IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 92-3564 _____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WALTER RICHARD, LESBURN LLOYD DA COSTA, and HEADLEY WEIR,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana _______________________________________________________ (June 22, 1993)
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, WILLIAMS, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
The government brings this interlocutory appeal of the
district court's pretrial order to suppress evidence discovered in
two motel rooms. The district court found that customs agents had
violated the Fourth Amendment when they made a warrantless entry
and search of a room at the Superdome Motor Inn in New Orleans,
Louisiana. The district court also concluded that any consent
given to search a room at the nearby Economy Motor Lodge was not
voluntary. As a result, the district court suppressed most of the
evidence discovered during the two searches. After reviewing the
1 record, we affirm the suppression of evidence found in the
Superdome Motor Inn and reverse the suppression of evidence from
the Economy Motor Lodge.
I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
In January 1992, federal customs agent Robert Mensinger
obtained information that the M/V HAVORN would arrive in Gramercy,
Louisiana, with drugs attached to the hull. Mensinger and agent
Barry Wood drove to Gramercy on January 31, 1992, and set up
surveillance near where the HAVORN had docked. During the night,
the agents discovered a van parked in the area and noticed that it
contained, among other things, space for cargo, a diving tank, and
a VHF marine radio. At 6:00 a.m., the agents saw a man run from
the levee to the van and begin to drive away, but the agents
stopped the van. Defendant Walter Richard emerged, wearing a
diving suit.
The agents questioned Richard and searched the van, in which
they found a card in the name of Dani Gonzalez and a beeper with
the number locked in for the Superdome Motor Inn in New Orleans.
For more than three years the agents had suspected Gonzalez of
involvement in marihuana smuggling. Richard then admitted that he
had been diving with two others, one of whom was called Johnny, and
that Johnny was staying in Room 214 of the Superdome Motor Inn.
While Wood arrested Richard, Mensinger called for local help to
search the area for the other two men. Mensinger also requested by
2 radio that other agents meet him at the Superdome Motor Inn.
Mensinger searched the ship area for one and a half hours. Then,
he left Gramercy at 8:00 a.m. and reached the motel by
approximately 9:00 a.m.
The agents first spoke with the Superdome Motor Inn's clerks,
who confirmed that two men from Barbados were registered to stay in
Room 214 and that the men had been making and receiving numerous
telephone calls. The agents knocked on the door of Room 214 and
announced that they were police officers. The agents contend that,
although the occupants responded “Okay. Okay. Wait a minute,” the
door did not open immediately. The agents then say they heard
people talking softly, doors or drawers slamming, and footsteps
moving about. As they saw the doorknob turn, the agents kicked in
the door and entered the room.
One agent immediately handcuffed defendant-appellee Headley
Weir and patted him down for weapons. A patdown of defendant-
appellee Lesburn Lloyd Da Costa revealed a .45 caliber pistol and
a key to Room 241 of the Economy Motor Lodge. After arresting the
men, agents learned that both knew Dani Gonzalez, who had been
staying in the room with Weir. Da Costa claimed that he was
staying at the Economy Motor Lodge, but had fallen asleep in Room
214 while waiting for Gonzalez. A further search of the room
turned up a ledger and two address books marked as Gonzalez's.
3 Agents maintain that Da Costa then gave them permission to
search his room at the Economy Motor Lodge, an assertion that Da
Costa denies. Agents Sidney Roberts and Eileen Escoto went to Da
Costa's room, which was occupied by Susan Collymore. After the
agents informed Collymore that Da Costa had given consent to search
the room, she admitted them, stating, “Well, I don't have anything
to do with it. Search the room. Search anything you want. I
don't have any part of this. I'm just here with my boy friend.”
The search produced four empty new suitcases, a box of trash bags,
and three boxes of dryer sheets.
Richard, Weir, and Da Costa were indicted for conspiracy to
possess marihuana with intent to distribute, conspiracy to import
marihuana, and carrying firearms during drug trafficking
activities. Da Costa was also charged with being a felon in
possession of a weapon. Before trial, the defendant-appellees
filed motions to suppress evidence. The district court denied
Richard's motion and refused Da Costa's request to suppress
evidence found in Room 214 of the Superdome Motor Inn.
