Markey, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Customs Court, 73 Cust. Ct. 1, C.D. 4550, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (1974), granting Yoshida’s motion for summary judgment, and declaring an import duty surcharge invalid. Presidential Proclamation 4074, because it imposed the sur[17]*17charge, was held to have been beyond the President’s delegated powers. The court stated that a delegation of sufficient breadth to encompass the proclamation would have been unconstitutional. We reverse.
FACTS
Yoshida’s merchandise (zippers) was imported from Japan and entered the port of New York on August 17, 25, and 26, 1971. The government levied, in addition to the standard duty under TSUS item 745.72, an import duty surcharge of 10% in accordance with item 948.00, which was added to the TSUS by Presidential Proclamation 4074.1 Yoshida challenges only the validity of Proclamation 4074.
Amicus
American Importers Association, Inc., filed a brief amicus curiae seeking, in the event of an affirmance, a declaration that the liquidations herein were null and void and the protests premature, the effect of which would be to remove barriers to a refund of amounts exacted by the surcharge. The government filed an opposing brief. The judgment below being reversed, the requests of amicus must be dismissed as moot.
President’s Actions
During the summer of 1971, the United States was faced with an economic crisis. The nation suffered under an exceptionally severe and worsening balance of payments deficit. The gold reserve backing of the U.S. dollar had dropped from $17.8 billion in 1960 to less than $10.4 billion in June of 1971,2 reflecting a growing lack of confidence in the U.S. dollar abroad. Foreign exchange rates were being controlled by some of our major trading partners in such a way as to overvalue the U.S. dollar. That action, by stimulating U.S. imports and restraining U.S. exports, contributed substantially to the balance of payments deficit.3 As one step in a program designed to meet the economic crisis,4 the President issued Proclamation 4074, which in relevant part stated:
[18]*18WHEREAS, there has been a prolonged decline in the international monetary reserves of the United States, and our trade and international competitive position is seriously threatened and, as a result, our continued ability to assure our security could be impaired;
WHEREAS, the balance of payments position of the United States requires the imposition of a surcharge on dutiable imports;
* * * *
A. I hereby declare a national emergency during which I call upon the public and private sector to make the efforts necessary to strengthen the international economic position of the United States.
B. (1) I hereby terminate in part for such period as may be necessary and modify prior Presidential Proclamations which carry out trade agreements insofar as such proclamations are inconsistent with, or proclaim duties different from, those made effective pursuant to the terms of this Proclamation.
(2) Such proclamations are suspended only insofar as is required to assess a surcharge in the form of a supplemental duty amounting to 10 percent ad valorem. Such supplemental duty shall be imposed on all dutiable articles * * * provided, however, that if the imposition of an additional duty of 10 percent ad valorem would cause the total duty or charge payable to exceed the total duty or charge payable at the rate prescribed in column 2 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, then the column 2 rate shall apply.
To implement the above language, Proclamation 4074 established the following item 948.00 of subpart C, part 2, of TSUS Appendix:
Rates of duty
Item Article 1 2
The referenced headnote 3 reads as follows:
3. Limitation on additional duties — The additional 10 percent rate of duty specified in rate of duty column numbered 1 of item 948.00 shall in no event exceed that rate which, when added to the column numbered 1 rate imposed on the imported article under the appropriate item in schedules 1 through 7 of these schedules, would result in an aggregated rate in excess of the rate provided for such article in rate of duty column numbered 2.
The President’s authority for proclaiming the surcharge was stated in Proclamation 4074 to be:
WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes, including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Tariff Act”), and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (hereinafter [19]*19referred to as “the TEA”), the President entered into, and proclaimed tariff rates under, trade agreements with foreign countries;
WHEREAS, under the Tariff Act, the TEA and other provisions of law, the President may, at any time, modify or terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation under his authority; * * *.
Importers of products subject to the surcharge sought and obtained permission from the Cost of Living Council to pass the surcharge through to customers as part of the price of the imported articles.5
Within less than five months following imposition of the surcharge, a multilateral agreement (The “Smithsonian Agreement” of December 18, 1971) among the major industrial nations was reached6 which, inter alia, gave promise of ending the overvaluation of the U.S. dollar in relation to other major currencies. On December 20, 1971, the import duty surcharge was terminated. (Presidential Proclamation 4098, 36 Fed. Reg. 24201 (1971).)
Customs Court
The main opinion below7 dealt extensively with the President’s termination and emergency powers, finding that neither encompassed the tariff surcharge promulgated in Proclamation 4074.
