To Intervene Claim Against Officer Naderi 13 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Valdez’s Failure to Intervene Claim 14 against Defendant Naderi (Claim 2) as time-barred because Valdez “makes this claim for the first 15 time in his TAC, long after the two-year statute of limitations lapsed.” Mot. at 2:10–11. Valdez 16 contends that this claim is not time-barred because it relates back to his original complaint. Opp. 17 at 1:18–19. In their Reply, Defendants “concede [the Claim] could relate back to the original 18 pleading, or other pleadings filed with [sic] the statutory period, based on liberal relation-back 19 standards.” Reply at 9:10–14. 20 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to be brought in by amendment when:
21 the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within 22 the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: 23 (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in 24 defending on the merits; and
25 (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's 26 identity. 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also id. at (c)(1)(B) (“the amendment asserts a claim or defense 1 original pleading . . .”). 2 Here, Defendants concede that Valdez’s Failure to Intervene Claim against Defendant 3 Naderi relates back to pleadings filed within the statutory period. The Court agrees and concludes 4 that this Claim is not barred by the statute of limitations because the Claim relates back under Rule 5 15. See Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014) 6 (explaining that in deciding whether the statute of limitations bars a claim, courts must “consider 7 both federal and state law and employ whichever affords the more permissive relation back 8 standard”) (cleaned up). Therefore, dismissal is not warranted. 9 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Valdez’s Failure to 10 Intervene Claim against Defendant Naderi (Claim 2). 11 C. Section 1983 Claims Against The City 12 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Valdez’s section 1983 Claims (Claims 3– 13 4) against Defendant City because they “are too threadbare and conclusory to make out a claim 14 against the City.” Mot. at 2:12–13. Valdez contends that his “failure to train Monell claims are 15 sufficiently pled.”2 Opp. at 7:8. 16 1. Failure To Train And Supervise In Violation Of Fourth Amendment 17 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Valdez’s Failure to Train and Supervise 18 Claim against Defendant City (Claim 3) because Valdez “does not plead any supervisory action or 19 supervisor to whom Section 1983 liability could attach.” Mot. at 5:17–21. Valdez does not 20 address this argument in his Opposition. See generally Opp. 21 The Civil Rights Act provides in relevant part:
23 2 At the outset, there is some ambiguity regarding Valdez’s theory of liability for Claims 3 and 4 against Defendant City. In the TAC, Valdez titled Claim 3 as failure to train and supervise in 24 violation of the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Claim 4 as a Monell claim for unconstitutional custom or policy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. TAC at 14–15. In their 25 Motion, Defendants argue in the alternative against Claim 3, as either a claim not premised on Monell liability, or one that is premised on Monell liability. Mot. at 5–7. And in his Opposition, 26 Valdez refers to Claims 3 and 4 as “his failure to train Monell claims.” Opp. at 1:12–21. Looking at the face of the TAC, the Court construes Claim 3 as one not premised on Monell liability and 27 Claim 4 as one that is premised on Monell liability. Therefore, the Court does not consider 1 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 2 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 3 or other proper proceeding for redress. 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 5 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 6 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A 7 defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under section 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or 8 her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 9 between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 10 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). 11 Here, the TAC is devoid of facts supporting supervisory action in the alleged incident 12 involving Naderi and Jimenez—this omission is fatal to Valdez’s claim. A municipality cannot be 13 vicariously liable under section 1983 for an employee’s actions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 14 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that 15 each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the 16 Constitution.”). Nor can a municipality be liable under section 1983 under a respondeat superior 17 theory. See Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021)) (“[A] 18 municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a 19 municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”) (quoting 20 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 563 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)) (emphasis original). 21 Therefore, because Valdez does not identify an individual supervisor in the TAC to whom section 22 1983 liability could attach, he fails to plead a cognizable claim, and dismissal is warranted. 23 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Valdez’s Failure to Train 24 and Supervise Claim against Defendant City (Claim 3). As Valdez does not articulate a basis for 25 supervisor liability in his Opposition, the Court DENIES Valdez leave to amend. 