In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-19-00378-CV ___________________________
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS SYSTEM, Appellant
V.
LISA BARRINGER, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. CV-2017-00827
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
In this accelerated interlocutory appeal,1 Appellant University of North Texas
System appeals the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction in this age-
discrimination and retaliation case brought by Appellee Lisa Barringer. In four issues,
UNT argues that the trial court erred by denying its plea because (1) Barringer did not
suffer an adverse employment action, (2) Barringer failed to establish she was replaced
or treated disparately, (3) Barringer failed to establish an adverse employment action
or a causal connection between her supervisor’s knowledge of any alleged protected
activity by her and the reason she left UNT’s employment, and (4) Barringer did not
present sufficient evidence of pretext by UNT. Because we conclude that the
jurisdictional evidence proves that Barringer resigned of her own free will and that she
was not constructively discharged, we reverse the trial court’s order denying UNT’s
plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment that this case be dismissed for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
II. BACKGROUND
Barringer, who at the time this suit was filed was fifty-one years old, began
working for UNT in March 2013 as its sole human resources (HR) project manager.
1 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8); Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(a).
2 Barringer’s duties initially included various HR compliance and technology projects,
but later, she was also assigned projects involving HR administrative responsibilities.
According to Barringer, she had always received “an overall rating of exceeding
expectations” on her informal and formal performance reviews. Initially, Barringer
reported to either Alan Clemson or Steve Sosland, but in November 2014, Luis Lewin
became Barringer’s direct supervisor.
By Barringer’s account, no later than early 2015, Lewin transferred his
executive assistant, Louise Hall, who was over seventy years old at the time, to
another position under one of his subordinates for the purpose of terminating Hall’s
employment. Afterward, Lewin hired Addyson Green, an individual under thirty
years of age, to replace Hall. Lewin allegedly then began to assign Green
administrative projects and duties that had traditionally been Barringer’s
responsibilities. He also began to remove most of Barringer’s compliance and
technology projects from her and assign them to other employees.
Barringer contended that she sought direction from Lewin regarding her work
on human resources compliance and technology projects, but that Lewin was “non-
communicative with respect to her request for assistance . . . to the point of absolutely
ignoring her.” Barringer claims that she complained to UNT’s HR representatives
about Lewin, but she was afforded no remedy. On August 12, 2016, as she was
seeking assistance from him regarding a project she was working on, Lewin
confronted Barringer. According to Barringer, Lewin subjected her to a “harangue” 3 that included Lewin’s allegations that she had been inadequately performing her duties
for the prior six months and that she was not well liked by other employees. During
this encounter, Lewin allegedly also “threatened” her with administrative leave and an
investigation based on complaints by others regarding her performance as co-
presenter of a recent HR workshop.
Barringer pleaded that “[i]n the face of Lewin’s unjustified threat of
administrative leave, investigation and discipline and threat of termination only, and
for no other reason, [she] was constructively discharged from her position.”
Specifically, Barringer alleged that she had to quit “with good cause” because she was
dissatisfied with Lewin’s lack of communication and feedback and because he had
made false claims of her inadequate performance. Afterward, Lewin allegedly
eliminated Barringer’s position, hired an assistant for Green (who is also under the age
of thirty), and promoted Green with an increase in salary.
Barringer filed a claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and subsequently received a notice of right to file a civil
action against UNT from the Texas Workforce Commission. Barringer later filed this
suit in April 2017, claiming age discrimination and (eventually) retaliation in violation
of Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.055. More
than two years later, UNT filed its plea to the jurisdiction claiming that it had
sovereign immunity from this suit under the Texas Labor Code because Barringer
could not meet all prima facie elements of her claims. Among several arguments, 4 UNT claimed that the jurisdictional evidence proved that Barringer had not suffered
an adverse employment action by being constructively discharged, an element to both
her age-discrimination and retaliation claims. As part of its plea, UNT attached
several exhibits including Barringer’s and Lewin’s depositions.
