United States v. Zacquon Grady

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: June 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-5814
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0297n.06

Case No. 24-5814

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 13, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE ZACQUON D. GRADY, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION

Before: McKEAGUE, MURPHY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Zacquon Grady challenges the procedural and substantive

reasonableness of the 84-month prison sentence he received after pleading guilty to being a felon

in possession of a firearm. Specifically, Grady asserts that the district court improperly applied a

four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on Grady’s use or possession of

the firearm in relation to another felony offense—namely, aggravated assault against his girlfriend,

Itosha Rucker. Grady contends that the district court accepted unreliable evidence to support

application of the enhancement, improperly found that the alleged aggravated assault was relevant

conduct, and gave undue weight to certain sentencing factors while failing to sufficiently consider

others. We AFFIRM. No. 24-5814, United States v. Grady

I.

In August 2022, Metropolitan Nashville Police Department officers responded to a

domestic violence report involving Grady and his longtime girlfriend, Itosha Rucker. When the

officers arrived at the residence, both Grady and Rucker were present. Rucker described how

Grady had assaulted her the night before. She reported that Grady had punched her during an

argument, and as captured on one officer’s body-worn camera (“bodycam”), she had visible

injuries on her face, arms, and forehead from the encounter. The officers arrested Grady on

outstanding warrants and spoke further with Rucker.

To assess the threat level, officers conducted a lethality interview with Rucker, which was

also recorded on bodycam. During this interview, Rucker explained that Grady had “pistol-

whipped” her “a couple weeks ago.” She escorted officers inside the home and directed them to

the location of Rucker’s handgun inside a nightstand drawer. The officers retrieved a loaded

SCCY-CPX-2 9mm pistol from the top drawer of the nightstand.

At the time, Grady had multiple felony convictions as well as a documented history of

committing domestic violence offenses against Rucker. A federal grand jury indicted Grady on

two counts: (1) felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and

(2) possession of a firearm following a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Grady pleaded guilty to the first count. And the government dismissed the

second count.

In preparation for sentencing, the probation department prepared a Presentence

Investigation Report (“PSR”). The PSR recommended a four-level enhancement pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). According to the PSR, this enhancement was warranted because

Grady had used or possessed the firearm “in connection with another felony offense.” The

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purported other offense—premised on Rucker’s report of Grady pistol-whipping her—was

aggravated assault, as defined under Tennessee law. But Grady objected to Rucker’s statement

that he pistol-whipped her. He also argued that the government failed to prove that the firearm

listed in the offense of conviction was the same firearm Rucker alleged he used weeks earlier.

Grady did not challenge the PSR’s accuracy about his earlier convictions for domestic abuse

against Rucker.

At sentencing, the government introduced the police bodycam footage of their interview

with Rucker. This recording contained Rucker’s full statement, including details about the pistol-

whipping incident. The government emphasized that Rucker gave the statement voluntarily,

immediately following a separate physical altercation, and that she had no apparent incentive to

fabricate. After the court played the pertinent excerpt from the recording, Grady took the stand to

testify. On direct examination, Grady flatly denied that he had pistol-whipped Rucker. Then on

cross-examination, he refused to answer any questions about his past convictions for violence

against Rucker or whether he previously struck Rucker. Instead, he invoked his Fifth Amendment

right at each turn. So although Grady denied the specific conduct in question, he did not address

the pattern of behavior that Rucker’s statement and facts in the PSR both described. Meanwhile,

he reiterated objections to the enhancement, citing a lack of corroborating physical evidence, the

absence of a police report, and the government’s failure to produce Rucker for live testimony.

Grady also sought a downward variance based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

For instance, in terms of his history and characteristics, he described experiencing a traumatic

upbringing that featured, among other things, incidents of sexual and physical abuse. He also

suffered a gunshot wound and witnessed several shootings throughout his childhood. Grady

explained that these experiences created a persistent sense of fear that motivated him to keep a

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firearm for protection. He asserted that his “possession was nonviolent and not in relation to any

other criminal conduct.” And he argued that one of his prior convictions, which had added three

criminal history points to his score, occurred in his youth and led to an overstatement of his

criminal history.

