United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio-Clc v. General Steel Industries, Inc., and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States

499 F.2d 215, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2848, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 8134
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJune 14, 1974
Docket73-1675
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 499 F.2d 215 (United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio-Clc v. General Steel Industries, Inc., and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio-Clc v. General Steel Industries, Inc., and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 499 F.2d 215, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2848, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 8134 (8th Cir. 1974).

Opinions

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal raises the principal question of whether the Insurance Plan,1 Pension Plan, and Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan, which were covered by separate agreements but referred to in an Employer-Union basic collective bargaining agreement, are governed by the arbitration provisions in the basic agreement.

The dispute giving rise to this law suit arose a few months after the agreements involved were signed. In mid-December, 1972, appellee (Employer) announced its decision to permanently close two plants for economic reasons, including its St. Louis Car Division plant at which appellant (Union) represented a production and maintenance unit. On December 28, 1972, Employer mailed letters to each of its 500 employees already in a lay-off status advising them that their employment had been terminated effective December 15, 1972.

On January 4, 1973, the Union filed a grievance in behalf of all union members .who received the termination letters, alleging that the company had violated the existing collective bargaining agreement “by the sending of such notices and by the actions purported to be taken thereunder, including attempted termination of employees’ services and termination of certain insurance and other benefits.” The Union did not dispute the Employer’s right to close the plant but it did contend that the “attempt to terminate benefits to employees provided by the Vacation clauses, Insurance Plan, Pension Plan and Supplemental Unem[217]*217ployment Benefit Plan, as incorporated by reference in the collective bargaining agreement, [is] in direct violation of rights of its employees provided under said articles of the collective bargaining agreement.” The grievance stated that the Union was willing to waive all preliminary steps and refer the matter to immediate arbitration under Article Y, Section 5, of the basic agreement.

The parties were unable to agree upon the matters to be arbitrated. The Union ultimately demanded arbitration of issues arising under the basic agreement, the Insurance Plan, the Pension Plan, and the Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan.2

The Employer would not agree to' arbitrate on these terms and the Union then commenced an action in the district court seeking an injunction compelling arbitration of all matters in dispute. The Employer did not dispute the Union’s right to arbitrate its vacation and seniority claims. However, it contended that the Union’s claims relating to benefits spelled out in the separate agreements were not arbitrable under the basic agreement.

Equitable moved that it be dismissed upon the ground it was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement.

This cause was submitted to the district court on a stipulation, affidavits, and briefs. The court dismissed the action against Equitable upon the ground that it was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement and the interpretation of its contract was not subject to arbitration.

Since Equitable’s rights and obligations cannot be determined in an arbitration proceeding under the labor contract, its motion to dismiss was prop-. erly sustained. See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO et al. v. Mesker Bros. Industries, Inc., 457 F.2d 91 (CA8 1972).

The district court further ordered that the Employer and the Union submit to arbitration those differences which arose under the basic collective bargaining agreement, but that the differences arising under the Insurance Plan, the Pension Plan, and the Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan should not be so submitted. The court indicated it so reasoned because it found, “There is nothing in the collective bargaining agreement which indicates that the separate insurance agreements should in any way be subject to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.” It found similarly with respect to the Pension Plan.

“The law compels. a party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so.” Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 94 S.Ct. 629, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974). Here the parties were bound by their 1972 collective bargaining agreement. Among other things the basic agreement provided for adjustment [218]*218of grievances, which reads in part as follows:

Should any dispute or difference arise between the Company and the Union or its members employed by the Company as to the meaning, application, or operation of any provisions of this Agreement, or should trouble of any kind arise, there shall be no suspension or slowdown of work, or lockout, but such dispute or- difference shall be settled in the following manner [.]

There followed a detailed five-step procedure for the adjustment of differences between the Employer and the Union. The fifth step provided for binding- arbitration and it reads in part as follows:

An Arbitrator to whom any grievance shall be submitted in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall, insofar as shall be necessary to the determination of such grievance, have authority to interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement, but shall not have authority to alter in any way the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Only questions as to interpretation or application of or compliance with the provisions of this Agreement may be submitted to an Arbitrator.

The Employer urges, as it did below, that the Insurance Plan, the Pension Plan and the Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan are separate agreements and are not subject to the arbitration procedure provided for in the basic agreement; that the separate agreement on the Pension Plan provides that disputes thereunder “shall be referred to an impartial umpire to be selected by the Company and the Union”; further, that during the 1969 negotiations the Union unsuccessfully proposed to change the appeals procedure in the Pension Plan to provide that differences be referred to an arbitrator to be selected in the manner provided in the basic agreement; that the Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan provides that if a company employee disagrees with a determination thereunder he should discuss the matter with a company representative, and if not resolved file a written request for review on a form provided by the company.

The Union contends that since Articles VIII, IX and X of the basic agreement make specific reference to the three plans,3 they are to be considered as included' in and governed by the basic agreement.

The fundamental dispute between the Employer and the Union in this case involves the Union’s contention that the employees whose work was discontinued by the closing were in “lay off” status, rather than “terminated,” and accordingly they were entitled to benefits contractually promised to laid-off employees. This involves a resolution of the critical question of whether the Employer’s closing of the plant entitled it to terminate the employees and thereby deprive them of benefits which they would enjpy if, as the Union claims, they remained in a lay-off status following the closing.

[219]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
499 F.2d 215, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2848, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 8134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-steelworkers-of-america-afl-cio-clc-v-general-steel-industries-ca8-1974.