Universal Protection Service, LLC v. Pamela Stover

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: A26A0396
• Status: Published

Opinion

THIRD DIVISION DILLARD, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules

July 1, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0396. UNIVERSAL PROTECTION SERVICE, LLC v. STOVER.

PIPKIN, Judge.

Appellant Universal Protection Service, LLC (“UPS”) appeals the denial of its

motion to dismiss this renewal action filed by Appellee Pamela Stover. As explained

below, Stover’s renewal complaint was facially insufficient, and, at any rate, her claims

against UPS are time barred. Accordingly, it was error to deny UPS’s motion to

dismiss, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

1. “Whether a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitation generally is

a mixed question of law and fact, but the question is one of law for the court when the

facts are not disputed.” Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 395(2) (788 SE2d 872)

(2016). Here, this appeal may be resolved on the face of the record before us; consequently, our review is de novo. See Beauparlant v. Aiken, 362 Ga. App. 341, 341-

42 (868 SE2d 482) (2022).

The undisputed record shows as follows.1 On January 24, 2019, a vehicle driven

by Stover was rear-ended by another vehicle. At the scene, the other driver identified

himself as Joe Leonard Smith Jr., and he reported that the vehicle he was driving

belonged to “Allied Universal.” At the time of the accident, Smith was cited for a

violation of OCGA § 40-6-49, an offense commonly referred to as “following too

closely,” which was ultimately disposed of on February 19, 2020. See OCGA § 40-13-

58. This triggered the start of the two-year statute of limitation on Stover’s personal

injury claims arising out of the accident. See OCGA § 9-3-99.

On December 15, 2020, Strover filed a personal injury action against Smith and

“Allied Universal Topco, LLC” arising out of the collision. However, in April 2021,

the parties entered into a consent agreement to substitute Allied Universal with the

proper party, namely, UPS, which was identified in full as “Universal Protection

Services, LLC d/b/a Allied Universal Security Services.” The parties subsequently

1 As Stover acknowledges in her brief, “[t]he parties seem to agree on what actually happened in terms of litigation filings and milestones, and even when those events took place, but disagree about the legal implications of all that history.” 2 engaged in discovery, but, approximately a year later, on May 4, 2022, Stover

voluntarily dismissed the December 2020 action.

On November 3, 2022, Stover filed a “Complaint for Damages” -- which

included no reference to the earlier litigation -- again naming Smith and “Allied

Universal Topco” as defendants. Counsel for Stover apparently discussed the case

with opposing counsel around November 9, 2022, and served Allied Universal on

November 17, 2022. Realizing that she had named the wrong defendant, Stover

thereafter purported to unilaterally amend her renewal complaint to add UPS as a

defendant; she served the purported amended complaint on UPS on December 12,

2022, and then, weeks later, she moved the trial court to add UPS as a defendant to

the new action. More than two years later, on December 20, 2024, the trial court

granted Stover’s motion to add UPS as a defendant, and, on that same day, Stover

served the amended complaint on UPS.2

UPS thereafter answered the amended complaint by special appearance and

contemporaneously filed a motion to dismiss. In its motion to dismiss, UPS argued,

as relevant to this appeal, that Stover’s renewal complaint was facially insufficient and

2 It appears that Stover failed to actually serve a summons on UPS with the amended complaint. 3 that, because she had failed to add UPS as a defendant to the renewal action until after

the expiration of the statute of limitation, the amended renewal complaint did not

“relate back” to the filing date of the original renewal complaint and, thus, was time

barred. In a brief response, Stover contended that the case was “ready for trial” and

that UPS “has throughout the course of this litigation had actual knowledge that it

[was] the target of the law suit” as evidenced by the consent order adding UPS to the

original action and by the fact that UPS is represented by the same counsel as Allied

Topco. On May 27, 2025, the trial court summarily denied UPS’s motion to dismiss

but granted UPS a certificate of immediate review. This Court subsequently granted

UPS’s application for interlocutory appeal. See Stover v. Universal Protection Services,

LLC, A25I0260 (July 7, 2025).

