September 17, 2026
The Honorable Joe Gonzales Bexar County Criminal District Attorney Paul Elizondo Tower 101 West Nueva San Antonio, Texas 78205
Opinion No. KP-0530
Re: House Bill 4490 and the confidentiality of next of kin information under Article 49.25 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (RQ-0617-KP)
Dear Mr. Gonzales:
You ask five questions regarding a county medical examiner’s duty under the Public Information Act (“the PIA”) to release “information relating to the next of kin of a decedent” as provided in Article 49.25, subsection 11(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1 For context, you explain that the county medical examiner “plays a critical role in locating next of kin to ensure proper communication” about various topics concerning the decedent. Request Letter at 1. The Legislature recently amended the medical examiner’s duties in this regard via the passage of House Bill 4490, implementing new subsection 11(d), which excepts a decedent’s next-of-kin information from public disclosure under the PIA. 2 This amendment has resulted in a lack of clarity regarding the status of next-of-kin information, i.e., whether House Bill 4490 makes it confidential and thus prohibits disclosure. Id. at 3, 10. As a result, there is also “uncertainty for counties, medical examiners, and nonprofit donation organizations, with potential [disclosure] violations exposing county personnel and medical examiners to criminal penalties.” Id. at 10; see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.352 (specifying penalties for unlawful disclosure of confidential public information). Within this context you ask a series of questions seeking clarification about subsection 11(d) and its application, which we address in turn. Request Letter at 3.
Letter and Exhibits from Hon. Joe Gonzales, Bexar Cnty. Crim. Dist. Att’y, to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y 1
Gen. at 3 (Sept. 19, 2025), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/request-files/request/2025/ RQ0617KP.pdf (“Request Letter” and “Exhibits,” respectively).
Act of May 25, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 459, § 1, 2025 Tex. Gen. Laws 1072, 1072 (codified at TEX. 2
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.25, § 11(d)).
Article 49.25 excepts next-of-kin information from mandatory disclosure but does not make the information confidential.
The State’s policy is to make state information public. 3 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001(a).
After all, “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914), https://law.louisville.edu/lawlibrary/specialcollections /louis-d-brandeis-collection/writings-louis-d-brandeis/other-peoples-money-3. 4 The PIA is therefore “liberally construed in favor of granting a request for information,” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001(b), and any exceptions to disclosure are narrowly construed to effectuate that purpose, Jackson v. State Off. of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290, 299 (Tex. 2011).
“[P]ublic information” is information that is “written, produced, collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.002(a). Such information falls within one of three categories under the PIA: “information required to be disclosed, information excepted from mandatory (but not voluntary) disclosure, and confidential information that is prohibited from disclosure and subject to criminal penalties.” Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. GateHouse Media Tex. Holdings II, Inc., 711 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accts. v. Att’y Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336, 360 (Tex. 2010) (Wainwright, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)). Information such as a medical examiner’s “completed report, audit, evaluation, or investigation” is public information subject to required disclosure. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.022(a)(1). But not all public information may be accessed by the public under the PIA.
Certain information is excepted from disclosure if it is “considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Id. § 552.101; accord id. §§ 552.022(a), .007(a). Confidential information is the most protected public information, as it is highly sensitive and thus must not be disclosed. See id. § 552.101; Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 360 (Wainwright, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Indeed, the PIA makes disclosure of such information a misdemeanor crime punishable by “fine, confinement, or both.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.352(a), (b). Information excepted from mandatory disclosure, by contrast, may be voluntarily shared without triggering a criminal violation. See id. § 552.007(a) (permitting voluntary public disclosure unless disclosure is “expressly prohibited by law or the information is confidential under law”). The PIA’s text shows that the “Legislature intended the word ‘confidential’ to have a specific meaning in the PIA, separating highly sensitive information that
3 In this respect, the Legislature did not mince words. Subsection 552.001(a) states:
the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative government that adheres to the principle that government is the servant and not the master of the people, it is the policy of this state that each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001(a).
