Utilimatic, Inc. v. Brick Tp. MUA

630 A.2d 862, 267 N.J. Super. 139
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJune 18, 1993
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 630 A.2d 862 (Utilimatic, Inc. v. Brick Tp. MUA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Utilimatic, Inc. v. Brick Tp. MUA, 630 A.2d 862, 267 N.J. Super. 139 (N.J. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

267 N.J. Super. 139 (1993)
630 A.2d 862

UTILIMATIC, INC., A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF,
v.
BRICK TOWNSHIP M.U.A., DEFENDANT. UTILIMATIC, INC., A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF,
v.
LAKEWOOD TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL UTILITY AUTHORITY AND WATER SPECIALTIES, INC., DEFENDANTS.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Ocean County.

Decided June 18, 1993.

*142 Vincent P. Trovini for plaintiff (Breslin & Trovini, attorneys).

Damian G. Murray for defendant Brick Township Municipal Utilities Authority.

Norman D. Smith for defendant Lakewood Township Municipal Utilities Authority.

Craig L. Wellerson for defendant Water Specialties, Inc. (Dasti, Murphy & Wellerson, attorneys).

SERPENTELLI, A.J.S.C.

This action in lieu of prerogative writs involves a novel issue arising out of the interpretation of Section 13 of the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 to -48, and its application to alleged "lock out" or "sole source" bidding specifications.

Plaintiff, Utilimatic, Inc. ("Utilimatic"), filed a suit against defendant Brick Township Municipal Utilities Authority ("BTMUA" or "Authority") and a second action against defendant Lakewood Township Municipal Utilities Authority[1] ("LTMUA" or "Authority"), and defendant Water Specialties, Inc. ("Water Specialties") alleging in both cases a failure to award a contract for water meters to Utilimatic as the "lowest responsive bidder." The matters were consolidated by court order dated March 20, 1992.

Both the BTMUA and the LTMUA advertised for bids for the purchase of water meters. Each Authority received three bids. Utilimatic, bidding Kent brand meters, was the lowest bidder in each instance. However, each Authority rejected Utilimatic's bid as nonresponsive and awarded the contract to the second lowest bidder, Water Specialties, which bid the Sensus SR-I brand *143 meter.[2]

The BTMUA cited three reasons for rejecting the Utilimatic bid. It was alleged that Utilimatic did not satisfy the specifications concerning the "register," the "magnetic coupling," and the "measuring chamber." The LTMUA also cited the first two reasons but not the third in rejecting Utilimatic's bid. The two specifications which the BTMUA and the LTMUA relied upon in finding Utilimatic was nonresponsive contained identical language in each bid notice:

A) Register: "All reduction gearing and the generator shall be contained in a permanently hermetically sealed, tamperproof enclosure made from a corrosion resistant material and shall be secured to the upper main case by means of a locking device located in the interior of the meter so the register cannot be removed externally (emphasis added)."
B) Magnetic Coupling: "The motion of the piston shall be transmitted to the sealed register through the use of a direct magnetic drive without any intermediate magnetic coupling (emphasis added)."

The third deficiency, cited only by the BTMUA, involved the measuring chamber and was described in its specifications in part as:

"C) Measuring Chamber: `The chamber's division plate shall be stainless steel with a bonded rubber coating' (emphasis added)."

The principal issue raised by this challenge is whether the defendants' specifications are valid or, conversely, whether the defendants advertised for a "brand name" in the guise of "lock out" or "sole source" specifications. The resolution of these questions turns on the application of N.J.S.A. 40A:11-13, specifically subsections (a) and (d), and the second to last unlettered paragraph of the statute.

The opening paragraph of N.J.S.A. 40A:11-13 bespeaks a fundamental tenet underlying our bidding laws in that it requires bid specifications to be "drafted in a manner to encourage free, open *144 and competitive bidding." To ensure that goal is attained, the statute expressly prohibits certain bidding procedures:

Subsection (a) disallows any specifications which:

Require any standard, restriction, condition or limitation not directly related to the purpose, function or activity for which the purchase, contract or agreement is made....

Subsection (d) provides that specifications may not:

Require, with regard to any purchase, contract or agreement, the furnishing of any "brand name," but may in all cases require "brand name or equivalent,"....

The second paragraph of N.J.S.A. 40A:11-13(e) states:

Any specification adopted by the governing body, which knowingly excludes prospective bidders by reason of the impossibility of performance, bidding or qualification by any but one bidder, except as provided herein, shall be null and void and of no effect and subject purchase, contract or agreement shall be readvertised, and the original purchase, contract or agreement shall be set aside by the governing body.

The present statutory provisions are reflective of long established principles of common law. The purpose of the bidding laws is to protect the public by placing bidders on an equal footing and to ensure that competition will eliminate the possibility of fraud, extravagance or favoritism in the expenditure of public funds. Shakel v. North Bergen Tp., 37 N.J. 369, 378-79, 181 A.2d 473 (1962). To conform with statutory requirements, bid specifications for public contracts:

... shall be sufficiently full and explicit to notify prospective bidders of the kind and nature of the subject of the contract and set up a common standard of competition, in short, supply such information as will afford all bidders a fair and reasonable opportunity for competition and enable them to bid intelligently.
[Camden Plaza Parking, Inc. v. City of Camden, 16 N.J. 150, 159, 107 A.2d 1 (1954) (citations omitted).]

Bidders are induced to participate by the promise of impartiality which only quality specifications can insure. Greenberg v. Fornicola, 37 N.J. 1, 178 A.2d 339 (1962). Our Supreme Court in Wazen v. Atlantic City, 1 N.J. 272, 63 A.2d 255 (1949), cautioned against deviation from this well ingrained doctrine.

The rule is one which is rooted deep in sound principles of public policy by general application. It should be rigidly adhered to by the courts and not frittered away by a careless or indifferent application to specifications that are not clear, precise *145 and definite on all matters that are material to the proposals, to which bidders are invited to compete. The necessity of having a common standard and the importance of definite and precise specifications upon which to found corporate action are too apparent to require argument. [Id. at 283-84, 63 A.2d 255.]

Thus, the statutory and case law directs the court to balance the right of the bidding agency to draw detailed and exacting specifications against the potential for fraud, extravagance or favoritism in order to ensure a level playing field for all potential bidders. The law does not require that bid specifications be so general in description that every supplier of a product can bid the contract thereby depriving an agency of the type and quality of goods to which it has become accustomed.

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630 A.2d 862, 267 N.J. Super. 139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/utilimatic-inc-v-brick-tp-mua-njsuperctappdiv-1993.