Universal Meditech, Inc. et al. v. City of Reedley, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 29, 2026
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00528
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 UNIVERSAL MEDITECH, INC. et al., Case No. 1:24-cv-00528 JLT EPG

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN 13 PART v. 14 (Docs. 7, 9, 28) CITY OF REEDLEY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Universal Meditech, Inc. (UMI) alleges the City of Reedley, California, the County of 19 Fresno, and two federal agents obtained warrants to search its warehouse based on false or 20 misleading affidavits. David He, UMI’s representative, alleges federal agents used excessive 21 force when they arrested him. Defendants move to dismiss. (Docs. 7, 9, 28.) The Court agrees 22 with Defendants that the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 23 Rule 12(b)(6). 24 ALLEGATIONS 25 UMI alleges it is a California corporation in good standing that has operated lawfully in 26 Tulare and Fresno counties since 2015. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4.) It claims to have had authorization from the 27 federal Food and Drug Administration to produce “diagnostic testing kits and other biologic 28 medical devices.” (Id.) Its ownership is based in China, and Mr. He, a Chinese national living in 1 California, was “at all times” the company’s “authorized representative.” (Id.) 2 The events that ultimately led to this litigation began in the fall of 2022, when UMI had an 3 unspecified “business dispute” with its landlord in Fresno. (Id.) The company left Fresno and 4 rented a warehouse in Reedley, where it began storing its assets temporarily until a new facility 5 could be constructed. (Id.) UMI stresses in its complaint that the Reedley warehouse “was 6 simply that, a warehouse” where its assets were stored. (Id.) The company “was not in active 7 business,” though it did “monitor and maintain” the assets in the warehouse, such as its 8 “laboratory mice,” “biological materials,” and “medical devices.” (Id.) 9 Soon after the company moved its assets into the warehouse, it came under investigation 10 by local and federal agencies. (Id. ¶ 15.) UMI alleges the investigations were based on a “false 11 narrative” that the company was performing dangerous work and that the warehouse was actually 12 an “illegal Chinese lab” engaging in “bioterrorism.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) Although Mr. He and UMI 13 “cooperated fully in the investigation”; although they made clear to the authorities that the 14 company “was not in active business”; although the company always kept “its assets safely and 15 securely stored”; and although “there was never any indication of any threat to public health and 16 safety,” the investigating agencies successfully pursued judicial warrants to inspect the 17 warehouse, search and seize its contents, and ultimately to destroy UMI’s property. (See id. 18 ¶¶ 15–22.) Each of these warrants, UMI claims, was based on false allegations that the company 19 “was operating an illegal laboratory, not merely storing its assets, and that it was engaging in 20 hazardous and unlawful activities.” (Id. ¶¶ 17–21.) The company lost “millions of dollars of 21 property without lawful justification.” (Id. ¶ 22.) It was reduced to “a worthless pariah.” (Id. 22 ¶ 23.) 23 Despite these setbacks, UMI and Mr. He continued to cooperate with investigators. (Id. 24 ¶ 24.) In October 2023, Mr. He went to what he believed was a meeting with the local 25 authorities. (Id.) The meeting was a pretext. (Id.) Federal officers took him into custody under 26 “baseless federal criminal charges.” (Id.) He is currently facing charges of wire fraud, 27 conspiracy to commit wire fraud, distribution of adulterated and misbranded medical devices, and 28 making false statements to officers of the federal Food and Drug Administration. See Case No. 1 1:23-cr-00219 DAD EPG Doc. 77 (first superseding indictment).1 Mr. He alleges the agents 2 “used unreasonable and excessive force” when they arrested him, “which resulted in his 3 sustaining a severe head injury that continues to cause him serious health issues and pain.” (Id.) 4 In this lawsuit, UMI alleges its property was unlawfully seized and destroyed without due 5 process in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 6 (Id. ¶¶ 25–28.) It names four officers as defendants, each in an individual capacity: Jeremy 7 Harrison, a building officer for the City of Reedley; Jessalyn Harper, a City code enforcement 8 officer; Jerry Isaak, the City’s Fire Chief; and Humberto Prado, the Assistant Public Health 9 Director of the Fresno County Department of Public Health. (Id. ¶¶ 7–11). UMI asserts a similar 10 claim under California law against the same four officers, the City of Reedley, and the County of 11 Fresno. (Id. ¶¶ 29–33.) Finally, Mr. He and UMI allege the two federal officers—Special Agents 12 Jeffrey Maurice and Maridehl Mather of the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations—deprived 13 them of their rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 34–37.) 14 Each defendant moves to dismiss the complaint. The City, Officers Harrison and Harper, 15 and Chief Isaak (the City Defendants) move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule 16 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 9.) The 17 County and Assistant Director Prado (the County Defendants) move to dismiss for failure to state 18 a claim. (Doc. 7.) Special Agents Maurice and Maridehl (the Federal Defendants) also move to 19 dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 28.) UMI and Mr. He oppose these motions in part. 20 They concede their state law claims must be dismissed (Doc. 20 at 17–18.), but they maintain that 21 the Court has jurisdiction to hear their federal civil rights claims and that those claims are viable, 22 (see Docs. 20 at 10–17; 29 at 9–14). Each group of Defendants has filed a reply, and the Court 23 took the motions under submission without hearing oral arguments. (Docs. 15, 22, 23, 30, 31.) 24 JURISDICTION 25 The City Defendants argue at the threshold that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case 26 1 The Court takes judicial notice of the filings in the criminal case but not the truth of any 27 allegations within those filings. See United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (permitting judicial notice of other proceedings 28 1 at all under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. That doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing 2 “a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 3 (2003). The City Defendants argue this case is, for all practical purposes, an appeal of the state 4 superior courts’ decision to issue warrants and other orders related to UMI’s warehouse. (Doc. 9- 5 1 at 7–8.) 6 Although “the Rooker–Feldman doctrine is exceedingly easy” to apply in a “routine” case, 7 it can “become difficult—and, in practical reality, only comes into play as a contested issue— 8 when a disappointed party seeks to take not a formal direct appeal, but rather its de facto 9 equivalent, to a federal district court.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155. This has “led to a good deal of 10 misunderstanding over the years, with lower federal courts struggling to evaluate their jurisdiction 11 in cases involving parties who had previously litigated against each other in state court.” Miroth 12 v. County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2025). 