Hamilton v. Dillin

88 U.S. 73, 22 L. Ed. 528, 21 Wall. 73, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1343

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: January 11, 1875
• Docket: 7
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mr. Justice BRADLEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

There can be no question that the condition requiring the payment of four cents per pound for a permit to purchase cotton in, and transport it from, the insurrectionary States during the late civil war, was competent to the war power of the United States government to impose. The war was a public one. The government in prosecuting it had at least all the rights which any belligerent power has when prosecuting a public war. That war was itself a suspension of commercial intercourse between the opposing sections of-the country. No cotton or other merchandise could be lawfully purchased in the insurrectionary States and transported to the loyal States without the conseut of the government. If such a course of dealing were to be permitted at all, it would necessarily be upon such conditions as the government chose to prescribe. The war power vested in the government implied all this without any specific mention of it in the Constitution.

In England this power to remit the restrictions on commercial intercourse with a hostile nation is exercised by the crown. Lord Stowell says: “By the law and constitution of this country, the sovereign alone has the power of declaring war and peace. He alone, therefore, who has the power of entirely removing a state of war, has the power of removing it in part, by permitting, where he sees proper, that commercial intercourse which is a partial suspension of the war.” * Bynhershoek says: “It is in all cases the act of the sovereign.” † By the Constitution of the United States the power to declare war is confided to Congress. The executive power and the command of the military and naval forces is vested in the President. Whether, in the absence of Congressional action, the power of permitting partial intercourse with a public enemy may or may not be exercised by the President alone, who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations, it is not now necessary to decide, although it would seem that little doubt could be raised on the subject. In the case of Cross v. Harrison, ‡ it was held that the President, as commander-in-chief, had power to form a temporary civil government for California as a conquered country, and to impose duties on imports and tonnage for the support of the government and for aiding to sustain the burdens of the war, which were held valid until Congress saw fit to supersede them; and an action brought to recover back duties paid under such regulation was adjudged to be not maintainable. The same views were held in Leitensdorfer et al. v. Webb. * in reference to the establishment of a provisional government in New Mexico, in the war with Mexico in 1846, and were reiterated by this court in the case of The Grapeshot. †

But without pursuing this inquiry, and whatever view may be taken as to the precise boundary between the legislative and executive powers in reference to the question under consideration, there is no doubt that a concurrence of both affords ample foundation for any regulations on the subject.

Our first inquiry, therefore, will be, whether the action of the executive was authorized, or, if not originally authorized, was confirmed by Congress.'

By the act of July 13th, 1861, ‡ the President was authorized, after certain preliminary measures for suppressing the insurrection, to declare by proclamation what States and parts of States were in a state of insurrection against the United States; “and thereupon,” the act proceeds to say, “all commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States shall cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostility shall continue; and all goods, &c., coming from said States or section into the other parts of the United States, and all proceeding to sueh States or section, by land or water, shall, together with the vessel or vehicle, &c., be forfeited to the United States: Provided, however, that the President may, in his discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse with any such part of said States or section, the inhabitants of which are so declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such time, and by such persons, as he, in his discretion, may think most conducive to the public interest; and such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.”

In pursuance of this act the President, on the 16th of August, 1861, issued a proclamation, * declaring that the inhabitants of certain States (including Tennessee) were in a state of insurrection against the United States, and that all commercial intercourse between them and the citizens of other States was unlawful, and that all goods, &c., coming from said States without the special license and permission of the President, through the Secretary of the. Treasury, or proceeding to any of said States, &c., would be forfeited, &c. This proclamation excepted from its operation, amongst other,things, such parts of the enumerated States as might maintain a loyal adhesion to the Union and Constitution, or might be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States. A subsequent proclamation, issued April 2d, 1863, † abrogated the said exception as embarrassing “ to the due enforcement of said act of July 13th, 1861, and the proper regulation of the commercial intercourse authorized by said act;” such abrogation, however, not extending to West Virginia, or the ports of New Orleans, Key West, Port Royal, or Beaufort, in South Carolina.

