United States v. Yang

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 18, 2025
• Docket: 25-1692
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-1692 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:24-cr-00010-RVM-1 v. MEMORANDUM* HONGJIANG YANG,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the District of Northern Mariana Islands Ramona V. Manglona, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 24, 2025 Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Hongjiang Yang (“Yang”) appeals from his conviction for conspiring to

transport, as well as aiding and abetting the transportation of, a noncitizen who has

come to, entered, or remains in the United States unlawfully under 8 U.S.C. § 1324

(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(I)-(II). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We affirm as to the sufficiency of the indictment, the admission of testimonial

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. evidence, and the jury instructions. We reverse the denial of the motion for

judgment of acquittal and remand for further consideration.

We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment where, as

here, Yang raised his challenge before trial. United States v. Solakyan, 119 F.4th

575, 590 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-1066, 2025 WL 2823712 (U.S. Oct.

6, 2025). Yang’s superseding indictment was sufficient because it “contain[ed] the

elements of the charged crime in adequate detail to inform [him] of the charge.”

Id. (quoting United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1216 (9th Cir. 2016)).

Yang’s argument that the indictment presented an invalid legal theory is

unavailing.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s admission of evidence.

United States v. Cabrera, 83 F.4th 729, 736 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.

Ct. 2634 (2024). The district court reasonably admitted testimony on Guamanian

customs requirements. The testimony was relevant and supported the inference

that the noncitizens sought to hide from the authorities.

We review for abuse of discretion Yang’s challenge to the district court’s

limiting instruction on the customs testimony. United States v. Hamilton, 131

F.4th 1087, 1096 (9th Cir. 2025). The district court instructed the jury to consider

the testimony on Guamanian customs requirements only in relation to the

transportation charge and only insofar as it might be relevant to Yang’s intent to

2 25-1692 further another noncitizen’s unlawful presence. We discern no abuse of discretion

in this instruction.

We review de novo whether the district court’s jury instructions adequately

addressed Yang’s theory of the case. See United States v. Del Toro-Barboza, 673

F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court properly declined to instruct

the jury that paying for another’s transportation is insufficient to establish a

transportation conspiracy where such payment was “inherent or incidental” to the

defendant’s own travel. This “inherent or incidental” theory is unsupported by the

statutory text, advisory guidance, or case law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1)(A)(ii)

(subjecting “[a]ny person who” commits the transportation offense to criminal

penalties); U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1)(A) (providing a three-level reduction if the

immigrants transported are family members); United States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120,

1124 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the buyer-seller rule as a “narrow exception” to

conspiracy liability).

Yang argues that failing to adopt his theory subjects any immigrant

transported jointly to liability for the transport of others. Not so. Our precedent

requires that there be a “direct or substantial relationship” between the

transportation and the furtherance of the immigrant’s unlawful presence. United

States v. Moreno, 561 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1977). This standard protects

those who act “with no evil or criminal intent.” Id. The district court correctly

3 25-1692 applied Moreno in its instructions.

Finally, we review de novo the district court’s denial of Yang’s motion for

judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence. United States v. Torralba-

Mendia, 784 F.3d 652, 663 (9th Cir. 2015). In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Liberato, 142 F.4th

1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2025). To convict Yang of conspiracy and aiding and

abetting the transportation of a noncitizen who has come to, entered, or remains in

the United States unlawfully, the government needed to prove that Yang had the

specific intent to further the unlawful presence of another immigrant. See

Torralba-Mendia, 784 F.3d at 663; Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury

Instructions 4.1, 7.2, 11.1.

The district court denied Yang’s motion for judgment of acquittal because it

found sufficient evidence that Yang had the specific intent to further the unlawful

presence of his wife. Yang’s wife had lawful status in the Commonwealth of the

Northern Mariana Islands: USCIS retroactively granted her CW-1 petition on

January 22, 2024, one month before the government filed its indictment in this

case. Given her lawful status, Yang’s wife could not have “come to, entered, or

4 25-1692 remain[ed] in the United States in violation of law,” such that her transportation

was in furtherance of any unlawful presence. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1)(A)(ii).

We remand for the district court to consider in the first instance whether

sufficient evidence supports Yang’s conviction as it relates to other noncitizens.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.

5 25-1692