In her deposition, Barringer testified that she had initiated the meeting with
Lewin where he told her that it had been reported to him that at the HR workshop
Barringer had made disparaging remarks about upper management and had made a
pejorative comment regarding Muslims. Barringer said that she admitted to Lewin
that she was “unprepared” to present the workshop, but she denied having made the
pejorative comment, and she attributed her other comments to her joking.
According to Barringer, Lewin told her that because of her performance in the
workshop, including the statements she allegedly made, he was going to place her on
administrative leave while he was away on vacation and that there would be an
investigation into her conduct at the workshop when he returned. Barringer said that
she asked Lewin whether he was going to fire her, and he told her that he had not
decided:
Q: Okay. Did he tell you he was contemplating terminating you?
A: He said he hadn’t decided.
Q: He did not say that he was contemplating it, based on all the complaints about [your] behavior?
A: No.
5 By Barringer’s account, the insinuation that Lewin did not know whether he
was going to fire her and that he would not decide until he returned from his two-
week vacation left a cloud of uncertainty over her “that was just torture for no
reason.” Barringer admitted that she told Lewin that she did not want to go through
an investigation. And Barringer said that shortly after the meeting, she gave Lewin a
two-week notice2 that she would be resigning, but “he refused” to let her serve out
the two weeks, and her resignation became effective immediately.
Lewin testified in his deposition that he had told Barringer that he was placing
her on administrative leave with pay while he was on vacation because of the alleged
comments she had made at the HR workshop. Consistent with Barringer’s deposition
2 While Barringer said that she gave a two-week notice, her August 12, 2016 resignation letter states:
It is with a great deal of sadness that I tender my resignation as Project Manager for the HR Department at the University of North Texas System effective today, August 12th.
My tenure in this role has been at times frustrating and discouraging but also fun and challenging.
I continue to be a proud UNT Alumni and I wish the HR team all the best as they strive to improve and succeed.
Barringer testified that she was “trying to resign with as much dignity and professionalism as I could.”
6 testimony,3 Lewin said that Barringer is the one who asked whether he was
contemplating firing her, and he responded, “I’m contemplating it, but I’m going to
place you on administrative leave pending an investigation.”
By Lewin’s account, less than an hour after this conversation, Barringer
informed him that she was resigning. Because of that, Lewin said that a formal
investigation never took place, but if it had, someone outside of HR would have
conducted it:
Q: But you never did the investigation because she refused?
....
A: I couldn’t do the investigation without her—giving her, you know, a fair chance to tell her story.
Q: So is that a formal, like, interview? Would you be doing the interview, or would it be a third party?
A: We had—we had a practice in HR that if there was a complaint about an HR—with an HR person, we would never make the investigation. We would call the General Counsel and ask them to recommend a third party from the outside to do an investigation not to show any bias, you know, or unfairness in the investigation, per se.
Q: So you couldn’t threaten [Barringer] with an investigation by you, correct?
A: Correct.
3 Barringer testified in her deposition that Lewin had told her that the reason he was placing her on administrative leave was because he was “going on vacation, and I don’t want to deal with this now.”
7 Lewin stated that had an investigation revealed that Barringer had not made the
offensive statements in the HR workshop, she “[a]bsolutely” would have retained her
job. But Lewin said that he did not believe Barringer when she said she had not made
inappropriate or pejorative comments in the HR workshop. 4
UNT also provided the trial court with Hall’s affidavit. Hall stated that she
never heard Lewin describe her as “old school” and that she did not believe that
Lewin or any other UNT employee ever treated her differently or unfairly “because of
[her] age.” She also swore that Barringer had never complained to her “about any age
discrimination by [Lewin].”
After having a hearing on UNT’s plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court denied
the plea. This appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
In its first issue, UNT argues that Barringer failed to establish an adverse
employment action and that because an adverse employment action is necessary to
establish a prima facie case of either age discrimination or retaliation, Barringer failed
to produce sufficient evidence of a critical element to both of her claims. Specifically,
4 Also attached to UNT’s plea to the jurisdiction are what appear to be two completed feedback forms from attendees of the HR workshop. One form indicated that Barringer did “not seem prepared” for the workshop and that she “sometimes seemed a bit insulting to the group.” Another form had the comment that Barringer was “a little unprepared” for the workshop. Barringer’s co-presenter of the workshop—the employee who allegedly brought Barringer’s conduct in the workshop to Lewin’s attention—on the other hand received reviews of being “excellent” and “Wonderful! A++!”