13 In 2005, the Supreme Court “confined” the Rooker–Feldman doctrine “to cases of the 14 kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining 15 of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 16 commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil 17 Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To underscore how limited the 18 Rooker–Feldman doctrine is, the Supreme Court wrote that federal district courts have 19 jurisdiction even when a plaintiff’s federal claim “denies a legal conclusion that a state court has 20 reached in a case to which he was a party.” Id. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 21 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)). The next year, the Supreme Court also made clear that the 22 Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar actions filed in federal court “by nonparties to the earlier 23 state-court judgment,” even when those nonparties “could be considered in privity with a party to 24 the judgment” for purposes of preclusion law. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (per 25 curiam). 26 The Ninth Circuit has thus applied the Rooker–Feldman doctrine narrowly. Miroth, 136 27 F.4th at 1149. The Circuit held in 2013, for example, that the district court had jurisdiction even 28 though the plaintiffs “sought relief designed to remedy injuries suffered from a state court 1 judgment.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). “[T]hey did not allege 2 before the court that the state court committed legal error,” and they did not “seek relief from the 3 state court judgment itself.” Id. Last year, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that the Rooker–Feldman 4 doctrine does not bar a federal district court from hearing a claim based on the wrongs of an 5 adverse party rather than by the state court itself. Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1151. A case is a 6 “forbidden de facto appeal” only if the federal plaintiff “asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 7 erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 8 decision.” Id. at 1155 (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164). 9 These decisions demonstrate that UMI’s complaint against the City Defendants is not a 10 “forbidden de facto appeal” of the state court’s decisions about warrants and inspections. To 11 begin, UMI was not a party in the state court warrant proceedings, which were actions in rem 12 against the property. The City Defendants cannot demonstrate otherwise by showing UMI’s 13 property “caused the issues and necessitated the abatement action.” (Doc. 23 at 2). Federal 14 courts have jurisdiction even when the plaintiff was in privity with the state court litigant, as 15 noted above. Lance, 546 U.S. at 466. That is true even if UMI and Mr. He “had ample 16 opportunity in state court to raise the fraud allegations they raise here.” Miroth, 136 F.4th at 17 1156. 18 This case also falls outside the definition of a “forbidden de facto appeal” because UMI 19 does not allege the state courts erred. It faults the City Defendants and their allegedly false 20 statements for the seizure and destruction of its property and reputation, not the courts. As noted, 21 the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar a federal district court from reviewing claims of 22 wrongdoing by an adverse party, such as the City Defendants. See id. at 1151; Noel, 341 F.3d at 23 1163–64; see also, e.g., Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 24 2021) (rejecting Rooker–Feldman argument in similar case of allegedly deceptive affidavits). For 25 these reasons, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not come into force, and this Court has 26 jurisdiction to hear UMI’s claims against the City Defendants. 27 ABSTENTION 28 Although federal courts have a “virtually unflagging” obligation to decide cases within 1 their jurisdiction, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 2 (1976), “[c]omity or abstention doctrines may, in various circumstances, permit or require the 3 federal court to stay or dismiss the federal action in favor of the state-court litigation,” Exxon, 544 4 U.S. at 292. The City Defendants cite two such doctrines. (Doc. 9-1 at 8–10.) 5 They rely first on the rule that has come to be known as “Younger abstention.” (Doc. 9-1 6 at 8–9 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).) This rule reflects a “national policy 7 forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special 8 circumstances.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. It is based on “a strong federal policy against federal- 9 court interference with pending state judicial proceedings.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. 10 Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). “For civil cases, ‘Younger abstention is 11 appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement 12 actions or involve a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, 13 (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges.” Yelp 14 Inc. v. Paxton, 137 F.4th 944, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. 15 State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014)). If these threshold requirements are 16 satisfied, then the court considers whether “the federal action would have the practical effect of 17 enjoining the state proceedings” and whether any “exception to Younger applies.” Id. (quoting 18 ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759). 19 The City Defendants do not claim the in rem warrant proceedings are ongoing, such that 20 this Court must abstain under Younger. They identify a different proceeding: a case initiated with 21 a petition by the California Department of Public Health, in which that agency seeks to condemn 22 and destroy medical test kits seized from UMI’s warehouse. (See Doc. 13 at 16–251); see also 23 Cal. Dept’ Pub. Health v. Prestige Biotech, Inc., No. 24CECG02431 (Cal. Super. Ct. Fresno 24 County filed June 5, 2024).2 The Department of Health’s petition is based on provisions in the 25 California Health and Safety Code that were passed as part of the state’s Sherman Food, Drug, 26 and Cosmetic Act. (See Doc.13 at 21.) These provisions instruct agents of the California 27 2 The Court takes judicial notice that the Health Department action was pending in the state court 28 1 Department of Public Health to embargo any medical devices that the agent “has probable cause 2 to believe” are “adulterated, misbranded, or falsely advertised.” Cal. Health & Safety Code 3 § 111860. The law also instructs the Department of Public Health to commence proceedings in 4 the superior court to condemn any adulterated, misbranded, and falsely advertised articles. Id. 5 § 111880. A device is “misbranded if it was manufactured in [California] in an establishment” 6 that was “not duly licensed” under the Sherman Act. Id. § 111425. A device is “adulterated” if, 7 among other reasons, it was “held under conditions whereby it may have been contaminated with 8 filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health.” Id. § 111255. If a court “finds 9 that an embargoed . . . device . . . is adulterated, misbranded, falsely advertised, or the sale of 10 which is otherwise in violation of [the Sherman Act], the . . . device . . . shall, after entry of the 11 judgment, be destroyed at the expense of the claimant or owner, under the supervision of an 12 authorized agent of the department.” Id. § 111885. 13 In the petition about UMI’s test kits, the Department of Public Health alleges the kits were 14 embargoed because they were “misbranded, adulterated, and manufactured without a license.” 15 (Doc. 13 at 17.) The Department alleges a company named Prestige Biotech, Inc., together with 16 UMI, “manufactured, processed, packaged, and held the [embargoed kits] in violation of 17 numerous Health and Safety Code provisions, including manufacturing without a license, holding 18 devices in rodent infested conditions, failing to keep required records, and failing to provide the 19 identity and strength to verify purity characteristics.” (Id. at 23.) 