20-3044(L) United States v. Williams
United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term 2022
Submitted: February 10, 2023 Decided: May 24, 2024
Nos. 20-3044(L), 20-3750(Con)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JULIUS WILLIAMS, a.k.a. STINKER, a.k.a. JULIUS ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant. ∗
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 00-cr-237-3, Victor Marrero, Judge.
Before: KEARSE, SULLIVAN, and MERRIAM, Circuit Judges.
Julius Williams appeals from the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits a court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the original sentence was based on a Sentencing Guidelines range that the United States Sentencing Commission has subsequently lowered. Williams argues that the district court (Marrero, J.) wrongly concluded that he was
∗ The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. ineligible for a sentence reduction under the Commission’s 2014 revisions to the narcotics Guidelines because he participated in a narcotics-related murder that subjected him to a higher Guidelines range under the “murder cross-reference” provision of U.S.S.G § 2D1.1(d)(1). Because the district court denied Williams’s motion on the independent ground that a sentence reduction was not warranted under the objectives of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we affirm the district court’s decision without reaching the issue of Williams’s eligibility for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2).
Judge Kearse dissents in a separate opinion.
AFFIRMED.
Winston M. Paes, Isabela Garcez, McCahey Townsend, Katherine Stein, Beatrice A. Walton Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
Micah F. Fergenson, Karl Metzner, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:
Julius Williams appeals from the denial of his motion for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits a court to reduce a
defendant’s sentence if the original sentence was based on a Sentencing Guidelines
range that the United States Sentencing Commission has subsequently lowered.
Williams argues that the district court (Marrero, J.) wrongly concluded that he was
ineligible for a sentence reduction under the Commission’s 2014 revisions to the
2 narcotics Guidelines because he participated in a narcotics-related murder that
subjected him to a higher Guidelines range under the “murder cross-reference”
provision of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d)(1). Because the district court denied Williams’s
motion on the independent ground that a sentence reduction was not warranted
under the objectives of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we affirm the
district court’s decision without reaching the issue of Williams’s eligibility for a
sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
In 2002, Williams was convicted at trial of racketeering, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count One); racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d) (Count Two); and conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A) (Count Three). After granting Williams’s
motion to set aside his conviction on Count One, the district court sentenced
Williams on the remaining counts. Following the then-mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines, the district court grouped Counts Two and Three together and applied
a base offense level of thirty-two – the level applicable for conspiring to distribute
at least fifty grams of crack cocaine. The court then added a three-level
enhancement for Williams’s role as a manager and supervisor of the conspiracy,
3 see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), and a two-level enhancement for his possession of a
dangerous weapon in connection with the offense, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(1), for a total
offense level of thirty-seven. The court next determined that Williams was a career
offender, resulting in a criminal history category of VI under section 4B1.1 of the
Guidelines. Although an offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of VI
would ordinarily result in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment,
the district court properly noted that the aggregate statutory maximum sentence
for Counts One and Two together was 600 months, yielding a revised sentencing
range of 360 to 600 months pursuant to section 5G1.1.
At sentencing, the district court noted that the evidence introduced at trial
supported application of the murder cross-reference provision set forth in
section 2D1.1(d)(1) of the Guidelines. Specifically, the court found that the
testimony of four eyewitnesses and the medical examiner, coupled with evidence
recovered from the crime scene, established by a preponderance of the evidence –
and, in fact, by clear and convincing evidence – that Williams stabbed Alan
McLeod to death, conduct for which the jury had been unable to reach a verdict.
Based on this finding, the district court determined that “the murder cross-
reference under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines [s]ection 2D1.1(d)(1) applies to Mr.
4 Williams . . . , which therefore leads to the adoption of an offense level of 43.”
App’x at 166. Although such an offense level would typically result in a
Guidelines range of life imprisonment, the district court again noted that
Williams’s counts of conviction carried an aggregate maximum term of
imprisonment of 600 months, which thereby resulted in a Guidelines range of 600
months – or 50 years.
Because the Guidelines were mandatory at the time, and because the
murder cross-reference resulted in a higher offense level, the district court was
required to apply the cross-reference when determining the applicable Guidelines
range. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d)(1). Nevertheless, the district court did not do so.
