United States v. X-Treme Bullets, Inc.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided October 29, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-00637·Unknown

Opinion

5 * * *

6 In re: Case No. 3:19-cv-00637-MMD

7 X-TREME BULLETS, INC., Member Cases:

8 Debtor. 3:19-cv-666-MMD, 3:19-cv-667-MMD, and 3:20-cv-00117- MMD INC., AMMO LOAD WORLDWIDE, INC., MACHINE, INC., FREEDOM Jointly Administered Under Bankruptcy. 11 MUNITIONS, LLC, LEWIS-CLARK Case No. 18-50609-BTB (Lead Case) AMMUNITION COMPONENTS, LLC, and Chapter 11

13 Jointly Administrated Debtors.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ORDER

TRADE BUREAU, 16

Appellant, 17 v. 18 X-TREME BULLETS, INC., AMMO LOAD BULLET, INC., FREEDOM MUNITIONS, HOWELL MUNITIONS & TECHNOLOGY, COMPONENTS, LLC, COMPONENTS 22 EXCHANGE, LLC, KASH CA, INC.; DAVID HOWELL, Z.B. N.A. dba ZIONS SOLUTIONS, LLC dba ADVANCED CFO, 24 Matthew McKinlay and Valerie Grindle,

25 Appellees. 26

27 /// 28 /// 2 Debtors and debtors-in-possession—X-Treme Bullets, Inc., Ammo Load 3 Worldwide, Inc., Clearwater Bullet, Inc., Freedom Munitions, LLC, Howell Machine, Inc., 4 Howell Munitions & Technology, Inc., Lewis-Clark Ammunition and Components, LLC and 5 Components Exchange, LLC (collectively, “Debtors-Appellees”)—filed a motion to dismiss 6 (ECF No. 22 (“Dismissal Motion”)). The Court granted Debtors-Appellees’ Dismissal 7 Motion. (ECF No. 78.) Appellant the United States of America, on behalf of the Department 8 of the Treasury Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (“TTB”), timely filed a motion 9 for rehearing (ECF No. 80 (“Rehearing Motion”))1 under Rule 8022 of the Federal Rules 10 of Bankruptcy Procedure. 11 Following the Rehearing Motion, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 12 (the “Committee”) filed an emergency motion to stay the case (ECF No. 84 (“Stay 13 Motion”)).2 TTB has since filed a motion to strike (ECF No. 91 (“Strike Motion”)) and a 14 motion for leave to file brief (ECF No. 92 (“Leave Motion”)) regarding Robert E. Opera’s 15 declaration (ECF No. 90). Before the Court is the issue of whether the Court overlooked 16 or misapprehended a point of law or fact in granting Debtors-Appellees’ Dismissal Motion. 17 Because TTB merely rehashes arguments the Court already rejected, and as further 18 explained below, the Court will deny TTB’s Rehearing Motion. Additionally, the 19 Committee’s Stay Motion, and TTB’s Strike and Leave Motions, are all denied as moot. 21 The Court’s prior order (ECF No. 78 at 2-10) contains a complete and accurate 22 recitation of the factual and procedural background underlying TTB’s Rehearing Motion. 23 The Court incorporates the background as set forth therein and does not recite it here. 24 Relevant to this order, the Court granted Debtors-Appellees’ Dismissal Motion. (ECF No. 25 78 (“Dismissal Order”).) There, the Court dismissed TTB’s appeals of the Compromise 26

