United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1042
DOUGLAS HUMBERTO URIAS-ORELLANA; SAYRA ILIANA GAMEZ-MEJIA; G.E.U.G.,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Gelpí, Lynch, and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.
Kevin P. MacMurray and MacMurray and Associates, on brief for petitioners. Brooke M. Maurer, Trial Attorney, Bryan M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Nancy E. Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, on brief for respondent.
November 14, 2024 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Douglas Humberto
Urias-Orellana ("Urias-Orellana") is a thirty-three-year-old
native and citizen of El Salvador. He -- along with his wife,
Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia ("Gamez-Mejia"), and their minor child,
G.E.U.G. -- petition for review of a final order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the Immigration Judge's
("IJ," together with the BIA, "the Agency") denial of their
requests for asylum. Urias-Orellana also petitions for review of
the denial of his application for protection under the Convention
Against Torture ("CAT").1 The Agency premised its denials on
several grounds, including that Petitioners did not meet their
burden to (1) demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution
to qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, or (2) show that
they could not reasonably relocate in El Salvador. As to CAT
relief, Urias-Orellana did not show there was error in the factual
finding that it is "[un]likel[y] [Urias-Orellana] will face
torture by or with the consent or acquiescence (including willful
1 Where necessary, we refer to the trio collectively as "Petitioners." Although Gamez-Mejia and G.E.U.G. can seek asylum as Urias-Orellana's derivative beneficiaries, they cannot assert derivative claims for CAT protection or withholding of removal. That is because those forms of relief do not carry derivative benefits, and Gamez-Mejia and G.E.U.G. did not file separate applications. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b), (c). The upshot is that our denials of Urias-Orellana's petitions for review of the asylum and withholding of removal determinations apply to their asylum application. Only Urias-Orellana brought a CAT claim. See Cabrera v. Garland, 100 F.4th 312, 315 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024).
- 2 - blindness) of any public official or persona acting in an official
capacity." We deny the petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND
"We draw our background 'from the administrative record,
including [Urias-Orellana's] testimony before the IJ, which the IJ
found credible.'" Gonzalez-Arevalo v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1, 6
(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Chun Mendez v. Garland, 96 F.4th 58, 61
(1st Cir. 2024)).
A. Underlying Facts
On or about June 28, 2021, Petitioners entered the
United States without authorization. The Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") served them on August 10 with Notices to Appear
in immigration court. DHS charged Petitioners with removability
for being present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled, Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Petitioners
conceded proper service and admitted their removability. In so
doing, Petitioners noted that they would seek asylum, while
Urias-Orellana indicated that he would also seek protection under
the CAT.2
2He also indicated his intent to seek withholding of removal. But Petitioners' brief is devoid of any argument mentioning withholding of removal. Accordingly, any challenge to the denial of withholding of removal has been waived. See Jimenez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 162, 165 (1st Cir. 2022).
- 3 - In his asylum application, Urias-Orellana explained that
he feared harm because his half-brothers, Juan and Remberto, had
been shot and severely injured, and he believed that similar harm
would befall him and his family.
Urias-Orellana expanded on these concerns during his
testimony before the IJ at a hearing on March 14, 2022, and through
an affidavit filed in immigration court. Urias-Orellana,
represented by counsel, explained that he feared persecution in El
Salvador on the basis of his particular social group:
Urias-Orellana's family. Specifically, Urias-Orellana feared
returning to El Salvador because of Wilfredo, a "sicario" (which
roughly translates to "hitman") for a local drug lord in El
Salvador. Wilfredo's mother and the father of Urias-Orellana's
half-brothers3 were involved in a relationship of which Wilfredo
did not approve. Around February 2016, Wilfredo's disapproval
turned to violence when, after an argument with Juan at a cantina,
he shot Juan six times. Juan suffered severe injuries from the
shooting -- he is now wheelchair-bound -- and moved away to Cara
Sucia (a forty-minute drive from where he was shot).
The shooting apparently did not placate Wilfredo's
anger. So he vowed to kill Juan's entire family. He turned his
crosshairs next on Remberto in August 2016. Wilfredo ambushed
3 Juan and Remberto have the same mother as Urias-Orellana but a different father.
- 4 - Remberto in a secluded alley, shooting him nine times. Remberto
survived the encounter. Urias-Orellana feared for his and his
family's safety, and they fled to Cojutepeque, El Salvador, where
they remained in peace for about one year.