Convinced by the government’s evidence concerning Grady’s possession of the firearm in

relation to Rucker’s pistol-whipping, the district court applied § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)’s four-level

enhancement. It found that Rucker’s statement to police, buttressed by other facts set forth in the

PSR, provided reliable evidence in support of the enhancement, and that Grady’s testimony failed

to overcome it. The district court also concluded that Grady’s offense was a “mine-run case for

gun possession,” so no variance was warranted. After so concluding, the district court sentenced

Grady to a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment and three years of

supervised release. Grady now appeals.

II.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law. Grady challenges both the procedural and

substantive reasonableness of his sentence. His attack on the district court’s application of the

Sentencing Guidelines is a question of procedural reasonableness. See United States v. Seymour,

739 F.3d 923, 929 (6th Cir. 2014). And his assertion that the district court gave inadequate

consideration to some statutory sentencing factors while affording outsized consideration to others

is a matter of substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504, 530 (6th

Cir. 2022).

We generally review all sentencing reasonableness questions for abuse of discretion.

Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 537 (2013). Under that standard, we typically review a

district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.

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Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2010). However, we have recognized that “for mixed

questions of law and fact—like the application of the Guidelines to the facts—the standard of

review varies.” United States v. Brown, 131 F.4th 337, 343 (6th Cir. 2025), reh’g denied, No. 23-

5610, 2025 WL 1166546 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025). As relevant here, we have not set a uniform

standard of review for a district court’s determination about whether an activity qualifies as

relevant conduct under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). See United States v. Shafer, 199 F.3d 826, 830 (6th Cir.

1999); see also United States v. Granado, No. 23-1171, 2024 WL 731128, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 22,

2024), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2592, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1246 (2024). But we need not resolve the

standard question here, as applying de novo review or according the district court’s determination

due deference reaches the same result on this record. That is, the district court properly applied

the enhancement to Grady’s Guidelines-calculation.

A. Procedural Reasonableness

“Procedural error occurs when the district court ‘fail[s] to calculate (or improperly

calculat[es]) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the

§ 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately

explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463, 469 (6th Cir. 2022) (italics

omitted) (quoting United States v. Fowler, 819 F.3d 298, 304 (6th Cir. 2016)); see also Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Conversely, “a sentence is procedurally reasonable where

the trial court follows proper procedures and gives adequate consideration to [the § 3553(a)]

factors.” United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753 (6th Cir. 2020) (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As noted, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies where a defendant uses or possesses a firearm

“in connection with another felony offense.” Grady contends that the district court misapplied this

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guideline in two different ways. First, Grady argues that the district court improperly relied on

Rucker’s statements which, according to Grady, did not satisfy the standard for reliability. Second,

Grady asserts that the district court did not conduct a “full and proper analysis under U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).” (ECF 14, Appellant’s Br., 10). Neither argument passes muster.

1. Application of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

Reliability of Evidence. At sentencing, the government introduced video footage of Rucker

telling an officer that Grady had pistol-whipped her a couple of weeks before the officer’s

interview with her. Grady complains that Rucker’s statement was unreliable because it lacked

temporal specificity, corroboration, or detail, and that Rucker did not testify at the hearing. And

to the extent the district court relied on Grady’s prior domestic violence and/or assault convictions

to bolster Rucker’s account, Grady asserts that doing so boiled down to reliance on propensity

evidence. He insists that his own sworn testimony denying the allegation should have carried

greater weight, since it was uncontested and subject to cross-examination.

The district court could rely on Rucker’s statement so long as it bore “some minimal indicia

of reliability.” United States v. Hamad, 495 F.3d 241, 247 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States

v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1512 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). Indeed, “[a] sentencing court may

consider all relevant evidence, whether or not such evidence would be admissible at trial.” United

States v. Rice, 844 F. App’x 844, 846 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d

526, 534 (6th Cir. 2020)). The minimal-indicia-of-reliability requirement is a “relatively low

hurdle.” United States v. Whitlow, 134 F.4th 914, 927 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Courts

can make certain that this hurdle has been cleared by “assur[ing] themselves of sufficient

corroborative evidence.” United States v. Santana, 723 F. App’x 331, 342 (6th Cir. 2018); see

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also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 cmt. (2021). And the district court did so here in assessing Rucker’s

statement.