Observing that the applicable Guidelines range would not “change significantly”
under the higher offense level from the murder cross-reference, App’x at 167, the
district court relied on the lesser offense level of 37 in sentencing Williams to the
statutory maximum term of 600 months’ imprisonment. Williams appealed his
conviction and sentence, which we largely affirmed; we nevertheless remanded to
the district court to consider whether resentencing was warranted in light of
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which rendered the previously
5 mandatory Sentencing Guidelines advisory. See United States v. Santiago, 126 F.
App’x 21, 23–24 (2d Cir. 2005).
On Booker remand, after “reexamining its original sentencing decision,” the
district court denied Williams’s request for resentencing. United States v. Santiago,
413 F. Supp. 2d 307, 311 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2006). The district court noted that, but
for the statutory maximum sentence of 50 years, “Williams faced a custodial
sentence that, under two alternative applications of the Guidelines that the [c]ourt
considered, would have ranged from 360 months to life imprisonment according
to one computation and to life under the other.” Id. at 312. The district court also
reaffirmed that “sufficient evidence indicated that Williams twice shot [Francisco]
Martinez in the back, and that he did inflict several fatal knife wounds on [Alan]
McLeod, the last of which Williams administered after McLeod had fled from him
and was already lying prone on the ground as a result of the first stab.” Id. at 321.
“[B]earing in mind such aggravating circumstances,” the district court concluded
that a lower sentence was not warranted. Id. at 322. Williams appealed the district
court’s denial, and we affirmed. See United States v. Williams, 216 F. App’x 67 (2d
Cir. 2007).
6 In 2014, while Williams was serving his sentence, the United States
Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendments 782 and 788 to the Guidelines,
which retroactively reduced the base offense levels for certain drug crimes. See
U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 782, 788. Based on the 2014 amendments, Williams
moved pro se for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2), which permits a
district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the sentence was based on a
Guidelines range that was subsequently lowered. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The
district court denied Williams’s motion and his request for appointed counsel in a
2016 order. See United States v. Williams, 190 F. Supp. 3d 359 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2016).
The district court agreed that Williams was indeed eligible for a sentence reduction
on account of the 2014 amendments, which lowered his offense level by two,
resulting in a Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. The district court
nevertheless denied Williams’s request for a sentence reduction because such
relief was unwarranted in light of the section 3553(a) factors.
Specifically, the district court concluded that “[t]he first factor listed in
[s]ection 3553(a)(1), the nature and circumstances of the offense,” weighed against
a reduction because “Williams, in the course of participating in the conspiracy to
distribute crack cocaine, did stab Mr. Alan McLeod to death, a murder that was
7 carried out intentionally, with premeditation and deliberation” and because
“Williams engaged in acts of extreme violence, including Williams’s firing a gun
at and twice wounding another individual in the back while pursuing him
following a fight.” Id. at 364 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, the district court determined that “[t]he second factor in [s]ection
3553(a)(1), ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant,’” weighed against a
reduction because Williams was a career offender, and “nothing on the record
indicated that Williams showed any remorse for his crimes.” Id. at 364–65 (quoting
U.S.S.G. § 3553(a)). Finally, the district court determined that the section 3553(a)(2)
factors – “the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) – weighed against
a reduction because of the “seriousness of Williams’s offense, the egregious nature
of his conduct, and the need to deter others and protect the public.” Williams, 190
F. Supp. 3d at 365.
8 More than three years later, on October 4, 2019, Williams, now represented
by counsel, asked the district court to “reconsider its denial of [his] motion for
reduction of sentence pursuant to [section] 3582(c)(2),” arguing that he was eligible
for a greater reduction than the two levels the district court had calculated in 2016.
App’x at 234. Specifically, Williams argued that his offense level should have been
reduced to 29 rather than to 35, and that his Guidelines range was therefore 151 to
188 months. Williams also maintained that his post-conviction rehabilitative
efforts and expressions of remorse weighed in favor of granting his motion
for relief. 1 The government opposed the motion, arguing that the murder
cross-reference provision provided an alternative basis in the Guidelines for
Williams’s 600-month sentence, making him ineligible for relief under
1 Although counsel asked the district court to “reconsider” its earlier denial of Williams’s motion for a sentence reduction, App’x at 234, we do not construe the request to have been a formal motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 49.1(d). First, such a motion – filed more than three years after the district court’s initial denial – would almost certainly have been time-barred, something counsel would no doubt have recognized. See S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. L.R. 49.1(d) (requiring motions for reconsideration in criminal cases to be filed within fourteen days of entry of the court’s order). Second, counsel asserted new arguments in favor of a sentence reduction that had not been presented to the district court in connection with Williams’s 2014 request, see App’x at 234–38, even though a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for presenting new facts, issues, or arguments not previously before the court. See United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d 32, 51 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that an appeal from the denial of a motion for reconsideration was meritless because such a motion “is inappropriate for the presentation of new facts or contentions, or for an attempt to reargue old ones”), vacated on other grounds, 142 S. Ct. 2863 (2022). Considered in context, it seems clear that counsel’s motion was in fact a new request for a sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2).