20 It is likely that the state court petition satisfies at least some of the threshold requirements 21 for the Younger abstention rule. As noted, the petition is pending, and UMI does not dispute the 22 City Defendants’ assertion that it is a “quasi-criminal enforcement action.” (See Docs. 9-1 at 8; 23 20 at 13–14.) The Supreme Court has held that civil enforcement actions, disciplinary actions, 24 and similar efforts to abate nuisances and impose sanctions for wrongful acts can justify 25 abstention under Younger. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 79 (2013) 26 (collecting authority); Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. County of Alameda, 953 F.3d 655, 657 27 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). Nor does UMI express any doubt that California has important interests 28 in protecting its citizens’ health and safety by preventing unlicensed or dangerous medical 1 devices from causing any harm. Cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) 2 (recognizing states’ longstanding and traditional “latitude under their police powers to legislate as 3 to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons” (citations, quotation 4 marks, and alterations omitted)). UMI similarly offers no reason to doubt that it could raise a 5 “federal challenge” in response to the pending petition. (See Doc. 9-1 at 9 (citing Cal. Civ. P. 6 Code § 1094.5).) 7 For these reasons, the Court assumes the Department of Health’s pending petition satisfies 8 the four threshold Younger requirements. Even so, the Court can abstain under Younger if 9 moving forward in this case would “have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings.” 10 ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759. The City Defendants do not explain why they believe this action 11 will have such a practical effect. UMI seeks damages, not an injunction or another type of 12 equitable relief. (See Doc. 1 at 8–9.) Its allegations also relate to statements by local officials, 13 not by agents of the California Department of Public Health, and the disputed statements are not 14 about the adulteration or misbranding of medical devices. As summarized above, UMI alleges 15 the City Defendants falsely stated “that UMI was operating an illegal laboratory, not merely 16 storing its assets, and that it was engaging in hazardous and unlawful activities.” (Id. at 5.) UMI 17 also believes the property underlying its damages request in this case “has already been 18 destroyed.” (Doc. 20 at 13.) It disclaims any intent “to take control over physical assets already 19 under control of a state court.” (Id.) For all practical purposes, it appears that this case could 20 continue alongside the state court petition without causing any disruptions. If UMI ultimately 21 shows it is entitled to damages, that award could be paid without disturbing the state court 22 proceedings, assuming they are still pending. The Court declines to abstain under Younger. 23 The second abstention doctrine raised in the City Defendants’ motion is based on the 24 Supreme Court’s decisions in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). (Doc. 9–10.) The 25 Burford rule “is concerned with protecting complex state administrative processes from undue 26 federal interference.” Peridot Tree, Inc. v. City of Sacramento, 94 F.4th 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2024) 27 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989)). It 28 applies when the district court is “sitting in equity.” Id. at 930. If “timely and adequate state- 1 court review is available,” then the district court should abstain when (1) “there are difficult 2 questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance 3 transcends the result in the case then at bar,” and (2) “the “exercise of federal review of the 4 question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent 5 policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. 6 Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (citations and quotation marks 7 omitted). The Ninth Circuit has further limited Burford abstention to situations in which “the 8 state has concentrated suits involving the local issue in a particular court,” “the federal issues are 9 not easily separable from complicated state law issues with which the state court may have 10 special competence,” and “federal review might disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent 11 policy.” Peridot Tree, 94 F.4th at 930 (quoting Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 671 12 (9th Cir. 2004)). 13 California has not concentrated petitions about embargoed medical devices in any 14 particular state court. Nor are the issues here—whether officers made false or misleading 15 statements about UMI’s business and its Reedley warehouse—difficult to separate from the issues 16 in the pending Health Department’s petition. The City Defendants have not demonstrated that 17 those issues are “complicated,” nor that the state court has “special competence” to resolve them, 18 and most fundamentally, this Court is not sitting in equity. As noted, UMI seeks damages and 19 believes the property in question has already been destroyed. Continuing with this litigation is 20 unlikely to disrupt California’s efforts to keep “adulterated, misbranded, and falsely advertised” 21 medical devices off the market. 22 In sum, the Court will not abstain from exercising its jurisdiction under the Younger or 23 Burford doctrines and moves now to the merits of the Defendants’ pending motions, starting with 24 the motions by the City and County Defendants and the claims against them. 25 CITY AND COUNTY DEFENDANTS 26 I. Legal Standards 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 permits motions to dismiss for “failure to state a claim 28 upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss 1 under this rule, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 2 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) quoting 3 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Federal Rules ordinarily require only 4 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 5 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff alleging fraud, however, “must state with particularity the 6 circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “Particularity” means, in this context, 7 that the plaintiff must allege the “who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged, 8 including what is false or misleading about the statement, and why it is false.” Benavidez, 993 9 F.3d at 1145 (quoting United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1180 (9th Cir. 10 2016)). The Court’s task in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a “context-specific” exercise 11 that draws on “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. at 679. The 12 Court must make “all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Boquist v. 13 Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of 14 Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014)). 15 UMI has conceded its state law claim is not viable under this standard. The court 16 dismisses that claim without leave to amend. In UMI’s remaining claim against the City and 17 County Defendants, it contends the individual officers made “false and misleading” statements in 18 their search warrant affidavits. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 16–20, 23, 25–28.) It alleges they falsely claimed 19 “that UMI was operating an illegal laboratory, not merely storing its assets, and that it was 20 engaging in hazardous and unlawful activities.” (Id. ¶¶16–20.) UMI does not clarify what it 21 means by “hazardous and unlawful activities,” but elsewhere in the complaint, it alleges that it 22 “was not in active business” and that if “there was any activity in the warehouse, it was only to 23 monitor and maintain its valuable assets.” (Id. ¶ 4, 15.) The Court thus interprets UMI’s 24 complaint as alleging that the officers falsely stated or implied that UMI was operating an illegal 25 or hazardous laboratory when in reality it was only storing, monitoring, and maintaining its assets 26 in a warehouse. 