The President’s termination power, as expressed in the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (Tariff Act) and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA), was construed as follows:
We conclude that the authority granted by statute to “terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation” does not include the power to determine and fix unilaterally a rate of duty which has not been previously legally established. On the contrary, the “termination” authority, as statutorily granted, merely provides the President with a mechanical procedure of supplanting or replacing existing rates with rates which have been established by prior proclamations or by statute. Relevant thereto is United States v. American Bitumuls & Asphalt Co., 44 CCPA199, C.A.D. 661, 246 F. 2d 270 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 883 (1957).
The power to “terminate, in whole or in part,” existing proclaimed rates was characterized as twofold: the President may “nullify and bring to an end an entire proclamation” (whereupon the duty rate would revert to one previously established but not terminated), or he may “specify the extent to which a prior proclamation is terminated, thereby permitting a portion thereof to remain in effect.” Thus, said the court, exercise of the termination power affects duty rates
* * * (1) to increase rates to the highest level, i.e., the statutory rate, or (2) to raise or lower rates to conform to rates which have been established by a prior proclamation. In either of these instances, the rates, to which conformance may be sought, have been [20]*20previously established either by the Congress (statutory rate) or by a bilateral negotiation embodied in a trade agreement pursuant to statutory authority. In short, the power to fix a new and independent rate requires a greater grant of power than that delegated to the President by the termination authority.
The Government’s reliance on the phrase “unless otherwise provided” in general headnote 4(d) of the tariff schedules8 was met with these words:
In our view that phrase is nothing more than an exception to the provision contained in headnote 4(d) fixing the order of rate reversion resulting from a termination proclamation. More specifically, the phrase “unless otherwise provided” gives the President discretionary authority when terminating a proclamation to specify a rate established in a specific previous proclamation other than the next intervening proclamation and thus avoid an automatic reversion to the next intervening proclaimed rate. In other words, the phrase “unless otherwise provided” contemplates only the exercise of Presidential discretion to preclude the order of reversion set forth in general headnote 4(d).
The President’s emergency power, as expressed in the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), section 5(b), to “regulate * * * importation * * * of * * * any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,” said the Customs Court,
* * * conveys to the President an authority consisting only of a specific mode of regulation, as distinguished from the full and all-inclusive power to regulate foreign commerce. The delegation of the specific regulatory authority, “by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise,” manifestly is restrictive in scope and is but one branch of many attached to the trunk of the tree in which is lodged the all-inclusive substantive power to regulate foreign commerce, vested solely in the Congress.
We, therefore, conclude that section 5(b)(1) of the Act contains such restrictive standards and guidelines as to meet the test of constitutionality, but which, in turn, precludes the President from laying the supplemental duties provided by Presidential Proclamation 4074.
Though recognizing that the power to impose duties “may also serve as a regulatory measure,” the Customs Court felt that the power to “regulate” could not, per se, be said to include the power to levy duties, citing Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73 (1875).
The “emergency” feature of the TWEA was noted by the Customs Court in these words:
For legislation delegating restrictive regulatory authority cannot operate, merely upon the declaration of an emergency, to the exclusion of other legislative acts providing procedures prescribed by the Congress for the accomplishment of the very purpose sought to be attained by Presidential Proclamation 4074. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
* * * If the words “regulate * * * importation” were given the construction contended by the defendant, the President by the declaration of a national emergency could determine and fix rates of duty at will, without regard to statutory rates prescribed by the Congress and without the benefit of standards or guidelines which must accompany any [21]*21valid delegation of a constitutional power by the Congress. Hampton & Co. v. United States, [276 U.S. 394] p. 409. The delegation of such an unrestrained and unbridled authority to lay duties, indeed, might well be deemed an abdication by the Congress of its constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce.
Citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420 (1935), for the proposition that good motives are not in point, the Customs Court summarized its view that neither motive nor national emergency would sustain the President’s authority to issue Proclamation 4074 as follows:
This court is not without appreciation of the burdensome problems encountered by the Executive as he represents these United States in the society of nations. Nor can the court fail to recognize the efforts of the President to achieve stability in the international trade position and monetary reserves of this country. But neither need nor national emergency will justify the exercise of a power by the Executive not inherent in his office nor delegated by the Congress. Expedience cannot justify the means by which a deserving and beneficial national result is accomplished. To indulge in judicial rationalization in order to sanction the exercise of a power where no power in fact exists is to strike the deadliest of blows to our Constitution.