8 UNT argues that Barringer failed to rebut UNT’s evidence that she was not
constructively discharged. Thus, UNT argues, the trial court erred by denying its plea.
We agree.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s ability to hear a case lies in its subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). “A plea to the jurisdiction is a
dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004) (citing Bland, 34 S.W.3d at
554). A plea to the jurisdiction may be used to assert governmental immunity and
defeat a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. A trial court’s ruling on a plea to the
jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 632 (Tex.
2015).
If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we
consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the
jurisdictional issues raised, just as the trial court must do. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004); Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555. If the evidence
creates a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the
plea to the jurisdiction, and the factfinder will resolve the question. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 227–28. But if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a
fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea as a matter of
law. Id. at 228. The standard mirrors our review of summary judgments, where we 9 take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, indulging every reasonable
inference and resolving any doubts in the non-movant’s favor. City of El Paso v.
Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009).
B. Waiver of Governmental Immunity and the McDonald Douglas Framework
Both of Barringer’s claims fall under the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act (TCHRA). See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.051 (age discrimination), 21.055
(retaliation). The TCHRA waives governmental immunity but only in those instances
in which “the plaintiff actually alleges a violation of the TCHRA by pleading facts that
state a claim thereunder.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629,
636 (Tex. 2012). Absent a pleading stating a claim under the TCHRA, the
governmental entity’s immunity from suit has not been waived. Id. at 637.
There are two alternative methods by which a plaintiff can establish
discrimination or retaliation under the TCHRA. See Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies,
47 S.W.3d 473, 476–77 (Tex. 2001). An employee can offer direct evidence of the
employer’s discriminatory actions or words. Id. at 476. Direct evidence of
discrimination is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus
without inference or presumption. Coll. of the Mainland v. Glover, 436 S.W.3d 384, 392
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
Alternatively, because direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation is a
“rarity” in employment cases, courts allow claims to proceed with indirect or
circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation. See Russo v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 10 93 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). Under this
second method, which applies in this case, Texas courts follow the burden-shifting
mechanism set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas.5 See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824–26 (1973);
Glover, 436 S.W.3d at 392.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, as applied to the TCHRA, the plaintiff
is entitled to a presumption of discrimination if the plaintiff meets the “minimal”
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Mission Consol.,
372 S.W.3d at 634. The prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination because
courts presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on
the consideration of impermissible factors. See id. Once a plaintiff has established a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
See M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Tex. 2000) (per
curiam). A plaintiff “will only be required to submit evidence if the defendant
presents evidence negating one of” the basic facts that make up the prima facie case.
Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 637.
5 Analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of the TCHRA. Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 634.
11 C. Adverse Employment Action and Constructive Discharge
An age discrimination prima facie case requires that the plaintiff show that she
suffered an adverse employment action. See Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 634; Bowen
v. El Paso Elec. Co., 49 S.W.3d 902, 908 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, pet. denied).
Likewise, a retaliation prima facie case requires the plaintiff to produce evidence that
she suffered an adverse employment action.6 See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 789 (Tex. 2018); Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d
317, 329 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied); Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P.,
214 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). One way
of demonstrating an adverse employment action is with proof that an employee was
constructively discharged. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex.
2010).
A constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes conditions so
intolerable that an employee reasonably feels compelled to resign. See Baylor Univ. v.
Coley, 221 S.W.3d 599, 604–05 (Tex. 2007) (citing Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S.
129, 141, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004)); Hammond v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 821 S.W.2d
174, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). Many factors are relevant
6 Citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, Barringer claims that an “adverse employment action . . . is actually not required to establish an actionable claim of retaliation . . . .” 548 U.S. 53, 69–70, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415–16 (2006). But the Supreme Court of Texas explained in Alamo Heights that an employee must experience a “material adverse employment action” to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the TCHRA. 544 S.W.3d at 782.