Rucker gave her statement to law enforcement during a structured lethality interview. She

had previously pointed police to the specific location of the firearm, and police corroborated the

accuracy of this information when they recovered the weapon exactly where Rucker said it would

be. Moreover, Rucker told officers about Grady’s history of violent conduct toward her. Evidence

of Grady’s violence toward Rucker came not just from her statement about the earlier pistol

whipping, but also from her appearance as she spoke with police on the day of the arrest. The

video footage of the interview, which the government played for the court at sentencing, revealed

fresh marks and bruises on Rucker’s face and body that corroborated her statement to police that

Grady had assaulted her the previous evening. And while those details do not speak to the pistol

whipping, they add to the picture of Grady’s history of violence toward Rucker, which the district

court could readily consider in weighing Rucker’s overall credibility. So the district court did not

clearly err in finding that the pistol whipping occurred as Rucker described. The same is true for

the proof of Grady’s prior convictions involving violence against Rucker, which were uncontested

and well documented in the PSR.

Faced with competing narratives—Rucker’s contemporaneous statement versus Grady’s

blanket denial at sentencing—the district court resolved the credibility dispute in Rucker’s favor,

albeit “ever so slightly.” (R. 50, Sentencing Tr., PageID 151). That finding, grounded as it is in

the record, is entitled to deference. See United States v. Abdalla, 972 F.3d 838, 851 (6th Cir. 2020)

(reaffirming that “district courts receive even greater deference when their findings are based on

determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses” (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470

U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (citation modified))).

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Relevant Conduct. Grady next argues that even if the pistol-whipping occurred, the

government failed to show that it qualified as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 as directed by

U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) cmt. n.14(E). “A prior incident counts as relevant conduct if it was ‘part

of the same course of conduct’ or a ‘common scheme or plan’ as the underlying conviction.”

United States v. Webb, 2021 WL 4806517, *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2021) (quoting U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3(a)(2)). If two offenses are not part of a common scheme or plan, the enhancement can

still apply if they are closely related enough to be treated as “part of a single episode, spree, or

ongoing series of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii) (2021). Three factors bear on this

inquiry: (1) “the degree of similarity of the offenses”; (2) “the regularity of the offenses”; and (3)

“the time interval between the offenses.” United States v. Phillips, 516 F.3d 479, 483 (6th Cir.

2008). We apply a “sliding scale” approach to these factors. Id.

Grady emphasizes that the court referenced only the time interval between the two

incidents—“a few weeks apart”—but did not explicitly address the similarity or regularity of the

conduct. (R. 50, Sentencing Tr., PageID 153). Although the court’s discussion of this issue was

brief, we are not persuaded that its reasoning was insufficient. To begin, the record reflects that

the events were close in time, occurred in the same residence, involved the same individuals, and

included a handgun that was either identical or substantially similar. While regularity may be less

clear, on the sliding scale we apply, strong similarity and close timing can compensate. See United

States v. Bowens, 938 F.3d 790, 800 (6th Cir. 2019).

The district court had sufficient grounds to conclude that the incidents formed part of an

“ongoing series.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii) (2021). For instance, both incidents occurred

within a short time frame—just a “couple” of weeks apart according to Rucker—and involved the

same individuals, the same household, and what the district court reasonably inferred to be the

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same firearm. See Webb, 2021 WL 4806517, at *2 (quoting United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856,

865 (6th Cir. 2016)) (“When two incidents ‘took place at the same location,’ that usually shows

they are ‘connected.’”). Moreover, Rucker’s use of the definite article—“the gun”—when

describing the firearm Grady used to pistol-whip her supports the inference that only one gun was

involved. Police recovered that gun in the precise location Rucker described, which further

supports the conclusion that Grady had possessed the firearm continuously across both incidents.