The concurring opinion set forth substantial additional portions of the TWEA’s legislative history, with this summarization:
Thus it can be seen that the amendments to section 5(b) sucessively extended the President’s licensing authority in the areas of foreign exchange, banking and currency transactions and transactions involving property in which foreign countries or nationals have an interest. However, nowhere in the Congressional debates, committee hearings or reports on section 5(b) and the amendments thereto is there even a glimmer of a suggestion that Congress ever intended — or even considered — this section as a vehicle for delegating any of its tariff-making authority. [Footnote omitted.]
Issue
The sole issues before us is whether the Customs Court erred, as a matter of law, in holding that Proclamation 4074 was an ultra vires Presidential act. Resolution of the issue requires determination of whether the surcharge imposed by Presidential Proclamation 4074 was within the delegated authority to be found in either (1) the termination provisions of § 350(a)(6) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (Tariff Act) (19 USC 1351(a)(6)) and § 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA) (19 USC 1885(b)),9 or (2) the emergency powers granted by § 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), as amended (50 [22]*22USC App. 5(b)),10 and if so, whether such a delegation of authority was constitutional.
OPINION
The people of the new United States, in adopting the Constitution, granted the power to “lay and collect duties” and to “regulate commerce” to the Congress, not to the Executive. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, clauses 1 and 3. Nonetheless, as the Customs Court recognized in the opinion below, and as other courts and commentators have noted,11 Congress, beginning as early as 1794 and continuing into 1974,12 has delegated the exercise of much of the power to regulate foreign commerce to the Executive. As perhaps an inevitable result, “few areas of American constitutional law [are] more burdened with conflicting decisions and scholarly disagreement.” Recent Decisions, 15 Va. J. Int’l. L. 649.(1975).
As inferred in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the President has certain “inherent” powers in the conduct of foreign relations and foreign affairs. Some of the commentators referred to above have cited certain “concurrent” powers he shares with the Congress in those fields. The Supreme Court referred to “pooled” legislative and executive powers in foreign affairs, including delegations of power over foreign commerce, -in Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110 (1948). It is nonetheless clear that no undelegated power to regulate commerce, or to set tariffs, inheres in the Presidency.13
Termination Provisions
We are in basic agreement with the Customs Court’s interpretation (quoted above) of the termination powers delegated by the Con[23]*23gress in the Tariff Act and in the TEA, United States v. American Bitumuls & Asphalt Co., 44 CCPA 199, C.A.D. 661, 246 F. 2d 270 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 883.
Having correctly found no delegation, in the acts or in their legislative histories, of the power to impose the surcharge here in question, the Customs Court nonetheless applied, and the parties have argued, the “separation of powers doctrine” and its corollary, the “delegation doctrine,” in relation to the termination provisions of the Tariff Act and the TEA. But whether the limitations on Congress’ power to delegate, as gleaned by the Customs Court from Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), are still viable, or whether they now rest on a rusted concept,14 are questions raisable only after it is determined that a particular delegation had been attempted. It is unnecessary to discuss the constitutional ramifications that might obtain if Congress had made such a delegation in the Tariff Act or in the TEA.15
Emergency Powers
We are presented, in this case, with the first reliance upon the TWEA as authority for a Presidential imposition of a temporary surcharge on imports. There being nothing in the TWEA or in its history which specifically either authorizes or prohibits the imposition of a surcharge, and no judicial precedent involving the same, we tread new ground.16
[24]*24
Power Delegated
Our duty is to effectuate the intent of Congress. In so doing, we look first to the literal meaning of the words employed. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958). Analysis of the statute and its wording provides the threshold determination of what was delegated by the Congress.
The express delegation in § 5(b) of the TWEA is broad indeed. It provides that the President may, during “any” period of national emergency declared by him, through “any” agency he designates, or “otherwise,” and under “any” rules he prescribes, by means of instructions, licenses, “or otherwise,” “regulate,” “prevent” or “prohibit” the importation of “any” property17 in which “any” foreign country or a national thereof has “any” interest, and that the President may, in the manner provided, take “other and further measures,” not inconsistent with the statute, for the “enforcement” of the Act.
The Act authorizes the President to define “any or all” of the terms employed by Congress in § 5(b). 50 USC App. 5(b)(3).
