Valdez-Bey v. Smith

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedSeptember 23, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00208
StatusUnknown

This text of Valdez-Bey v. Smith (Valdez-Bey v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Valdez-Bey v. Smith, (W.D.N.C. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION 1:24-cv-00208-MR

PAUL VALDEZ-BEY, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ORDER ) ) DUSTIN SMITH, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ___________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, and Plaintiff’s miscellaneous filings [Docs. 4, 7]. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 6]. I. BACKGROUND Pro se Plaintiff Paul Valdez-Bey, Jr., is a pretrial detainee currently housed at the Cherokee County Detention Center (the “Jail”) in Murphy, North Carolina. He filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 12, 2024, against the following Defendants: (1) Dustin Smith, identified as the Cherokee County Sheriff; (2) Captain FNU Smith; (3) Lieutenant FNU Avero; (4) Sergeant FNU Gibbs; and (5) Sergeant FNU Flattenes.1,2 [Id. at 2-4]. Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities only. [Id.].

By way of summary, Plaintiff appears to allege that during his detention at the Jail he and other Muslim detainees have been hindered from fully practicing their Muslim religion and that he has been physically prevented

from leading religious services by placement in “the hole.” [Id. at 6-7]. Plaintiff claims violation of his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff does not allege what injury he has suffered. [Id. at 8]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief and for “people

of all colors not to be persecuted Because of they’re faith and Targeted because of they’re color and for the people who took a oath to uphold the constitutional rights of humans[.]” [Id. (errors uncorrected)].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which

1 Plaintiff has since filed an unsigned letter and an unsigned purported “Notice” with the Court seeking to correct the spelling of the last names of Defendants Flattenes and Avero. [Docs. 4, 7]. The Court will strike these improper filings. Plaintiff is strongly cautioned to carefully review the Court’s Standing Order in this case, the Local Rules of this Court, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before filing any further documents with this Court.

2 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Smith, Avero, Gibbs, and Flattenes are “Deput[ies]” employed by Defendant Sheriff Smith and the Jail. [Doc. 1 at 2-4]. relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). III. DISCUSSION To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review for several reasons.

Suits against an officer in his official capacity “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985)

(1985) (quoting Monell v Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 (1978)). The Office of Sheriff is not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional tort.”

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120-21, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1066 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036). That is, “[f]or a governmental entity to be liable under section 1983, the official policy must

be the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 366, 481 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Thus, the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.

658, 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38). Plaintiff purports to sue Defendants, who he alleges are employees of either the Jail or the Defendant Sheriff, in their official capacities only.

Plaintiff, however, fails to allege that any official policy was the moving force behind or otherwise played a part in any constitutional violation. The Court, therefore, will dismiss these claims.

Moreover, to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must affirmatively show that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of [his] rights.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir.

2018) (cleaned up); see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). In his Complaint, Plaintiff neglects to clearly allege which Defendant is responsible for which conduct. That is, Plaintiff alleges that “they” or “he” or “we” or “us” acted in certain ways or did certain things, but

he fails to clearly allege to whom these pronouns refer or he omits the subject of the sentence altogether. [See Doc. 1 at 6-7].

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Kentucky v. Graham
473 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Collins v. City of Harker Heights
503 U.S. 115 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Moore v. City of Creedmoor
481 S.E.2d 14 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1997)
Dustin Williamson v. Bryan Stirling
912 F.3d 154 (Fourth Circuit, 2018)
Aaron Ellis v. Daniel I. Werfel
86 F.4th 1032 (Fourth Circuit, 2023)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Valdez-Bey v. Smith, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/valdez-bey-v-smith-ncwd-2024.