MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WINGATE, District Judge.
Before the court once again is the defendant Charles L. Young who previously filed a motion to vacate and set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The defendant was found
guilty by a jury of his peers of one count of bank robbery in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d);
and one count of using a firearm during the commission of the bank robbery in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
The defendant was sentenced on December 15, 1998, to serve 121 months on the first count and 60 months on the second count, the two terms to run consecutively. Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in December of 1999.
After his conviction was affirmed, the defendant sought post conviction relief under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his conviction and sentence should be set aside because his attorney had been ineffective. The defendant’s only contention against his attorney’s performance is the alleged failure of counsel to object to this court’s application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a matter he did not raise on direct appeal. The defendant contended that this court misapplied § 2B3.1(b) (2)(C)
of the Guidelines when it enhanced his sentence, and that counsel should have objected to this application. This court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate, noting a district court’s technical
application of the Sentencing Guidelines does not give rise to a constitutional issue cognizable under § 2255.
United States v. Segler,
37 F.3d 1131, 1133-34 (5th Cir.1994). This court also noted that the manner in which this court employs the Guideline criteria to determine a sentence implicates no constitutional issues,
United States v. Faubion,
19 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir.1994), and cannot serve as the basis for the defendant’s claim that counsel’s performance was deficient under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was found by this court to have no merit.
Now, the defendant returns to this court with a motion purported to be filed in accordance with Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
. The defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) amended the United States Sentencing Guidelines so as to bring his claim within the auspices of § 3582(c)(2). In
Apprendi,
the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.,
120 S.Ct., at 2362-63.
Pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), a sentencing court may reduce a term of imprisonment “based on a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission ..., if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
See
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The applicable policy statement is U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10
, entitled “Retroactivity of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement).”
United States v. Drath,
89 F.3d 216, 217-18 (5th Cir.1996). Thus, where a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual, a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). However, if no amendment to a particular Guideline is applicable, a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is not consistent with this policy statement and thus is not authorized. Moreover, in order to be applicable, the amendment must be retroactive.
See United States v. Drath,
89 F.3d, at 218, noting that § 3582(c)(2) applies
only to amendments to the Guidelines that operate retroactively, as set forth in the Guidelines policy statement, U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(d).
See also United States v. Whitebird,
55 F.3d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir.1995); and
United States v. Pardue,
36 F.3d 429, (5th Cir.1994) (a § 3582(c)(2) motion applies only to guideline amendments that operate retroactively, as listed in the policy statement, U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(d)).
In the instant case the defendant has named no amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines made pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) which has been applied retroactively to the Guidelines under which the defendant was sentenced by this court.
For this reason alone, the defendant’s motion for reduction of his sentence pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) must be denied.
Recently, in the case of
United States v. Griffin,
2001 WL 540997 (E.D.La. May 21, 2001) (NO. CR.A.93-491), the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that an
Apprendi
challenge may not be brought pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) because it does not relate to a change in the Sentencing Guidelines by the Sentencing Commission. The Louisiana district court relied on the recent Seventh Circuit case of
United States v. Smith,
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WINGATE, District Judge.
Before the court once again is the defendant Charles L. Young who previously filed a motion to vacate and set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The defendant was found
guilty by a jury of his peers of one count of bank robbery in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d);
and one count of using a firearm during the commission of the bank robbery in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
The defendant was sentenced on December 15, 1998, to serve 121 months on the first count and 60 months on the second count, the two terms to run consecutively. Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in December of 1999.
After his conviction was affirmed, the defendant sought post conviction relief under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his conviction and sentence should be set aside because his attorney had been ineffective. The defendant’s only contention against his attorney’s performance is the alleged failure of counsel to object to this court’s application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a matter he did not raise on direct appeal. The defendant contended that this court misapplied § 2B3.1(b) (2)(C)
of the Guidelines when it enhanced his sentence, and that counsel should have objected to this application. This court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate, noting a district court’s technical
application of the Sentencing Guidelines does not give rise to a constitutional issue cognizable under § 2255.
United States v. Segler,
37 F.3d 1131, 1133-34 (5th Cir.1994). This court also noted that the manner in which this court employs the Guideline criteria to determine a sentence implicates no constitutional issues,
United States v. Faubion,
19 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir.1994), and cannot serve as the basis for the defendant’s claim that counsel’s performance was deficient under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was found by this court to have no merit.
Now, the defendant returns to this court with a motion purported to be filed in accordance with Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
. The defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) amended the United States Sentencing Guidelines so as to bring his claim within the auspices of § 3582(c)(2). In
Apprendi,
the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.,
120 S.Ct., at 2362-63.
Pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), a sentencing court may reduce a term of imprisonment “based on a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission ..., if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
See
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The applicable policy statement is U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10
, entitled “Retroactivity of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement).”
United States v. Drath,
89 F.3d 216, 217-18 (5th Cir.1996). Thus, where a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual, a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). However, if no amendment to a particular Guideline is applicable, a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is not consistent with this policy statement and thus is not authorized. Moreover, in order to be applicable, the amendment must be retroactive.
See United States v. Drath,
89 F.3d, at 218, noting that § 3582(c)(2) applies
only to amendments to the Guidelines that operate retroactively, as set forth in the Guidelines policy statement, U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(d).
See also United States v. Whitebird,
55 F.3d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir.1995); and
United States v. Pardue,
36 F.3d 429, (5th Cir.1994) (a § 3582(c)(2) motion applies only to guideline amendments that operate retroactively, as listed in the policy statement, U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(d)).
In the instant case the defendant has named no amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines made pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) which has been applied retroactively to the Guidelines under which the defendant was sentenced by this court.
For this reason alone, the defendant’s motion for reduction of his sentence pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) must be denied.
Recently, in the case of
United States v. Griffin,
2001 WL 540997 (E.D.La. May 21, 2001) (NO. CR.A.93-491), the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that an
Apprendi
challenge may not be brought pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) because it does not relate to a change in the Sentencing Guidelines by the Sentencing Commission. The Louisiana district court relied on the recent Seventh Circuit case of
United States v. Smith,
241 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir.2001), and the Fourth Circuit case of
United States v. Smith,
248 F.3d 1137, 2001 WL 427790 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 2001) (not reported) (any argument that Smith’s sentence violates
Apprendi
was a new issue, one not authorized by § 3582(c), for it is unrelated to any change in the Sentencing Guidelines).
See also United States v. Paul,
2001 WL 883130 (E.D.La. July 26, 2001) (the clear and unambiguous language of section 3582(c)(2) establishes that this statute is not designed to encompass sentencing challenges based upon court decisions; rather, section 3582(c)(2) is intended to aEow courts to modify a term of imprisonment only if the sentencing range has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) subsequent to the sentence being imposed upon the defendant).
This court agrees with the rationales of
Griffin
and
Paul
that section 3582(c)(2) apphes only when an amendment to a Sentencing Guideline is issued subsequent to a sentence imposed on a defendant, and has no apphcation to court decisions. Furthermore, there is no authority which applies the court’s decision in
Apprendi
retroactively.
In re Tatum,
233 F.3d 857, 859 (5th Cir.2000) (finding no United States Supreme Court opinion or other authority that applies
Apprendi
retroactively).
Therefore, in Eght of the foregoing, this court finds that the defendant’s motion submitted pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) is not well taken and the same is denied.