12 to the consideration of whether the plaintiff was constructively discharged, including
evidence of badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to
encourage the employee’s resignation. Davis v. City of Grapevine, 188 S.W.3d 748, 766
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied), abrogated on other grounds by Lujan v.
Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. 2018). In deciding if the work conditions meet
that standard, courts consider a number of employer actions, such as demotion or a
reduction in salary or job responsibilities. Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d
473, 481 (5th Cir. 2008). But potential disciplinary action, investigations into alleged
work-place violations, or work-place criticisms are insufficient alone to cause a
reasonable person to resign. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied). And courts “have repeatedly held that complaints of
ostracism and personality conflicts, unfair criticism, and heated exchanges are petty
annoyances, not conduct likely to deter an employee from making a discrimination
complaint.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 789; see also Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.
Ct. at 2415 (reasoning that “‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and
‘snubbing by supervisors and co-workers’ are not actionable” under Title VII)
(quoting 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 669
(3d ed. 1996)).
Evidence that an employee was forced to choose between resigning or being
fired may also be sufficient to raise a fact issue regarding constructive discharge.
Gardner v. Abbott, 414 S.W.3d 369, 383 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.); Perret v. 13 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 770 F.3d 336, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2014). In these so-called
“ultimatum” cases, courts require something beyond the employee’s subjective belief
that termination was inevitable. See Perret, 770 F.3d at 338–39 (holding that employees
were not given ultimatum when employer placed employees on a performance
improvement plan, which was the last step in employer’s process for terminating
employees); Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997) (reasoning
ultimatum standard met when supervisor told employee he should find another job,
and he had one week before he would be placed on indefinite unpaid leave); Davis,
188 S.W.3d at 766 (holding ultimatum standard met when manager informed
employee that “it would be in his best interest if he decided to resign rather than be
terminated because future employers may ask the City whether Davis resigned or was
terminated”).
D. No Evidence of Constructive Discharge
Barringer argues, as she did in the trial court, that the cumulation of Lewin’s
recent unsatisfactory performance reviews of her, his telling her that she was unliked
by her coworkers, his assuming the truthfulness of the allegation that she had made
inappropriate comments at the HR workshop, his alleged position that an
investigation would not change his mind about terminating her employment, and his
actual threat of termination all led her to reasonably believe she needed to resign. We
disagree.
14 Regarding Lewin’s recent unsatisfactory performance reviews, it is well-
established that work-place criticisms are insufficient to cause a reasonable person to
resign for purposes of establishing constructive discharge. Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d at 9.
As to Lewin’s telling Barringer that she was disliked by fellow employees, this
comment amounts to nothing more than potentially unfair criticism about personality
conflicts and is “not conduct likely to deter an employee from making a
discrimination complaint.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 789.
The evidence also does not support Barringer’s contention that Lewin had
already assumed the truthfulness of the allegations against her and thus an alleged
investigation would have been a sham. Indeed, Lewin testified at his deposition that
he intended to have these claims investigated once he returned from his two-week
vacation and that had the results of an investigation exonerated Barringer, she would
have “[a]bsolutely” retained her position at UNT. Further, investigations into alleged
work-place violations are insufficient alone to cause a reasonable person to resign.
Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d at 9. Additionally, believing one employee’s version of events
over another’s is not evidence of constructive discharge. Tex. State Office of Admin.
Hearings v. Birch, No. 04-12-00681-CV, 2013 WL 3874473, at *8 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio July 24, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reasoning that belief in “one
employee’s statements over another’s is not supportive of a claim for constructive
discharge. If so, employers would be subject to a constructive discharge claim each
time there was a dispute between two or more employees . . . .”). 15 Barringer points to no evidence in the record that Lewin did not intend to do
exactly what she testified he told her, which was that he was placing her on paid leave
pending an investigation. And to the extent that Barringer contends that Lewin’s
testimony that he did not believe her explanations for what occurred at the HR
workshop demonstrates that he had already predetermined to terminate her
employment, Barringer has pointed to no evidence in the record contradicting Lewin’s
testimony that he told her that an investigation into these allegations would occur
prior to making a decision as to her employment. Moreover, the evidence
demonstrates that Lewin would not have been the one conducting the investigation
into Barringer’s behavior at the HR workshop, and Lewin said he did not have the
authority to threaten Barringer with an investigation by him.