4 The statement and related discussion are located in Chapter V titled “What Publicity Can Do.”
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is prohibited from disclosure (such as the home address of a peace officer) from sensitive information that is merely excepted from disclosure (such as information in a student record).” Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 360 (Wainwright, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). With this background, we turn to your first question.
You ask whether subsection 11(d) excepts next-of-kin information “from mandatory disclosure,” thus “prohibit[ing] a county medical examiner from disclosing” this information to “tissue and corneal donation organizations” under the PIA. Request Letter at 3. Article 49.25 addresses a medical examiner’s duties related to “[i]nquests upon [d]ead [b]odies.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 49.01−.52 (addressing a medical examiner’s office and duties). Relevant here, section 11 addresses a decedent’s records that are in the medical examiner’s possession. Id. art. 49.25, § 11. Subsection 11(d), about which you inquire, provides that a decedent’s next-of-kin information is “excepted from required public disclosure in accordance with” the PIA, “but is subject to disclosure under subpoena or authority of other law.” Id. § 11(d). Thus, the main inquiry is whether the phrase “excepted from required public disclosure” bars disclosure by rendering the information confidential or only exempts it from mandatory disclosure. Request Letter at 3.
In construing subsection 11(d), “our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent without unduly restricting or expanding the [subsection’s] scope.” Greater Hous. P’ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2015). We begin with the text. Id. Subsection 11(d) provides that “[t]he information relating to the next of kin of a decedent is excepted from required public disclosure in accordance with” the PIA “but is subject to disclosure under subpoena or authority of other law.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.25, § 11(d). Applying the text as written, subsection 11(d) does not make next-of-kin information expressly confidential. But cf. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 418.182(a) (designating certain government security information “confidential”); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Abbott, 310 S.W.3d 670, 675 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (determining that DVDs containing video recorded by security cameras in a Texas Capitol hallway were confidential under subsection 418.182(a)). Instead, subsection 11(d) excepts this information from “required public disclosure” under the PIA. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.25, § 11(d). This is not necessarily dispositive as to confidentiality, however, as the Texas Supreme Court has opined that “[a] law does not have to use the word ‘confidential’ to expressly impose confidentiality.” In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 334 (Tex. 2001) (finding confidentiality in the context of consulting reports). But our “text-based approach to statutory construction requires us to study the language of the specific provision at issue, within the context of the statute as a whole, endeavoring to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” Malouf v. State ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 726 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 867 (Tex. 2014)). Here, the statutory context proves instructive.
Unlike subsection 11(d), subsection 11(c) classifies an autopsy report as confidential with express language, providing that it is “confidential” and “not subject to disclosure” under the PIA. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.25, § 11(c) (emphasis added). When the Legislature added subsection 11(d), it could have declared next-of-kin information confidential, as it did previously with autopsy reports in subsection 11(c), but elected not to do so. Likewise, the Legislature could have designated the information “not subject to disclosure” under the PIA, id. § 11(c) (emphasis
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added), but instead excepted next-of-kin information from “required . . . disclosure” only, id. § 11(d) (emphasis added). In construing subsection11(d), “[w]e must presume that every word of a statute was used for a purpose, and that every word excluded from a statute was excluded for a purpose.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 S.W.3d at 673. Since we “ascertain and give effect to the [L]egislature’s intent as expressed by the plain meaning of the words in the statute,” id., we conclude from the plain language here that the Legislature intended to make information under subsection 11(c) confidential, whereas information under subsection 11(d) is excepted from mandatory disclosure only, cf. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 711 S.W.3d at 663 (concluding same where statutory text at issue permitted but did not require disclosure). In sum, subsection 11(d) does not render next-of-kin information confidential; it does, however, grant the medical examiner’s office discretion to withhold the information. 5
Information indirectly identifying next-of-kin constitutes information “relating to” next-of-kin.