9 section 3582(c)(2). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (forbidding sentence reductions if
the amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
guideline range”).
The district court agreed with the government that Williams was not eligible
for relief under section 3582(c)(2) – contradicting its 2016 determination that
Williams was eligible for a two-level reduction on account of the 2014 amendments
to the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Williams, No. 00-cr-237-3 (VM),
2020 WL 5253205, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2020). The district court explained that,
had it foreseen the 2014 amendments, “it would still have calculated the
Guidelines range based on the murder cross-reference provision of [s]ection
2D1.1(d)(1).” Id. It also noted that Williams’s new section 3553(a) evidence, which
primarily involved his remorse and rehabilitation, was not sufficient to warrant a
sentence reduction. Williams timely appealed from the district court’s denial of
his motion.
II. DISCUSSION
Generally, a federal court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it
has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Among the few exceptions to this general
rule is “the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
10 based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.” Id. § 3582(c)(2). In such a case, a district court must determine
“whether the defendant is eligible for a reduction by calculating the Guidelines
range that would have been applicable had the amended Guidelines been in place
at the time the defendant originally was sentenced.” United States v. Wilson,
716 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2013). If the defendant is found to be eligible, the district
court must still consider whether a sentence reduction is warranted based on the
sentencing factors in section 3553(a) and any applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010).
We review the district court’s denial of Williams’s motion for abuse of discretion,
and any questions of law we review de novo. See United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d
109, 113 (2d Cir. 2013).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s 2019
motion. Although the parties fiercely dispute whether the district court “applied”
the murder cross-reference at the original sentencing and, if not, whether the
district court’s failure to apply it precludes it from doing so on a motion for
resentencing under section 3582(c), we need not reach those issues given the
district court’s independent conclusion that the section 3553(a) factors counseled
11 against granting Williams relief. In the course of denying Williams’s 2019 motion,
the district court stated that, to grant Williams’s request for a sentence reduction,
it would have to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” and the need to “protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant,” among other section 3553(a) factors.
Williams, 2020 WL 5253205, at *4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). With those factors in mind, the district court acknowledged that
Williams had recently “expressed remorse for his actions” and that he had “taken
[steps] to rehabilitate himself [while in custody].” Id. at *5. Nevertheless, while
the district court commended Williams for his efforts at rehabilitation, it ultimately
concluded that a sentence reduction was not appropriate.
To be sure, the district court did not mechanically march through each and
every one of the section 3553(a) factors. But it was under no obligation to do so.
Rather, “we presume that the sentencing judge has considered all relevant
[section] 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record suggests otherwise.”
United States v. Smith, 982 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (alterations and internal
quotations marks omitted). Here, the record reflects the district court’s
12 consideration of the new information relevant to the section 3553(a) factors and,
taken as a whole, supports, rather than rebuts, that presumption.
The dissent takes issue with this characterization of the district court’s order,
arguing that the court did not base its conclusion on the section 3553(a) factors.
See Dissent at 5–8. But while it’s true that the district court stated that “it need not
consider the factors set forth in [s]ection 3553(a)” because it had already found
Williams to be ineligible for a reduction, the district court began the next sentence
with the word “[h]owever,” and then did, in fact, consider those factors. The
district court quoted from its prior consideration of the section 3553(a) factors in
its 2016 decision, and then discussed Williams’s new section 3553(a) evidence.
