United Student Aid Funds v. Prodanis

2008 DNH 108

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: May 22, 2008
• Docket: CV-07-214-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

United Student Aid Funds v. Prodanis CV-07-214-JL 05/22/08 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United Student Aid Funds, Inc.

v. Civil N o . 07-214-JL Opinion N o . 2008 DNH 108 Prodanis, Inc., d/b/a/ Seasons Tickets Sports Pub

O R D E R

Plaintiff United Student Aid Funds, a loan guaranty agency

under 20 U.S.C. § 1095a, sued Prodanis, Inc. for failure to

comply with a wage withholding order requiring Prodanis to

garnish the wages of its employee--whose federally guaranteed

student loan had been purchased by USA Funds after she had

defaulted on her monthly payments. By agreement of the parties,

the court entered judgment in favor of USA Funds on March 5 ,

2008, and scheduled a hearing on the issue of damages, costs, and

attorney’s fees. After considering the arguments of the parties,

both in their pleadings and at the hearing conducted on May 7 ,

2008, the court orders Prodanis to make payment to USA Funds as

set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

USA Funds guaranteed the student loan of an employee of

Prodanis who had defaulted on her monthly payments. After repeated attempts to collect the loan payments directly from her,

USA Funds issued a wage withholding order to her employer,

Prodanis, requiring it to garnish 15% of her wages. Prodanis

failed to comply with, or respond t o , the order. After several

additional attempts to get Prodanis to comply, including issuing

a second wage withholding order, Fox Rothschild, LLP (“national

counsel”) issued a demand letter to Prodanis requesting

compliance with the withholding order. On June 2 2 , 2007, after

several months without a response to its letter, USA Funds hired

local counsel in New Hampshire--the Law Office of Rodney K.

Stark, P.A (“local counsel”)--to file suit against Prodanis.

On July 1 6 , 2007, USA Funds filed a complaint against

Prodanis in this court, which was later amended to correct a

number of errors in the original.1 As months passed, settlement

negotiations ensued and continued. On March 5 , 2008, at the

preliminary pretrial conference in this court’s chambers,

Prodanis stipulated to its liability for failing to comply with

the order and to judgment in favor of USA Funds. The specific

amount of the judgment was to be determined at a damages hearing.

1 The original complaint (Doc. 1 ) alleged that Prodanis failed to garnish 10% of its employee’s wages over the relevant period of time, and requested damages commensurate with that percentage. The amended complaint (Doc. 8 ) increased that figure to 1 5 % .

2 II. ANALYSIS

USA Funds now seeks $644.89 in ungarnished wages,

reimbursement for $9,272.68 in attorney’s fees and costs

associated with this litigation, and $963.08 in interest.2

Prodanis, while conceding the amount of ungarnished wages, argues

that the remainder of USA Funds’s requested damages are either

unwarranted or excessive.

In 1991, Congress amended the Higher Education Act of 1965

to authorize guaranty agencies to order the garnishment of the

wages of student borrowers who have defaulted on their student

loans. See 20 U.S.C. § 1095(a). Once an employer has been

served with a wage withholding order by a guaranty agency, it is

obligated to withhold a percentage of the wages due to the

employee referenced in the order. See 34 CFR § 682.410(b)(9).

In the event an employer fails to comply with the order, the

statute specifically sets forth the remedies available to a

guaranty agency:

the employer [of the student borrower in default on his or her loan] shall pay to the . . . guaranty agency as directed in the withholding order issued in this action, and shall be liable for, and the . . . guaranty

2 USA Funds asks the court for leave to “supplement its claim at the time of the court’s decision to reflect additional costs and fees incurred.” (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Award Damages, Costs, and Att’ys Fees § I I , D ) .

3 agency . . . may sue the employer . . . to recover, any amount that such employer fails to withhold from wages due to an employee following receipt of such employer of notice of the withholding order, plus attorney’s fees, costs, and in the court’s discretion, punitive damages.

20 U.S.C. § 1095a(a)(6) (emphasis added). Employers that choose

to ignore a withholding order are thus liable for not only the

ungarnished wages, but also the guaranty agency’s attorney’s fees

and costs in pursuing these wages. Here, with respect to the

amount of ungarnished wages, the parties agree that Prodanis

failed to withhold $644.89 in wages from its employee--or 15% of

$4,299.85. (Doc. 24 §§ 1 - 2 ) . Accordingly, the court awards

$644.89 to USA Funds in compensatory damages.