This was enough to satisfy § 1B1.3. For these reasons, we see no procedural error in the court’s

application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

2. Consideration of Lower Sentence

Grady next argues that the district court failed to consider several nonfrivolous arguments

he advanced for a lower sentence, including his untreated post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),

his exposure to violence and abuse during childhood, and the allegedly nonviolent nature of his

firearm possession. Because Grady did not object to the district court’s explanation at

sentencing—despite being asked the Bostic question, so named for United States v. Bostic, 371

F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004)—we review this aspect of his appellate challenge for plain error. See

United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 919–20 (6th Cir. 2024). To establish plain error, Grady

“must show the district court committed (1) an error that was (2) plain and (3) affected his

substantial rights. If he can satisfy those three threshold requirements, then we have discretion to

grant relief only if (4) we conclude that the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Golson, 95 F.4th 456, 462 (6th Cir.

2024) (citation modified).

Grady cannot meet this demanding standard. The district court acknowledged multiple

times that it considered his childhood trauma and drug abuse in mitigation. For instance, it stated

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that “a very difficult childhood” and “a history of drug abuse” were “part of [his] story,” and cited

those factors in rejecting the government’s request for a higher sentence. (R. 50, Sentencing Tr.,

PageID 167). The court also explicitly grounded its decision to impose a sentence at the bottom

of the Guidelines range in those same mitigation arguments.

To the extent the district court did not specifically mention every detail Grady wished it to

discuss, that omission does not establish reversible error, because a court need not recite every

§ 3553(a) factor or address each argument head-on. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356–

59 (2007). What matters is “whether the record makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to

each argument, considered the supporting evidence, was fully aware of the defendant’s

circumstances and took them into account in sentencing him.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d

382, 387 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 358) (internal quotation marks omitted).

That is the case here.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Grady maintains that his 84-month sentence is substantively unreasonable due to his

mitigating history and characteristics. Again, we review claims of substantive unreasonableness

for an abuse of discretion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 40–41. To be substantively reasonable, a sentence

“must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and

sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).” United States

v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). On appellate

review, we may presume the reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence, see Perez-Rodriguez,

960 F.3d at 754, but even with presumptive reasonableness, we must inquire as to whether the

district court “placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in

sentencing the individual.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). Yet,

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rebutting the presumption is “no small burden,” and we generally do not “second guess” sentences

on substantive grounds when they fall within the Guidelines. United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d

348, 365 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Grady has not met his burden to rebut the presumption

of reasonableness for his within-Guidelines sentence. The record shows that the district court

thoroughly and appropriately weighed the § 3553(a) factors before imposing the sentence.

To start, the district court gave due weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Although Grady accurately notes that he was not brandishing the

firearm at the time of his arrest, the court emphasized that he possessed the weapon “after having

multiple violent convictions” and while “engaging in criminal conduct.” (R. 50, Sentencing Tr.,

PageID 167). As to Grady’s history and characteristics, the court acknowledged his “very difficult

childhood,” his “experiences that no child should have to encounter,” and his “history of drug

abuse.” (Id.). But it also considered that Grady had recently served time for an attempted

aggravated robbery in which he had discharged a firearm; he had incurred “multiple probation and

parole violations”; and he had amassed “multiple convictions for violent acts, including using a

firearm.” (Id.). Further, at the time of this offense, Grady had been out of prison for less than two

years. Then, in discussing the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law and to provide

just punishment, it noted that Grady’s swift return to firearm possession reflected little regard for

the law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). And Grady’s “violent criminal history” made protecting

the public from further crimes “a very important factor.” (R. 50, Sentencing Tr., PageID 168).

Finally, the district court’s statement that this case was not outside the “mine-run” of firearm

possession cases reflected a correct understanding of its role in avoiding unwarranted sentencing

disparities. (Id., PageID 169). It placed Grady’s conduct within the mainstream of similarly

situated defendants, reinforcing the appropriateness of a Guidelines sentence. See Perez-

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Rodriguez, 960 F.3d at 754. All in all, these facts, the court concluded, diminished the weight of

his mitigation claims.

Grady’s remaining objections ask this Court to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors in his favor.

But a defendant’s dissatisfaction with the district court’s weighing of the sentencing factors does

not render a sentence unreasonable. United States v. Trejo–Martinez, 481 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir.

2007). The district court articulated a reasonable basis for its decision, grounded in the facts of

this case and consistent with governing law. That is all the law requires, thus we find no abuse of

discretion.

III.

We AFFIRM.

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