Under, and in supposed pursuance of, this act and these proclamations, the license of the President and the trade regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury were made under which the plaintiffs purchased and shipped the cotton in question. These public acts of the executive department must be construed as one system. The license of the President to hold commercial intercourse cannot be separated, in determining this controversy, from the treasury regulations which were adopted for the government of that intercourse. .There is an evident effort on the part of the plaintiffs to separate them; and it is worthy of passing observation that the actual license of the President was not put in evidence. But a public act of the government of such importance may receive the judicial notice of the court; and. availing ourselves of that right we find that the regulations referred to as adopted September 11th, 1863, are revised regulations, expressly approved by the President., and supplementary to previous regulations adopted March 31st, 1863, to which the President had attached the license of same date, under which the entire authority to pursue the trade in this cotton arose. This license, after reciting the act of Congress of July 13th, 1861, so far as relates to commercial intercourse, proceeds as follows: “And whereas it appears that a partial restoration of such intercourse between the inhabitants of sundry places and sections heretofore declared in insurrection, in pursuance of said act, and the citizens of the rest of the United States, will favorably affect the public interests: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, exercising the authority and discretion confided to me by the said act of Congress, do hereby license and permit such commercial intercourse between the citizens of loyal States and the inhabitants, of such insurrectionary States in the cases and under the restrictions described and expressed in the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, bearing even date with these presents, or in other such regulations as he may hereafter, with my approval, prescribe.”

it is clear, therefoz'e, that the license to trade given by the President was a conditional one, requii'ing a full compliance with the regulations adopted by the Secretary of the Treasui’y, between whom and the President, as would be supposed, there was entire hazanony and even unity of action.

The question then comes to this: Under the supposed authority of the act of July 13th, 1861, the President and Seeretai’y of the -Tz'easuz’y authoi'ized and licensed cotton to be puz’chased in and ti’ánsported from insurrectionary districts, on condition that the parties availing themselves of the license should pay to the government four cents per pound and all other fees. If we znight offer a conjecture as to the motive for this regulation, it may have been this, namely: that 9neh a bonus would help to counterbalance, in favor of our government, an}' benefit which the enemy might derive from a sale of the cotton instead of its destruction. But the actual motive is not material. The government chose to impose this condition. It supposed it had a right to do so. No one was bound to accept it. No one was compelled to engage- in the trade. Not the least compulsion was exercised. The plaintiffs endeavor to put the case as if they were obliged to pay this exaction to save their property. This is not a true view of it. It is admitted that the property was purchased under the license. If so, it was also purchased in view of the regulations to which the liceuse referred. The regulations themselves show that the permit to purchase and the permit to export were correlative to each other; that no one was permitted to purchase who did not enter into bond to pay all fees required by the regulations, amongst which the charge of four cents per pound on cotton was expressly inserted. In short, the permit to purchase and export constituted substantially one permit, and that was granted only on the condition of paying the prescribed fees, as before stated. The clearance of particular lots or cargoes required afterwards, when the property was actually shipped, was necessary to show that the stipulated conditions had. been complied with, and that the particular articles specified were free for transportation. The whole series of acts constituted, so far as the right to trade and transport was concerned, but one transaction; a conditional permission given on the part of the government, and the acceptance of and compliance with that condition on the part of the trader.

The position in which the plaintiffs put themselves, therefore, was an entirely voluntary one. They have no right now to say: “ It is true we purchased the cotton under a license which required us to pay a certain bonus; but having purchased it, we were entitled to repudiate the condition, although we had no right to make the purchase except by virtue of the license.” Much less have they now a right to say, after having complied with the condition without murmur or objection, that the bonus ivas extorted from them by compulsion.

Whether, therefore, the President and Secretary of the Treasury did or did not rightly judge as to their powers under the act, the plaintiffs evidently agreed with them and voluntarily applied for permission to engage in the trade on the conditions imposed, and voluntarily paid the bonus which is now sought to be recovered back. The case does not come within any class of cases on which the plaintiffs rely to take it out of the rule as to voluntary payments. In our judgment, therefore, the defence in this case might have rested on this ground alone.

But we are also of opinion that the conditions imposed were authorized by the act of July 13th, 1861. Its language has been already quoted. The material part in reference to the question under discussion is the proviso of section three, which is as follows: “ The President may, in his discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse ... in such articles, and for such time, and by such persons as he in his discretion may think most conducive to the public interest; and such intercourse . . . shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.”