Your last question focuses on the scope of information that can be withheld by a medical examiner under subsection 11(d). Request Letter at 3. You ask whether “information that indirectly identifies” or “could be used to contact a decedent’s next of kin” constitutes “information relating to the next of kin of a decedent” in subsection 11(d). Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.25, § 11(d). Article 49.25 does not define “relating to” so we apply the term’s ordinary meaning, looking first to the term’s dictionary definition. See Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017). “Relating to” means “to have some connection to” or “to stand in relation to.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (12th ed. 2024) (defining “relate”); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 S.W.3d at 675 n.2 (referring to Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “relate” to interpret “relating to”). The Legislature’s use of the phrase “information relating to” the next of kin suggests the information extends beyond direct information, such as the next-of-kin’s listed address or phone number. And this is consistent with Texas court holdings. For example, one Texas court examined a confidentiality provision within the context of the PIA and held that “information that . . . relates to a motor vehicle accident” broadened the scope of information to “render more than the actual accident reports confidential.” City of San Antonio v. Abbott, 432 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. denied) (alteration in original); see also Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 S.W.3d at 674–75 (determining that DVDs containing video recorded by security cameras in a Texas Capitol hallway were confidential because information on them “relates to the specifications, operating procedures or location of a security system used to protect public or private property from an act of terrorism”). Thus, the court concluded that the statute “did not limit the scope of the confidentiality . . . to either the accident reports themselves or to defined categories of information” but extended to information relating to the motor vehicle accident. City of San Antonio, 432 S.W.3d at 432–33. The same reasoning applies here. Subsection 11(d) is not limited to the next-of-kin’s direct information. If the information relates to the next of kin, meaning it has some connection, it can be withheld from required disclosure under the PIA. Thus, if the decedent and next of kin have a
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Since we conclude the information is not confidential, we do not address your fourth question asking about criminal liability, as section 552.352 would not be implicated in the sharing of information under subsection 11(d). See Request Letter at 4; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.352 (applying only to unauthorized disclosures of confidential information).
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“shared home address, “home telephone number,” or “other similar contact information,” such information constitutes “information relating to the next of kin of a decedent” and may be withheld. Request Letter at 3.
A contractual agreement between a county and a nonprofit tissue and corneal donation organization is “other law” under subsection 11(d) of Article 49.25.
Your second question concerns the meaning of “other law”—whether a “pre-existing nofee contractual agreement between a county and a nonprofit tissue and corneal donation organization[]” constitutes “other law,” requiring the disclosure of next-of-kin information under subsection 11(d). Id. Although “other law” is not defined in Article 49.25, section 11, or the PIA, the term “is not limited to other statutes.” In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d at 332. The Texas Supreme Court has concluded that “other law” encompasses judicial decisions, procedural and evidentiary rules, as well as common law—varying types of binding and enforceable legal mandates. Id. The essential question then is whether a contract has the same force and effect to fit within the “other law” category. We conclude it does. This conclusion relies on the determination that disclosure under subsection 11(d) is discretionary.
A contract is somewhat unique from the types of “other law” referenced above as it is an agreement founded upon “a promise or a set of promises” between contracting parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). But it is not wholly distinct. A valid contract is binding and enforceable under the law—“the breach of which the law gives a remedy” as well as “the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.” Id. In fact, Texas courts have affirmed the binding terms of contracts as “sacred” and that they “shall be enforced by Courts of justice.” Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 481 (Tex. 2017) (internal quotation omitted) (citations omitted). And this “paramount public policy mandates that courts are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). Therefore, as long as a contract “does not violate the law or public policy,” courts “must respect and enforce the terms.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, like a judicial decision, statute, or rule of civil procedure, a contract is a binding and enforceable legal mandate constituting “other law.” 6 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.25, § 11(d).
And the context of subsection 11(d) supports this conclusion. Subsection 11(d) permits disclosure “under subpoena or authority of other law.” Id. (emphasis added). Applying noscitur a sociis, a statutory construction tool, the meaning of statutory terms may be “ascertained by reference to words associated with them in the statute.” City of Fort Worth v. Cornyn, 86 S.W.3d 320, 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 195−98 (2012) (discussing noscitur a sociis). Where “two or more words of analogous meaning are employed together in a statute, they
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The medical examiner’s discretionary disclosure authority is dispositive as to whether a contract qualifies as “other law.” See supra pp. 2−4. In no event may a contract convert what is unlawful into lawful conduct; for instance, it cannot negate the confidential nature of public information. See Kokernot v. Gilstrap, 143 Tex. 595, 600, 187 S.W.2d 368, 370−71 (1945) (concluding a contract was illegal, void, and unenforceable where transaction violated the law).