Williams, 2020 WL 5253205, at *5. In doing so, the district court expressly
acknowledged the developments in the record regarding Williams’s remorse and
rehabilitation since the 2016 decision, which implicated “the history and
characteristics of the defendant,” the need for the sentence imposed “to provide
just punishment for the offense,” and the need for the sentence imposed “to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Furthermore, as noted, the district court referenced its 2016 order denying
Williams’s request for a sentence reduction, in which it had considered the section
13 3553(a) factors in detail. The district court’s view as to the other section 3553(a)
factors is therefore “obvious from the history of the case.” United States v. Christie,
736 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109,
119 (2018) (observing that a court reviewing a resentencing decision should “not
turn a blind eye to what the judge said at” prior sentencing proceedings but rather
should consider whether “the record as a whole satisfies us that the judge
considered the parties’ arguments” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2
The dissent seizes on the district court’s statement that it could not “reduce
a sentence based on rehabilitation alone under either [s]ection 3582(c)(2) or
[s]ection 3582(c)(1)(A),” Williams, 2020 WL 5253205, at *6, as evidence that the
district court did not appropriately consider the § 3553(a) factors, since the
“rehabilitation alone” limitation found in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) is applicable only to
reductions under section 3582(c)(1)(A), not reductions under section 3582(c)(2), see
Dissent at 8. But even if the district court misstated the limits of section 3582(c)(2),
we are not persuaded that such a misstatement affected its view of the section
3553(a) factors. It is clear from the rest of the district court’s discussion and from
2The dissent argues that Chavez-Meza is distinguishable because the district court in that case certified (on a form order) that it had considered the section 3553(a) factors. But here the district court did more than that: it actually discussed the substance of the factors. The distinction the dissent identifies cuts for the majority, not against it.
14 the district court’s consistent view of the section 3553(a) factors throughout “the
history of the case” that it did not consider a reduction to be warranted. Christie,
736 F.3d at 196. We need not remand this case to the district court for it to tell us
again what it has already made clear.
Finally, if there were any remaining doubt as to the district court’s views
concerning the application of the section 3553(a) factors to Williams’s motion, that
doubt is dispelled by the district court’s 2021 order denying Williams’s subsequent
motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018. See United States
v. Williams, No. 00-cr-237 (VM), 2021 WL 509987 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2021). When
considering the section 3553(a) factors, the district court explained that “Williams
had engaged in particularly violent and dangerous conduct, including the
intentional and premeditated murder of Alan McLeod”; reiterated its 2016
determination that the “seriousness of Williams’s offense, the egregious nature of
his conduct, and the need to deter others and protect the public weigh[ed] against
granting a reduction”; and concluded that the section 3553(a) analysis “ha[d] not
meaningfully changed” since the district court’s 2016 order, notwithstanding
Williams’s remorse. Id. at *4–5. The district court was “therefore persuaded that[,]
even if Williams were eligible [for] and would be subject to a Guidelines reduction,
15 a sentence reduction would not be warranted.” Id. at *5. The dissent does not
address this subsequent history.
Based on this record, we hold that the district court did not abuse its “broad
discretion” in denying Williams’s 2019 motion for a sentence reduction under
section 3582(c)(2). United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 184 (2d Cir. 2011).
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.
16 U.S. v. Williams, Nos. 20-3044, -3705
KEARSE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. While we frequently state that the sentencing court
"is presumed to have considered all relevant [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors and
arguments unless the record suggests otherwise," e.g., United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th
566, 570 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), I do not believe it
appropriate to affirm by applying that presumption when the district court has
expressly said--erroneously--that it "lacks discretion to reduce Williams's sentence
under Section 3582(c)(2)," and that "[b]ecause . . . it lacks [such] discretion . . . it need
not consider the factors set forth in Section 3553(a)." Decision and Order dated
September 3, 2020 ("2020 Decision"), 2020 WL 5253205, at *5.
Defendant Julius Williams was convicted in 2002 of racketeering
conspiracy (Count Two) and conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack
cocaine (Count Three). Under 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a), and 841(b)(1)(A), the narcotics
conviction subjected him to a prison term of not less than five years. See generally
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 263-64 (2012). The statutory maximum
imprisonment for Williams's combined offenses was 50 years. In sentencing him to 600 months' imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), the
district court stated in part as follows:
After . . . extensive review, the Court in this case of Mr. Williams groups Counts Two and Three for calculation purposes of the offense level . . . and chooses to calculate Mr. Williams's offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section 2D1.1(a)(3), which adopts an offense level of 32 for conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine. . . .
