US v. Fields

2017 DNH 207

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 22, 2017
• Docket: 14-cr-074-LM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 14-cr-074-01-LM Opinion No. 2017 DNH 207 Joshua Fields

O R D E R

On December 1, 2016, the court issued an amended judgment

for defendant Joshua Fields on his conviction for possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Fields

has since appealed his sentence. The amended judgment included

an order requiring the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to “destroy any

and all copies of Mr. Fields’s original [Presentence Report

(“PSR”)] within its possession and reclassify Mr. Fields based

on the new PSR and without reference to any portion of the

original PSR.” Doc. no. 31-1 at 2-3. The order was intended to

correct Fields’s erroneous classification as a sex offender,

which the BOP had imposed as a result of an error in the

original PSR.

Fields has now filed a motion for contempt against the BOP,

alleging that the BOP has continued to use his original PSR and

has retained his sex offender classification. The government

objects. For the following reasons, Fields’s motion is denied.1

1 To the extent that Fields’s motion includes a request for a hearing on the matter, see doc. no. 42 at 2, the court denies The government argues that the motion should be denied for

three reasons: (1) the court does not have jurisdiction over the

case as a result of Fields’s appeal; (2) the proper vehicle for

Fields’s complaint is 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and (3) Fields’s claim

lacks merit. See doc. no. 45 at 1-2. Although the court is not

persuaded by the government’s first two arguments, it agrees

that Fields has not carried his burden on the merits.

Generally, “the filing of a notice of appeal divests the

district court of jurisdiction over matters related to the

appeal.” Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 368 F.3d 49, 58 (1st

Cir. 2004). “But that principle has no bearing on a court's

power to hold a party in contempt for violating a court order

related to execution on a judgment.” Id.; see also United

States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that a

district court may “act in aid of execution of a judgment that

has been appealed but not stayed”). Therefore, the court

retains jurisdiction to enforce its order while the appeal is

pending.

his request. Fields does not suggest that he will provide additional evidence to the court. See Hawkins v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. For N.H., Comm’r, 665 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Where the moving party fails to indicate that it possesses new material evidence that it wishes to present to the court, an evidentiary hearing is not required.”).

2 Nor has the government shown that Fields was required to

bring his complaint through a separate action under 28 U.S.C. §

2241. Although an individual may seek relief “from the manner

of execution of a sentence” by way of a § 2241 action, Muniz v.

Sabol, 517 F.3d 29, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2008), the government cites

no authority for the proposition that the alleged violation of a

court order must be litigated through such an action simply

because it relates to a defendant’s conditions of confinement.

Rather, this court has the “inherent power to enforce

compliance with [its] lawful orders through civil contempt,”

Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966), and it

may invoke that power to “protect the due and orderly

administration of justice and . . . maintain the authority and

dignity of the court,” Goya Foods, Inc. v. Wallack Mgmt. Co.,

290 F.3d 63, 78 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal brackets omitted).

Thus, the court may properly consider Fields’s motion and, if

necessary, enforce compliance with its prior order through its

civil contempt power. See Agtuca v. Reed, No. CV-86-331-RHW,

2006 WL 2009050, at *2 (E.D. Wash. July 17, 2006) (declining to

classify motion for contempt as one seeking habeas relief,

because “[p]etitioner is not seeking relief from an alleged

infringement of his constitutional rights; he is merely seeking

enforcement of an order issued by the Court”).

3 Nevertheless, on the merits, the court cannot conclude that

Fields has satisfied his burden of establishing that the BOP

violated the order. “A district court may issue a civil

contempt order if the moving party establishes by clear and

convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor violated the

order despite clear and unambiguous notice of the order and the

ability to comply with it.” AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG,

780 F.3d 420, 426 (1st Cir. 2015).

The government has provided two BOP forms showing Fields’s

classification—one based on the original PSR and one compiled

after the court issued its amended judgment and order. The

former displays a sex offender classification, while the latter

does not. Compare doc. no. 45-1, with doc. no. 45-2. This is

strong evidence that the BOP has complied with the court’s order

and reclassified Fields based on the new PSR.

By comparison, Fields offers the following evidence to

support his motion: (1) a sentence monitoring computation form,

which shows his new sentence but still references his now-

vacated sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924; (2) an

email exchange between Fields and the BOP regarding the

calculation of his sentence; (3) the results of a FOIA request

pertaining to his sex offender classification; and (4) an inmate

profile form that he apparently obtained from his FOIA request,

4 which contains redactions of information compiled for law

enforcement purposes which could reasonably be expected to

endanger the life or physical safety of any individual, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(F). See doc. nos. 42-2, 42-3, 42-4, 42-5. Unlike

the express references in the government’s exhibits, none of

this evidence explicitly shows that the BOP is continuing to

classify Fields as a sex offender. Even if it provides some

circumstantial evidence supporting Fields’s claim, in light of

the evidence proffered by the government, the court cannot

conclude that Fields has demonstrated a violation of the court’s

order by clear and convincing evidence. See AngioDynamics,

Inc., 780 F.3d at 426.

Accordingly, the motion for contempt (doc. no. 42) is

denied.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge

September 22, 2017

cc: Seth R. Aframe, Esq. John J. Farley, Esq. Thomas F. McCue, Esq. U.S. Probation U.S. Marshal