2. As an initial matter, we agree with UPS that Stover’s renewal complaint was

facially insufficient. As both this Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia have

explained over the last century,

in order to show the right to renew the suit within six months after the dismissal of a prior suit on the same cause of action, when such right is relied upon to relieve the plaintiff of the bar of the statute of limitation, it is necessary for the renewal petition to show affirmatively that the former petition was not a void suit, that it is such a valid suit as may be

4 renewed under OCGA § 9-2-61, that it is based upon substantially the same cause of action, and that it is not a renewal of a previous action which was dismissed on its merits so that the dismissal would act as a bar to the rebringing of the petition.

Whitesell v. Georgia Power Co., 341 Ga. App. 279, 281 (800 SE2d 370) (2017) (citation

modified; relying on Talley v. Commercial Credit Co. of Ga., 173 Ga. 828, 835(1) (161

SE 832) (1931)).

Here, Stover’s renewal complaint does not even reference the earlier action, let

alone satisfy these conditions. Further, while both this Court and the Georgia

Supreme Court have recognized alternative ways to establish the validity of a renewal

suit -- such as through a request for judicial notice or attaching past pleadings to

various filings in the renewal suit, see, e.g., Belcher v. Folsom, 258 Ga. App. 191, 192

(573 SE2d 447) (2002) -- Stover does not suggest on appeal that she availed herself of

these options. Instead, Stover argues on appeal that the requirements highlighted in

Whitesell are not found in the plain text of OCGA § 9-2-61 (a) and “[t]here should be

at least some question” as to whether the cases underpinning Whitesell are applicable

because they “pre-date[] the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, which relaxed

pleading standards [and] replace[d] issue pleading with notice pleading.” While there

5 may be some force to this argument, Stover neither asks this Court to reconsider

Whitesell nor does she explain how her renewal complaint -- which, as explained

above, lacks any indication that it is a renewal action -- provides even the slightest

notice that it is a renewed action pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-61 (a). For this reason alone

it was error for the trial court to deny UPS’s motion to dismiss.

3. Notwithstanding the facial insufficiency of the renewal complaint, we agree

with UPS that it was error for the trial court to deny its motion to dismiss for an

independent reason: Stover’s claims against UPS are time barred.

Here, Stover filed her renewal complaint on November 3, 2022 -- which was

outside of the two year statute of limitation and just one day before the expiration of

the renewal period -- naming the two original defendants from the December 2020

action; she did not initially name or serve UPS, despite knowing that it was the proper

party. It was not until December 7, 2022 -- nearly five weeks after the expiration of the

renewal period and almost 10 months after the expiration of the statute of limitation --

that Stover attempted to unilaterally amend her complaint to add UPS as a defendant

6 and then serve UPS with the amended renewal complaint.3 Stover does not contest

this procedural time line but, instead, argues that UPS had sufficient notice of the

action for her complaint to “relate back” under OCGA § 9-11-15(c).4 However, even

assuming that a plaintiff may use OCGA § 9-11-15 (c) to revive a time barred claim

against a defendant not named in an initial renewal complaint -- which is not at all

clear -- that statutory provision does not save Stover’s action against UPS.

As our Supreme Court has explained, OCGA § 9-11-15(c) applies

provided that three conditions are met: (1) the claim “arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in the original pleading,” (2) the proposed defendant, before the statute of limitations expired,

3 While Stover purported to amend her complaint to add UPS as a defendant in December 2022, she did so without permission from the trial court. “As this Court previously has explained, an amendment to a complaint adding a new party without first obtaining leave of the court is without effect.” Connie v. Garnett, 360 Ga. App. 24, 25-26(1) (860 SE2d 592) (2021). At best, UPS was added as a party in December 2024 after the trial court granted Stover’s motion to add party and after UPS was served with the amended complaint. 4 “An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back to the date of the original pleadings if the foregoing provisions are satisfied, and if within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.” 7 “received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits,” and (3) the proposed defendant, before the statute of limitations expired, “knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.”