It appears incontestable that § 5(b) does in fact delegate to the President, for use during war or during national emergency only, the power to “regulate importation.” The plain and unambiguous wording of the statute permits no other interpretation. As was said of war power in Lichterv. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948), the primary implication of an emergency power is that it should be effective to deal with a national emergency successfully. The delegation in § 5(b) is broad and extensive; it could not have been otherwise if the President were to have, within constitutional boundaries, the flexibility required to meet problems surrounding a national emergency with the success desired by Congress.18
A question remains, however, as to how the President may regulate importation in a national emergency, i.e., what means of execution of the delegated power are permissible. As appears below, we agree with the Customs Court that the delegation could not constitutionally have been of “the full and all-inclusive power to regulate commerce.” We do not believe, however, as the Customs Court apparently did, that only in such a sweeping delegation could authority be found for Proclamation 4074. The choice is not draconian.
[25]*25
Means of Execution
The Customs Court, considering a broad delegation unconstitutional in the absence of standards restricting the President’s actions thereunder, found such standards in an interpretation of the words “by means of instructions, licenses or otherwise” as words of restriction. Citing the war-related history of the Act, commencing with the Act of July 13, 1861 (12 Stat. 255, 257), and its genesis in the common law rule against trading with an enemy, the Customs Court carried through to the present day the licensing or permission to import specific goods originally envisaged as the means of executing the power delegated by the Act.
We agree with the Customs Court on the necessity of determining the scope and extent of delegated regulatory power.19 The question in this context is whether Congress, having itself regulated imports by employing duties as a regulatory tool, and having delegated to the President, for use in national emergencies, the power to regulate imports, intended to permit the President to employ the same regulatory tool, and what, if any, limitations lay upon his use thereof.
The opinion below states:
The words “instructions, licenses, or otherwise” contained in section 5(b)(1) define the nature and mode of the regulatory authority intended to be delegated to the President. These words conform to the phraseology used through the history of the Act in the establishment of a system of licenses and permits for the control of property during a time of war and crisis and which have come to be recognized as the hallmark and distinguishing feature of the Act. (Emphasis added.)
We do not find, however, that the words “instructions, licenses, or otherwise,” either “conform to the phraseology used throughout the history of the Act” or “have come to be recognized as the hallmark and distinguishing feature of the Act.” No specific authority was cited in support of that view and we find none. The words “instructions” and “importation” were not added until 1941. As the concurring opinion below recognizes, the legislative history of the TWEA is silent regarding the reasons for the 1941 insertion of those two words. A statute must be interpreted as a whole, and we cannot reconcile the Customs Court’s restrictive view with the remainder of § 5(b), which authorizes the President to take numerous actions not amenable to “licensing.”
[26]*26Recognizing that to impose duties can be to “regulate,” the Customs Court nonetheless interpreted the words “the President may * * * regulate * * * importation” as though they read, in effect, “the President may * * * license * * * importation.” We cannot agree.
Also relying on the war-related history of the TWEA and its progenitors, appellee argues, in agreement with the Customs Court’s view, that the congressional intent of § 5(b) is to allow the President only to permit trade, not to prohibit it. The argument fails on two bases. The statute itself authorizes the President, during emergencies, to “regulate * * * prevent or prohibit * * * importation.” Secondly, the argument unrealistically by-passes more recent history of the TWEA. The 1933 amendment,21 delegating power to the President for use in response to economic emergencies (indeed, to “any” national emergency declared by the President, Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1965)), clearly expanded the purview of the TWEA from that which encompassed only trading with an enemy in time of war to that which also encompassed dealing with “any” national emergency,, including those involving no enemy and no war-related trading.22
Adhering to the analogy applied by the Customs Court, which found the roots of the TWEA in the Act of July 13, 1861 and the delegation in § 5(b) a branch of the tree in which congressional power to regulate foreign commerce is lodged, we find, Mendel-like, a cross-breeding which produced an economic emergency branch. Only if the TWEA had remained limited to trading with the enemy in “time of war” would the “licensing” limitation and its historical background be controlling. The first War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 839, the fourth and last amendment to the TWEA, was indeed “hasty legislation,” as described by the Supreme Court in Clark v. Uebersee Finanz Korporation, supra, note 17, having been adopted upon the onset of war. The Congress, however, did not withdraw or diminish any previously delegated power. [27]*27Moreover, apparently perceiving no threat of abuse of executive power, Congress has been content to let the Act stand untouched for thirty-four years, while various emergencies have been declared and courts have sustained both the breadth of the TWEA and the constitutionality of diverse actions taken under its authority. (See note 16, supra.)