A. Attorney’s fees and costs

As explained supra, § 1095a(a)(6) of the amended Higher

Education Act requires courts to award attorney’s fees and costs

to a guaranty agency forced to bring suit to enforce a

garnishment order. The guaranty agency, however, is only

entitled to recover those expenses reasonably incurred by its

attorneys in connection with work that was both useful and

necessary to its claim in this court. See Hensley v . Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (reasonableness standards “are

generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has

4 authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’”); see also

Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v . Cherish Prods., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d

1183, 1186 (D. Minn. 2004); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v . Cherish

Prods., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 (D. Minn. 2003); Educ.

Credit Mgmt. Corp. v . Wilson, N o . 1:05-cv-41, 2006 WL 4608614, at

*8-*9 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 3 , 2006). Despite USA Funds’ argument to

the contrary at the damages hearing, the absence of the word

“reasonable” in § 1095a(a)(6) does not eliminate this court’s

discretion to assess the reasonableness of fee and cost claims.

Only those attorney’s fees and costs which the court deems

reasonable, as opposed to all fees requested by counsel, are

recoverable. See Wilson, 2006 WL 4608614, at *9 (the court is

not “a mere ‘rubber stamp’ without any authority and discretion

to review claims for attorney’s fees”). Accordingly, the court

awards to USA Funds what it requested in both its original and

amended complaints: “Reasonable fees and costs of court.” (Doc.

1 at 7 ; Doc. 10 at 7 ) .

The calculation of reasonable attorney’s fees is made by

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a

reasonable hourly rate of pay. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.

This is commonly referred to as the “lodestar” calculation.

Grendel’s Den, Inc. v . Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1st Cir. 1984).

5 The First Circuit briefly but succinctly described the lodestar

analysis as follows:

To determine the numbers of hours reasonably spent, one must first determine the number of hours actually spent and then subtract from that figure hours which were duplicative, unproductive, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary. In calculating a reasonable hourly rate, one must consider such factors as the type of work performed, who performed i t , the expertise that it required, and when it was undertaken.

Id. at 950-51 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In

calculating the lodestar figure, the court may exclude “time

spent on certain unsuccessful claims, eliminate excessive or

unproductive hours and assign more realistic rates to time

spent,” Vieques Conservation and Historical Trust, Inc. v .

Martinez, 313 F. Supp. 2d 4 0 , 46 (1st Cir. 2004), and is

“entitled to rely upon its own knowledge of attorney’s fees in

its surrounding areas in arriving at a reasonable hourly rate.”

Andrade v . Jamestown Housing Authority, 82 F.3d 1179, 1190 (1st

Cir. 1996). Likewise, when determining the reasonableness of

requested costs associated with the litigation, “the court must

apply a similar test of reasonableness and necessity.” Larkin,

749 F.2d at 951.

In arriving at the number of hours reasonably spent by USA

Funds’s attorneys in litigating this case, the court excludes:

6 (1) all work performed by national and local counsel in amending

the original complaint to remove its errors, see Copeland v .

Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[h]ours that are

not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed

to one’s adversary”), and (2) all work performed by national

counsel after June 2 2 , 2007, the date USA Funds retained local

counsel. The court excludes the fees incurred by national

counsel after June 2 2 , 2007, as duplicative and unnecessary in

light of the able and effective representation of local counsel

available to USA Funds from that date forward.

In its lodestar calculation, the court adopts the hourly

rate of Attorney Sherry Hieber ($185/hour)--the primary attorney

for local counsel--as a reasonable hourly rate for both local and

national counsel for the type of work and requisite level of

expertise involved. See Ackerly Communications v . Somerville,

901 F.2d 170, 172 (1st Cir. 1990) (reasonable rate for out-of-

town counsel “depends on prevailing rates in the community for

comparably qualified attorneys”). The court also adopts the

paralegal hourly rate requested by USA Funds ($85/hour).

Applying those rates, and excluding the costs and fees mentioned

above, the court awards attorney’s fees and costs, totaling

$6,294.01, to USA Funds as follows:

7 Fees Costs Total

• National counsel: $370.00 $18.613 $388.61

• Local counsel: $5788.004 $117.40 $5905.40

B. Interest

While 20 U.S.C. § 1095a authorizes damages, attorney’s fees,

and costs, the statute makes no mention of interest. USA Funds

argues that it is entitled to interest at the rate of $1.19 per

day, totaling $963.08 through March 2 4 , 2008. USA Funds arrived

at this daily rate by multiplying the borrower's total student

loan debt--rather than the amount of ungarnished wages--by "the

annual rate of interest," and then dividing that figure by

365.25. (Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s O b j . to Mot. Damages, Att’ys

Fees, Costs, and Interest ¶ 6 ) . USA Funds cites no authority in

support of this proposed interest rate. Rather, it

unconvincingly argues that it is “in accordance with industry

standards” and “routinely awarded in these types of cases.” Id.

