U.S. Bank National Association, Etc. v. Abraham S. Heyman, Etc.
This text of U.S. Bank National Association, Etc. v. Abraham S. Heyman, Etc. (U.S. Bank National Association, Etc. v. Abraham S. Heyman, Etc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0042-23
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR CMALT REMIC SERIES 2006-A7-REMIC PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-A7,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ABRAHAM S. HEYMAN and GEULA HEYMAN,
Defendants-Appellants/ Third-Party Plaintiffs,
CENLAR, FSB,
Third-Party Defendant/ Respondent. __________________________
Submitted March 31, 2025 – Decided August 25, 2025
Before Judges Gummer and Berdote Byrne. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Passaic County, Docket No. F-020244-19.
Abraham S. Heyman and Geula Heyman, appellants pro se.
Pluese, Becker & Saltzman, LLC, attorneys for respondents (Stuart H. West, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Challenging the final judgment entered against them and other previously-
issued orders, defendants Abraham S. Heyman and Geula Heyman contend,
among other things, this foreclosure case was barred by the statute of limitations,
other preclusionary doctrines, and plaintiff's alleged lack of standing. Because
defendants' arguments are legally without merit, we affirm.
The record reveals defendant Abraham S. Heyman borrowed $435,000
from GFI Mortgage Bankers in 2006 and executed in GFI's favor a note that
required monthly payments. At the same time, defendants executed a mortgage
to secure the note's repayment. The mortgage immediately was assigned to
CitiMortgage. It ultimately was assigned to plaintiff in 2014. The mortgage
and assignments were duly executed and recorded. Despite a loan modification
executed by defendants that reduced the monthly payment, defendants failed to
make a scheduled October 2013 payment and all later monthly payments.
A-0042-23 2 Plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action in December 2019. The
parties eventually cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted
plaintiff's motion and denied defendants' motion in October 7, 2022 orders. It
denied defendants' reconsideration motion in a November 4, 2022 order. The
court granted plaintiff's subsequent motion for final judgment on August 25,
2023. Defendants appeal from those orders and judgment.
On appeal, defendants contend the trial court erred by not finding the case
time-barred under N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a), N.J.S.A. 12A:3-118(a), or N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1. This case involves a residential mortgage foreclosure. Thus, neither
N.J.S.A. 12A:3-118(a), which addresses commercial transactions, nor N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1, which addresses trespass and other tortious injuries to real and
personal property, applies. N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1 is the statute that addresses
residential foreclosures. See Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas as Tr. for
Residential Accredit Loans, Inc. v. Weiner, 456 N.J. Super. 546, 547-49 (App.
Div. 2018) (describing the history of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1 and applying it to a
residential mortgage foreclosure).
The statute of limitations in effect when defendants executed the mortgage
was twenty years. Id. at 547; see also Chepovetsky v. Civello, 472 N.J. Super.
631, 654 n.8 (App. Div. 2022), certif. denied, 259 N.J. 366 (2024). In 2009, the
A-0042-23 3 Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1, declaring a residential foreclosure
action could not be commenced after the earliest of:
• Six years from "the date fixed for the making of the last payment or the maturity date set forth in the mortgage or the note," N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a);
• Thirty-six years from the date the mortgage was recorded or, if not recorded, from the date of execution, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(b); and
• Twenty years from the date of a default that "has not been cured," N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(c).
[Weiner, 456 N.J. Super. at 547 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1 (2009)) (footnote omitted).]
In 2019, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1, changing the
timeframe in subsection (c) from twenty years to six years. L. 2019, c. 67, § 1.
Defendants rely on the amended version of the statute. However, in enacting
the amendment, the Legislature expressly provided the amendment would be
effective on April 29, 2019, and would "apply to residential mortgages executed
on or after the effective date." L. 2019, c. 67, § 2; see Maia v. IEW Constr.
Grp., 257 N.J. 330, 350 (2024) (when determining whether a statute applies
retroactively, courts consider whether the Legislature "explicitly or implicitly
expresse[d] an intent" as to retroactivity). Defendants executed the mortgage at
A-0042-23 4 issue in this case in 2006, well before the effective date of the amendment.
Consequently, the 2019 amended version of the statute does not apply.
The three events described in the original version of the statute were
scheduled to occur in 2042 (six years after the 2036 maturity date), 2042 (thirty-
six years after the recording of the mortgage), and 2033 (twenty years from
defendants' uncured default). Thus, this lawsuit is not time-barred under either
the timeframes set forth in the original version of the statute or the statute of
limitations recognized by courts before the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1.
See Weiner, 456 N.J. Super. at 549 n.5 (court assumes original version of
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1 applied in foreclosure case involving a 2005 mortgage but
acknowledges result would be the same if "the pre-statute twenty-year time-bar"
applied).
Defendants contend the trial court erred in not finding this lawsuit was
barred by various preclusionary doctrines, including the entire controversy
doctrine, collateral estoppel, and res judicata. Defendants base that argument
on a lawsuit they filed in the United States District Court in 2014: Heyman v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 14-1680-KM-MAH. Defendants did not include in their
appellate appendix a copy of the complaint or amended complaint they filed in
that matter. In its decision granting Citi's summary-judgment motion, the
A-0042-23 5 District Court described the case as defendants "essentially alleg[ing] that Citi
'misled' them into a loan modification under [the Home Affordable Modification
Plan (HAMP)] and offered a modification that 'did not comply or conform with
HAMP guidelines and material promises made by [Citi.]'" Heyman v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 14-1680-KM-MAH, 2019 WL 2642655, *15 (D.N.J.
June 27, 2019) (last alteration in original). On that record, we see no basis to
conclude the court misapplied the law or abused its discretion in finding the
preclusionary doctrines cited by defendants did not bar this foreclosure action.
See Francavilla v. Absolute Resols. VI, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 171, 178 (App.
Div. 2024) (applying de novo review to questions of law regarding preclusionary
doctrine and abuse-of-discretion standard to equitable considerations in whether
to apply the doctrine); see also id. at 178-79 (describing scope of the entire
controversy doctrine); Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168,
172-73 (App. Div. 2000) (identifying what a party must show to demonstrate
collateral estoppel and res judicata).
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