The narrow interpretation adopted by the Customs Court also rests upon disregard of the phrase “or otherwise,” which follows “by means of instructions, licenses,”23 and, thus, would require a re-writing, in effect, of the statute. Judicial power does not extend that far.24 To treat use of the phrase “or otherwise” by Congress as having been without purpose is to violate a basic rule of statutory construction. Ex Parte Public National Bank, 278 U.S. 101, 104 (1928).
If the phrase “by means of instructions, licenses or otherwise” defines “the nature and mode of the regulatory authority intended to be delegated to the President,” it does so very broadly indeed. The phrase appears to us to be expansive, not restrictive. The words “or otherwise,” if they mean anything, must mean that Congress authorized the use of means which, though not identified, were different from, an additional to, “instructions” and “licenses.” Congress, by its use of “or otherwise,” signaled its intent not to bind the President into “instructions” or “licenses,” or into any other pre-specified means which might preclude his dealing with a national emergency and defeat the purpose of the legislation.
Demonstrably careful and extensive research into the history of § 5(b) led the author of the concurring opinion below to give weight to the lack of an indication that Congress “intended — or even considered — this section as a vehicle for delegating any of its tariff-making authority.” However, we do not find it surprising that Congress did not specify that the President could use a surcharge in a national emergency. Having left the battlefield, it would hardly do to dictate all the weapons to be used in the fight. Nor do we find anything in the inconclusive and [28]*28hurried legislative history of § 5(b) which indicates an intent to prohibit action such as that reflected in Proclamation 4074.
We conclude, therefore, that Congress, in enacting § 5(b) of the TWEA, authorized the President, during an emergency, to exercise the delegated substantive power, i.e., to “regulate importation,” by imposing an import duty surcharge or by other means appropriately and reasonably related, as discussed below, to the particular nature of the emergency declared. Whether a delegation of such breadth as to have authorized Proclamation 4074 would be constitutionally embraced, is determined, however, by the nature of the particular surcharge herein and its relationship to other statutes, as well as by its relationship to the particular emergency confronted.
Limited Nature of Proclamation 4074
In its proper concern for adherence to the Constitution, the Customs Court erred, we believe, in its expressed fear that, if Proclamation 4074 were upheld, the President, by “merely” declaring a national emergency, “could determine and fix rates of duty at will, without regard to statutory rates prescribed by Congress.” The concurring opinion expressed the same unease in these words:
Furthermore, a finding that the President has the power under section 5(b) to impose whatever tariff rates he deems desirable simply by declaring a national emergency would not only render our trade agreements program nugatory, it would subvert the manifest Congressional intent to maintain control over its Constitutional powers to levy tariffs.
As was said in Falcon Sales Company v. United States, 47 Cust. Ct. 129, 136, C.D. 2292, 199 F. Supp. 97, 102 (1961) presidential actions must be judged in the light of what the President actually did, not in the light of what he could have done. To this we would add, “and not in the light of what he might do.” Each Presidential proclamation or action under § 5(b) must be evaluated on its own facts and circumstances. To uphold the specific surcharge imposed by Proclamation 4074 is not to approve in advance any future surcharge of a different nature, or any surcharge differently applied or any surcharge not reasonably related to the emergency declared.
Proclamation 4074, far from fixing rates in disregard of congressional will, specifically provided, as noted above, “that if the imposition of an additional duty of 10 percent ad valorem would cause the total duty or charge payable to exceed the total duty or charge payable at the rate prescribed in column 2 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, then the column 2 rate shall apply.”
Further, the surcharge was limited to articles which had been the subject of prior tariff concessions and, thus, to less than all United States imports. It resulted in a range of effective surcharge rates and duties. The surcharge rate on automobiles, for example, became 6.5% [29]*29ad valorem. S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971).25 With respect to some articles the surcharge could result in the precise statutory duty set by the Congress. If a prior concession had reduced the statutory rate by 10% ad valorem, the imposition of the 10% ad valorem surcharge would produce the statutory rate of column 1 in the Tariff Schedules. As Proclamation 4074 recognized, the duty rate after the surcharge might become that of column 2 for other articles. With respect to some other articles, the surcharge might result in a duty set by one of a series of earlier concessions following presidentially negotiated trade agreements. In the case of still other articles, the total duty under Proclamation 4074 might be less than that resulting from a rate set by Congress and different from that resulting from prior tariff concessions.