And to the extent that Barringer contends that her allegations that Lewin took
away a project that Barringer wanted and gave it to a younger employee constitutes a
factor demonstrating constructive discharge, even if a change in job assignments is
based on discriminatory action, that alone, without the presence of aggravating
factors,7 is not sufficient to show constructive discharge. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
798 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1986), remanded in part on other grounds, 491 U.S. 701,
7 “Aggravating factors” include hostile working conditions and any other evidence suggesting any invidious intent on the part of the employer in creating or perpetuating the intolerable conditions compelling retirement or resignation. Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981). Barringer has not pointed to any evidence showing that she experienced perpetually intolerable conditions compelling her resignation.
16 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989). Furthermore, constructive discharge cannot be based upon
the employee’s subjective preference for one position over another. Id.
Barringer also contends that Hall was fired 8 and replaced by a younger worker
and that Hall had been subjected to age discrimination and that this is a factor
demonstrating she was constructively discharged. In her affidavit, however, Hall
stated that she had never been subjected to age discrimination by Lewin or any UNT
employee, that she had never heard Lewin describe her as “old school,” and that
Barringer had never complained to her (Hall) “about any age discrimination by
[Lewin].” We conclude that not only is there no evidence that Hall was subjected to
age discrimination, the contrary is true: UNT presented undisputed evidence that
Hall never experienced age discrimination at UNT. If the relevant undisputed
evidence negates jurisdiction, then the plea to the jurisdiction must be granted. State v.
Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007).
Additionally, there is no evidence that Lewin threatened Barringer with
terminating her employment. First, Barringer is the one who initiated the meeting
with Lewin. Second, Barringer’s own testimony establishes that Lewin had not
8 Hall disputes that she was fired. Rather, Hall stated in her September 18, 2019 affidavit,
After I retired in April 2016, I was rehired a few weeks later with [Lewin’s] approval to work in the System Human Resources Department on a part-time basis. This allowed me to collect my full retirement benefits and also continue to work for the System. I am still currently employed in this position.
17 mentioned firing Barringer until she asked him whether he was considering firing her.
Indeed, Barringer admitted in her deposition that when she did ask Lewin whether he
would fire her, he said that he had not yet decided. Third, Barringer’s belief that it
was “torture” to be placed on paid administrative leave while Lewin was away for two
weeks is nothing more than Barringer’s subjective belief that termination was
inevitable. Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319. Fourth, the resignation letter that Barringer sent
on the day of the meeting with Lewin makes no mention of any termination.
In coming to a different conclusion, Barringer argues that Faruki supports her
position that she had effectively been given an ultimatum, but in Faruki the plaintiff’s
deposition testimony was that the employer had specifically told him that he “should
find another job, as [the employer] would be unable to retain him, and that he had
one week before he would be placed on indefinite unpaid leave.” Id. There is simply
no evidence in this record that Lewin told Barringer that she should find another job
or that she would be placed on unpaid leave. In fact, both Lewin’s and Barringer’s
deposition testimony established that Lewin intended to place Barringer on paid leave
pending his return from vacation and an investigation into Barringer’s alleged
statements made at the HR workshop. In short, Faruki and this case have very little
in common. Accordingly, Barringer has failed to present any evidence that Lewin
made conditions at work so intolerable that she reasonably felt compelled to resign.
See Coley, 221 S.W.3d at 604–05.
18 Because the undisputed evidence negated one of the prima facie elements to
both her age-discrimination and retaliation claims (an adverse employment action in
the form of constructive discharge) and Barringer’s evidence failed to raise a fact issue
on that element, the trial court erred by denying UNT’s plea to the jurisdiction. We
sustain UNT’s first issue. Because our resolution of UNT’s first issue is dispositive of
this case, we need not address UNT’s remaining three issues. See Tex. R. App. P.
47.1.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having held that the trial court erred by denying UNT’s plea to the jurisdiction,
we reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment that Barringer’s suit be
dismissed for lack of the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack Justice
Delivered: September 10, 2020