27 This claim arises under the Fourth Amendment, which protects “[t]he right of the people 28 to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 1 seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection applies not only to police officers who wish to 2 search a home for evidence of a crime, but also to “health, fire, or building inspectors” who come 3 to a “warehouse” with the intent “to locate and abate a suspected public nuisance.” Michigan v. 4 Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 (1978). But the Fourth Amendment “does not prohibit all unwelcome 5 intrusions on private property.” Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 198 (2021). Officials can 6 conduct searches and make seizures “pursuant to a valid warrant.” Id. This is also true in the 7 case of “entries onto private land to search for and abate suspected nuisances.” Conner v. City of 8 Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487, 1490 (9th Cir. 1990). 9 Because a warrant must be “valid,” officers may not conduct searches or make seizures 10 under “ill-begotten or otherwise invalid” warrants. Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 11 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). So officers may not rely on deception to obtain warrants. KRL v. Moore, 12 384 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978)). 13 Nor may officers omit information from their affidavits if doing so will cause those affidavit to be 14 materially misleading when “considered as a whole.” Scanlon v. County of Los Angeles, 92 F.4th 15 781, 799 (9th Cir. 2024). But “negligence or good faith mistakes will not invalidate an affidavit 16 which on its face establishes probable cause.” Blight v. City of Manteca, 944 F.3d 1061, 1069 17 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). So in sum, to withstand the City and 18 County Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(6), UMI must allege that the defendant officers 19 made “a misrepresentation or omission,” either “deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the 20 truth,” and that this misrepresentation or omission was “material to the judicial decision.” 21 Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1147. And under Rule 9(b), UMI must allege “the who, what, when, and 22 where of the judicial deception.” Id. at 1148. 23 The City and County Defendants argue any false or misleading statements in the affidavits 24 were not material. (See Docs. 7 at 11–16; 9-1 at 10–11.) “A misrepresentation or omission is 25 material if a court would have declined to issue the order had the defendant been truthful.” 26 Scanlon, 92 F.4th at 799 (quoting David v. Kaulukukui, 38 F.4th 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2022)). 27 Conversely, if the affidavit would have established probable cause “once corrected and 28 supplemented,” then there is “no constitutional error.” Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1083 (quotation marks 1 and citations omitted). 2 The Court’s decision here thus depends on the definition of the phrase “probable cause” 3 within the Fourth Amendment. In a criminal case, there is “probable cause” when, “given all the 4 circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge 5 of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence 6 of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) 7 (quotation marks omitted). By contrast, in cases about “administrative searches,” the Supreme 8 Court has “explicitly lowered the probable cause test from the standard applied in criminal cases.” 9 Columbia Basin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 10 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of the City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967)); see also, e.g., O’Connor v. 11 Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) (rejecting criminal probable cause requirement for public 12 employers’ searches of employees’ private workplaces); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 13 307, 320–21 (1978) (same for inspections under the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 14 1970). “But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the 15 intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.” 16 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. The County defendants argue the affidavits in this case related to 17 administrative searches and seizures, not criminal investigations or prosecutions, and UMI does 18 not contend otherwise. (See Docs. 7 at 11; 20 at 16–17.) The Court’s task is therefore to 19 determine whether the disputed affidavits would have established probable cause under the lower 20 “reasonableness” standard if the officers had made clear within them that UMI was only storing, 21 monitoring, and maintaining its assets in the Reedley warehouse. 22 II. Discussion 23 This inquiry is somewhat complicated by the fact that UMI did not include the disputed 24 affidavits in its complaint. Nor did it quote them. Courts may ordinarily consider only the 25 complaint and its allegations when deciding whether a complaint must be dismissed under Rule 26 12(b)(6). Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). If the court takes other 27 matters into consideration, then “the 12(b)(6) motion converts into a motion for summary 28 judgment under Rule 56.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 1 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). But there are two exceptions to this rule, and these 2 exceptions permit the court to review the affidavits themselves. 3 First, the “incorporation-by-reference” rule “is a judicially created doctrine that treats 4 certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.” Id. at 1002. It “prevents 5 plaintiffs from selecting only portions of documents that support their claims, while omitting 6 portions of those very documents that weaken—or doom—their claims.” Id. This rule permits 7 this Court to consider a document if “the plaintiff’s claim depends on [its] contents,” if “the 8 defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss,” and if “the parties do not dispute the 9 authenticity of the document, even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of 10 that document in the complaint.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). UMI’s 11 claims against the City and County Defendants depend on its allegations about the officers’ 12 affidavits and the contents of those affidavits. The City and County Defendants have also 13 attached copies of their affidavits to their motion. (See Docs. 10–14.) Although UMI claims 14 some assertions within those documents are false, it does not dispute that they are authentic 15 copies of the allegedly false or misleading affidavits. (See Doc. 20 at 15.) The Court may 16 therefore consider the affidavits under the incorporation doctrine. 17 Second, Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits this Court to take “judicial notice” a fact if 18 it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 19 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–(2). In addition, “[a] court may take judicial notice of 20 matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 21 judgment.