(Sentencing Transcript, November 26, 2002 ("S.Tr."), 50-51 (emphases added).)
As the majority notes, despite the general principle that a federal court
"may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed," 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c), that section includes an exception that gives the court a certain amount of
discretion to reduce the sentence "in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission," id. § 3582(c)(2). In 2014, the Sentencing
Commission ("Commission") adopted Amendment 782, which modified Guidelines
§ 2D1.1 by lowering the sentencing ranges for certain categories of drug-related
offenses, including "reduc[ing] by two levels the offense levels assigned to the
quantities that trigger the statutory minimum penalties." Guidelines 2023
Supplement to Appendix C, Amendment 782, at 66 (eff. Nov. 1, 2014). At the same
-2- time, the Commission made Amendment 782 retroactive, albeit providing that
sentence reduction orders based on Amendment 782 could not take effect before
November 1, 2015. See id. Amendment 788, at 80-82 (eff. Nov. 1, 2014).
As relevant to Williams on this appeal, § 3582(c)(2) provides that as to
a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). Guidelines § 1B1.10, which is "[t]he policy
statement applicable to § 3582," United States v. Brooks, 891 F.3d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 2018),
provides in pertinent part that
[i]n determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement is warranted, the court shall determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) . . . had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced[,] . . . [and] shall substitute . . . the amendments . . . for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced,
Guidelines § 1B1.10(b)(1) (Policy Statement) (emphases added).
When Williams first moved for a sentence reduction based on
-3- Amendment 782 in 2015, the district court found that he was eligible for such a
reduction under § 3582(c)(2), see Decision and Order dated June 3, 2016 ("2016
Order"), at 8-10, because "[a]t sentencing, the Court calculated Williams's offense level
on the basis of [Guidelines] Section 2D1.1," id. at 7; see also id. at 7-8 (quoting
extensively from S.Tr. 50-52 and 54-55). However, the district court proceeded to
deny Williams's motion because it found that the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant
granting the reduction. See 2016 Order at 11-13.
When Williams in 2019 (newly represented by counsel) moved for
reconsideration, the district court--in the decision at issue on this appeal--ruled that
Williams was not eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2). See 2020 Decision, 2020
WL 5253205, at *5. The district court stated that "[a]lthough the Court formally
adopted a Guidelines range based on an offense level of 37," it had also made offense-
level calculations under an alternative set of guidelines that would have given
Williams "an offense level of 43" but would have eventuated in the same prison term.
Id. The district court indicated in its 2020 Decision that "if" it had known the
Guidelines § 2D1.1 range on which it actually based Williams's sentence would be
lowered, "it would" have chosen to sentence him based on the alternative calculations
instead, id.; and, "[a]ccordingly, the Court holds that it lacks discretion to reduce
-4- Williams's sentence under Section 3582(c)(2)," id.
This was error. Section 3582(c)(2) deals with the prison term that was
imposed "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission," 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added); it gives the court
discretion to "substitute . . . the amendments . . . for the corresponding guideline
provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced," Guidelines
§ 1B1.10(b)(1) (Policy Statement) (emphasis added). It matters not what guidelines
the court could, would, or perhaps should, have applied. Section 3582(c)(2) and the
applicable Guidelines policy statement expressly require the court to consider the
defendant's eligibility for a Guidelines-Amendment-reduced sentence when his
sentence was "based on" "guideline provisions that were applied" and resulted in a
range that the Commission subsequently lowered.
Here, the district court erred by eliminating from its § 3582(c)(2)
consideration the Commission's lowering of the sentencing ranges in Guidelines
§ 2D1.1--i.e., the guideline that the court had expressly "cho[]se[n]" to apply at
sentencing (S.Tr. 51), and had "formally adopted," 2020 Decision, 2020 WL 5253205,
at *5, in "calculat[ing] Williams's offense level," 2016 Order at 7. Instead, the district
court's present decision focused on the alternative offense level the court had
-5- explored but not applied; the court ruled that it had no authority to grant Williams's
request for a reduction under Amendment 782 because the Commission did not lower
the offense level in the guideline that the district court had not applied, see 2020
Decision, 2020 WL 5253205, at *5. And that erroneous ruling led the court to conclude
erroneously that "it need not consider the factors set forth in Section 3553(a)," id.