It is contended that the imposition of the bonus of four cents per pound ivas not a “rule” or a “regulation” within the fair meaning of the act ; and it is conceded that in many cases the power to make rules and regulations on a particular subject is a limited power, having respect to mode and form, and time and circumstance, and not to substance. But it must also be conceded that in other eases the power is much more extensive and substantial. Thus, in the Constitution, the several powers “ to regulate commerce,” “ to establish a uniform rule of naturalization,” “to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States,” are understood to give plenary control over those subjects. The power to regulate commerce has been held to include the power to suspend it; * and the power to make rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States, has been held to include the power to legislate for and govern such territory, and establish governments therein. † The extensive effect given to these clauses is undoubtedly largely due to the character of the instrument and that of the donee of the powers, to wit, the legislature of the United States, to whom the grant of a power means the grant of a branch of sovereignty. It shows, however, that the rule of construction depends, at least in some sort, upon the nature of the subject-matter. In the case before us, the power of the government to open and regulate trade with the enemy was intended to be conferred upon the President and the Secretary of the Treasury. The power of regulation in such a case is to be taken in its broadest sense, and, in our judgment, included the power to impose such conditions as the President and Secretary should see fit.

The statutes relating to the internal revenue, passed July 1st, 1862, and March 7th, 1864, which have beeu referred to for the purpose of showing that Congress imposed a special tax upon cotton, and, therefore, could not have intended by the act of 1861 to sanction the regulations of the treasury now in question, do not, in our judgment, have that effect. The act of 1862 imposed a tax of half a cent per pound on all cotton, to be paid before its removal from the place of production. The same act and section imposed various taxes on a hundred other articles. The question is, did Congress intend, by the imposition of these taxes, to revoke by implication, any power given to the Executive Department of imposing such regulations as it might see fit for the carrying on of trade with insurrectionary districts? We answer, certainly not. The two subjects were entirely distinct. No conflict or repugnancy could arise in relation thereto. When, in March, 1863, the President issued his license to trade in cotton and other articles in the insurrectionary districts, under and subject to the conditions contained in the regula tions adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury, his action was not inconsistent with or repugnant to the internal revenue law passed the year .before. It had nothing to "do with that law or the subject-matter of it. The conditions exacted by him were not imposed in the exercise of the taxing power, but of the war power of the government. The exaction itself was not properly a tax, but a bonus required as a condition precedent for engaging in the trade. Whether, when the condition was fulfilled, the cotton became subject to the internal revenue law is a question we are not called upon to decide. There was no inconsistency between the regulations and the law any more than there is between a license tax for carrying on a particular trade and the excise imposed on the products of that trade. The act of March 7th, 1864, raised the internal revenue tax on cotton to two cents a pound where no duty had already been levied, paid, or collected thereon. Neither does this act present any inconsistency with the regulations in question. If it refers to them at all (when speaking of duties already paid) it contains an implied recognition of them. If it does not refer to them, it does not contravene them.

The position that Nashville, being within the National lines, was not hostile territory in 1863 and 1864, and, therefore, not withiu the prohibition of commercial intercourse contained in the act of 1861, is not tenable. The State of Tennessee was named in the President’s proclamation as one of the States in insurrection; and, as we have seen, the exceptions made in his first proclamation in favor of maintaining commercial intercourse with parts of such States remaining loyal, or occupied by the forces of the United States, were abrogated by the proclamation of April 2d, 1863, except as to West Virginia and certain specified ports. There was nothing in this action of the .President repugnant to, or not in conformity with, the act of 1861. “ This revocation,” as remarked by this court in the case of The Venice, * “ merely brought all parts of the insurgent States under the special licensing power of the President, conferred by the act of July 13th, 1861.” The act gave the President power, where*a State or part of a State remained irreclaimable, to declare that the inhabitants of such State, or any section or part thereof where such insurrection existed, were in a state of insurrection. This power clearly gave the President a discretion to declare an entire State, where the insurrection was persisted in, or only a hostile district therein, in a state of insurrection. Finding the attempt to discriminate between the different parts of a State (except in peculiar cases) impracticable, he abandoned the attempt, and declared the entire State in a state of insurrection. He clearly had authority so to do, more especially as the insurrection was supported by State organizations and the actual State authorities. Thenceforth the war became a well-defined territorial war, and was in great measure conducted as such. The further provision of the act, that all commercial intercourse with the insurrectionary districts should cease “so long as such condition of hostility shall continue,” could not be construed as allowing such intercourse to be resumed by ihdividuals at will, as fast and as far as our armies succeeded in occupying insurgent territory. The “condition of hostility” remained impressed upon the insurrectionary districts.until it was authoritatively removed by the proclamation of the President at the close of the war.

This view of the meaning of the act of 1861 is corroborated by the act of March 12th, 1863, respecting abandoned and captured property.