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Courts thus commonly 22 take judicial notice of the contents of publicly available search warrants in cases like this one. 23 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Cal. Dep’t of Just., No. 16-06627, 2017 WL 2851195, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 24 4, 2017); Bennett v. Cnty. of Shasta, No. 15-1764, 2016 WL 3743151, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. July 25 13, 2016). UMI does not dispute that the affidavits and warrants are public court records; it 26 alleges expressly, in fact, that they are. (Doc. 1 ¶ 23.) And although UMI argues correctly that 27 the Court must not assume the assertions within the officers’ affidavits are true and cannot resolve 28 factual disputes, it does not dispute that the Court may take judicial notice that the officers who 1 signed the affidavits made the statements within them. Nor does UMI dispute that the related 2 state court filings accurately reflect what was filed and what the state court ordered. The Court 3 thus concludes that it may consider the state court records attached to the City Defendants’ 4 request for judicial notice without converting the pending motion into a motion for summary 5 judgment. (See Docs. 10–14.) 6 The text of the disputed affidavits leaves no question but that there would have been 7 “probable cause” for searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, even if the officers had 8 made clear to the state court that UMI was merely storing, monitoring, and maintaining assets in 9 the warehouse. The Court begins by summarizing what remains in the affidavits after all of the 10 allegedly false and misleading claims about the warehouse are removed. To be clear, the court 11 does not assume the statements summarized below are accurate or true, but rather only that the 12 state court had these statements at its disposal when it was deciding whether to issue the warrants 13 in question. 14 The first affidavit cited in UMI’s complaint was sworn by defendant Harrison, a city 15 building officer, on March 10, 2023. (See Docs. 1 ¶ 15; 10-1 at 9–12.) According to that 16 affidavit, he visited the Reedley warehouse with several other officers the week before. (Doc. 10- 17 1 at 10.) They “witnessed multiple building and municipal code violations throughout the 18 portions of the facility that were not locked.” (Id.) They saw “multiple electrical circuits” had 19 been “added to the facility that were not permitted or inspected.” (Id.) “There was a garden hose 20 running [from] a service sink [to a] locked portion of the building through a hole in the rear wall.” 21 (Id.) There was a hole in a door “to allow for ventilation from unknown equipment,” and it 22 smelled like “rodent excrement.” (Id.) From what Harrison could see, there were “various 23 chemicals” in the building as well. (Id. at 11.) 24 The Superior Court issued an inspection warrant based on Harrison’s affidavit a few days 25 later. (Id. at 23.) It authorized City officials to inspect “the interior and exterior of the industrial 26 warehouse, structures, and storage facilities, including any portions of those facilities that may be 27 locked located on the Property for any existing violations of the Reedley Municipal Code, the 28 California Building Code, and the California Health and Safety Code.” (Id. at 21.) The court’s 1 order permitted officers to use “reasonable force” to secure the property, restrain occupants, and 2 conduct the inspection. (Id.) The court also permitted officers to collect samples of substances 3 found on the property, such as any suspected hazardous waste and soil and liquid samples. (Id. at 4 22) Officers were required to give twenty-four hours’ notice of the warrant, to complete the 5 search between March 10 and 24, 2023, and to execute the search between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., 6 regardless of whether any responsible parties, owners, or occupants were present. (Id.) 7 According to the warrant return, Harrison and other officers served the warrant on March 8 16, 2023 at approximately 11 a.m. (Docs. 10-1 at 27; see also 10-2 at 10.) They found “multiple 9 building and safety violations.” (Doc. 10-1 at 27.) Officers from the California Department of 10 Public Health “documented embargoed items” during this search, as discussed in the section 11 above, i.e., the allegedly misbranded and adulterated medical testing kits. (See id.) Officers from 12 the California Department of Toxic Substance Control also “identified a room with multiple 13 vessels of liquid, apparatus, and other items that were potentially unsafe,” which the officers did 14 not enter. (Id.) Finally, officers also “found a room housing hundreds of laboratory mice.” (Doc. 15 10-2 at 11.) There was a person at the warehouse during the search. (Id.) That person told the 16 officers “that these mice were genetically engineered to catch and carry the COVID-19 virus.” 17 (Id.) 18 The second disputed affidavit was sworn by defendant Harper, a City code enforcement 19 officer, a few days later, on March 29, 2023. (See Docs. 1 ¶ 17; 10-2 at 9–12.) In this affidavit, 20 Harper reported that she had exchanged emails with a person named Xiuquin Yao, who claimed 21 responsibility for the warehouse. (Doc. 10-2 at 11.) Harper asked if Yao “could provide any 22 licenses of certifications permitting the experiments and breeding of these mice” the officers had 23 found in the warehouse. (Id.) Yao “never provided any certifications or licenses from any state 24 or federal agency that permitted the activities being conducted on the property.” (Id.) Nor did 25 Yao give Harper “a plan to care for the mice, or where the mice would be moved.” (Id.) Yao 26 gave Harper the names of people “who were supposed to provide food and water to the mice,” but 27 these people either did not return Harper’s calls or told her they were not actually the company’s 28 employees. (Id.) A veterinarian inspected the property at the City’s request. (Doc. 10-2 at 11.) 1 She said “the mice [were] being housed in conditions that are far outside of all animal welfare 2 regulations and standards of care,” such as overcrowding in cages and constant lighting. (Id.) 3 The superior court issued a warrant on April 4, 2023. (Doc. 11 at 4.) It authorized 4 officers to enter the property between April 6 and 20, 2023 between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. to seize 5 “all mice being kept on the Property so that they may be humanely euthanized.” (Id.) Officers 6 posted a notice of the warrant on the property on April 10, 2023 and executed it on April 12, 7 2023, at approximately 12:45 p.m. (Id. at 8.) They found “a large number of dead mice in the 8 cages, and many injuries and deformities.” (Id.) There was no running water, and the cages were 9 severely filthy. (Id.) A veterinarian recommended the mice be euthanized because they were 10 suffering and adequate housing and care were not possible. (Id.) 11 The third disputed affidavit was sworn by defendant Prado, the Assistant Director of the 12 County of Fresno Department of Public Health, on June 15, 2023. (Docs. 1 ¶ 18; 11 at 48.) He 13 stated that Public Health staff had attempted unsuccessfully to contact the warehouse operators 14 since December 2022. (Id.) He also described in more detail what officers had found when they 15 executed the first warrant a few months before: “embargoed medical devices, e.g. COVID tests 16 and pregnancy tests” (id. at 49); “blood, tissue and other bodily fluid samples and serums” (id.); 17 “thousands of vials of unlabeled fluids and suspected biological material” (id.); “[v]arious 18 laboratory equipment,” including “a biological safety cabinet and centrifuge” (id.); and 19 refrigerators and freezers, including two “ultralow temperature freezer units” capable of 20 maintaining temperatures of between negative 60 and 80 Celsius. (id.) Prado stated on 21 information and belief “that since December 2022, UMI and [another company, i.e., Prestige 22 Biotech, Inc.] were disposing of deceased laboratory mice, considered to be medical waste, 23 without the use of a licensed medical waste hauler.” (Id. at 50.) 