The majority finds the latter error excusable--and the former error
harmless--by presuming that the district court denied Williams a sentence reduction
in the exercise of its discretion, because the district court proceeded to mention some
of the § 3553(a) factors. However, in my view, the district court should rarely, if ever,
be presumed to have given appropriate consideration to factors that it stated need not
be considered at all.
And the record in this case suggests that the district court did not
appropriately "consider[]" the § 3553(a) factors "to the extent that they are applicable,"
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). For example, with regard to the § 3553(a)(2)(D) factors of
effective educational or vocational training and other correctional treatment, although
the district court noted that Williams had made substantial steps "in furtherance of
his rehabilitation," id. at 14-15, it considered rehabilitation only in isolation, not as it
may affect other § 3553(a) factors. See generally Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476,
-6- 491 (2011) ("evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation may be highly relevant to several of the
§ 3553(a) factors," including "plainly . . . 'the history and characteristics of the
defendant[,]' § 3553(a)(1)," and perhaps "'the need for the sentence imposed' to serve
the general purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2)--in particular, to 'afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,' [and] 'protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant'" (emphasis added)).
Although the majority states that "[i]n the course of denying Williams's
2019 motion, the district court stated that, to grant Williams's request for a sentence
reduction, it would have to consider" the § 3553(a) factors such as the need to protect
the public from future crimes and the nature and circumstances of the offense,
Majority Opinion ante at 11-12 (citing 2020 Decision, 2020 WL 5253205, at *4), that
statement by the district court, in the paragraph that preceded its "Discussion"
section, referred expressly to what a court must consider "[i]f the defendant is eligible
for a [§ 3582(c)(2)] sentence reduction," 2020 WL 5253205, at *4 (emphasis added). But
in the first paragraph of its Discussion section, the district court held--erroneously,
as discussed above--"that Williams is not eligible for a sentence reduction," id. at *5
(emphasis added). And having found that Williams was not eligible, the district court
ruled that it "lack[ed] discretion to reduce Williams's sentence under Section
-7- § 3582(c)(2)," id., and concluded that "[b]ecause . . . it lacks discretion to reduce
William[s]'s sentence, it need not consider the factors set forth in Section § 3553(a),"
id.
The record here thus contrasts with that in Chavez-Meza v. United States,
585 U.S. 109 (2018), cited by the Majority Opinion ante at 13, in which the district
court's denial of a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction "was entered on a form issued by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The form certified the judge
had . . . 'tak[en] into account' the § 3553(a) factors," 585 U.S. at 114.
And here, rather than consider what likely effect Williams's
demonstrated progress in rehabilitation would have on other § 3553(a) factors such
as the need to deter Williams from committing additional crimes, the district court
said "the Court cannot reduce a sentence based on rehabilitation alone," 2020 Decision,
2020 WL 5253205, at *6 (emphases added). And it proceeded to refer to two statutory
sections that are inapposite. See id. ("28 U.S.C. Section 994(t) provides that
'[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and
compelling reason' warranting a reduction [of sentence] within the meaning of
Section 3582(c)(1)(A). . . . Courts lack discretion to reduce a sentence based solely on
[rehabilitation]. See . . . 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)." (emphases mine)). Neither § 994(t) nor
-8- § 3582(c)(1)(A) purports to deal with reductions by the Commission of Guidelines
ranges of imprisonment. And plainly, when a defendant has requested a sentence
reduction under § 3582(c)(2) because the Commission has lowered the punishment
for his crime, the request for a reduction is not based on rehabilitation alone.
In sum, the district court erred in concluding that it lacked any discretion
to reduce Williams's sentence, based (a) in part on its erroneous refusal to find under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) that Guidelines Amendment 782 applies to the guidelines that
the court stated it was applying in sentencing Williams, and (b) in part on its reliance
on statutory authority that--by referring to "rehabilitation . . . alone," and to
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), not § 3582(c)(2)--does not govern cases in which the amended
Guidelines-recommended imprisonment ranges were lowered. I cannot join the
majority in affirming the denial of reconsideration of Williams's request for a
§ 3582(c)(2) reduction of sentence based on the majority's presumption that the
district court, in dealing with the motion before it, adequately considered, as required,
the § 3553(a) factors that the district court stated it "need not consider."
-9-