26 2. Monell Liability For Unconstitutional Custom Or Policy 27 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Valdez’s Monell Claim against Defendant 1 not plausibly support a theory of widespread practice or custom of excessive force for Monell 2 liability.” Mot. at 2:12–14. Valdez contends that he sufficiently alleged a Monell claim against 3 Defendant City “for failure to train its officers.” Opp. at 7:23–24 (citing TAC ¶¶ 15–16, 23–26, 4 29). 5 A municipality may face section 1983 liability if it “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of 6 rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 7 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Monell, 563 U.S. at 692). However, the municipality may be held liable 8 “only for ‘[its] own illegal acts.’” Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 9 (1986)) (emphasis in original). It cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ actions. Id. 10 (citations omitted). 11 To establish municipal liability, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official 12 municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Id. (quoting Monell, 563 U.S. at 691). “The ‘official 13 policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of 14 the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the 15 municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479–80 (emphasis in original). 16 “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its 17 policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force 18 of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). Such policy or practice must be a “moving 19 force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 20 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). An official municipal policy may be either 21 formal or informal. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 131 (1988) (acknowledging 22 that a plaintiff could show that “a municipality’s actual policies were different from the ones that 23 had been announced”). 24 In the Ninth Circuit, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 under three possible 25 theories. Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018). The first is where 26 “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 27 edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflict[ed] the injury.” Id. (quoting 1 of policy or in the failure of an official to take any remedial steps after [constitutional] violations.” 2 Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (alteration added) (cleaned up). 3 Second, “a local government can fail to train employees in a manner that amounts to 4 ‘deliberate indifference’ to a constitutional right, such that ‘the need for more or different training 5 is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that 6 the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the 7 need.’” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 802 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). 8 To allege a failure to train under Monell,
9 a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training 10 policy that amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted if 11 the municipality properly trained their employees. 12 Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1153–54. 13 Third, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 if “the individual who committed 14 the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified 15 a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 16 802–03 (quoting Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up)). 17 Here, Valdez asserts that he sufficiently alleges Monell liability against Defendant City 18 based on a failure to train theory—he does not contend in his Opposition that he alleges Monell 19 liability based on the other two theories of liability. Opp. at 7:8–9:8. The parties disagree on 20 whether Valdez can establish failure to train Monell liability through his allegations involving a 21 single incident of excessive force. Valdez argues that his alleged isolated incident of excessive 22 force falls within the exception to the general rule that a plaintiff must show a pattern of similar 23 constitutional violations by untrained employees to demonstrate deliberate indifferences for 24 purposes of failure to train. Id. at 7:23–8:18 (citing Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). Defendants respond 25 that while deliberate indifference can be inferred from a single incident, an inadequate training 26 policy itself cannot be inferred from a single incident. Reply at 2:8–11 (citing Hyde v. City of 27 Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2022)). Thus, according to Defendants, “[b]ecause 1 to train under Monell.” Id. at 2:12–13. 2 Defendants have the better argument. The Ninth Circuit explained:
3 While deliberate indifference can be inferred from a single incident when the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train are patently 4 obvious, an inadequate training policy itself cannot be inferred from a single incident. Otherwise, a plaintiff could effectively shoehorn 5 any single incident with no other facts into a failure-to-train claim against the supervisors and the municipality. 6
7 Hyde, 23 F.4th at 874–75 (cleaned up). In other words, Valdez cannot rely on a single incident of
8 excessive force to demonstrate that Defendant City had an inadequate municipal training policy, a
9 required element of his failure to train Monell claim. Id. at 875. As in Hyde, Valdez does not
10 plead facts suggesting that Defendant City had a defective training policy. Id. In Hyde, the
11 plaintiffs made only conclusory allegations regarding a failure to train and argued in their brief
12 that their claims were supported by the “events giving rise to the excessive force and inadequate
