Uriel Mendoza Araiza v. Cammilla Wamsley et al.

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 URIEL MENDOZA ARAIZA, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00421-LK 11 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING HABEAS 12 v. PETITION 13 CAMMILLA WAMSLEY et al., 14 Respondents. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Uriel Mendoza Araiza’s Amended 17 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. No. 12. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies 18 the petition.1 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Mendoza Araiza is a native and citizen of Mexico. Dkt. No. 10-2 at 2. In 2001, he was 21 granted a voluntary return to Mexico, Dkt. No. 10-1 at 4, but subsequently returned to the United 22 23 1 The Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing because the record is sufficient for adjudication of the petition. 24 See Owino v. Napolitano, 575 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing” where “the record is insufficient to decide whether [the petitioner’s] detention is authorized by statute”). 1 States. In 2006, he was convicted of shoplifting, and the following year, he was convicted of 2 Forge/Alter Vehicle Registration. Id. 3 On September 29, 2025, Mendoza Araiza was arrested and served with a Notice to Appear, 4 categorizing him as a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or

5 paroled” and charging him as removable under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and 6 Nationality Act. Dkt. No. 10-2 at 2. He was transferred to the Northwest ICE Processing Center 7 (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 4. 8 This is Mendoza Araiza’s second habeas petition. He filed his first petition on October 30, 9 2025, seeking “enforcement of his rights as a member of the Bond Denial Class certified in 10 Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 20, 2025).” Dkt. 11 No. 10-4 at 3. Judge Lin found that Mendoza Araiza is a member of the Rodriguez Vazquez class, 12 granted his petition, and ordered Respondents to release him unless they provided him with a bond 13 hearing within seven days. Araiza v. Hermosillo, No. 2:25-CV-02139-TL, 2025 WL 3516103, at 14 *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2025) (“Araiza I”). Mendoza Araiza had a timely bond hearing, and the

15 immigration judge found that he was a flight risk and thus denied bond. Dkt. No. 10-5 at 2. 16 Mendoza Araiza has appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and his 17 appeal remains pending. Dkt. No. 10-6; see Dkt. No. 12 at 4. Mendoza Araiza has also applied for 18 cancellation of removal, which was denied; his appeal of that decision to the BIA remains pending. 19 Dkt. No. 10-3 at 2–4; Dkt. No. 12 at 4. 20 When Mendoza Araiza filed his pro se petition in this case on February 2, 2026, he had 21 been detained at the NWIPC for four months. Dkt. No. 6 at 1. He subsequently retained counsel 22 and filed an amended petition, noting that his detention has now continued beyond six months. 23

24 1 Dkt. No. 12 at 4. In light of Mendoza Araiza’s amended petition, the Court permitted Respondents2 2 to file a supplemental response by April 13, 2026, and Mendoza Araiza to file a supplemental reply 3 by April 17, 2026. Dkt. No. 13. Neither party filed a supplemental brief. 4 II. DISCUSSION

5 In his amended petition, Mendoza Araiza contends that his removal is not likely to occur 6 in the reasonably foreseeable future and thus violates Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 7 Dkt. No. 12 at 4–5. Specifically, he notes that “[h]is appeal remains pending at the Board of 8 Immigration Appeals that has yet to generate a transcript or request briefing from the parties,” and 9 “[e]ven if he were to lose his appeal, [he] can seek Circuit Court review of the underlying decision, 10 a process that will take many months.” Id. at 4. He thus requests that the Court “[i]ssue a Writ of 11 Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release [him] from custody subject to appropriate 12 conditions of supervision if necessary,” or alternatively, “provide a new bond hearing where the[] 13 government bears the burden of showing that [he] is a flight risk or a danger to the community.” 14 Id. at 5.

15 Respondents filed a response to the original petition. See Dkt. No. 9. They argue that the 16 abuse of writ doctrine applies and precludes what amounts to a successive petition, and even if the 17 doctrine does not apply, the Court should require prudential exhaustion of Mendoza Araiza’s 18 administrative remedies. Id. at 3–5. 19 20 21 2 Although Bruce Scott, the warden of the NWIPC, has not appeared in this case, (1) the purpose of naming the 22 petitioner’s custodian is to effectuate injunctive relief where appropriate, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (the custodian has “the power to produce the body of [the petitioner] before the court or judge,” such that “he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary.” (citation modified)); and (2) federal respondents 23 often represent the warden’s interests, as they do in this case, see Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Even in cases where private contract wardens are named as respondents, the government can and has stepped 24 in to defend its interest in keeping petitioners detained.”). 1 A. Legal Standard 2 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 3 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing 4 U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody

5 upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release 6 from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus 7 may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 8 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 9 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 10 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district 11 court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 12 at 687. 13 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 14 no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const.

15 amend. V. “The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process in deportation proceedings.” Torres- 16 Aguilar v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2001). “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all 17 ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, 18 unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 19 510, 523 (2003) (recognizing that Fifth Amendment due process protections extend to deportation 20 proceedings, but noting that “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid 21 aspect of the deportation process”). 22 B. Mendoza Araiza Is Not Entitled to Relief 23 1. The Abuse of the Writ Doctrine Does Not Bar this Petition

24 Respondents argue that Mendoza Araiza’s petition “should be dismissed under the abuse 1 of the writ doctrine because it is an improperly filed successive petition.” Dkt. No. 9 at 3. Mendoza 2 Araiza did not file a reply or respond to this argument. 3 “The doctrine of abuse of the writ generally forbids the reconsideration of claims that were 4 or could have been raised in a prior habeas petition.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042,