24 Prado went on to explain in his affidavit that Fresno County Public Health staff “were 25 concerned how the biological materials, viruses, bacterial agents, and other infectious agents may 26 react if the refrigerators and freezers failed and these infectious agents reached an ambient 27 temperature.” (Id.) Accordingly, they inspected the property again on April 21, 2023. (Id. at 28 52.) In this inspection they “observed biologicals stored and kept in hazardous and non- 1 compliant conditions, the presence of multiple infectious agents (confirmed by [representatives of 2 the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]).” (Id.) They also found “32 3 refrigerators and freezers” and saw that some “had either stopped functioning or were failing due 4 to an inadequate power supply,” a result of the unpermitted electrical additions that code 5 enforcement staff had previously observed. (Id.) 6 Prado also referred to a letter from defendant Isaak, the City Fire Chief, “regarding the fire 7 danger and explosion hazards created by the corrosive, toxic, and highly flammable chemicals 8 stored within the warehouse on the Property.” (Id. at 53, 69.) In Isaak’s opinion, the combination 9 of “drums of chemicals” and “hazardous (unpermitted) electrical” infrastructure on the warehouse 10 property created “a huge concern for a fire to occur.” (Id. at 69.) The danger of chemical 11 inhalation and explosions would prevent firefighters from entering the facility if a fire broke out. 12 (Id.) Isaak “stressed the need for a plan to have an evacuation zone of one city block around the 13 warehouse on the Property.” (Id. at 53.) This would have been no trivial task. “The proposed 14 evacuation zone would include the City of Reedley Police Department, City Hall, the Kings 15 Canyon Unified District main office, and approximately 12 residential homes.” (Id.) 16 Prado also explained in his affidavit how officers from the California Department of 17 Public Health had inspected the property on May 1, 2023. (Id. at 53.) According to Prado’s 18 summary of that inspection, “CDPH staff observed containers labeled as serum or plasma (of 19 unknown origin) and/or with the name of an infectious agent.” (Id.) Many other containers were 20 unlabeled. (Id.) They “appeared to contain blood, or a blood product, such as serum, or other 21 bodily fluids.” (Id.) Officers also found “numerous vials of pharmaceuticals” and “what 22 appeared to be a biohazardous waste container shrink wrapped to a pallet.” (Id. at 54.) Similarly, 23 Prado wrote that officers of the federal CDC, FDA, and FBI had inspected the facility on May 2, 24 3, and 4, 2023. (Id. at 55.) They found “thousands of vials that had unclear labeling, coded 25 labeling, or no identification” along with “evidence that the entity labeled items” were 26 “dangerous.” (Id.) The CDC officers found “at least 20 potentially infectious agents” including 27 Chlamydia trachomatis, E. coli, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Mycoplasma pneumoniae and 28 general Mycoplasma species, Neisseria meningitidis, Nostoc species, Sphingobacterium 1 heparinum, Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus species, Toxoplasma gondii, Hepatitis 2 B virus, Hepatitis C virus, Dengue virus, Human Immunodeficiency Virus 1 and 2, Human 3 Herpes virus 1 (Herpes simplex virus), Human Herpes virus 5 (Human Cytomegalovirus), 4 Respiratory Syncytial virus, Rubella virus, Serve Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 5 (SARS-CoV-2), and Malaria. (Id. at 55–56, 80.) Some of these specimens appeared, however, to 6 be “diagnostic,” rather than “isolates or culture.” (Id. at 80.) 7 Prado exchanged emails about the facility with Mr. He, who claimed to be authorized to 8 speak on behalf of UMI. (Id. at 58.) Mr. He did not provide satisfactory documentation of that 9 authority. (Id.) Mr. He also failed to propose an adequate plan to make the warehouse safe; he 10 denied, in fact, that there were any infectious agents in the warehouse at all. (Id. at 58–59.) In 11 Prado’s mind, this “raise[d] serious concerns with the lack of safety protocols” and suggested the 12 warehouse posed “a serious threat to public health and safety.” (Id.) 13 Based on the inspections and his communications with Mr. He, Prado was concerned that 14 “[t]he continued presence of biological material, medical waste, and infectious agents” at the 15 facility posed “a serious and substantial risk to public health and safety.” (Id. at 62.) “For 16 example,” he wrote, “a mosquito could feed on a sample of tissue or blood exposed to Malaria 17 stored on the Property and become a vector to spread Malaria.” (Id. at 62–63.) “Alternatively, 18 the documented infestation of rats and other pests on the Property could become vectors if 19 exposed to any one of the numerous infectious agents that, as a matter of law, cause or 20 significantly contributes to the cause of morbidity or mortality of human beings.” (Id. at 63.) In 21 Prado’s opinion, “the history of the poor maintenance of the Property and the unlawful storage 22 and handling of biological materials” meant that “abatement by destruction of all biological 23 material, medical waste and infectious agents [was] the reasonable and prudent course of action to 24 prevent the spread of the infectious and communicable diseases found on the Property.” (Id.) 25 The Superior Court issued an abatement warrant on June 23, 2023. (Doc. 12 at 4.) It 26 authorized Fresno County Public Health staff to enter the warehouse and “dispose of all 27 biological material,” including waste, “all infectious agent,” and “all containers, vials, boxes, 28 bags, laboratory equipment and other storage devices that store or have been contaminated by 1 biological material, medical waste and/or infectious agents.” (Id. at 3.) Public Health officers 2 executed the warrant on July 5, 6, and 7, 2023. (Doc. 13 at 2–4.) 3 The final two disputed affidavits were sworn by defendants Izaak (the Fire Chief) and 4 Harper (the code inspection officer) on July 18, 2023, in support of the City’s application for a 5 warrant to enter the warehouse and remove any other dangerous, abandoned, and embargoed 6 property that remained. (See Docs. 1 ¶ 19; 12 at 16–20, 49–54.). Izaak stated that he had found 7 garbage, contaminated materials, violations of state building codes, hazardous liquids, poor 8 maintenance, unsafe electrical wiring, “potentially explosive and flammable substances,” 9 inadequate ventilation equipment, an infestation of mice and other rodents, and a collapsing roof. 10 (Id. at 18–19.) Harper stated in her affidavit that the officers’ past inspections had “resulted in 11 further concern for the structural integrity of the building, with visible signs of disrepair, 12 deterioration, and neglect.” (Id. at 52.) The large numbers of stored medical devices, 13 components, and machines were also blocking the way into and out of the building. (Id. at 52– 14 53.) The Superior Court issued the requested warrant on July 26, 2023. (Doc. 13 at 10.) It 15 authorized the officers to enter the warehouse between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. on any day within the 16 next fourteen days and to remove any improperly stored hazardous materials, chemicals, medical 17 waste, and similar materials; to remove any abandoned components, appliances, furniture and 18 similar items that pose a risk of “inadequate” or “obstructed” egress; to remove unpermitted 19 electrical work; and to have a structural engineer assess the property to confirm its structural 20 integrity. (Id. at 11.) 