USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY v. WILLIAM J. GOGAN, M.D.

238 So. 3d 937
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMarch 14, 2018
Docket16-3313
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 238 So. 3d 937 (USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY v. WILLIAM J. GOGAN, M.D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY v. WILLIAM J. GOGAN, M.D., 238 So. 3d 937 (Fla. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT

USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM J. GOGAN, M.D., a/a/o TARA RICKS, Appellee.

No. 4D16-3313

[March 14, 2018]

Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Daniel J. Kanner, Judge; L.T. Case No. COCE-10- 016026(55).

Douglas H. Stein of Association Law Group, P.L., Miami, for appellant.

Andrew A. Harris and Nichole Segal of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Barry Aronin of LaBovick Law Group, Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee.

KUNTZ, J.

We are presented with the following question, certified by the county court, to be of great public importance:

IN A PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION MATTER, IS AN INSURER REQUIRED TO APPLY THE DEDUCTIBLE TO THE TOTAL BILLED AMOUNT, OR TO THE TOTAL BILL AFTER SAID BILL IS REDUCED BY ANY APPLICABLE STATUTORY REDUCTION(S) AS CONTAINED IN FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 627.736(5)(a)(1)?

We rephrase the certified question as follows:

PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 627.736 AND 627.739, FLORIDA STATUTES (2013), IS AN INSURER REQUIRED TO APPLY A POLICY DEDUCTIBLE TO THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF A PROVIDER’S INVOICES TO AN INSURED PRIOR TO APPLYING ANY FEE SCHEDULE FOUND IN § 627.736, FLA. STAT.?

For the reasons explained in our opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Care Wellness Center, LLC a/a/o Bardon-Diaz, No. 4D16-2254 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 14, 2018), also issued today, we answer the rephrased certified question in the negative, reverse the county court’s summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. We also certify conflict with Progressive Select Insurance Co. v. Florida Hospital Medical Center a/a/o Jonathan Parent, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D318 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 9, 2018).

Reversed and remanded; conflict certified.

FORST, J., concurs. GROSS, J., dissents with opinion.

GROSS, J., dissenting.

I agree with the result reached by the Fifth District in Progressive Select Ins. Co. v. Florida Hospital Med. Ctr. a/a/o John Parent, No. 5D16-2333, 2018 WL 792012 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 9, 2018) (hereinafter Florida Hospital a/a/o Parent). Applying the plain language of the PIP statute in light of its history, leads to the conclusion that insurers cannot use the Medicare fee schedule to reduce providers’ bills to the insured before the deductible has been satisfied.

The issue in this case is whether section 627.739(2), Florida Statutes (2010), which mandates that an insured’s deductible be applied to “100 percent of the expenses and losses described in section 627.736,” allows an insurer to (1) reduce a provider’s claim to an amount allowed under a fee schedule found at section 627.736(5)(a)2., Florida Statutes (i.e., “200 percent of the applicable Medicare Part B fee schedule”) and (2) apply the insured’s unsatisfied deductible to that lower amount. 1

Under the PIP statute, medical claims following a motor vehicle accident are processed by insurers in three distinct phases: The Deductible Phase;

1 In the 2010 version of the PIP Statute, the fee schedule was set forth at subparagraph (5)(a)2. The statute was amended effective January 1, 2013, and the fee schedule is now found at subparagraph (5)(a)1. Ch. 2012-197, § 10, at 20-21, Laws. of Fla. The 2010 version of the PIP Statute applies to this case. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law are to the 2010 version of the statute.

2 the Benefits Phase; and the Post-Benefits Phase. The following chart demonstrates these phases:

Deductible Phase $250, $500, or $1,000 Benefits Phase Insured Pays until Post-Benefits Phase $10,000 deductible reached Max. Policy Limits Insurer Pays (80%) Reached Insurer applies Insured Pays co-pay Insured pays 100% deductible to: “100% of (20%) expenses & losses described in § 627.736”

The insurer seeks to use the fee schedule to reduce providers’ bills during the Deductible Phase. The provider argues, and the lower court agreed, that the insurer may use the fee schedule to reduce providers’ bills only during the Benefits Phase, or when the insurer is actually paying the provider.

1. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

“The first principle of statutory construction is that legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute.” Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla. 2000). If a statute is unambiguous, it must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Kingsway Amigo Ins. Co. v. Ocean Health, Inc., 63 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Where a statute is ambiguous and statutory construction is required, the legislative intent “is the polestar that guides” a court’s inquiry. Blish v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 736 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (Fla. 1999).

In matters requiring statutory construction, courts always seek to effectuate legislative intent. Where the words selected by the Legislature are clear and unambiguous, however, judicial interpretation is not appropriate to displace the expressed intent ... It is neither the function nor prerogative of the courts to speculate on constructions more or less reasonable, when the language itself conveys an unequivocal meaning.

3 Heredia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353, 1354-55 (Fla. 1978) (internal case citations omitted).

“Where possible, it is the duty of the courts to adopt that construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions of the same act.” Woodgate Dev. Corp. v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 351 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 1977). The Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law should be liberally construed with any ambiguity interpreted “to effectuate the legislative purpose of providing broad PIP coverage for Florida motorists.” Malu v. Security Nat. Ins. Co., 898 So. 2d 69, 74 (Fla. 2005); see generally Derius v. Allstate Indem. Co., 723 So. 2d 271, 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). However, if the Act is not vague or ambiguous, it should not be construed in such a way as to broaden coverage. Govan v. Int’l Bankers Ins. Co., 521 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 1988).

Two statutes are at issue here: section 627.739, Florida Statutes (the “Deductible Statute”) and section 627.736, Florida Statutes (the “PIP Statute”).

The Deductible Statute cross-references the PIP Statute. “[A] cross- reference to a specific statute incorporates the language of the referenced statute as it existed at the time the reference was enacted, unaffected by any subsequent amendments to or repeal of the incorporated statute.” Preface to Florida Statutes, at viii; see also Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 1969) (“the adoption of another statute by specific reference takes the second statute as it then exists, unaffected by any subsequent amendment or repeal unless a contrary intent clearly appears.”).

The Deductible Statute’s cross reference to the PIP Statute was inserted in 2003 and revived and reenacted in 2007 (effective 2008). Ch. 2007- 324, § 15, Laws of Fla.

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Related

USAA Gen. Indem. Co. v. Fla. Hosp. Med. Ctr.
259 So. 3d 1013 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2018)
Progressive Select Ins. Co. v. Florida Hospital Medical
249 So. 3d 779 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2018)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
238 So. 3d 937, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/usaa-general-indemnity-company-v-william-j-gogan-md-fladistctapp-2018.