Urban v. Beloit Corp.

711 P.2d 685, 1985 Colo. LEXIS 534

• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado
• Decided: December 2, 1985
• Docket: 84SA298
• Status: Published

Opinions

LOHR, Justice.

Robert Urban was injured while operating a machine manufactured by Beloit Corporation. Urban sued Beloit for damages resulting from this injury, and Beloit moved for summary judgment based solely on a Colorado statute of repose. The Denver District Court granted the summary judgment motion, and Urban appealed. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved and therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.

I.

Urban was employed by Packaging Corporation of America. As part of his employment duties, he operated a “calendar stack” machine. The machine was manufactured and sold by Beloit in 1922, and at the time of Urban’s injury, it had been in continuous use at the Packaging Corporation plant for more than twenty-two years. On May 14, 1982, three of the fingers on Urban’s left hand were severed when his hand was caught as he placed a stack of cardboard into the machine. Urban filed a complaint against Beloit, alleging breach of express and implied warranties, negligent design and manufacture, and strict liability. Beloit asserted as an affirmative defense that a Colorado statute limiting actions against manufacturers of manufacturing equipment barred Urban’s claim. The statute, section 13-80-127.6, 6 C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), provides in part that all personal injury actions against a maker of manufacturing equipment must be brought within ten years after the equipment is first used for its intended purpose by someone who is not engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, or leasing the equipment. The statute by its terms does not apply to claims arising from injuries caused by hidden defects in the equipment. § 13-80-127.6(l)(b), 6 C.R.S. (1985 Supp.).¹ The district court agreed with Beloit that this statute forecloses Urban’s claims and granted Beloit’s motion for summary judgment under C.R.C.P. 56.

II.

Urban acknowledges that the calendar stack machine is “manufacturing equipment,” and he does not dispute the fact that his suit was filed more than ten years after the machine was first used for its intended purpose. Rather, Urban argues that section 13-80-127.6 should not foreclose his claims since his injury may have been caused by a hidden defect in the machine. Furthermore, he contends that the statute violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process of law, Colorado’s constitutional guarantee of equal access to courts of justice, and the Colorado Constitution’s prohibitions against special legislation. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Colo. Const, art. II, §§ 6, 11, art. V, § 25. Because we decide that a genuine factual issue exists as to whether Urban’s injury was caused by a hidden defect, we reverse the summary judgment without reaching Urban’s constitutional challenges to section 13-80-127.6.

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and is never warranted except on a clear showing that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact. E.g., Pueblo West Metropolitan District v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 689 P.2d 594, 600 (Colo.1984); Ginter v. Palmer & Co., 196 Colo. 203, 205, 585 P.2d 583, 584 (1978); Abrahamsen v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 177 Colo. 422, 426, 494 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1972). The moving party has the burden of establishing the lack of a triable factual issue, and all doubts as to the existence of such an issue must be resolved against the moving party. Ginter, 196 Colo. at 206, 585 P.2d at 584; Primock v. Hamilton, 168 Colo. 524, 528, 452 P.2d 375, 378 (1969). This is true even if the party opposing summary judgment would have the burden of proving the alleged facts at trial. Ginter, 196 Colo. at 206, 585 P.2d at 585 (citing Benton-Volvo-Metairie, Inc. v. Volvo Southwest, Inc., 479 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.1973)).

In its order granting summary judgment, the district court stated that Urban had failed to produce any facts to support his assertion that his injury was caused by a hidden defect. This suggests that the district court placed too heavy a burden on Urban. Although C.R.C.P. 56(e) requires an opposing party to demonstrate adequately by relevant and specific facts that there is a genuine issue for trial, this requirement comes into play only after a moving party makes a convincing showing that genuine issues are lacking. Ginter, 196 Colo. at 206, 585 P.2d at 585. Beloit Corporation, the moving party in the present case, failed to make such a showing.

Urban averred in his complaint that his injuries were caused by defects in the machine and that he was using the machine in a proper manner and in no way contributed to his injuries. Beloit denied these aver-ments. In support of its position on summary judgment that Urban’s injury was not caused by a hidden defect, Beloit relied solely on Urban’s statement in his deposition that he knew, prior to his injury, that the calendar stack was dangerous. Urban did acknowledge that the machine was dangerous and his injury did occur when his left hand was pulled into the machine. Neither of these facts, however, can be said to resolve the genuine factual question whether Urban’s injuries were caused by a hidden defect in the machine, since the acknowledged facts alone do not establish whether the cause of his injury was a hidden defect or a condition of which Urban was aware. See Vilardebo v. Keene Corp., 431 So.2d 620, 622 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983). The record simply leaves the precise cause of Urban’s injury in doubt. Because summary judgment “is a drastic remedy which denies litigants their right to trial and is never warranted except on a clear showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,” Ginter, 196 Colo. at 205, 585 P.2d at 584, it is not appropriate in this case.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

ERICKSON, J., dissents and QUINN, C.J., and ROVIRA, J., join in the dissent.

1 . Section 13-80-127.6, 6 C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), provides in pertinent part:

(l)(a) Notwithstanding any other statutory provisions to the contrary, all actions for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage brought against a person or entity on account of the design, assembly, fabrication, production, or construction of new manufacturing equipment, or any component part thereof, or involving the sale or lease of such equipment shall be brought within three years after the claim for relief arises and not thereafter.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection (1), no such action shall be brought on a claim arising more than ten years after such equipment was first used for its intended purpose by someone not engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, or leasing such equipment, except when the claim arises from injury due to hidden defects or prolonged exposure to hazardous material.

(c) The time limitation specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) shall not apply if the manufacturer, seller, or lessor intentionally misrepresented or fraudulently concealed any material fact concerning said equipment which is a proximate cause of the injury, death, or property damage.

(2) As used in this section, "manufacturing equipment" means equipment used in the operation or process of producing a new product, article, substance, or commodity for the purposes of commercial sale and different from and having a distinctive name, character, or use from the raw or prepared materials used in the operation or process.

(3) The provisions of subsection (1) ... shall not apply to a claim against a manufacturer ... who, in an express written warranty, warranted manufacturing equipment to be free of defects [for more than ten years after its first use for its intended purpose], if the injury complained of occurred and the claim for relief arose during [the warranty period].

(4) The provisions of subsection (1) ... shall not [apply to indemnity actions by a manufacturer against any other person who may be liable to the manufacturer for all or part of any judgment rendered against the manufacturer].