27 1The Court has also considered the related response, reply, and declaration. (ECF Nos. 87, 89, 90.) 28 2The Debtors-Appellees joined the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 85.) 2 MMD), and Sale Order (Case No. 3:19-cv-00667-MMD). (Id. at 12-22.) The Court 3 reasoned that TTB’s appeals were statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). (Id.) 5 Rule 8022 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure requires a motion for 6 rehearing to “state with particularity each point of law or fact that the movant believes the 7 district court . . . has overlooked or misapprehended and must argue in support of the 8 motion.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(2). “[T]he movant must identify an error committed by 9 the Court in rendering its decision.” Reish v. Mukai, Case No. CV-19-00400-PHX-DLR, 10 2020 WL 122875, *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2020) (citing In re Kenny G Enters., LLC, 708, F. 11 App’x 390 (9th Cir. 2017)). Motions under 8022 “are designed to ensure that the appellate 12 court properly considered all relevant information in rendering its decision.” In re Hessco, 13 295 B.R. 372, 375 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (citing Armster v. United States Dist. Ct. for Cent. 14 Dist., 806 F.2d 1347, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). But “[a motion] for rehearing is not a means by 15 which to reargue a party’s case.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 296, 297 (9th Cir. 16 1962)). “Whether or not to grant [a motion for rehearing] is committed to the sound 17 discretion of the court.” In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Navajo 18 Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003)). 20 In the Rehearing Motion, TTB primarily asserts the Court overlooked that the 21 additional relief provided in the Compromise Order, Sale Procedures Order, and the Sale 22 Order (collectively, the “Orders”) goes beyond the sale transaction in this matter, which 23 effectively “eviscerates” TTB’s property rights and prevents TTB from sharing in the 24 proceeds. (ECF No. 80 at 3.) TTB more specifically makes three arguments to support its 25 position that the Court overlooked or misapprehended law and facts in this matter. As 26 further explained below, none are persuasive. Indeed, Debtors-Appellees3 persuasively 27

28 3Appellee Kash CA, Inc. (“Kash CA”) joined Debtors-Appellees’ Opposition to TTB’s Rehearing Motion. (ECF No. 88.) 2 no good cause to rehear the Dismissal Order. (ECF No. 87 at 11-12.) Debtors-Appellees 3 further argue the Court was correct in finding TTB’s appeals of the Orders to be statutorily 4 moot under § 363(m). (Id. at 12-14.) The Court agrees with Debtors-Appellees. 5 TTB first argues that the Court cannot look to the Bankruptcy Code to determine 6 lien priority, as the Court did with respect to the Compromise Order and the Sale Order. 7 (ECF No. 80 at 5.) But this argument mirrors the argument TTB put forward in its opposition 8 to the Dismissal Motion, contending that the Bankruptcy Court “incorrectly authorized that 9 the proceeds of sales to creditors in ways that are contrary to Title 11 priorities.” (ECF No. 10 26 at 6, 11.) The Court considered this issue in the Dismissal Order, but concluded TTB’s 11 argument regarding lien priority “in its essence would undermine the sale, even if the Court 12 were to try to separate out the issues of whether TTB’s lien takes priority over other liens.” 13 (ECF No. 78 at 16-18.) Thus, the Court declines to reconsider TTB’s argument because 14 TTB is seeking “to reargue [its] case.” Anderson, 300 F.2d at 297. 15 TTB next argues that the Court misapprehended the facts of the case as to the sale 16 of non-estate property. (ECF No. 80 at 6.) TTB asserts that Debtors-Appellees improperly 17 sold property belonging to non-debtor entities, that the Court “did not notice the allocation 18 of purchase price to non-debtor entities because the copy of the Asset Purchase 19 Agreement . . . did not include Schedule 11.2,” and that the Court misinterpreted State 20 Dep’t of Revenue v. Blixseth, 942 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019). (Id. at 6-8.) However, like 21 TTB’s first argument, this argument is not new. TTB already argued the “sale of non-estate 22 property is not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code.” (ECF No. 26 at 10.) And the Court 23 made clear in its Dismissal Order that it considered this argument when it stated that 24 “TTB’s paramount contention is . . . that the bankruptcy estate included non-estate 25 property.” (ECF No.

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United States v. X-Treme Bullets, Inc., (D. Nev. 2020).

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Related

J. Leland Anderson v. Roger I. Knox
300 F.2d 296 (Ninth Circuit, 1962)
Kosmala v. Imhof (In Re Hessco Industries, Inc.)
295 B.R. 372 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Navajo Nation v. Norris
331 F.3d 1041 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Armster v. United States District Court
806 F.2d 1347 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)