Believing the worst to be over, Petitioners moved in
February or March 2017 to live with Gamez-Mejia's family to another
town in El Salvador, Colonia Claudia Lara -- about a thirty-minute
drive from Sonsonate, where Urias-Orellana used to live. But,
according to Urias-Orellana, Wilfredo must have learned of this
move because two masked men approached Urias-Orellana in Claudia
Lara a few months after. They demanded money and, when
Urias-Orellana refused, warned him that they would "leave [him]
like" his half-brothers and possibly kill him if he did not cave
to their demands.
About six months later, Urias-Orellana again was
threatened at gunpoint by masked men in August 2017. They
threatened to kill him if he did not pay up the next time that
they saw him.4
Petitioners then moved, again within El Salvador, to
Cara Sucia to stay with Juan. They lived there without any
Urias-Orellana testified that he and his family moved to 4
Cara Sucia after the threats in February or March 2017. He explained that he was not approached again after that incident. But his affidavit indicates that he was targeted in August 2017. The IJ also analyzed the August 2017 encounter. Accordingly, we shall consider the August 2017 encounter in our analysis.
- 5 - harassment or complaints or threats for two-and-a-half years. In
December 2020, Urias-Orellana and Gamez-Mejia returned to visit
his family in Sonsonate, and while there, he was confronted by two
masked men on a motorcycle demanding money. They threatened him,
assaulted him by striking him three times in the chest, and warned
him that they would kill him if he did not pay them.
Urias-Orellana and Gamez-Mejia returned to Cara Sucia
thereafter. But, on their journey, Urias-Orellana noticed two men
on a motorcycle -- whom he believed to be the same men who beat
him -- following him to Cara Sucia. Fearful that Cara Sucia was
unsafe, Petitioners took a taxi to San Salvador before ultimately
returning to Claudia Lara.
Upon their return, Urias-Orellana noticed that the same
men who assaulted him were patrolling Claudia Lara apparently in
search for him. And, while shopping in Claudia Lara around
February or March 2021, he overheard two men asking a store
employee if there were any newcomers to the area and where they
were located.
The IJ asked Urias-Orellana questions once he finished
recounting this narrative. He asked if Urias-Orellana's mother
had ever been harmed or mistreated while living in El Salvador.
Urias-Orellana answered that she had not, besides a threat from
individuals "from Guatemala." The IJ asked the same question about
Urias-Orellana's siblings, who also lived in El Salvador. Neither
- 6 - his sister nor his half-sister (nor his half-sister's children)
were ever harmed or mistreated while in El Salvador. The IJ asked
about Urias-Orellana's other siblings besides Juan and
Remberto -- Jaime, Celina, Rosabel, and Elmer. Although
Urias-Orellana explained that some unknown assailants had
"grabbed" and placed Jaime "in a room for [three] hours" at some
point, he did not recall any of his other siblings facing harm or
harassment in El Salvador.
The IJ further asked Urias-Orellana if he had been able
to live without being harmed or threatened when he moved to
Cojutepeque and Claudia Lara. Urias-Orellana admitted that he had
been.
B. Procedural History
The IJ denied the application after considering
Urias-Orellana's testimony, the submissions in support of
Petitioners' claims, and the entire record. We focus on the facets
of the IJ's decision that are relevant to this petition for review.
First, the IJ concluded that Urias-Orellana's testimony
was credible, and that the recounted harm did not rise to the level
of past persecution. The IJ acknowledged the death threats and
assault, and found that the death threats were not so menacing as
to qualify as past persecution. Further, the December 2020 assault
did not require Urias-Orellana to receive medical treatment, and
so was not past persecution.
- 7 - Beyond that, the IJ found that Petitioners did not meet
their burden to show that a reasonable person would fear returning
to El Salvador. The IJ so concluded, reasoning (1) Urias-
Orellana's relatives lived throughout El Salvador without
suffering any harm or mistreatment at Wilfredo's hands, and
(2) Petitioners were able to successfully relocate in El Salvador
without facing any harassment or mistreatment. Indeed, the IJ
noted, Urias-Orellana only encountered danger after he returned to
his hometown.
Third, the IJ found that Urias-Orellana's CAT claim
failed. The IJ noted that Urias-Orellana neither reported his
harassment to the police nor demonstrated that doing so would be
futile. The IJ acknowledged that a 2020 U.S. Department of State
Country Conditions Report for El Salvador "present[ed] a mixed
picture" on the country's efforts to combat organized crime. That
mixed picture included the limited resources available to and
corruption in the Salvadoran police and judiciary. The IJ also
noted that the Report stated that the police had developed new
techniques to combat gang violence and made efforts to root out
corruption in the police force. The IJ concluded it would not be
futile for Urias-Orellana to report any threats to the authorities,
and he had not shown that, if there were further harassment, the
Salvadoran government would acquiesce to it.