With respect to those articles on which no concession had been granted, the congressionally established rates remained untouched. And the limitation to “dutiable” articles meant that no duties were created on goods entitled to free entry under the statute. Far from attempting, therefore, to tear down or supplant the entire tariff scheme of Congress, the President imposed a limited surcharge, as “a temporary measure” (see footnote 4, supra) calculated to help meet a particular national emergency, which is quite different from “imposing whatever tariff rates he deems desirable.”26
Relationship to Other Statutes
Reliance by the Customs Court on Youngstown Sheet & Tube, as quoted above, is misplaced. We do not have here, as was the case in Youngstown, what the Customs Court described as “legislative acts providing procedures prescribed by the Congress for the accomplishment of the very purpose sought to be obtained” by a Presidential Proclamation. The surcharge did not run counter to any explicit legislation. We know of no act, other than the TWEA, “providing procedures” for dealing with a national emergency involving a balance of payments problem such as that which existed in 1971.
Congress has provided numerous acts touching upon the regulation of imports. The Tariff Act of 1930 and its amendments, the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, and its amendments, and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 all provide tariff-making authority to the President,27 albeit with various limitations. Those trade acts were viewed by the Customs [30]*30Court as indicating a congressional intent that such limitations should apply to any delegation of its tariff making authority.28 Those acts, however, are applicable to normal conditions on a continuing basis. The existence of limited authority under certain trade acts does not preclude the execution of other, broader authority under a national emergency powers act. Though § 5(b) of the TWEA does overlap the traditional framework of trade legislation, it is not controlling that some of the same considerations are involved. That is to be expected. All deal with foreign commerce. Congress has said what may be done with respect to foreseeable events in the Tariff Act, the TEA, and in the Trade Act of 1974 (all of which are in force) and has said what may be done with respect to unforseeable events in the TWEA. In the latter, Congress necessarily intended a grant of power adequate to deal with national emergencies. It was error below to apply the same approach to determination of intent when Congress is legislating for normal conditions (where the grant is properly narrow) and when Congress is legislating for national emergency conditions (where the grant must be of greater breadth). We find it unreasonable to suppose that Congress passed the TWEA, delegating broad powers to the President for periodic use during national emergencies, while intending that the President, when faced with such an emergency, must follow limiting procedures prescribed in other acts designed for continuing use during normal times.
Relation to the Power Delegated and the Emergency Declared
A standard inherently applicable to the exercise of delegated emergency powers is the extent to which the action taken bears a reasonable relation to the power delegated and to the emergency giving rise to the action. The nature of the power determines what may be done and the nature of the emergency restricts the how oí its doing, i.e., the means of execution. Though courts will not normally review the essentially political questions surrounding the declaration or continuance of a national emergency, they will not hestitate to review the actions taken in response thereto or in reliance thereon.29 It is one thing [31]*31for courts to review the judgment of a President that a national emergency exists. It is another for courts to review his acts arising from that judgment.
It is clear that the surcharge herein had, as its primary purpose, the curtailment, i.e., the regulation, of imports. What was sought was an offset to actions of our foreign trading partners which had led to loss of our favorable balance of trade and to a serious negative balance, as the President’s address, supra note 4, made plain. Pressure exerted by the surcharge contributed to achievement of a multilateral agreement of major nations,30 which included a realignment of currency exchange rates. As was indicated in South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trad. Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct.Cl. 1964), it is purpose, not form, which should govern judicial characterization of a charge on imports. Cf. Moon v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382, 391 (9th Cir. 1967). A principal function and necessary effect of the import surcharge in Proclamation 4074 was to regulate imports. Section 5(b) delegated power to “regulate importation.” The relationship between the action taken and the power delegated was thus one of substantial identity.
The President’s choice of means of execution must also bear a reasonable relation to the particular emergency confronted. In considering section 3 of the Tariff Act of 1890, which authorized the President, in non-emergency situations, to impose retaliatory measures at his discretion “for such time as he shall deem just,” the Supreme Court, after noting the fact finding limitation normally involved in peacetime delegations, said in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691 (1892):
[I]n the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of our people, against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign governments, in the interests of their people, to invest the President with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations.
The “discriminating regulations * * * in the interests of their people” referred to in Field may be likened to the “unfair exchange rates,” “unfair treatment” and “the unfair edge” which the President described in his address, supra note 4, as causing the United States “to compete with one hand tied behind her back” and as the “major reason why our trade balance has eroded.”