Oconee County v. Cannon, 310 Ga. 728, 732-33(2) (854 SE2d 531) (2021) (citation

modified; emphasis supplied). Here, even if the first condition is met, we agree with

UPS that neither the second nor third condition can be satisfied because there is no

evidence establishing the requisite knowledge requirement.5

While Stover asserts that UPS had notice of the renewal action because UPS

“was a party to the initial lawsuit” filed in December 2020, she cites no authority

5 Under these circumstances, the burden was on Stover to establish the applicability of OCGA § 9-11-15(c). Compare Harper v. Mayor & Alderman of Savannah, 190 Ga. App. 637 (380 SE2d 78) (1989) (citing Baily v. Kemper Grp., 182 Ga. App. 604, 606 (356 SE2d 695) (1987)), and Milburn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 228 Ga. App. 398 (419 SE2d) (1997) (recognizing that a plaintiff generally bears the burden of demonstrating the applicability of OCGA § 9-11-15(c)),with Watts v. Joseph, 374 Ga. App. 367, 370 (912 SE2d 744) (2025), and Swan v. Johnson, 219 Ga. App. 450, 451 (1) (465 SE2d 684) (1995) (recognizing burden shifting with respect to OCGA § 9-11-15 (c) where defendant has moved for summary judgment). Even if the burden were initially on UPS, Stover’s own pleadings and filings show that she was plainly aware that UPS was the proper defendant -- indeed, that there was no mistaken identity -- and this alone would suffice to shift the burden from UPS to Stover. See Dean v. Hunt, 273 Ga. App. 552, 553 (615 SE2d 620) (2005). 8 supporting her argument that UPS’s notice of the December 2020 proceedings

controls the application of OCGA § 9-11-15(c) to a renewal action.6 Instead, a renewal

action is a de novo proceeding, see SunTrust v. Lilliston, 302 Ga. 840, 843 (809 SE2d

819) (2018), and we look to the circumstances of that action to evaluate the

applicability of OCGA § 9-11-15(c), see Milburn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 228 Ga. App.

398, 401-02(1)(c) (491 SE2d 848) (1997) (evaluating the applicability of OCGA § 9-11-

15(c) based on the renewal complaint).

Stover also argues that OCGA § 9-11-15 (c) applies because UPS was “served

with the Renewal Lawsuit early on” and “was the ‘target’ of a redundant Motion to

Add.” However, it is of no consequence that UPS was served with a copy of the

renewal complaint “early on” or was a “target” of the “motion to add” because

neither event occurred within the relevant limitation period; thus, these circumstances

6 Stover cites Jensen v. Yong Ha Engler, 317 Ga. App. 879 (733 SE2d 52) (2012), for the proposition that “[t]he question of relation back of the amendment turns on fair notice of the same general fact situation from which the claim arises.” However, Jensen concerns the addition of claims asserted after the expiration of the statute of limitation, not the addition of parties. See Id. at 879 (“On appeal, [the defendant] asserts that the trial court erred by allowing [the plaintiff] to amend her original complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitation to add claims for professional negligence and battery.”). 9 do not satisfy the notice requirements of the second and third conditions of OCGA §

9-11-15(c).

Finally, Stover suggests that UPS had notice of the renewal lawsuit because

UPS shares counsel with Allied Universal. Even if this fact, alone, were sufficient to

impute notice of the renewal action on UPS -- which is doubtful, see Matson v. Noble

Inv. Group, LLC, 288 Ga. App. 650, 656(2) (655 SE2d 275) (2007) (recognizing that

notice to improper corporate defendant may be imputed on proper corporate

defendant only where those corporations are “closely intertwined”) -- there is nothing

in the record to suggest that Allied Universal or its attorney had notice of the renewal

action before the expiration of either the statute of limitation or the renewal period. As

explained above, Stover’s counsel did not discuss the renewal action with Allied

Universal’s counsel until November 9, 2022, and Allied Universal was not served

with the renewal complaint until November 17, 2022. Consequently, this argument

is unavailing. See St. Francis Health, LLC v. Weng, 354 Ga. App. 310, 312 n.5 (840

SE2d 712) (2020) (“Even if we assumed that the attorneys for [improper defendant]

informed [the proper party] of the underlying lawsuit, the record shows that [the

10 improper party] was not served with the complaint (and therefore did not have notice

of the lawsuit) until September 6, 2018, one day after the statute expired.”).

Because UPS was not served with the renewal complaint until after the

expiration of both the statute of limitation and the renewal period and because

Stover’s amended complaint adding UPS as a defendant to the renewal action does

not relate to the date of the filing of that renewal complaint, her claims against UPS

are time barred, and the trial court erred when it failed to grant UPS’s motion to

dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

Judgment reversed. Dillard, P. J., and Gobeil, J., concur.