5 1049 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). The doctrine bars “a successive petition that raises 6 identical grounds for relief as a prior petition” unless certain criteria are met. Id. The doctrine bars 7 only successive petitions that raise claims “identical” to those in the prior petition. Eldridge v. 8 Howard, 70 F.4th 543, 551 (9th Cir. 2023). 9 Whatever merits Respondents’ argument on this issue might have had when they filed their 10 response were lost when Mendoza Araiza subsequently filed his amended petition. Respondents 11 note that in Araiza I, the district court “analyzed whether Petitioner was subject to Section 1226(a) 12 and entitled to a bond hearing,” and they contend that if Mendoza Araiza “disagrees with the 13 outcome of Araiza I, [he] can do so through appeal of that decision.” Dkt. No. 9 at 3–4. However, 14 Mendoza Araiza does not dispute the outcome of Araiza I. See generally Dkt. No. 12. Rather, his

15 amended petition raises a claim that he has been detained longer than the presumptively reasonable 16 six-month period in Zadvydas, a claim that was unavailable to him when Araiza I was litigated late 17 last year. Compare id. at 2 (“March 29, 2026 marked six months in detention for Mr. Mendoza”), 18 with Araiza I, 2025 WL 3516103, at *1–2 (noting in a December 8, 2025 decision that Mendoza 19 Araiza had been detained since September 29, 2025, he was not mandatorily detained, and he was 20 entitled to a bond hearing). Because a Zadvydas claim was “not yet ripe” when Mendoza Araiza 21 filed his petition in Araiza I, he did not have a “full and fair opportunity” to raise that claim 22 previously. Eldridge, 70 F.4th at 552 (citation modified). According, the doctrine of abuse of the 23 writ does not bar this petition.

24 1 2. Mendoza Araiza is Not Entitled to Relief Under Zadvydas 2 Having determined that the petition is not barred, the Court turns to its merits. As noted 3 above, Mendoza Araiza asserts that his pending litigation will take many months, and “[d]ue 4 process does not permit the government to indefinitely detain [him].” Dkt. No. 12 at 5.

5 Respondents contend that Mendoza Araiza “cannot allege that his detention has become 6 indefinite,” as he has “presented no evidence that ICE will be unable to remove him if his removal 7 order ultimately becomes final,” and as “there is no doubt that [his] continued detention is related 8 to a legitimate government purpose” because he is in ongoing removal proceedings. Dkt. No. 9 at 9 6. 10 Mendoza Araiza is being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Araiza I, 2025 WL 3516103, 11 at *2. That statute allows the Attorney General to detain any alien “pending a decision on whether 12 the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1062 13 (9th Cir. 2008). Mendoza Araiza argues that he has been detained more than six months, “[h]is 14 appeal remains pending at the [BIA] that has yet to generate a transcript or request briefing from

15 the parties,” and “[e]ven if he were to lose his appeal, [he] can seek Circuit Court review of the 16 underlying decision, a process that will take many months.” Dkt. No. 12 at 4. True enough, 17 “§ 1226(a), like § 1231(a)(6), also does not authorize indefinite detention.” Prieto-Romero, 534 18 F.3d at 1063. Accordingly, “[c]onsistent with Zadvydas, [the Ninth Circuit] construe[s] the 19 Attorney General’s detention authority under § 1226(a) as limited to the period reasonably 20 necessary to bring about [a noncitizen’s] removal from the United States, even if continued 21 detention in any particular litigant’s case would not pose a constitutional problem.” Id. (citation 22 modified). However, Mendoza Araiza does not provide “good reason to believe that there is no 23 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future[.]” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

24 701. On that front, he does not argue that anything would prevent the government from removing 1 him to Mexico if his challenge to removal is unsuccessful, Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1064–65, 2 or that he is in a “removable-but-unremovable limbo,” Jama v. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 543 U.S. 3 335, 347 (2005). Rather, his administrative proceedings will end at some point, even in the 4 “absence of a date certain” as to when that will occur. Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 758 (4th

5 Cir. 2024); see also Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008) (“That the detention 6 did not have a certain end date does not change the [Zadvydas] analysis.”). Nor is this a case where 7 the government has unreasonably prolonged the administrative proceedings. Cf. Nadarajah v. 8 Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075–77, 1081–82, 1084 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding petitioner’s detention 9 indefinite when he “ha[d] won relief at every administrative level,” and proceedings continued 10 only due to an “unusual move” by the BIA “referr[ing] the case to the Attorney General for 11 review”). Under these circumstances, Mendoza Araiza’s “continued detention, while lengthy, is 12 not indefinite,” and detention “remains authorized by § 1226(a)[.]” Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 13 1065. 14 In addition, consistent with the procedures laid out in the implementing regulations for

15 Section 1226(a), see Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 8 16 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), -(d)(1), -(d)(3), 1003.19), Mendoza Araiza had a bond hearing in December 17 2025, Dkt. No. 10-5 at 2, and although he disagrees with the outcome, he does not assert that he 18 was not accorded any rights due to him under the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation at the 19 hearing, Dkt. No. 12 at 4–5. Consequently, he has failed to show that he has been denied due 20 process or is otherwise entitled to release or another bond hearing. The Court thus denies the 21 petition. See, e.g., Martir-Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-02194-LK, 2026 WL 709787, at *4 (W.D. 22 Wash. Mar. 13, 2026) (denying habeas petition when petitioner “has been afforded all the process 23 he is due and does not otherwise point to other statutory grounds to grant immediate release”

24 (citation modified)). 1 If continued detention becomes unreasonably prolonged and indefinite, Mendoza Araiza 2 may file another habeas petition at that time on that issue. Now, though, he is not entitled to habeas 3 relief. 4 III. CONCLUSION

5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Mendoza Araiza’s petition without 6 prejudice. 7 Dated this 21st day of May, 2026. 8 A 9 Lauren King United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23