13 medical care claims.” Id. at 874. Similarly, in his Opposition, Valdez points to his excessive
14 force allegations as support for his Monell claim. Opp. at 8:18–9:8. And in the TAC, Valdez
15 makes conclusory statements about the failure to train but does not allege any facts about the
16 training received by SFPD officers. Mot. at 7:3–10 (citing TAC ¶¶ 90–93, 96); see, e.g., TAC ¶¶
17 96–97 (“Furthering this practice [to use excessive force during detentions without proper
18 justification], [Defendant City] has either failed to train its officers to not illegally seize
19 individuals or has ratified improper training on this point.”). Therefore, Valdez fails to plead a
20 cognizable failure to train claim, and dismissal is warranted. 21 Valdez’s cited cases do not compel a different conclusion. First, all the cited cases predate 22 Hyde and thus did not have the benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s guidance there. See Opp. at 8:8–17, 23 9:1–8. Second, Valdez fails to parse an inference of deliberate indifference from an inference of 24 an inadequate training policy. For example, in Dizon v. City of S. San Francisco, relied on heavily 25 by Valdez, the court held that the plaintiff need not allege a pattern of similar constitutional 26 violations to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See id. at 8:4–17; Dizon, No. 18-cv-03733-JST, 27 2018 WL 5023354, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2018). Unlike here, the plaintiff in Dizon alleged 1 WL 5023354, at *4 n.1. Therefore, Dizon does not stand for the proposition that a single incident 2 can create an inference of an inadequate training policy in the absence of facts about that training 3 policy. 4 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Valdez’s Monell Claim 5 against Defendant City (Claim 4). Because Valdez fails to cure deficiencies in his Monell claim, 6 the Court DENIES Valdez leave to amend. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 892 (explaining a court 7 “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to . . . repeated failure to cure deficiencies 8 by amendments previously allowed”). 9 D. California State Law Claims 10 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss all of Valdez’s claims under California law 11 (Claims 5–10) because (1) Valdez “fails to plead compliance with the California Government 12 Claims Act”; (2) Valdez fails to allege a cognizable claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 13 Distress (“IIED”) against Defendant Jimenez; and (3) Valdez’s Negligent Hiring, Training, and 14 Retention Claim fails as a matter of law. Mot. at 2:15–21. 15 1. Negligent Hiring, Training, And Retention Claim 16 Defendants argue that Valdez’s Negligent Hiring, Training, and Retention Claim (Claim 8) 17 fails as a matter of law because this claim cannot exist against the City as a public entity. Mot. at 18 12:10–11. Valdez does not address this claim in his Opposition nor respond to Defendants’ 19 arguments regarding this claim. See generally Opp. 20 Here, Defendants contend that “[s]ince [Valdez] fails to address Defendants’ arguments for 21 dismissal, this claim is abandoned and dismissal is appropriate.” Reply at 9:6–9. The Court 22 agrees. See Lunn v. City of Los Angeles, 629 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (“Where a 23 party fails to address arguments against a claim raised in a motion to dismiss, the claims are 24 abandoned and dismissal is appropriate.”) (citations omitted). Therefore, dismissal is warranted. 25 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Valdez’s Negligent 26 Hiring, Training, and Supervision Claim against Defendant City (Claim 8). Because Valdez has 27 abandoned his claim, the Court DENIES Valdez leave to amend. 1 2. California Government Claims Act 2 Defendants argue that none of Valdez’s state claims are cognizable because Valdez “does 3 not allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance with the Government Claims Act[.]” 4 Mot. at 11:6–8. Valdez contends that his state law claims “are sufficient under the doctrine of 5 equitable tolling and estoppel.” Opp. at 1:20–21. Defendants respond that Valdez does not “plead 6 sufficient facts to warrant equitable remedies” in his TAC. Reply at 1:7–8. 7 The California Government Claims Act “is a comprehensive statutory scheme that sets 8 forth the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.” Cordova v. 9 City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 4th 1099, 1104–05 (2015) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 810 et seq.). The 10 Government Claims Act requires plaintiffs to present “‘all claims for money or damages against 11 local public entities’ . . . to the responsible public entity before a lawsuit is filed.” City of Stockton 12 v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 734 (2007) (quoting Cal. Gov’t Code § 905). The Government 13 Claims Act also applies to claims against public employees and former public employees for acts 14 or omissions committed within the scope of their employment as public employees. Cal. Gov’t 15 Code § 950.2; see also Briggs v. Lawrence, 230 Cal. App. 3d 605, 613 (1991) (noting “what 16 amounts to a requirement that (with exceptions not relevant here) one who sues a public employee 17 on the basis of acts or omissions in the scope of the defendant’s employment have filed a claim 18 against the public-entity employer pursuant to the procedure for claims against public entities”) 19 (emphasis in original); Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 17 Cal. App. 5th 1052, 1055 20 n.1 (2017) (“The defense of noncompliance with the Government Claims Act also applies to the 21 claims against [individual defendant public employee].”). 