Nevertheless, it granted Weir's motion to suppress the evidence
found in Room 214 of the Superdome Motor Inn and Da Costa's motion
to suppress evidence discovered in Room 241 of the Economy Motor
Lodge. The government has timely appealed.
4 II. DISCUSSION
We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party when we review the granting of a motion to
suppress. The district court's factual findings are accepted
unless they are clearly erroneous. Questions of law are considered
de novo. United States v. Capote-Capote, 946 F.2d 1100, 1102 (5th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Rodriguez v. United States, ---
U.S. ---, 112 S.Ct. 2278, 119 L.Ed.2d 204 (1992).
A. Entry and Search at the Superdome Motor Inn
The Fourth Amendment protects people in their homes from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment requires
probable cause to obtain a warrant either to arrest a suspect in
his home or to search the home. This Fourth Amendment protection
is extended to guests staying in hotel rooms. Stoner v. State of
Cal., 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964).
Warrantless searches and seizures inside someone's home are
presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or exigent
circumstances exist to justify the intrusion. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 1382, 63 L.Ed.2d 639
(1980). Thus, if agents have no warrant and no consent, even if
they have probable cause and statutory authority to arrest a
suspect, they must also have exigent circumstances to enter.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327-28, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1154, 94
L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (“A dwelling-place search, no less than a
dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause . . . .”). Because
5 consent was not an issue in the entry of Room 214, we focus on the
presence of exigent circumstances.
Exigent circumstances include hot pursuit of a suspected
felon, the possibility that evidence may be removed or destroyed,
and danger to the lives of officers or others. Capote-Capote, 946
F.2d at 1103. A district court may consider several relevant
factors when determining whether exigent circumstances exist.
These factors include:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant;
(2) [the] reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be removed;
(3) the possibility of danger to the police officers guarding the site of the contraband while a search warrant is sought;
(4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police are on their trail; and
(5) the ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowledge “that efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are characteristic behavior of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic.”
United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 948 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citing United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 833, 94 S.Ct. 173, 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973)). Exigent
circumstances, however, do not pass Fourth Amendment muster if the
officers deliberately create them. United States v. Webster, 750
F.2d 307, 327 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106, 105
S.Ct. 2340, 85 L.Ed.2d 855 (1985).
6 The district court found that exigent circumstances arose when
the agents knocked at Room 214's door. The court, however, also
found that the agents had manufactured the exigencies by knocking
on the door and announcing that they were police officers. The
government argues on appeal that the court clearly erred in its
finding that the exigencies were contrived. The presence of
exigent circumstances is a finding of fact, so the inquiry is
whether the finding was clearly erroneous. United States v.
Vasquez, 953 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gomez
v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 112 S.Ct. 2288, 119 L.Ed.2d 212
(1992).
The agents concede that the reason they went to the motel room
was to try to locate Dani Gonzalez. They had only a reasonable
suspicion that Dani Gonzalez was in Room 214. Consequently, they
did not seem to have considered a warrant a possibility. The
agents testifying at the suppression hearing told the court that
they were conducting an “investigative stop” to determine
Gonzalez's whereabouts. The supervisor stated that the agents
intended to enter the room one way or another to further that
investigation. Because the officers thought they had only
reasonable suspicion and not probable cause, there was no
justification for either a warrant or a warrantless search. The
agents' own testimony belies the government's original argument
that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry.
7 Nevertheless, the district court concluded that probable cause
for a search warrant existed. The government concedes the finding
on appeal. There is no question that agents conducting an ongoing
investigation do not need to obtain a warrant at the first
opportunity. Thompson, 700 F.2d at 949. If exigencies arise
before agents can obtain a warrant, they can justifiably act.
After reviewing the record, however, we find that the district
court did not clearly err when it found that the agents had created
the exigencies.
In considering claims of manufactured exigency, we
“distinguish between cases where exigent circumstances arise
naturally during a delay in obtaining a warrant and those where
officers have deliberately created the exigent circumstances.”
Webster, 750 F.2d at 327. In United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d
79, 87-88 (5th Cir. 1983), we held that exigent circumstances arose
naturally when the transmitter worn by a confidential informant
participating in a drug buy suddenly failed. Concern for the
confidential informant's safety justified the warrantless entry.
On the other hand, we held a warrantless entry to be illegal
because of manufactured exigency in United States v. Scheffer, 463
F.2d 567, 574-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Stretcher v.
United States, 409 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 324, 34 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972).