21 In each instance, the officers’ affidavits established probable cause for searches and 22 seizures at the Reedley warehouse under a variety of laws and regulations, even without any 23 claims about illegal laboratory operations or other business activity. The defendants’ motions and 24 filings before the superior court offer five examples of categories of laws and regulations that 25 supported the challenged warrants under the Fourth Amendment standard: 26 • The California Code of Civil Procedure permits a state superior court to issue an 27 inspection warrant for suspected violations of “state or local law or regulations 28 relating to building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor, or zoning.” 1 Cal. Civ. P. Code § 1822.50. Inspection warrants are “issued upon cause,” id. 2 § 1822.51, which “shall be deemed to exist if . . . there is reason to believe that a 3 condition of nonconformity exists with respect to the particular place, dwelling, 4 structure, premises, or vehicle,” id. § 1822.52. Federal and state appellate courts 5 have not distinguished inspection from abatement warrants under these provisions. 6 See Connor, 897 F.2d at 1490–91 (citing Gleaves v. Waters, 175 Cal. App. 3d 413 7 (1985)). 8 • California law defines “[a]nything which is injurious to health” as a nuisance. Cal. 9 Civ. Code § 3479. A “public nuisance” is a nuisance that “affects at the same time 10 an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons.” 11 Id. § 3480. The law authorizes an abatement as a remedy for a public nuisance. 12 Id. § 3491. The City of Reedley also authorizes its officers to abate nuisances if 13 they obtain an abatement warrant. See, e.g., City of Reedley Mun. Code § 1-12- 14 1(D). 15 • The state Health and Safety Code regulates the generation, transportation, and 16 disposal of “medical waste.” See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 117918 17 (treatment); id. § 117928 (storage); id. § 18025 (hauling). “Medical waste” 18 includes “waste generated in research pertaining to the production or testing of 19 microbiologicals” and “in research using human or animal pathogens,” among 20 other things. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 117690(a). Medical waste also 21 includes “biohazardous waste,” i.e., waste that is “suspected of containing a highly 22 communicable disease”; “recognizable human blood, fluid human blood products, 23 contains, or equipment containing human blood that is fluid”; “cultures and stocks 24 of infectious agents from research”; and “wastes from the production of bacteria, 25 viruses, spores, discarded live and attenuated vaccines used in human health care 26 or research,” and other things. Id. § 117690(b)(1)(A)–(C). Serious violations of 27 these provisions can be felonies punishable by imprisonment; unknowing 28 violations may be infractions only, punishable by a fine of up to $1,000. See id. 1 § 118340(b)–(d). 2 • The Reedley Municipal Code makes it unlawful to deprive animals of adequate 3 food, drink, and shelter and to keep animals “in a foul, offensive, obnoxious, 4 filthy, or unsanitary condition.” City of Reedley Mun. Code § 5-3-8(C), (H). 5 California law likewise makes it a crime to keep animals “in any building . . . 6 without proper care and attention.” Cal. Pen. Code § 597.1(a)(1). 7 • State law gives local Health Officers authority to take “measures as may be 8 necessary” to prevent the spread of any “infectious or communicable disease” that 9 they know or have “reason to believe” is within their jurisdiction. Cal. Health & 10 Safety Code § 120175. 11 Under these provisions, it would have been reasonable for the Superior Court to permit the 12 inspections of the Reedley warehouse based on the claims in Harrison’s affidavit. He reported 13 unpermitted and dangerous electrical and plumbing work, poor ventilation, and chemicals would 14 remain. 15 It was reasonable also for the Superior Court to rely on Harper’s affidavit to conclude that 16 mice were being kept in the warehouse in unsanitary conditions and without adequate care. As 17 noted, she described the conditions of the warehouse, her unsuccessful attempts to communicate 18 with the warehouse’s tenants and the mice caregivers, and the opinions of a veterinarian. 19 Prado’s affidavit likewise supported an abatement warrant. He included extensive details 20 about what local, state, and federal investigators found in the warehouse, as summarized above: 21 embargoed medical devices, blood and human tissue samples, unlabeled fluids, ultra-low 22 temperature freezers at risk of failure, toxic chemicals, vials of pharmaceuticals, biohazardous 23 waste, and at least twenty potentially infectious agents. The unpermitted electrical additions 24 within the warehouse increased the risk of fire. If a fire did break out, the suspected chemicals 25 and the risk of an explosion would prevent firefighters from entering the building. In the opinion 26 of the fire chief, a fire would therefore have necessitated the evacuation of the police department, 27 city hall, school district office, and about a dozen homes. And Mr. He, who claimed to be an 28 authorized representative of the warehouse’s tenants, either did not know or lied about the 1 presence of the infectious agents in the building, suggesting that the company was unlikely to 2 take prompt and adequate actions on its own. 3 The same is true of the warrants Harper and Isaak filed in support of the City’s application 4 for an abatement warrant. Their affidavits explained how garbage, contaminated materials, 5 hazardous liquids, unsafe electrical wiring, inadequate ventilation, rodents, a collapsing roof, 6 potentially explosive and flammable substances, and poor maintenance had obstructed the 7 building’s exits and made it generally unsafe. 8 The City and County Defendants’ motions to dismiss are thus granted. UMI requests 9 leave to amend its federal civil rights claims against the City and County. (Doc. 29 at 14.) 10 Although the contents of the disputed affidavits and state court filings is subject to no reasonable 11 dispute, the Court cannot exclude the possibility that UMI could make new or more specific 12 allegations about other statements in those affidavits. Amendments like these—if possible to 13 make in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11—would not necessarily be an 14 exercise in futility. This case is also in its early stages from a procedural vantage point, and the 15 Court perceives no bad faith, prejudice, or undue delay in UMI’s request for leave to amend. 16 UMI is therefore granted leave to amend its first claim. See, e.g., AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. 17 Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) (summarizing applicable factors and 18 emphasizing that “Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend should be freely given when 19 justice so requires.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 20 FEDERAL DEFENDANTS 21 UMI and Mr. He assert constitutional claims against the federal officers under Bivens v. 22 Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 34–37.) UMI alleges 23 Special Agent Maurice deprived the company of its right to be free from unreasonable searches 24 and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. UMI alleges Special Agent 25 Maurice, like the City and County Defendants, falsely or misleadingly stated that “UMI was 26 operating a laboratory, not merely storing its assets, and that it was engaging in hazardous and 27 unlawful activities.” (Id. ¶¶ 21, 35.) Mr. He alleges for his part that the two special agents used 28 excessive force during his arrest in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. 1 ¶¶ 24, 35.) The Federal Defendants move to dismiss these claims under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 28- 2 1 at 5.) They argue UMI and Mr. He cannot make out a cognizable legal claim under Bivens. 