22 A plaintiff’s complaint must “allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with this 23 claim presentation requirement[.]” State of California v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1237 24 (2004); accord Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) 25 (requiring plaintiff to “allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance” with the 26 California Tort Claims Act). 27 Here, the parties agree that Valdez did not facially comply with the Government Claims 1 Defendant City denied his claims filed against the City. Opp. at 9:25–10:6; Reply at 3:6–9. 2 Specifically, Valdez filed his original complaint forty days after January 13, 2024, the deadline to 3 file the complaint to comply with the Act. Opp. at 15:19–21; see Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6(a)(1) 4 (“[A]ny suit brought against a public entity . . . must be commenced: (1) If written notice is given 5 in accordance with Section 913, not later than six months after the date such notice is personally 6 delivered or deposited in the mail.”); ECF No. 34-4 (claim rejection notice dated July 13, 2023). 7 The dispositive issue is whether, despite Valdez’s failure to comply with section 945.6 of the Act, 8 his claims are nonetheless timely under a doctrine that tolls the statute of limitations. 9 As a threshold issue, Defendants repeatedly misstate the pleading standard for claims 10 subject to the Act—a plaintiff may either plead facts demonstrating compliance with the Act or 11 plead facts excusing compliance with the Act. State of California, 32 Cal. 4th at 1239; see, e.g., 12 Mot. at 10:20–21 (“The Court need not reach the substance of [Valdez’s] state law claims because 13 the TAC fails to plead compliance with the Government Claims Act.”). Indeed, after holding that 14 the claim presentation requirement of the Act is an element of a cause of action against a public 15 entity, the California Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of “whether plaintiff 16 had, in fact, alleged facts sufficient to excuse compliance on the ground of estoppel[.]” State of 17 California, 32 Cal. 4th at 1243, 1245. In short, Valdez is not required to explicitly reference the 18 Act or its requirements in his complaint; he is only required to “alleg[e] an appropriate excuse, 19 such as equitable estoppel.” Id. at 1245. 20 a. Equitable Estoppel 21 Valdez argues that his state law claims are “tolled by the doctrine of equitable estoppel 22 because he feared retaliation from [Naderi] if he brought suit against him and [Defendant City].” 23 Opp. at 16:4–7. Defendants respond that Valdez’s TAC “fails to plead sufficient facts to support 24 equitable estoppel.” Reply at 7:20. 25 Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “[i]t is well settled that a public entity may be 26 estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have 27 prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act.” John R. v. Oakland 1 commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim,” this is 2 not always the case—“estoppel may certainly be invoked when there are acts of violence or 3 intimidation that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also 4 Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 383 (2003) (“To create an equitable estoppel, it is 5 enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay 6 in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.”) 7 (cleaned up). Tolling under equitable estoppel applies during the period that the threats or 8 intimidation prevent a plaintiff from pursuing their claims. John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 446. 9 Here, the Court concludes that Valdez sufficiently alleges facts in the TAC demonstrating 10 circumstances excusing compliance with the Act under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Taking 11 Valdez’s allegations as true, as the Court must, Valdez establishes the following in the TAC: 12 Naderi used excessive force against Valdez, causing Valdez to suffer serious injuries; after Valdez 13 complained to the SF DPA about the excessive force incident, Naderi “taunted and harassed” 14 Valdez on at least five separate instances, spanning a six-month time period; in his capacity as an 15 SFPD police officer, Naderi harassed Valdez and visited Valdez at Valdez’s place of employment 16 while on duty; Valdez felt harassed and threatened by Naderi, feared for his life, and eventually 17 lost his job due to safety concerns; Valdez feared the consequences of filing a formal lawsuit 18 against Naderi and others; Valdez eventually moved from California to Washington because he 19 “could no longer live with the constant fear of living in San Francisco”; and Valdez did not file his 20 initial complaint until he secured residence out of state. See TAC ¶¶ 23–24, 41–44, 52–53, 63–73; 21 ECF No. 69 (Request for Judicial Notice). These facts are sufficient to plausibly allege that 22 Naderi—while acting within his scope of employment with Defendant City—intimidated Valdez 23 with the intention of preventing Valdez from bringing a formal lawsuit. See John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 24 444 (inquiring whether “the facts alleged in the complaint, if proven, might well demonstrate that 25 the claim was timely filed under a theory of equitable estoppel”). 