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are understood to be used in their cognate sense, to express the same relations and give color and expression to each other.” Id. (citation omitted). Subsection 11(d) not only identifies “authority of other law” as an avenue for disclosure but also links that authority with disclosure under a subpoena. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.25, § 11(d). A subpoena is “[a] writ or order commanding a person to appear before a court or other tribunal, subject to a penalty for failing to comply.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1732 (12th ed. 2024); accord Ex parte Gould, 60 Tex. Crim. 442, 452, 132 S.W. 364, 369 (1910) (describing a subpoena duces tecum as a “process by which a court, at the instance of a suitor, commands a person, who has in his possession or control some document or paper that is pertinent to the issues of the pending controversy, to produce it for use at the trial” (citation omitted)). Akin to a contract, a subpoena pertains to specific parties. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 176.1, .2. Likewise, it is formalized and executed under the law rendering it binding and enforceable. Id. 176.4, .8. This indicates that the phrase “authority of other law,” when considered in relation to a subpoena, refers to legally binding and enforceable authority similar to that inherent in a contract.
A United States Supreme Court decision further supports this conclusion. In Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass’n, the phrase “all other law” was a point of contention in an Interstate Commerce Act provision that provided, in part, a merger “transaction is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law” necessary to carry out the transaction. 499 U.S. 117, 127 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting language in current 49 U.S.C. § 11321, formerly in 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a)). The issue was whether “all other law” included legal obligations under a collective bargaining agreement. Id. The Court observed that this language was “clear, broad, and unqualified” and did not distinguish “between positive enactments and commonlaw rules of liability.” Id. at 128. Concluding that a contract, lacked “legal force apart from the law that acknowledges its binding character,” id. at 130, the Court held that “other law” encompassed laws imposing legal obligations on the parties and compelling them to perform their agreement, id. at 129. In sum, the Court concluded that “all other laws” included contractual obligations. Id.
Ultimately, where a medical examiner and a nonprofit organization enter into a valid and enforceable contractual agreement that “facilitates the harvesting of tissue and provides related facility access,” Request Letter at 3, that agreement constitutes “other law” where it requires disclosure of next-of-kin information by a medical examiner to the nonprofit organization. 7
The Texas Anatomical Gift Act and Glenda Dawson Donate Life-Texas Registry do not require disclosure of next-of-kin information by a medical examiner.
Your third question asks whether “other Texas statutes, including those governing organ and tissue donation” as well as the “Donate Life Texas Registry” “authorize or require[]” a medical examiner to disclose next-of-kin information “notwithstanding the confidentiality requirements” in subsection 11(d). Id. As discussed, subsection 11(d) does not impose confidentiality requirements so we address this question in the context of discretionary disclosure. See supra pp. 2−4. While your question does not specifically identify any statutory provisions, you and multiple briefing parties reference various provisions in the Health and Safety Code, offering different
7 We note that no specific contract provisions were provided, but even if they were, the Committee does not construe contracts. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0479 (2025) at 2.
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positions on whether next-of-kin information may or may not be shared under those provisions. 8 We limit our review to the provisions raised, 9 beginning with the Texas Anatomical Gift Act. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 692A.001−.023 (“the Gift Act”).
The Gift Act governs “an anatomical gift or amendment to, revocation of, or refusal to make an anatomical gift.” Id. § 692A.003. “Anatomical gift” means “a donation of all or part of a human body to take effect after the donor’s death for the purpose of transplantation, therapy, research, or education.” Id. § 692A.002(3). The Gift Act’s provisions address related topics such as donor consent, authorization and manner of making a gift, and rights of and coordination with procurement organizations. See generally id. §§ 692A.001−.023. One briefing party suggests that section 692A.014 “authorizes an information exchange outside of the Public Information Act.” 10 Again, we look to the text. Greater Hous. P’ship, 468 S.W.3d at 58.