- 8 - Petitioners appealed to the BIA, attacking the IJ's
finding that the Petitioners had not shown that they (1) faced
past persecution due to the threats and December 20 assault; or
(2) had a well-founded fear of future persecution due to internal
relocation and unharmed family members. Petitioners also appealed
the IJ's finding that Urias-Orellana had not shown he qualified
for CAT relief.
The BIA affirmed. It adopted the IJ's reasoning and
added its views as to the denials of Petitioners' asylum claim and
Urias-Orellana's CAT claim. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the
threats and assault did not amount to persecution. And, after
recognizing that Petitioners' failure to prove past persecution
meant that they bore the burden of showing that relocation would
be unreasonable, the BIA concluded that Petitioners had not met
this burden. Moreover, the BIA noted that Urias-Orellana's mother
and sisters were never threatened or harmed in El Salvador, and
that Jaime was held by someone unaffiliated with Wilfredo.
Finally, the BIA noted, inter alia, as to Urias-Orellana's CAT
claim, that he never attempted to report his mistreatment to the
police -- and that it would not have been futile to do so, in light
of the country conditions evidence.
This timely petition for judicial review, over which we
have jurisdiction, followed. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
- 9 - II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
"Where, as here, 'the BIA adopts and affirms an IJ's
decision, we review the IJ's decision "to the extent of the
adoption, and the BIA's decision as to [any] additional ground."'"
López-Pérez v. Garland, 26 F.4th 104, 110 (1st Cir. 2022)
(alteration in original) (quoting Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56,
59-60 (1st Cir. 2007)).
"We review the [A]gency's legal conclusion de novo. But
we review its factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard." Gonzalez-Arevalo, 112 F.4th at 8 (citation omitted).
Under this standard, we must "accept the findings 'as long as they
are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole.'" Gomez-Abrego v. Garland, 26
F.4th 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Aguilar-De Guillen v.
Sessions, 902 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2018)). Thus, "we will only
disturb the [A]gency's findings if, in reviewing the record as a
whole, 'any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary.'" Gonzalez-Arevalo, 112 F.4th at 8 (quoting
Barnica-Lopez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 520, 527 (1st Cir. 2023)).
"That the record supports a conclusion contrary to that reached by
the [Agency] is not enough to warrant upsetting the [Agency's]
view of the matter; for that to occur, the record must compel the
contrary conclusion." Santos Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th 455,
- 10 - 460-61 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d
213, 218 (1st Cir. 2007)). It is through this lens that we consider
Petitioners' asylum claim and Urias-Orellana's CAT claim.
The INA requires a petitioner for asylum to prove that
he is a "refugee," meaning someone "who is unable or unwilling to
return to" his country of origin "because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). "Persecution in this sense
'requires proof of a "certain level of serious harm (whether past
or anticipated), a sufficient nexus between that harm and
government action or inaction, and a causal connection to one of
those statutorily protected grounds."'" Gonzalez-Arevalo, 112
F.4th at 8 (quoting Barnica-Lopez, 59 F.4th at 527). If a
petitioner fails to meet any of these requirements, then so too
must his past or future persecution claim fail. See id.
B. Asylum Claim
We consider Petitioners' arguments concerning asylum.
In so doing, we cabin our review to whether the Agency conclusion
they had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear
of future persecution was supported by substantial evidence.
i. Past Persecution
Part of Petitioners' past persecution burden was to
prove that Urias-Orellana suffered "a certain level of serious
- 11 - harm." Gonzalez-Arevalo, 112 F.4th at 8 (quoting Barnica-Lopez,
59 F.4th at 527). Persecution transcends "unpleasantness,
harassment, and even basic suffering." Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at
461 (quoting Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 2000)).
While "'[c]redible, specific threats can amount to persecution if
they are severe enough' -- particularly if they are death
threats," Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71, 80 (1st Cir.
2023) (quoting Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland, 59 F.4th 510, 516 (1st
Cir. 2023)) -- to qualify as past persecution, these threats must
be "so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm,"
Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at 461 (quoting Lobo v. Holder, 684 F.3d
11, 18 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Petitioners argue that the record compelled a finding
that the threats and assault experienced by Urias-Orellana met
this burden. They emphasize that Urias-Orellana's assailants were
armed, assaulted him on one occasion, and promised to leave him
like his half-brothers if he did not comply.
Unfulfilled death threats rarely prove past persecution
unless they are "so menacing as to cause significant actual
suffering or harm." Id. The Agency reasonably concluded that the
threats experienced by Urias-Orellana do not meet that threshold.
