Urquhart v. Goddard

Opinion

1!: 59

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM

JUANITA M. URQUHART, Superior Court Case No. CV0905-15 Plaintiff, vs. DECISION AND ORDER re JOHN GODDARD, MOTIONS FOR Defendant. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROBERT SALAS, Intervenor-Defendant.

The Court here considers separate motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff

Juanita M. Urquhart and Intervenor-Defendant Robert Salas. 1 Having evaluated the applicable

law, the record, and the parties' arguments, the Court DENIES Salas' Motion for Summary

Judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when the applicable statute of

limitations began to run. Moreover, the Court DENIES Urquhart's Motion for Summary

Judgment, but finds no controversy as to the validity of the purported deed.

I. ISSUES PRESENTED

The Court considers the following issues:

As presented in Salas' Motion for Summary Judgment:

1. Is Urquhart's action governed by a statute of limitation? 2. If so, which statute of limitation applies?

1 Leevin Camacho represents Urquhart; Mitchell Thompson of Thompson Thompson & Alcantara, P.C. represents Salas.

ORJGJNAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2

3. Is there a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Urquhart's case barred by the applicable statute oflimitation?

As presented in Urquhart's Motion for Summary Judgment:

1. Whether there are any genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Pauline Mateme's handwritten note constitutes a deed? 2. Whether the spendthrift clause in Pauline Mateme's Revocable Living Trust prohibited Trust beneficiaries from transferring their interests?

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Urquhart filed her Complaint on September 21, 2015. The Complaint raises three causes

of action: (1) Proof of Execution oflnstrument Under 21 GCA § 33122; (2) Quiet Title; and (3)

Declaratory Relief under 7 GCA § 26801. The first cause of action seeks to prove that

Urquhart's stepmother, Pauline Mateme, signed a handwritten note thus "entitling it to be

recorded in the records of the Department ofLand Management." Compl. at 4 (Sep. 21, 2015).

The second cause of action seeks a determination that the note constitutes a deed. The Court has

stayed the quiet title action. See Dec. and Order re Mot. Joinder of Necessary Parties and Mot.

Scheduling Conf. (Apr. 28, 20 17). The declaratory relief action asks the Court to declare the

rights and duties of Urquhart with respect to her interests in the Nimitz Hill properties described

more fully below. Compl. ~~ 30-31.

III. UNDISPUTED FACTS

The Court finds the following facts to be undisputed:

1. Juan Mateme is Urquhart's grandfather. Subsequent to Juan Mateme's passing in 1980,

the Court probated his Estate. In its Order Settling Final Account and Report of Executor

and of Final Distribution Under Will, the Probate Court ordered that "Any and all right,

title, and interest in and to any real property of the Decedents that may be discovered

after the date of this Order" be distributed 3114 to the Estate of Dingo Matern e. Reply

OR1GtNAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3

Mem. in Support oflntervenor-Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., App. A at 3-4 (Nov. 22, 2017).

2. Dingo Materne is Urquhart's father. Dingo Materne was married to Pauline Materne.

They had three children, including Juanita Urquhart and John Materne.

3. Dingo Materne passed away in 1997. Compl. ~ 6. His will bequeathed all property to

Pauline Materne. Compl. ~ 24; Req. Jud. Not., Ex. A (Jan. 11, 20 16) (In re Dingo C.

Materne, PR0016-98, Decree ofFinal Distribution).

4. On May 15, 2001, Urquhart recorded Claims oflnterest asserting that she was heir to the

Estates of Juan Materne and Dingo Materne, and that as heir she had an interest in Lots

246, 246-1-1, and 246-2, 264, and Lot 265-1 (also known as ''Nimitz Hill Properties").

Decl. Juanita M. Urquhart in Support ofOpp'n to Mot. Summ. J., att. (Nov. 14, 2017).

5. In 2003, the Guam Ancestral Lands Commission returned the Nimitz Hill Properties to

the estate of Juan Materne. Compl. ~ 8; Memo. P. & A. in Support of [Intervenor-Def. 's]

Mot. Summ. J. at 1.