26 Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Valdez’s allegations support the inference 27 that Naderi’s conduct “actually and reasonably induced” Valdez “to forbear suing within” the six- 1 equitable estoppel insufficiently pled where “plaintiffs have pled no facts indicating that 2 defendants' conduct directly prevented them from filing their suit on time”). Indeed, Valdez 3 alleges that he waited to file his original complaint until he left San Francisco, where he lived in 4 “constant fear.” TAC ¶¶ 71–73; Opp. at 17:12–14. Therefore, Valdez pleads facts sufficient to 5 establish that equitable estoppel tolls the statute of limitations in section 945.6 of the Act. 6 Defendants’ remaining arguments are unpersuasive. Defendants cite no authority for their 7 proposition that Naderi’s alleged “conduct does not constitute violence or intimidation intended to 8 prevent filing of a claim” as a matter of law. Reply at 7:20–23. In fact, even at the summary 9 judgment stage, courts have found that a plaintiff’s averment that she was prevented from filing a 10 timely claim on account of “her fear of retaliation from the officers due to what she perceived as 11 their threatening conduct” created a triable issue of fact where defendants asserted that the named 12 police officers never threatened plaintiff with “any harm or violence to dissuade her from filing a 13 timely claim.” McMahon v. Valenzuela, No. 14-cv-02085-CAS(AGRx), 2015 WL 5680305, at 14 *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015). A fortiori, on a motion to dismiss, Valdez’s allegations in the 15 TAC that he feared consequences of filing suit based on what he perceived as threatening and 16 harassing conduct by Naderi is enough to defeat Defendants’ request for dismissal. 17 Further, Defendants’ arguments attacking the severity of Naderi’s purported conduct and 18 the reasonableness of Valdez’s response are not appropriate at this stage. Reply at 7:20–8:3. To 19 be sure, Valdez may not be able to ultimately prove that equitable estoppel should toll the 20 limitations period—but that is a question for summary judgment, or trial, and the Court will not 21 engage in impermissible fact finding at the dismissal stage. See John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 446 (noting 22 questions of fact regarding equitable estoppel include whether threats were made and when the 23 effects of the threats ceased). Therefore, because Valdez’s TAC demonstrates that his failure to 24 comply with the Government Claims Act is excused, dismissal of his state law claims is not 25 warranted. 26 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Valdez’s Bane Act Claim 27 (Claim 5), IIED Claim (Claim 6), Battery Claim (Claim 7), Negligence Claim (Claim 9), and False 1 Valdez’s argument regarding the doctrine of equitable tolling. 2 3. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress Claim Against Officer Jimenez 3 Defendants argue that Valdez’s IIED Claim against Defendant Jimenez (Claim 6) is not 4 cognizable because “[t]here are no facts to suggest that [Jimenez] engaged in any extreme and 5 outrageous conduct with the intent of causing emotional distress, or that [Valdez] suffered from 6 emotional distress as a result of [Jimenez’s] conduct.” Mot. at 2:17–20. Valdez contends that he 7 “details numerous actions taken by [Jimenez] that satisfy each element of his IIED claim.” Opp. 8 at 18:6–7. 9 Under California law, “[a] cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 10 exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of 11 causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's 12 suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the 13 emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 14 1050 (2009) (cleaned up). “A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so extreme as to 15 exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendant's conduct 16 must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” Id. at 17 1050–51 (cleaned up). Whether “conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result 18 in liability” is a question of fact. Cross v. Bonded Adjustment Bureau, 48 Cal. App. 4th 266, 283 19 (1996). 20 Here, the Court concludes that Valdez alleges a cognizable claim for IIED against Jimenez. 21 Defendants’ contention that Valdez’s theory underlying his IIED Claim against Jimenez is 22 premised solely on “Jimenez’s involvement in handcuffing [Valdez]” is disingenuous. Reply at 23 8:16–18. Valdez alleges the following: After Naderi had slammed Valdez’s head on the concrete, 24 caused him to lose consciousness, and placed his body weight on Valdez’s neck, Jimenez 25 continued to pin and restrain Valdez’s hands. TAC ¶¶ 22–27. After Naderi compressed Valdez’s 26 airway and impaired his ability to breathe, “Jimenez continued to pin [Valdez] down to the 27 ground,” despite Valdez pleading with the officers to stop. Id. ¶¶ 28–30. Valdez had a large gash 1 cops were “beating the shit out of a guy.” Id. 9 31. Collectively, these allegations show that at the 2 very least, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Jimenez’s conduct was sufficiently extreme 3 and outrageous. Cf. Cross, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 284. It is a reasonable inference that pinning a 4 || person down who is injured and cannot breathe will likely cause that person severe emotional 5 distress. Moreover, Valdez alleges that the excessive force used against him by Naderi and 6 || Jimenez resulted in “great distress” from necessary surgery, and “extreme anxiety attacks, 7 paranoia, and depression.” TAC {ff 49, 72, 113. Therefore, Valdez pleads sufficient facts to 8 || establish an ITED claim against Jimenez. 9 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Valdez’s IED Claim 10 against Jimenez (Claim 6). 11 Vv. CONCLUSION 12 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 5 13 || Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), IT IS SO ORDERED.
a 16 Dated: August 18, 2025 TAA. 8 THOMAS S. HIXSON United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28