As an initial matter, Urias-Orellana did not testify "about the
'immediate impact, if any, that these threats had on him,'" so we
cannot say that the record compels a conclusion that they caused
- 12 - significant actual suffering or harm. Id. (quoting Rodriguez v.
Lynch, 654 F. App'x 498, 500 (1st Cir. 2016)). Here, "there [was]
no finding that [] threats [against the petitioner] were 'credible'
threats of death as opposed to threats intended to frighten him
into paying, especially given the lack of severity of the one
assault." Vargas-Salazar v. Garland, 119 F.4th 167, 173 (1st Cir.
2024) (alterations in original) (quoting Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th
at 461. Indeed, the Agency considered how, over a four-year
period, Urias-Orellana was threatened only three times by unknown
assailants who demanded money and, on one occasion, struck him in
the chest, three times -- an attack that did not result in
hospitalization. That the assault "did not require
hospitalization bears on the 'nature and extent' of [a
petitioner's] injuries and is certainly 'relevant to the ultimate
determination'" of persecution. Jinan Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40,
46 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 89 (1st
Cir. 2013)).
Because this sequence of events did not involve threats
or actions "so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering,"
Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at 461, substantial evidence supports the
Agency's no-past-persecution finding.
Petitioners highlight the assailants' striking the chest
of Urias-Orellana and the assailants' mentioning of Juan and
Remberto's fates as proof that they could make good on their
- 13 - threats. But these circumstances do not present a case distinct
from our precedents. Previously, we have upheld Agency decisions
concluding that nearly identical -- or even more
egregious -- circumstances did not rise to the level of
persecution. Vargas-Salazar, 119 F.4th at 172-73 (concluding that
multiple extortionate death threats and an injury that did not
require hospitalization did not compel a finding of past
persecution); Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at 459-61 (three
extortionate threats and a beating by armed assailants did not
constitute persecution); Jinan Chen, 814 F.3d at 42-43 (upholding
the Agency's no-persecution finding when the petitioner "was
beaten and subsequently taken to the police station where he was
placed in custody, interrogated, further assaulted, and threatened
with forced sterilization"); Cabas v. Holder, 695 F.3d 169, 174
(1st Cir. 2012) (upholding no-persecution finding where the
petitioner was kidnapped, beaten, and left unconscious and
received threats after a break-in at his parents' home); Bocova v.
Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding
no-persecution finding based on two death threats and a beating
that left the petitioner unconscious and hospitalized). It follows
that the record here did not compel a finding of past persecution.
ii. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
Because Petitioners did not establish past persecution,
they are not entitled to a presumption of future persecution.
- 14 - Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at 462. The Agency ruled that Petitioners
did not establish future persecution, finding that they had no
reasonable fear of future persecution on the basis that they could
internally relocate. We thus examine the merits of that
conclusion.
Even if a petitioner proves that "[he has] suffered past
persecution or [has] a well-founded fear of future persecution,
[the] application for asylum will be denied if the adjudicator
determines that [he] could avoid persecution by internally
relocating within the country of removal and, under all the
circumstances, it would be reasonable to do so." Caz v. Garland,
84 F.4th 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2023). For a petitioner "to be able to
internally relocate safely, there must be an area of the country
where he or she has no well-founded fear of persecution." Matter
of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 33 (B.I.A. 2012). To determine
this, the Agency considers "the totality of the relevant
circumstances" for relocation, such as "the size of the country of
nationality or last habitual residence, the geographic locus of
the alleged persecution, the size, numerosity, and reach of the
alleged persecutor, and the [petitioner's] demonstrated ability to
relocate to the United States in order to apply for asylum." 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3). Other relevant factors to the analysis
include whether the petitioner previously had success relocating
internally and his family's "continued safe residence . . . in the
- 15 - country of removal." Caz, 84 F.4th at 28. After all, a
petitioner's unimpeded movement "demonstrates that [he] can
relocate safely," Chen Qin v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir.
2016), and that "close relatives continue to live peacefully in
the [petitioner's] homeland undercuts the [petitioner's] claim
that persecution awaits his return," López-Pérez, 26 F.4th at 112
(quoting Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 573 (1st Cir. 1999)).
Because Petitioners have not shown past persecution, they bear the
burden "to establish that relocation would be unreasonable."
Camara v. Holder, 725 F.3d 11, 15 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013).
Substantial evidence supports the Agency's conclusion
that internal relocation in El Salvador would be reasonable.