6. After the return of the Nimitz Hill Properties, another probate case for Juan Materne was

opened. In re Juan M Materne, PRO 118-03.

7. PRO 118-03 's Petition for Letters Testamentary referenced the return of lands from the

Guam Ancestral Lands Commission as the basis for the case. PR0118-03 (Pet'n Letters

Testamentary, Sep. 9, 2003 ). 2 PRO 118-03 's petitioners submitted Quitclaim Deeds for the

properties, recorded in 2003.

8. The probate Petition lists Urquhart as an heir to Juan Materne, and a Declaration of

Mailing indicates service of the PRO 118-03 petition on Urquhart. PRO 118-03 (Decl.

2 The Court takes limited judicial notice of the filings in PRO 118-03, as discussed elsewhere in this decision. See Taitano v. Calvo Fin. Corp., 2009 Guam 9 ,-r 31 (a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record).

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 4

Mailing, Oct. 16, 2003).

9. Urquhart has produced a handwritten note dated January 14, 2004, which states: "I,

Pauline R. Mateme do hereby surrender whatever interest I am entitled to the Former

ComNav. Officers housing on Nimitz Hill, to our daughter Juanita 'Mateme' Urquhart.

Is/ Pauline R. Mateme." Compl. Ex. A. Urquhart testified at her deposition that Pauline

Mateme did not want the property and therefore conveyed the property to Urquhart.

Decl. Cecille Flores, Ex. A at 13 (Oct. 17, 2017).

10. Urquhart witnessed Pauline Mateme write and sign the note. Id. at 13-14. Pauline

Mateme handed the note to Urquhart, who then stored it. Id. at 14-15.

11. On April29, 2004, Pauline Mateme executed a will. Decl. Mitchell Thompson, Ex. B

(May 27, 2016). Pauline's will transferred all property to her trust, which she created in

1999.

12. Pauline executed a First Amendment to Trust on August 16, 2005, which contains a

spendthrift provision. Decl. Mitchell Thompson, Ex. B at 30. The First Amendment

distributed, after disposition of cash, 25% of the remainder of her estate to Urquhart.

13. Although Urquhart was originally listed as an heir to Juan Mateme in PR0118-03, she

was no longer listed as an heir in a January 11, 2005 Final Account for Settlement and

Petition for Distribution. Instead, the Estate of Dingo Mateme, not listed in the original

Petition, was scheduled to receive a Ya distribution. PRO 118-03 (Final Account

Settlement and Pet'n Distribution at 4, Jan. 11, 2005). A Declaration of Mailing indicates

that on or about February 11, 2005, Urquhart was mailed notice of the Final Account for

Settlement and Petition for Distribution. PRO 118-03 (Decl. Mailing, Mar. 18, 2005).

14. In 2006, Pauline Mateme passed away.

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 5

15. On or about July 26, 2012, the Probate Court issued an Order recognizing that Lots 246,

264, and 265 were assets of Juan Mateme's Estate. That Order subsequently distributed

to the Estate of Dingo Mateme "Lot 246-REM-2; Lot 246-REM-6; Lot 246-REM-9; Ysth

Undivided Interest in Lot 246-REM-8; and Ysth Undivided Interest in Lot 246-REM-10."

Req. Judicial Not., Ex. B (Jan. 11, 2016) (PR0118-03 (Order and Decree Settling Final

Accounting and Report of Administration and Final Distribution)).

16. Despite the representations made in the Declarations of Mailing, Urquhart contends that

she did not know her father's estate received the Nimitz Hill Properties until2012. She

claims she learned of this fact through a cousin. Decl. Cecille A. Flores, Ex. A at 19-20.

17. Salas claims John Mateme conveyed his interest in the Nimitz Hill Properties to Salas.

See Intervenor-Def. Robert Salas' Answer to Compl. (Jan. 13, 2017).

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Urquhart and Salas both seek relief under Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 56. "A party

seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment

may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after

service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without

supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof."

GRCP 56( a). A court may grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." GRCP 56( c) (emphasis added).