The court finds this argument--especially the idea that interest

3 In its award to national counsel, the court excludes $2,121.00 from USA Fund’s request for attorney’s fees and $361.92 from its requested costs for work performed after June 2 2 , 2007. 4 In its award to local counsel, the court excludes $495.75 of fees requested by USA Funds which the court can readily attribute to the amendment of its complaint.

8 accrues not on the sum of ungarnished wages, but rather on the

entire debt, for which the employer bears no responsibility--

unreasonable, without statutory or case law support, and

especially unpersuasive in a case where the statutorily-required

award of costs and fees is nearly ten times the amount of the

principal recovery, even after a substantial reduction by the court.5

1. Pre-judgment interest

The federal statute applicable to this case, 20 U.S.C. §

1095a, provides no standards governing the allowance of pre-

judgment interest. Under First Circuit precedent, however, where

a federal statute is silent on the issue of pre-judgment

interest, “[t]he court has proper discretion under its equitable

powers to [grant prejudgment interest] as long as the interest

deals with tangible losses.” Colon Velez v . P.R. Marine Mgmt.,

Inc., 957 F.2d 933, 941 (1st Cir. 1992); see also U.S. ex rel.

Metric Elec., Inc. v . Enviroserve, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 5 6 , 75

(D. Mass. 2003) (court may order pre-judgment “interest on

damages unless they were not ascertainable with sufficient

5 See Riverside v . Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575-76 (1986) (explaining situation where fee awards that substantially exceed recoveries may be necessary to ensure that plaintiffs are able to secure legal representation).

9 certainty before trial”). When establishing a pre-judgment

interest rate under its equitable powers, “the court may look to

state law in setting the pre-judgment interest rate.” Velez, 957

F.2d at 941. Under New Hampshire law, the pre-judgment rates of

interest applicable to this case (6.8% for 2007, and 6.0% for

2008), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 336:1, accrue on damages from the

date suit is filed until judgment is entered. Id. § 524:1-b.

The court, in the exercise of its discretion, awards pre-

judgment interest on USA Funds’ $644.89 in ungarnished wages to

“compensate [it] for loss of use of the money it should have had”

if Prodanis had complied with the garnishment order. E . Mtn.

Platform Tennis, Inc. v . Sherwin-Williams Co., 40 F.3d 492, 504

(1st Cir. 1994); see also West Virginia v . United States, 479

U.S. 305, 310 n.2 (1987) (“Prejudgment interest serves to

compensate for the loss of use of money due as damages from the

time the claim accrues until judgment is entered, thereby

achieving full compensation for the injury those damages are

intended to redress.”). Utilizing the interest rates authorized

by New Hampshire law, and allowing pre-judgment interest to

accrue from the date the complaint was filed (July 1 6 , 2007)

through the date of the judgment (March 5 , 2008), the court

awards $27.16 in pre-judgment interest.

10 2. Post-judgment interest

28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which governs the award of post-

judgment interest in federal court, provides that “[i]nterest

shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered

in a district court.” Interest “shall be calculated from the

date of the entry of the judgment,” § 1961(a), and “computed

daily until the date of payment,” § 1961(b). The First Circuit

recently defined the phrase “entry of judgment” to refer to the

date liability is established--here, March 5 , 2008, the date of

the preliminary pretrial conference at which Prodanis stipulated

t o , and the court entered, judgment--rather than the date the

“money judgment” is quantified--the date of this order. See

Radford Trust v . First Unum Life Ins. C o . of Am., 491 F.3d 2 1 , 24

(1st Cir. 2007). Under the statute, the interest rate applicable

to damages post-judgment is determined by the weekly average one-

year constant maturity Treasury yield for the calendar week

preceding the date of judgment.6 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

The court accordingly awards post-judgment interest to USA

Funds to be calculated daily at the applicable rate of interest

from March 5 , 2008, until the date payment is made.

6 The current interest rates applicable under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 are published weekly by the Federal Reserve and can be located at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/current.

11 III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, USA Funds is

awarded attorney’s fees of $6,158.00, costs of $136.01, damages

of $644.89, prejudgment interest of $27.16, and post-judgment

interest to be calculated as set forth in the order.

SO ORDERED.

______________

Josfeph N. Laplante United States District Judge Dated: May 2 3 , 2008

cc: Cheryl M. Hieber, Esq. Roy W . Tilsley, Jr., Esq.