Section 692A.014 governs the rights and duties of procurement organizations and other related entities. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 692A.014. “Procurement organization” means “an eye bank, organ procurement organization, or tissue bank.” 11 Id. § 692A.002(24). Relevant here, subsection 692A.014(a) requires a procurement organization, upon the receipt of a hospital referral of “an individual at or near death,” to “make a reasonable search of the records of the Department of Public Safety” (“DPS”) as well as “any donor registry that it knows exists for the geographical area in which the individual resides.” Id. § 692A.014(a); see also id. § 692A.014(b) (“A procurement organization must be allowed reasonable access to information in the records of the Department of Public Safety to ascertain whether an individual at or near death is a donor.”). The procurement organization must also make a “reasonable search for any person” listed in section 692A.009 who has “priority to make an anatomical gift on behalf of a prospective donor.” Id. § 692A.014(g); see also id. §§ 692A.014(f) (requiring same to locate parents of a minor), .009 (governing who may make an anatomical gift). These provisions put the onus on the organization to locate information and any person implicated by the anatomical gift, and allocate resources for the organization to do so, such as access to DPS records and donor registries. Id. § 692A.014(a)– (b), (f)–(g). Yet, they do not grant access to a medical examiner’s next-of-kin records or, in fact, make any mention of a medical examiner. See id. And we are not permitted to expand upon what the Legislature has expressly provided. See Greater Hous. P’ship, 468 S.W.3d at 58.
8 See generally Request Letter; Brief from Audra Taylor, S. Tex. Blood & Tissue, to Off. of the Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. Comm. (rec’d Oct. 22, 2025) (“Taylor Brief”) (on file with the Op. Comm.); Brief from Adam Robison, King & Spalding LLP, to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. (Oct. 21, 2025) (“Robison Brief”) (on file with the Op. Comm.); Brief from J. Keith Pinckard, MD, PhD, Chief Med. Exam’r, Travis Cnty. Med. Exam’r, to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. (rec’d Oct. 23, 2025) (“Pinckard Brief”) (on file with the Op. Comm.).
9 Because an “exhaustive treatment” of your question is outside the scope of an opinion, we consider only the statutory provisions raised before the Committee. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. AC-0003 (2023) at 2 n.5.
10 Pinckard Brief at 2; see also Robison Brief at 2−3 (suggesting chapters 692A and 693 as well as Article 4925, subsection 11(d) together permit exchange of information to carry out donation purpose).
11 An “[o]rgan procurement organization” is “a person designated by the secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services as an organ procurement organization.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 692A.002(19). A “[t]issue bank” is “a person licensed, accredited, or regulated under federal or state law to engage in the recovery, screening, testing, processing, storage, or distribution of tissue.” Id. § 692A.002(35).
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Subsection 692A.014(d), however, presents a slightly different picture. It applies “at any time after a donor’s death” and provides that “the person to which a[n] [anatomical gift] passes under Section 692A.011 may conduct any reasonable examination necessary to ensure the medical suitability of the body or part for its intended purpose.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 692A.014(d). The examination “may include an examination of all medical and dental records of the donor.” Id. § 692A.014(e). Section 692A.011 identifies who may receive an anatomical gift, which includes an organ procurement organization or tissue bank. Id. § 692A.011(a)(1), (4). Thus, if an organization receives an anatomical gift in compliance with section 629A.011, that organization is permitted to examine “all medical and dental records of the donor,” which would include next-of-kin information should it be located within those records. Id. § 692A.014(e). This review does not implicate the PIA, as it is not a request for information but a piece of the examination process to determine medical suitability under the Gift Act. Compare id., with TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.003(6) (“‘Requestor’ means a person who submits a request to a governmental body for inspection or copies of public information.” (emphasis added)), and Boeing Co. v. Paxton, 466 S.W.3d 831, 833 (Tex. 2015) (“Typically, a request for public information involves two parties, the governmental body holding the information and the citizen requesting it[] . . . .”). Nonetheless, since the organization’s access to information is restricted to an assessment needed to confirm the medical suitability of a body or part for its intended use, subsection 692A.014(d) does not require the disclosure of next-of-kin information to support a donation; it is solely for evaluating the medical eligibility of an anatomical gift. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 692A.014(d), (e). Thus, in response to your inquiry, the Gift Act does not require or authorize a medical examiner to disclose next-of-kin; instead, it provides access to information when a donation has already been made. Id. § 692A.014(d). Although section 692A.014 permits or requires a procurement organization to access certain information, none of these provisions require or authorize a medical examiner to disclose next-of-kin information under the PIA to an organization for the purpose of facilitating a donation.