A genuine issue exists if there is "sufficient evidence" which requires a fact-finder to

resolve a factual dispute. Jizuka Corp. v. Kawasho Int'l (Guam), Inc., 1997 Guam 10 ~ 7. Such

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 6

dispute must concern a material fact, defined as a fact "relevant to an element of a claim or

defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit." Id. To determine whether

summary judgment is appropriate, "the court must view the evidence and draw inferences in the

light most favorable to the non-movant." Edwards v. Pac. Fin. Corp., 2000 Guam 27 ~ 7 (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "Stated simply, there is a trial issue

if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Kim

v. Hong, 1997 Guam 11 ~ 8 (citing Anderson, 4 77 U.S. at 250).

V. SALAS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Statutes of limitation "come into the law not through the judicial process but through

legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate . . . . [T]he history of

pleas oflimitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a

relatively large degree of legislative control." Duty v. Abex Corp., 263 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (Ct.

App. 1989). In interpreting a statute of limitations, a Court gives effect to the statute's "plain

meaning." Id. at 16; Macris v. Swavely, 2008 Guam 18 ~ 17 ("the Court must base its decision

on the statute's plain meaning and the legislature's intent"). Where the meaning of a statute of

limitation is clear, "it is the function of this court to apply the statute as written." Blakey v.

Super. Ct., 200 Cal. Rptr. 52, 57 (Ct. App. 1989); O'Neill v. Tichy, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162, 164-65

(Ct. App. 1993). "Absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the plain meaning prevails."

Sumitomo Constr. Co. v. Gov't of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 ~ 17.

The Guam Legislature determined that all civil actions be attached to a limitations

period: "Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the period prescribed in

this Chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued, unless where, in special cases, a

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 7

different limitation is prescribed by law." 7 GCA § 11101 (emphasis added). Reading this

statute plainly, the Court must apply a limitations period to each of Urquhart's claims.

Salas proposes that Urquhart's causes of action fall under the four-year "catch-all" statute

of limitations (7 GCA § 11312), and except for arguing that the Court need not apply a

limitations period, Urquhart does not propose any different statute of limitations applies. Finding

that no other statute of limitations applies to an action for proof of an instrument or for

declaratory relief, the Court determines that the four year limitations period under section 11312

applies to Urquhart's claims.

The Court next focuses on when the statute of limitations began to run. The "statute of

limitations will begin to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that [her] injury was

caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong" to her. Custodio v.

Boonprakong, 1999 Guam 5 ~ 27. Once a "plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and

therefore an incentive to sue," she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. !d.

The Court finds that Urquhart had enough reason to sue once she both knew or should

have known that the Nimitz Hill Properties were being returned and gained Pauline Mateme's

interest in the properties. The earliest evidence presented which indicates when Urquhart knew

of the property return is the existence of PRO 118-03, initiated in order to distribute the Nimitz

Hill Properties. Further requiring Urquhart's need to take action, PRO 118-13 originally

recognized her purported interest in the Nimitz Hill Properties but omitted her as a direct heir in

later pleadings. In other words, by the time of the proposed distribution ofPR0118-03 in 2005,

Urquhart had reason to act to protect her interest in the properties.

However, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact remains on when Urquhart

gained enough information to start the limitations clock. On one hand, by around February 11,

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDERre MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 8

2005, Urquhart knew or should have known she had a protectable interest in the Nimitz Hill

Properties because: (1) she filed Claims oflnterest; (2) she knew that all ofher father's interest

in the properties transferred to Pauline Mateme; (3) in the January 14, 2004 handwritten note,

Pauline Mateme transferred all her interest in the properties to Urquhart; and (4) she had notice

of the probate's intended distribution to the Estate of Dingo Mateme. Under this scenario,

Urquhart should have taken action to assert and protect her interest in the Nimitz Hill Properties

within four years of the date of the notice of the proposed distribution, February 11, 2005.