In Scheffer, co-defendants who had already been arrested were
helping agents to catch other members of a drug conspiracy. Agents
sent the cooperating defendants into a residence to consummate a
8 drug deal and then made a warrantless entry to arrest the
residents. We refused to accept the government's argument that the
agents lacked the time to obtain a warrant, because the agents
controlled the timing of the drug buy.
The exigencies claimed by the government are the possibility
of destruction of evidence and danger to the officers. To support
its argument, the government relies on United States v. MacDonald,
916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---,
111 S.Ct. 1071, 112 L.Ed.2d 1177 (1991). MacDonald is inapposite,
however. In that case an undercover officer had entered an
apartment and actually bought drugs. He then left to inform other
agents of the drug buy, and ten minutes later the officers knocked
and announced their presence. Agents watching the rear of the
apartment radioed to the front that the occupants were trying to
escape through the back door, so the officers at the front door
broke in. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted first that
exigent circumstances had existed before the officers knocked, and
second that the occupants responded to a lawful knock with an
escape attempt, further justifying the entry. Id. at 771.
In this case, however, exigent circumstances did not arise
until the agents announced themselves. The record indicates that
the agents did not know what, if any, evidence Room 214 might
contain. They were looking for Dani Gonzalez. Their primary fear,
they urge then, became that the room's occupants were “setting them
9 up” when the door did not immediately open. Agents were also
posted behind the room, and the occupants did not attempt to flee
when the officers announced their presence.
Defendants rely on United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295
(5th Cir. 1986). In that case, officers responding to several tips
had placed a residence under surveillance. After noticing some
marihuana in plain view through a window, the officers knocked at
the patio door. One of the occupants motioned through the door
that he had to get a key. Fearing that he was in fact going to get
a gun, the officers broke through the door and arrested the
occupants. We held that there was no justification for approaching
the suspects without a warrant because the police surveillance was
undetected. Consequently the officers could have secured the
“condominium covertly from the outside” and delayed their entry
until they obtained a warrant. Instead, the warrantless entry
became a foregone conclusion once officers knocked. Id. at 298.
The agents had secured Room 214 from the outside, successfully
and covertly. The government nevertheless attempts to distinguish
Munoz-Guerra by suggesting that Weir and Da Costa had reason to
know of the police surveillance. The government urges that Weir
and Da Costa could have suspected problems when Richard did not
return from Gramercy or that they could have been tipped off by one
of the numerous phone calls they received. These conclusions are
pure speculation. No evidence was offered at the suppression
10 hearing to suggest that the room's occupants knew about Richard's
arrest, that they were aware they were being watched, or that they
were destroying evidence.
The government also asserts that the agents had no time to
obtain a warrant. It argues that Agent Mensinger was busy
searching the dock area for Gonzalez and then returning to New
Orleans. But Mensinger was in radio contact with other officers
beginning at approximately 6:30 a.m., and he could have initiated
the procurement of a warrant telephonically at least an hour before
he departed Gramercy to drive the hour to New Orleans.
Additionally, after reaching the Superdome Motor Inn, the officers
could have maintained their surveillance until a warrant arrived.
If exigent circumstances had arisen while waiting for the warrant,
then the agents would have been justified in entering. United
States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325
(1974)).
The government argues that the agents were acting in the midst
of a rapidly developing investigation and had to enter Room 214 to
prevent the destruction of valuable evidence. No evidence was
presented to justify these assertions either. We conclude that the
district court did not err when it found that the agents had
created exigent circumstances by knocking on the door of Room 214
and identifying themselves.
11 B. Consent at the Economy Motor Lodge
The government also appeals the district court's suppression
of evidence uncovered in the search of Da Costa's Room 241 at the
Economy Motor Lodge. The district court found first that Da
Costa's consent to search Room 241 was involuntary because of the
coercive police procedures he had endured, and the government does
not challenge that initial finding. The court found next that the
consent of Da Costa's girlfriend, Collymore, was involuntary for
two reasons: she had no interest in the items seized in the
search, and she consented only because the agents told her Da Costa
had. The government contends that the district court erred here
because Collymore's consent was voluntary and cured any taint
arising from Da Costa's involuntary consent.