That the surcharge herein had overtones of foreign relations and foreign policy seems self-evident. As the world has grown smaller and trade more complex, foreign exchange rates, international monetary reserves, balances of payments, and trade barriers have become increasingly intertwined, with trade barriers being used as tools in furtherance of foreign policy. See the Congressional findings which appeared in § 2 (50 USC App. 2401) of the Export Administration Act of [32]*321969, 83 Stat. 841 (50 USC App. 2401-13). The Customs Court appreciated that the nature of the surcharge action converged with presidential representation of the United States in the “society of nations” and with the President’s efforts to achieve “stability in the international trade position” of our country. The declared national emergency was premised on a prolonged decline in our country’s international monetary reserves, the serious threat to our trade position, and our unfavorable balance of payments position. Unlike quotas and other forms of action, a surcharge can obviously be quickly imposed and removed, is not discriminatory among nations affected, and is administratively less complex.31 Through its impact on imports, the surcharge imposed by Proclamation 4074 had a direct effect on our nation’s balance of trade and, in turn, on its balance of payments deficit and its international monetary reserves. We conclude, therefore, that the President’s action in imposing the surcharge bore an eminently reasonable relationship to the emergency confronted.
Constitutionality
It should be understood, in considering the constitutionality of the TWEA as here interpreted, that the President’s imposition of the surcharge could not violate any individual’s constitutional rights in foreign trade. No one has a vested right to trade with foreign nations. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); The Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1912); Brotan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216 (1915); Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915); Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933). And no one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933). Nor are we faced here with denial or infringement, even indirectly, of any right arising from any of the Amendments to the Constitution, as were the courts, for example, in Veterans & Resero. For Peace In Vietnam v. Regional Com’r, and Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs, supra note 16, wherein detention, under § 5(b), of publications sent from North Vietnam was upheld against a claim of violation of First Amendment rights, or in Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, supra note 16, wherein blocking of property, under § 5(b), was found not to be a deprivation of property violative of the Fifth Amendment.
The Customs Court, as quoted above, perceived a constitutional flaw in § 5(b) of the TWEA if it were interpreted as permitting the surcharge herein, viewing such interpretation as a denial of the people’s right to a government of separated powers, i.e., that Congress’ delegation in § 5(b), unless restricted to “licensing,” would be a violation of the “dele[33]*33gation doctrine.” Whatever may be the current viability of that doctrine (see note 14, supra), we find no conflict therewith in the TWEA as applied to Proclamation 4074. The Supreme Court in Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), dealing with non-emergency conditions, found those delegations proper which laid down an “intelligible principle” under which the President was to act. We find that principle, as did the court in Veterans & Resero. For Peace In Vietnam v. Regional Com’r, supra, in the express limitations that (1) § 5(b) of the TWEA shall become operative only in “time of war” or “any other period of national emergency declared by the President” (i.e., a congressional requirement that the President, before acting in peacetime, must find and declare the fact that a national emergency exists), and (2) that the power delegated therein shall be applied only to “property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.”
It cannot be lightly dismissed that the TWEA is operative only during (war or) national emergencies,32 which inherently preclude prior prescription of specific, detailed guidelines. Even in relation to tranquil, non-emergency conditions, the more modern view of the “delegation doctrine” was stated by the Supreme Court in American Power Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946), in these words:
The legislative process would frequently bog down if Congress' were constitutionally required to appraise beforehand the myriad situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for each situation. Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congres to prescribe detailed rules; it then becomes constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority. Private rights are protected by access to the courts to test the application of the policy in the light of these legislative declarations.
Clearly, Congress can be “constitutionally required to appraise beforehand the myriad situations” even less stringently when legislating [34]*34with respect to the inherently unknown and unknowable problems which may accompany a future national emergency.
The need for prompt action, another essential feature of a national emergency, precludes the otherwise oft-provided requirement for prior hearings, extensive fact finding, Tariff Commission reports to the President, and the like. Emergencies, by definition, require a quick, decisive response. Of the three branches of government, only the Executive has a continuing, spontaneous capability for mounting such a response. Further, emergencies are expected to be shortlived.33 As the court said in upholding the constitutionality of § 5(b) in Nielsen v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424 F. 2d at 843:
Nevertheless, it is also true that it may be reasonable and hence valid for a government to take more drastic measures in time of emergency, especially when they are reasonably limited in time, than it would propose or justify as permanent legislation. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 441, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 64 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 88 A.L.R. 1481 (1934); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 37 S.Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755, L.R.A. 1917 E, 938 (1917). [Emphasis added.]
