Urban v. State

387 S.W.2d 396

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 13, 1965
• Docket: 37122
• Status: Published

Opinions

McDONALD, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the offense of engaging in the business of bookmaking as denounced by Art. 652a, Vernon’s Ann.P.C.; his punishment was assessed at confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of three years.

The pertinent parts of the statute are:

“Art. 652a. Bookmaking; definition; penalty”

“Section 1. Any person who takes or accepts or places for another a bet or wager of money or anything of value on a horse race, * * * shall be guilty of book making and upon conviction be punished by confinement in the State Penitentiary for any term of years not less than one (1) nor more than five (5) or by confinement in the county jail for not less than ten (10) days nor more than one (1) year and by a fine of not less than One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars nor more than One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars.

“Sec. 2. Any person, who shall within a period of one (1) year next preceding the filing of the indictment commit as many as three (3) acts which are prohibited under Section 1 of this Act shall be guilty of engaging in the business of book making and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in Section 1 of this Act.”

The State’s evidence reflects that J. C. Davidson, a police officer of the City of Dallas working in plain clothes, placed, and appellant accepted, bets on horse races on three separate days in December of 1961.

The State, over objection that it was hearsay, was permitted to introduce the indictment into evidence. It is the state’s position that the indictment was offered for the purpose of showing the date of presentment to the Court in this case, for that purpose only, and for the record alone. The state also contends that since the indictment had been read to the jury that the part introduced before the court could not have caused injury to appellant.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence because the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the indictment as evidence of guilt; therefore, the jury could not have found that the three acts of bookmaking could not have been proved to have been within one year prior to its filing.

We have concluded the learned trial court fell into error in not sustaining appellant’s objection to the admission of the indictment. The indictment was clearly hearsay. It constituted no proof. Hearsay evidence is not actually evidence at all. 24 Tex.Jur.2d, p. 51, Sec. 557; Ex Parte Thrash, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 409, 320 S.W.2d 357; Doyle v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 458, 329 S.W. 2d 286. Although it was properly read to the jury and also the jury might properly have taken the indictment into the jury room during its deliberations, the indictment was still merely a pleading of the state. If the indictment was not offered by the state as evidence to show the date of presentment, but only for the record, for that purpose alone and for the purpose of showing the court the date of presentment, then no proof was given to the jury. However, we are constrained to disagree with the state’s position for the reason that this hearsay evidence shown by the indictment was also before the jury. It was the jury’s ■ task to find, and not the court, that the three acts alleged in the indictment were committed within a period of one year next preceding ' the filing of the indictment. These three acts must necessarily have been determined by facts derived from evidence to give support to a verdict of guilt. The state asserts that the date of presentment or filing of the indictment is not evidence of guilt, but a fact to he determined to compute the period of limitations. If the state’s position is sound, then surely and certainly this was an evidentiary fact. Appellant’s guilt could not be established without evidence to sustain the allegation contained in the indictment that the three acts transpired within one year prior to the filing of the indictment; so the conclusion is inescapable that the indictment was offered into evidence by the state to show that limitation had not run on the offense charged.

The state earnestly insists that the doctrine of judicial notice applies in this case and that the indictment as read shows the acts to have been committed within less than one year prior thereto. The state says that judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force and that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. However, the record here does not reflect that the Court took judicial notice. No request was made that the Court judicially notice the indictment or anything else. The Court did not indicate that it had judicially noticed the indictment, nor certainly was there a showing that the Court instructed the jury to consider the indictment under the doctrine of judicial notice. We doubt that it would have been proper for a court to have judicially noticed a vitally contested bit of' imperative proof, such as the three essential dates in the indictment, anyhow. We think the state was relegated to proof and should have and could have adduced evidence pertaining to these dates without relying upon the indictment. Certainly the clerk of the court and the Minutes of the Court could have supplied this vital evidence. We feel that the Court’s instruction in the charge to the jury effectively destroyed any credence that the jury might have placed upon the indictment initially. This phase of the court’s charge was as binding as any other part of the charge of the court.

The writer expresses the view that an indictment is an integral part of the state’s pleading and it is a useful and essential guide to the jury in its deliberations to test and weigh the evidence against the allegations contained in the indictment in order to determine if the state’s proof supports these various allegations contained in the-indictment. However, it would constitute fallacious reasoning to adopt the view that this pleading of the state became evidence, without proof.

We find no necessity to pass upon appellant’s other contentions. Upon another trial hereof, the complained of error in the courf s charge will no doubt not arise again. We express the further view that no error is reflected in the action of the trial court in failing to instruct the court reporter to take down all of the voir dire examination of the jury panel, in view of the court’s qualification of this bill of exception and the acceptance by appellant’s counsel of the bill as qualified.

Finding the evidence insufficient to sustain the verdict, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.