The first question is whether Collymore had the authority to
consent to the search of Room 241. The district court concluded
that she did not because she had no interest in the items found in
the room. This finding was clearly erroneous because it was
irrelevant once it was decided Collymore was a co-tenant. A third
party can consent to a search if she has “common authority” over
the premises. “Common authority” has been defined as the “mutual
use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993 n. 7, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974);
United States v. Rizk, 842 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir. 1988). In such
a situation, “the complaining co-user [has] assumed the risk that
12 the consenting co-user might permit the search.” Rizk, 842 F.2d at
112-13. Unless the complaining co-tenant has somehow limited the
other's access to a piece of property, the consenting co-tenant's
authority extends to all items on the premises. For example, in
Rizk, the owner of a briefcase asked Rizk to carry it, but locked
it and did not give Rizk the combination. The owner could consent
to a search of briefcase, but Rizk could not.
The evidence shows that Collymore had the authority to consent
to a search of Room 241 and that her authority extended to the
items seized. Both Da Costa and Collymore had been staying in Room
241 for several days. Both had clothes and personal items in the
room. No evidence was proffered to suggest that Da Costa had
limited Collymore's access to the empty suitcases, trash bags, and
dryer sheets. See United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1084-85
(5th Cir. 1991). The district court thus erred in finding that
Collymore's consent was defective because she had no interest in
the items found in the room.
The second and more difficult question is whether Collymore's
consent was valid. A search may be conducted without either
probable cause or a warrant if it is conducted pursuant to consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043-
44, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). For consent to be valid, however, the
government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
consent was given freely and voluntarily. United States v. Kelley,
13 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3788
(U.S. May 24, 1993). If the consent to search was preceded by a
Fourth Amendment violation, the government bears a heavier burden
of proof. United States v. Ruigomez, 702 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir.
1983).
Because we accept the district court's finding that Da Costa's
consent was involuntary, the analysis of Collymore's consent breaks
down into two steps. First, we consider whether her consent was
given voluntarily and freely. Second, we examine whether the taint
from Da Costa's involuntary consent was dissipated. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d
416 (1975); United States v. Pierre, 932 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1991),
reversed on other grounds, 958 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Harris v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 113
S.Ct. 280, 121 L.Ed.2d 207 (1992).
We consider six factors in evaluating the voluntariness of
consent:
(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.
Kelley, 981 F.2d at 1470; see also United States v. Tedford, 875
F.2d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1989) and Ruigomez, 702 F.2d at 64.
Although all six factors are relevant, no single one is
14 dispositive. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62;
Kelley, 981 F.2d at 1470.
Agent Roberts, who went to the Economy Motor Lodge, recounted
the consent and search:
So we went up and [the hotel manager] knocked on the door. A female voice answered from the inside. I told her that we were U.S. Customs, we need to talk to her. She opened her door. And I told her that we had permission to search the room. She said “Fine. What's going on?” And I explained to her that we were conducting an investigation. She said, “Well, I don't have anything to do with it. Search the room. Search anything you want. I don't have any part of this. I'm just here with my boyfriend.”
. . .
[Agent] Escoto and I searched the room. We found four brand new suitcases, we found, had never been used, we found one -- or trash bag, box of trash bags. I asked her, Susan, what the trash bags were for. She said she didn't know, that they were for her boyfriend. And I found three dryer -- boxes of dryer sheets, and I questioned her about the dryer sheets. She said she had no idea what they were for, they are for her boyfriend.
Collymore was not in custody when she consented to the search.
The testimony indicates that she was cooperative and that she did
not think any evidence would be found that would incriminate her.
When the agents questioned her about the trash bags and dryer
sheets, she responded that she did not know what they were for.
Although the testimony suggests that Collymore is of at least
average intelligence, there was no evidence concerning her
education. The agents did not tell her she had the right to refuse
consent, as they had no need to do since they believed they had Da
15 Costa's consent. The lack of such awareness, however, is not fatal
to a finding of voluntariness. United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894
F.2d 1430, 1440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct.
1957, 109 L.Ed.2d 319 (1990).
Da Costa argues, however, that the agents used coercive police
procedures because they obtained Collymore's consent after telling
her that they had Da Costa's permission. Consent is invalid if it
is coerced, either explicitly or implicitly. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973). Coercion is clearly a factor if consent is “granted only
in submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Id. at 233, 93
S.Ct. at 2051 (emphasis added); United States v. Gomez-Diaz, 712
F.2d 949, 951 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1051, 104
S.Ct. 731, 79 L.Ed.2d 191 (1984).