3 (See id.) 4 In Bivens, the Court held that the plaintiff had “a cause of action under the Fourth 5 Amendment” to seek damages from agents from the federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 6 at 397. He alleged that they had entered his apartment, arrested him, “manacled” him in front of 7 his wife and children, and “threatened to arrest the entire family.” Id. at 390. “Over the 8 following decade, the Court twice again fashioned new causes of action under the Constitution— 9 first, for a former congressional staffer’s Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination claim, and second, 10 for a federal prisoner’s inadequate-care claim under the Eighth Amendment.” Egbert v. Boule, 11 596 U.S. 482, 490–91 (2022) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 229 (1979) and Carlson v. 12 Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)). But since then, “the Court has not implied additional causes of 13 action under the Constitution.” Id. at 491. The Court has not “dispense[d] with Bivens 14 altogether,” but it has “emphasized that recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is ‘a 15 disfavored judicial activity.’” Id. (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017)). It has 16 instructed lower courts to use “caution” when a litigant argues a damages remedy is available 17 under Bivens. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 101 (2020)). 18 The inquiry in Bivens cases is normally framed as a two-step process. Id. at 492. First, 19 the court must ask “whether the case presents ‘a new Bivens context’—i.e., is it ‘meaningfully’ 20 different from the three cases in which the Court has implied a damages action”? Id. (alterations 21 omitted) (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139). “Second, if a claim arises in a new context, a Bivens 22 remedy is unavailable if there are ‘special factors’ indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably 23 less equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to 24 proceed.’” Id. (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 136). “If there is even a single ‘reason to pause before 25 applying Bivens in a new context,’ a court may not recognize a Bivens remedy.” Id. (quoting 26 Hernandez, 589 U.S. .at 102). But these two steps “often resolve into a single question: whether 27 there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” 28 Id. 1 Starting, with UMI’s claim, the company argues the Ninth Circuit has already held that a 2 Bivens-style damages remedy is available to compensate plaintiffs when a federal officer has 3 made false statements against them, citing Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2018). (See 4 Doc. 29 at 10–11. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Lanuza probably cannot be reconciled with the 5 Supreme Court’s intervening opinion in Egbert. In Egbert, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth 6 Circuit’s had erred in recognizing a Bivens remedy, even going so far as to describe the Circuit’s 7 analysis as “deeply flawed.” 596 U.S. at 502. The Ninth Circuit had relied in turn on Lanuza. 8 See 998 F.3d at 389 (quoting and citing 899 F.3d 1019). This later history has led some to 9 conclude that Lanuza has been “implicitly overruled.” Sheikh v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 10 No. 22-00409, 2022 WL 16964105, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2022), aff’d, 106 F.4th 918 (9th 11 Cir. 2024); see also Sheikh, 106 F.4th at 930–31 (R. Nelson, J., concurring) (“[T]he reasoning in 12 Lanuza is impossible to defend post-Egbert.”). 13 It is not necessary to decide whether Lanuza has been overruled, because even if it 14 remains binding, the claims in this case arise “in a new context” for purposes of the two-step test 15 summarized above. A case arises in a new context “if it ‘is different in a meaningful way from 16 previous Bivens cases’” decided by the Supreme Court itself, not from the decisions of any other 17 lower courts. Sheikh, 106 F.4th at 924 (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 139); see also id. at 926 18 (declining to follow Lanuza for this reason). A claim that a federal officer has presented 19 misleading or false evidence to a judge arises in a new and different context from Bivens, Davis, 20 and Carlson; none of those cases concerned an officer’s allegedly false or misleading statements 21 to a magistrate judge. See id. at 925–26. This case also concerns the actions of agents working 22 for a different administrative agency with a different “mandate” than the agencies whose officers 23 were defendants in the Supreme Court’s previous cases. See id. at 925. 24 Because UMI’s claim arises in a “new” context, this Court must “ask if there are ‘special 25 factors indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to weigh the 26 costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Id. at 926 (quoting Egbert, 596 27 U.S. at 492). There is at least one: an alternative remedy is available. “[A] court may not fashion 28 a Bivens remedy if Congress already has provided, or has authorized the Executive to provide, ‘an 1 alternative remedial structure.’” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493 (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137). As 2 the government points out, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit a person “aggrieved 3 by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property [to] move for the 4 property’s return.” (Doc. 28-1 at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g)). 5 Federal regulations also authorize the Office of Internal Affairs of the Food and Drug 6 Administration to take action on complaints against the agency’s personnel. See id. at 11 & n.1. 7 For these reasons, no Bivens damages remedy is available to UMI in this case. 8 Mr. He’s excessive force claim arises in a “new” context as well. In Egbert, as in Bivens, 9 the plaintiff alleged a federal officer had used excessive force. 596 U.S. at 490. But the Supreme 10 Court held nevertheless that the case arose in a new context—despite the plaintiff’s “similar 11 allegations of excessive force,” “almost parallel circumstances,” and “similar mechanism of 12 injury.” Mejia v. Miller, 61 F.4th 663, 668 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 495). 13 Among other reasons, excessive force cases arise in a “new” context when the defendants are 14 officers of a different federal agency with a different mandate and when they used force outside 15 the plaintiff’s home. See id. at 668–69. Mr. He’s claims about actions by FDA special agents 16 outside his home thus arise in a new context. And because he has alternative remedies, such as an 17 internal investigation and discipline, “special factors” counsel against extending him a damages 18 remedy under Bivens. See id. at 669. Mr. He cannot pursue his Bivens claim. 19 Amendments to the complaint could not remedy the defects above. The court therefore 20 grants the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend. See Sheikh, 106 F.4th 21 at 930 (affirming dismissal of Bivens claim without leave to amend in similar circumstances). 22 CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons stated, the Court ORDERS: 24 1. The County Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) and the City Defendants’ 25 motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) are GRANTED with leave to amend in part: UMI may amend its 26 first claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 within thirty days of the date this order is filed, but UMI may 27 not amend claim two. 28 2. The Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 28) is GRANTED without 1 | leave to amend. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4| Dated: _ January 29, 2026 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26