Urias-Orellana testified that he avoided harm, harassment, and
threats twice successfully: first by moving to Cojutepeque and
staying for one year, and then by moving to Cara Sucia and staying
there for two and a half years. See Chen Qin, 833 F.3d at 45
(considering the petitioner's successful internal relocation to a
relative's house). Likewise, as he has admitted, Urias-Orellana's
relatives live throughout El Salvador undisturbed. See, e.g.,
López-Pérez, 26 F.4th at 112 (considering that the petitioner's
sister and cousin still resided in Guatemala without being
persecuted). Evidence of "prior successful internal relocation
and the continued safe residence of [Petitioners'] family members
in" El Salvador supports the Agency's conclusion. Caz, 84 F.4th
- 16 - at 28 (first citing López-Pérez, 26 F.4th at 112; and then citing
Chen Qin, 833 F.3d at 45).
Petitioners contend that Urias-Orellana did not
internally relocate with success because, upon returning to
Claudia Lara, he was confronted by the men who threatened him.
They also note that El Salvador has a high per-capita murder rate;
is full of criminal gangs dispersed throughout the country; and is
so small as to make it impossible to avoid Wilfredo.
Petitioners' complaints falter against the substantial
evidence standard. As we have stated, we do not consider whether
the record contains any evidence suggesting that relocation might
not be reasonable -- only "whether a reasonable factfinder, having
considered all the evidence, would be compelled to conclude that
[Urias-Orellana] could not safely relocate within" El Salvador.
Id. at 29. A reasonable factfinder would not be so compelled here.
Urias-Orellana was able to live in towns across El Salvador for
years without harassment and only encountered difficulties once he
returned to his hometown. And his relatives -- members of his
family who Wilfredo would presumably also want dead -- have lived
across El Salvador unscathed. Therefore, substantial evidence
supports the Agency's conclusion that Urias-Orellana did not
establish that relocation was unreasonable.
- 17 - C. CAT Claim
To succeed on his CAT claim, Urias-Orellana "must show
that 'it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if
returned to his home country.'" Lafortune v. Garland, 110 F.4th
426, 438 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Bonnet v. Garland, 20 F.4th 80,
84 (1st Cir. 2021)). In doing so, he must show that "he would be
subject to torture 'by or with the acquiescence of a government
official.'" Perez-Trujillo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 10, 18 (1st Cir.
2021) (quoting Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir.
2014)). "Acquiescence" requires that a "public official, prior to
the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity
and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene
to prevent such activity." 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7).
Urias-Orellana argues that the record compels the
conclusion that the Salvadoran government lacked the resources to
protect him from torture at the hands of criminal gangs. He
stresses that the 2020 country conditions report demonstrates
corruption in the judicial system and government, along with
impunity for those officials, undermining the rule of law. In
turn, he contends that this led to the government's inability to
halt gangs.
Urias-Orellana's argument fails, as the Agency held, for
a fundamental reason: The 2020 country conditions report does not
"supplant the need for particularized evidence." Amouri v. Holder,
- 18 - 572 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that country conditions
reports "do not necessarily override petitioner-specific facts").
He is "oblig[ated] to point to specific evidence indicating that
he, personally, faces a risk of torture." Alvizures-Gomes v.
Lynch, 830 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2016).
That he does not do. Urias-Orellana never even attempted
to report his harassment, which did not rise to the level of
persecution and certainly not torture, to the police. He only
speculates here -- as he did before the Agency -- about its
inability to protect him. See, e.g., Ramírez Pérez v. Barr, 934
F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2019) (rejecting petitioner's argument of
government acquiescence where he never attempted to report his
mistreatment to the police); Gomez-Abrego, 26 F.4th at 46
(rejecting petitioner's arguments where she only pointed to "her
belief that the police were 'in cahoots' with gang members and [a]
country report showing widespread violence and police corruption
in El Salvador," and the Agency properly considered and rejected
this as evidence of acquiescence to torture).
And "even where 'efforts at managing gang activity [are
not] completely effectual,' that is insufficient to sustain a CAT
claim unless the record 'compel[s] a conclusion that the government
has acquiesced in gang activities.'" Perez-Trujillo, 3 F.4th at
20 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675
F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2012)). The record does not compel such a
- 19 - conclusion. The IJ explicitly considered the 2020 country
conditions report, and noted that report described how the
Salvadoran police's investigative units "have shown great promise"
in managing gangs. See id. at 20-21 (holding that substantial
evidence supported the Agency's no-acquiescence finding where
country conditions evidence stated, in part, that the Salvadoran
police had made efforts to crack down on gang violence);
Mayorga-Vidal, 675 F.3d at 20 (holding similarly).
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we deny the petition for judicial
review.
- 20 -