At the same time, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.” Florida v. Jimeno, --- U.S. ---, 111 S.Ct. 1801,
1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). The Fourth Amendment protects
against unreasonable searches, not against incorrect ones. The
Supreme Court has recognized that warrants issued on “seemingly
reliable but factually inaccurate information” pass Fourth
Amendment muster. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-86, 110
S.Ct. 2793, 2799-2800, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).
16 Defendant Da Costa relies on Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). In Bumper, the
defendant successfully obtained suppression as evidence of a rifle
found in a search of his home. Police had approached the home
where the defendant lived with his grandmother. The officers told
the grandmother that they had a search warrant, and she invited
them to search the house although she never saw the warrant. The
Supreme Court refused to allow the officers to rely on her consent
instead of the warrant, later challenged as defective, in the
absence of any other evidence of voluntariness. Id. at 548-50, 88
S.Ct. at 1792. Bumper, however, is not controlling authority in
the instant case.
Agents Escoto and Roberts both testified that they were given
the key to Room 241 and told that Da Costa had consented to a
search. Although the district court found Da Costa's consent to be
invalid as a matter of law, Escoto and Roberts were not present
when Da Costa allegedly gave his permission. At the time both
agents reasonably believed that they had consent to search Room
241. They did not represent to Collymore that they had a warrant,
as did the officers in Bumper. And Collymore did not simply
acquiesce quietly and open the door. After hearing of Da Costa's
consent, she first asked for an explanation before admitting the
agents and inviting them to search the room. The totality of the
circumstances compels us to conclude that Collymore's consent was
voluntary.
17 The inquiry does not end there, however. Collymore's
voluntary consent did not necessarily dissipate the taint of Da
Costa's involuntary consent. We apply the three factors set out in
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). We consider “(1) the temporal proximity of
[the Fourth Amendment violation] and consent, (2) intervening
circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.” United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1471 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. May 24, 1993). There
was a short passage of time between the involuntary consent and
Collymore's consent. Da Costa was arrested and allegedly gave his
permission to search at approximately 9:30 a.m. The agents
testified that they arrived at the Economy Motor Lodge at about
10:00 a.m. Additionally, the two events occurred in different
places, and Collymore was not present when the agents entered Room
214 and arrested Weir and Da Costa.
Several factors constituted intervening circumstances. Not
only did the two conversations occur in different places, but they
also occurred with different people in a different atmosphere. For
example, consent did not cure the taint of an improper detention
when agents stopped a traveler in an airport, involuntarily
confined him in a small room without probable cause, and obtained
his consent to search his luggage. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality). The agents in
Royer had requested consent from the detainee during an illegal
18 detention. In this case, agents requested consent from Da Costa's
co-tenant, after obtaining his invalid consent in a different
location. The atmosphere was also more conducive to an act of free
will. In United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1013
(10th Cir. 1992), a woman was present when her husband was
arrested. Nevertheless, after a short time had passed and all had
calmed down, the wife offered to allow the officers to search the
residence. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Brown
factors and held that the woman's valid consent had cured the taint
of the illegal arrest. The change in atmosphere is more compelling
in this case. Collymore did not witness Da Costa's arrest, and she
was approached by only two agents.
Finally, there is little evidence of flagrant official
misconduct. The agents reasonably believed they had Da Costa's
consent. The evidence shows that they approached Collymore
truthfully and respectfully. They did not intentionally mislead
her in any way. The agents did not barge into Room 241, waving
their claim of lawful authority. Instead they answered her
questions until she was satisfied and allowed them to enter.
After applying the Brown factors and reviewing the evidence,
we hold that Collymore's voluntary consent dissipated taint of the
coercive entry that exacted invalid consent from Da Costa. The
district court failed to apply the full Brown analysis and erred in
finding that Collymore's consent was involuntary. We must reverse
19 the suppression of evidence discovered in the search of Room 241 of
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that the agents had created their own exigent circumstances when
they knocked at the door of Room 214 of the Superdome Motor Inn.
We affirm the suppression of evidence discovered in the search of
that room. We hold, however, that the district court did err in
finding that Collymore's consent was involuntary, and we reverse
the suppression of evidence found in Room 241 of the Economy Motor
Lodge.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.