On the 1st of July, 1862, the President had issued a proclamation declaring what States and parts of Stales were in insurrection, with a view to the provisions of the act imposing a land tax, and made no exception of any fractions of States,- except the counties constituting West Virginia. Expressly referring to this proclamation, Congress, in the fourth section of the act referred to, enacted “ that all property coming into any of the United States not declared in insurrection as aforesaid, from any of the States declared in insurrection, through or by any other person than any agent duly appointed under the provisions of this, act, or under a lawful clearance by the proper officer of the Treasury Department, shall be confiscated.” * This is a clear recognition on the part of Congress of the President’s demarcation of insurrectionary territory. It is also a recognition of the treasury regulations as to intercourse with that territory— not, perhaps, of any specific regulations, but of the applicability of such regulations to all portions of insurrectionary territory, whether under occupation of the Union forces or not.

But it is unnecessary to pursue this subject. We have frequently held that the civil war affected the status of the entire territory of the States declared to be in insurrection, except as modified by declaratory acts of Congress or proclamations of the President; and nothing but the apparent earnestness with which the point has been urged would have led to a further discussion of the point. †

We are also of opinion that the act of July 2d, 1864, ‡ recognized and confirmed the regulations in question. It is sufficient to quote a portion of the third section to evince the correctness of this conclusion. It enacts as follows-: “That all moneys arising from the .leasing of abandoned lands, houses, and tenements, or from sales of captured and abandoned property collected and sold in pursuance of said act, or of this act, or from fees collected under the rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury, and approved by the President, dated respectively the 28th of August, 1862, 81st of March, and 11th of September, 1868, or under any amendments or modifications thereof, which have been or shall be made by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by the President, for conducting the commercial intercourse, which has been or shall be licensed and permitted by the President, with and in States declared in insurrection, shall, after satisfying therefrom all necessary expenses, to be approved by the Secretary'of the Treasury, be paid into the treasury of the United States; and all accounts of moneys received or expended in connection therewith shall be audited by the proper accounting officers of the treasury.”

Here the regulations in question are referred to by name and date, and the money accruing under their operation (the great bulk of which was derived from the bonus on cotton) was directed to be paid into the treasury. It is designated by the term “ fees,” it is true, but that was the designation used in the regulations themselves. It will be observed that the law was prospective, relating to moneys thereafter to be received, as well as to those already received. This was clearly an implied recognition and ratification of the regulations, so far as any ratification on the part of Congress may have been necessary to their validity.

It is hardly necessary, under the view we have taken of the character of the regulations iu question, and of the charge or bonus objected to by the plaintiffs, to discuss the question of the constitutionality of the act of July 13th, 1861, regarded as authorizing such regulations. As before stated, the power of the government to impose such conditions upon commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war as it sees fit, is undoubted. It is a power which every other government iu the world claims and exercises, and which belongs to the government of the United States as incident to the power to declare war and to carry it on to a successful termination. We regard the regulations in question as nothing more -than the exercise of this power. It does not belong to the same category as the power to levy and collect taxes, duties, and excises. It belongs to the war powers of the government, just as much so a3 the power to levy military contributions, or to perform any other belligerent act.

We perceive no error in the record, and the judgment of the Circuit Court must be

Affirmed.

Note.

At the same time with the preceding case was adjudged the case of McClelland v. United States; an appeal from the Court of Claims; in which the claimant sought to recover payments of four cents per pound on cotton, made, as was admitted, under and in pursuance of the license of the President, and the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, whose validity was considered in the case just above reported. There was a demurrer to the petition which the Court of Claims sustained, and, as this court, after a full argument by Messrs. J. W. Denver and C. F. Peck, for the appellant, now adjudged, rightly; declaring that this case was substantially decided by the preceding one. The judgment of the Court of Claims was accordingly

* The Hoop, 1 Robinson, 199.

† Questionum Juris Publiei, bk. 1, c. 3.

‡ 16 Howard, 164, 190.

* 20 Howard, 176.

‡ Section 5, 12 Stat. at Large, 257.

† 9 Wallace, 129.

* 12 Stat. at Large, 1262.

† 13 Id. 731.

* 1 Kent, 432.

† 4 Wheaton, 422; Story on the Constitution, \ 1328.

* 2 Wallace, 278.

* Act of March 12th, 1863, 12 Stat. at Large, 820, § 4.

† See Mrs. Alexander’s Cotton, 2 Wallace, 404; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Id. 542; McKee v. United States, 8 Id. 163; and numerous other eases.

‡ 13 Stat. at Large, 375.