That § 5(b) and Proclamation 4074 deal only with foreign goods also is of significance. The Supreme Court, though dealing with international relations and the sale of arms rather than with imports, and with normal rather than national emergency conditions, in Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra, recognized the distinction between delegations of power in foreign and domestic affairs in these words (299 U.S. at 320):
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment — perhaps serious embarrassment — is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.34
Congress, by delegating to the President in § 5(b) the power to regulate imports within the national emergency powers standard, has not succeeded in abdicating its constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce. It remains the ultimate decision maker and the fundamental reservoir of power to regulate commerce. It may, of course, recall or [35]*35limit the delegated emergency power at any time. Throughout the 114 year life of the TWEA and its progenitors, Congress has repeatedly exercised its untrammeled plenary power over foreign commerce.
Exercise of the regulatory power by the President differs substantially from its exercise by the Congress.35 Unlike congressional freedom of exercise, Presidential exercise is limited to actions consistent with the national emergency purpose of § '5(b). Further, the President, unlike Congress, is required to take a political step, the declaring of a national emergency, before acting. Finally, both Congress and the President are bound by the Constitution, but the President must also avoid action in conflict with prior governing statutes. Youngstown Sheet and Tube, supra, and United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff’d on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
The mere incantation of “national emergency” cannot, of course, sound the death-knell of the Constitution. Nor can it repeal prior statutes or enlarge the delegation in § 5(b). The declaration of a national emergency is not a talisman enabling the President to rewrite the tariff schedules, as it was not in this case. We agree, also, with the statement of the court in Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 518 F.2d 1051, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 923 (1975) (No. 75-382), that: “Our laws were not established merely to be followed only when times are tranquil.” The TWEA, which is among “our laws” and is designed specifically for non-tranquil times, was not before the court in Algonquin,36 As we have noted, if every law applicable to tranquil times were required to be followed in emergencies, there would be no point in delegating emergency powers and no adequate, prompt means for dealing with emergencies.
The Executive does not here seek, nor would it receive, judicial approval of a wholesale delegation of legislative power. Nor do we find in § 5(b) the grant of the “unrestrained and unbridled” authority feared by the Customs Court. The courts continue to sit and remain prepared, as was the court in Real, supra note 29, to impede an unreasonable or ultra vires exercise of the power granted in § 5(b). We do not here sanction the exercise of an unlimited power, which, we agree with the Customs Court, would be to strike a blow to our Constitution. On the contrary, we find ourselves in agreement with this statement of the Court of Claims in South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trad. Corp. (334 F.2d at 632):
[W]hen Congress uses far-reaching words in delegating authority to the President in the [36]*36area of foreign relations, courts must assume, unless there is a specific contrary showing elsewhere in the statute or in the legislative history, that the legislators contemplate that the President may and will make full use of that power in any manner not inconsistent with the provisions or purposes of the Act. In a statute dealing with foreign affairs, a grant to the President which is expansive to the reader’s eye should not be hemmed in or “cabined, cribbed, confined” by anxious judicial blinders. [Footnote omitted.]
Conclusion
The broad and flexible construction given to § 5(b) by the courts which have considered it is consistent with the intent of Congress and with the broad purposes of the Act. As was said by the Supreme Court in discussing the President’s power to define “banking institution” under an earlier version of § 5(b): “The power in peace and war must be given generous scope to accomplish its purpose.” Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 481 (1949). Though such a broad grant may be considered unwise, or even dangerous, should it come into the hands of an unscrupulous, rampant President, willing to declare an emergency when none exists,37 the wisdom of a congressional delegation is not for us to decide. As was said in Normanv. B. & O. R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 297 (1935), with respect to “gold clause” measures: “We are not concerned with their wisdom. The question before the Court is one of power, not of policy.”
Congress, fully familiar with its own use of duties as a means of regulation, delegated to the President, in § 5(b) of the TWEA, the power to regulate importation during declared national emergencies by means appropriate to the emergency involved. Interpreted as having authorized the President’s imposition of the specific surcharge in Proclamation 4074, as a reasonable response to the particular national emergency declared therein, the delgation in § 5(b) of the TWEA passes constitutional muster.
Accordingly, the President’s action under review was within the power constitutionally delegated to him, and the judgment of the Customs Court that said action was ultra vires must be reversed.