However, Urquhart denies having knowledge ofPR0118-03 until sometime in 2012. If

she had no knowledge of the return of the lands from the Ancestral Lands Commission, and no

knowledge ofPR0118-03, then she had no reason to believe her claim had ripened. Ignorance of

the return of the lands until2012 gives Urquhart no incentive to prove the note to be a deed, or to

seek a declaration of her rights. Under this scenario, the September 21, 2015 Complaint remains

timely.

Even though the Court may take judicial notice of court filings, "the more critical an

issue is to the ultimate disposition of the case, the less appropriate judicial notice becomes."

Taitano v. Calvo Fin. Corp., 2009 Guam 9 ~ 31. While the Court here has taken judicial notice

of the filings in PRO 118-03, the Declarations of Mailing to Urquhart cannot be relied upon to

establish Urquhart's knowledge, a central issue before the Court. A fact-finder must assess

whether Urquhart knew of the return of the Nimitz Hill property and its intended disposition,

whether in 2004, 2005, 2012, or some other time.

The Court rejects Salas' proposal to deem the statute to have run even earlier, such as at

the closing of Juan Mateme's first probate, or when Urquhart filed her Claims of Interest, or even

when Pauline Mateme delivered her note. There is no evidence that Urquhart knew or should

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 9

have known of the return of the lands until, at the earliest, the filing of PRO 118-03. Even then,

she did not receive her direct interest until Pauline Mateme signed the note. Moreover, the

PRO 118-03 Petition lists Urquhart as a direct heir to receive property from the Estate of Juan

Mateme. It is only until 2005 that she is omitted as an heir, and the Estate of Dingo Mateme is

listed as an heir. It is at that moment that Urquhart--ifin fact she received notice of the proposed

distribution--had notice that her property interests were at stake. 3

The Court also rejects Urquart's proposal to deem the statute to have run in 2012 in the

event she had awareness of the PRO 118-03. If Urquhart had notice of PRO 118-03 earlier than

2012, then she had enough facts and incentive to bring her claims.

Because it remains an issue of fact as to when Urquhart knew of PRO 118-03, summary

judgment must be denied as to Salas' argument on the statute oflimitations.

VI. URQUHART'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Establishing a Deed

Urquhart claims that she has established all requirements for an effective deed: a (1)

grantor, (2) grantee, (3) writing and subscription, (4) delivery and (5) acceptance. In its

Opposition and as confirmed at the Motions hearing, Salas stated that other than the statute of

limitations, he had no specific defense to the validity of the deed.

The Court finds that Urquhart has in fact established an effective deed. The handwritten

note indicates a grantor, Pauline Mateme, and a grantee, Urquhart. The note is in writing, and

Urquhart has provided sufficient authentication of Urquhart's handwriting. Urquhart also

3 Salas asks the Court to find that the 2012 distribution contradicts the Juan Materne's original probate distribution. The Court finds that this case is not the proper forum to consider an invalidation of PR0118-03. Moreover, invalidating the PR0118-03 proceedings has no effect on the Court's statute of limitations analysis.

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 10

established that Mateme delivered the note to Urquhart, and Urquhart accepted it. These facts

are undisputed.

Although Urquhart has established the existence of a valid deed, which is not in dispute,

the Court hesitates to grant summary judgment because her action may be barred by the statute

of limitations. As discussed earlier, all civil actions "without exception" must be brought within

an applicable limitations period. While this may seem harsh, it is consistent with the Guam

Supreme Court's enforcement oflimitations periods "to promote justice by preventing surprises

through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,

memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Taitano v. Calvo Fin. Corp., 2008

Guam 12 ~55 (citing Order ofR.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49

(1944)). This case exemplifies the need to file a timely action. For example, had Urquhart

known ofPR0118-03 and filed her action upon receipt of Pauline Mateme's note shortly

thereafter, Pauline Mateme may have still been alive to testify in such action, and Juan Mateme's

probate court distribution could have been addressed. Moreover, these issues could have also

been addressed earlier in Pauline Mateme's probate proceedings, long before Salas purchased

John Mateme's interest.