Briefers also suggest that sections 693.002 and 693.003 require a medical examiner’s office to share next-of-kin information with procurement organizations to facilitate organ and tissue donation. 12 Chapter 693 addresses the removal of body parts and tissue. See generally id. §§ 693.001−.024. Relevant here, subsection 693.002(b) provides that a medical examiner “may permit the removal of tissue” upon a tissue bank’s request. 13 Id. § 693.002(b). Section 693.003 similarly authorizes a county court to permit removal of tissue in certain circumstances where consent cannot be obtained. Id. § 693.003. But both provisions are silent as to information access or mandatory disclosure. Id. §§ 693.002(b), .003. If the statutory text “is not hazy, we must . . . take the Legislature at its word.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d at 475 (Willett, J., concurring) (internal quotation omitted) (citation omitted). Neither section 693.022 nor 693.033 provides an exception to subsection 11(d) that would implicate either an authorization or mandatory duty to disclose next-of-kin information by a medical examiner.
You also ask if the “Donate Life Texas Registry” requires disclosure of next-of-kin information. Request Letter at 3. We assume you are referring to the Glenda Dawson Donate Life-
12 See Robison Brief at 3; Pinckard Brief at 1−2.
13 See supra note 11.
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Texas Registry. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 692A.020. The registry is a “statewide Internet-based registry of organ, tissue, and eye donors.” Id. § 692A.020(c). Per the governing statute, a nonprofit organization maintains and administers the registry, while DPS is charged with transferring donor information to the administering nonprofit. Id. § 692A.020(a)−(d). The nonprofit must make donor information available to procurement organizations, while the organizations are charged with “protect[ing] the confidentiality and privacy of the individuals providing information.” Id. § 692A.020(e)(4). And, while subsection (f) identifies the entities to which the procurement organization may share information, it is silent as to a medical examiner’s duty to share next-of-kin information. Id. § 692A.020(f). At bottom, section 692A.020 addresses only the duties of the administering nonprofit, DPS, and procurement organizations. The registry’s governing law does not mandate or authorize sharing next-of-kin information by a medical examiner. 14
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Your request is limited to “Texas statutes,” see Request Letter at 3, but at least one briefing party raised federal requirements under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule, Taylor Brief at 2 (citing to 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(h)). While we limit our response to Texas statutes, we note that subsection 164.512(h) provides that a “covered entity may . . . disclose” protected health information to certain procurement organizations but does not mandate it. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(h) (emphasis added). Assuming arguendo that a medical examiner is a “covered entity” under HIPAA and next-of-kin information is “protected health information,” a medical examiner is not required to disclose such information.
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S U M M A R Y
We must apply statutory text as written by the Legislature.
When it amended the Code of Criminal Procedure article 49.25, adding subsection 11(d), the Legislature elected to except next-ofkin information from required disclosure under the Public Information Act but chose not to make the information confidential. Therefore, subsection 11(d) permits a medical examiner’s office to withhold next-of-kin information from mandatory disclosure under the PIA but does not bar disclosure.
Very truly yours,
KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
MICHAEL C. COTTON Chair, Opinion Committee
AMY L. K. WILLS Assistant Attorney General