Because it remains an issue of fact as to whether Urquhart has brought a timely action,

the Court must deny her summary judgment motion. However, under Rule 56(d) the Court may

"ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are

actually and in good faith controverted." The Court hereby finds that the January 14, 2004

handwritten note from Pauline Mateme to Urquhart constitutes a valid deed, and that such issue

stands without substantial controversy.

B. Relevance of the Trust

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER re MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 11

Urquhart asks the Court to enforce the Pauline Mateme Revocable Living Trust

spendthrift provision which prohibits beneficiaries from voluntarily transferring their interests.

In opposition, Salas argues that a spendthrift clause in a revocable trust is ineffective upon the

trustor's death. Salas also argues that in its Decision and Order concerning his Motion to

Intervene, the Court already determined that Salas had a protectable interest.

In that Decision and Order, the Court relied on the same documentation that the Court

now relies upon, specifically, Pauline Mateme's probate court documents submitted by Attorney

Thompson. For the Motion to Intervene, the Court determined that Salas' protectable interest

derived from that purchased from John Materne. The Court also noted that the "validity of the

handwritten note and the legal consequences that may follow are two factors that greatly affect

[Salas'] interest." Dec. and Order at 8 (Jan. 5, 2017). In other words, the Court noted that

Urquhart's action affected an interest held by Salas, thus, Salas had a right to intervene.

However, now having taken a closer look at Pauline Materne's estate documents in the

context of summary judgment, and the chronology of those documents, the Court questions the

relevance ofPauline Materne's Revocable Living Trust. Mateme created her Trust in 1999,

however, nothing indicates what property, if any, she transferred into the Trust. According to the

Trust, the "trust estate" consists of property listed in the Trust's Schedule A and "any property

hereafter transferred to the trust by the Trustor, her will, her attorney-in-fact or conservator, or as

pension benefits or insurance proceeds, or from any other person or source." Dec I. Mitchell

Thompson, Ex. Bat 23. Schedule A to the Trust, however, lists no assets, and no other evidence

has been provided that demonstrates a transfer of the Nimitz Hill Properties into the Trust prior

to the January 14, 2004 conveyance to Urquhart. Decl. Mitchell Thompson, Ex. Bat 35. Plainly

read, Pauline Mateme's Trust did not contain assets until the First Amendment in 2005.

ORIGINAL CV0905-15 DECISION AND ORDER reMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 12

Furthermore, while Pauline Mateme executed a Pour-Over Will bequeathing her property

into her Trust, the only Will provided to the Court is dated April29, 2004. 4 In other words,

Pauline Mateme executed this Will three months after she executed a valid deed to Urquhart.

With the evidence presented to the Court, no evidence supports a transfer of the Nimitz Hill

Properties into Pauline Mateme's Trust.

The Court therefore DENIES Urquhart's Motion for Summary Judgment because

Urquhart fails to demonstrate a link between the Trust and the Nimitz Hill property. The Court

recognizes that this analysis may hold implications broader than the spendthrift clause or issues

raised by either party. The Court therefore makes clear that its denial of Urquhart's Motion

pertains to the limited issue of the spendthrift clause.

VII. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court DENIES Salas' Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that a genuine issue

of material fact exists as to whether or not Urquhart filed a timely action.

The Court DENIES Urquhart's Motion for Summary Judgment but finds that Pauline

Mateme executed a valid deed and conveyed her interests in the Nimitz Hill Properties to

Urquhart. Summary judgment on her claims, however, is improper until resolution of the

limitations issue. The Court also DENIES Urquhart's Motion for Summary Judgment on the

spendthrift clause.

The Court reminds the parties of the February 28, 2018 Pretrial Conference.

SO ORDERED this 5th day of February 2018. SERVICE 'IIA COURT oOX e in HON. ELYZE M. IRIARTE ~~. ~~r;;::.c:.....-:o Judge, Superior Court of Guam "'\:'~"')5,.._. '""-o vu...... t;:)l c...o--.~ : .z..\~f~~~alas posited that ~aulin.e ~atern~ executed a .will in 1999. However, the Court -lfe ~e!l rro-e~& to support a will extstmg earher than Apnl29, 2004. 0012

ORIGINAL