22-1467-cr United States v. Williams
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 31st day of January, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., EUNICE C. LEE, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 22-1467-cr
JAMES WILLIAMS, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 1,
Defendant-Appellant. ------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: THEODORE S. GREEN, Green & Willstatter, White Plains, NY
FOR APPELLEE: JEFFREY C. COFFMAN (Michael D. Maimin, Stephen J. Ritchin, on the brief), for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Vincent L. Briccetti, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
James Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on July 1,
2022, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Briccetti, J.). After trial, a jury found Williams guilty of conspiring to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B), and using and carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or possessing a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
2 facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to
explain our decision to affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction on either count. We review his challenge de novo, viewing the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” and we will uphold the
conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 113
(2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Williams has not
met this “heavy burden.” United States v. Landesman, 17 F.4th 298, 319 (2d Cir.
2021) (quotation marks omitted).
With respect to Williams’s conspiracy conviction, the Government
presented evidence that Williams, following his arrest on state drug charges,
directed Ajah Hodges and Blessing Rogers, among others, to transport and store
drugs, including 42 grams of crack cocaine contained in a gym bag. Both
Hodges and Rogers testified that they were aware that Williams was dealing
crack cocaine and that they were aware that the gym bag contained drugs. The
jury could have reasonably found that Williams’s references during his calls to 3 the bag’s contents were code for drugs. App’x 113, 175, 264. This evidence was
thus sufficient for the jury to find a conspiracy to possess and distribute 28 grams
or more of cocaine base. United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2008).
Williams also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
§ 924(c) conviction. Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for
a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams’s conduct
violated § 924(c)(1)(A), we reject the challenge. As for Williams’s possession of
the guns, Rogers testified at trial that Williams’s brother acknowledged that the
guns in the gym bag belonged to Williams. And keeping in mind that
“[c]onstructive possession exists when a person has the power and intention to
exercise dominion and control over the contraband in question,” United States v.
Willis, 14 F.4th 170, 181 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted), there was also
evidence that Williams controlled his gym bag, which contained guns as well as
drugs, by directing how and where it would be transported and stored, see
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 677 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is of no moment that
other individuals also may have exercised control over the weapons.”). A
rational juror could also have found that the evidence showed “some nexus
between the firearm[s]” recovered by the police “and the drug selling operation.”
4 United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2001). The guns at issue in this
case were stored together with the drugs, and Williams repeatedly emphasized
the need to keep them together. This evidence was sufficient for a rational juror
to find that the guns “afforded some advantage (actual or potential, real or
contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes of drug trafficking.” United States v.
Lewter, 402 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2005).
II. Motion to Suppress
Williams also appeals the District Court’s denial of his pretrial motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of the police’s search of the gym bag,
arguing that the evidence was the fruit of a prior illegal search conducted by a
confidential informant (“CI”). In considering this argument, we note that the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment do not apply “to a search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as
an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
governmental official.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)
(quotation marks omitted). Here, Williams failed to show that the CI’s initial
search of the gym bag was requested by a government official. To the contrary,
during the suppression hearing, the Government adduced testimony, which the 5 District Court credited, that police were not even aware of the bag until the CI
told them what was in it. “We . . . pay special deference to the district court’s
factual determinations going to witness credibility.” United States v. Jiau, 734
F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s
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22-1467-cr United States v. Williams
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 31st day of January, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., EUNICE C. LEE, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 22-1467-cr
JAMES WILLIAMS, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 1,
Defendant-Appellant. ------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: THEODORE S. GREEN, Green & Willstatter, White Plains, NY
FOR APPELLEE: JEFFREY C. COFFMAN (Michael D. Maimin, Stephen J. Ritchin, on the brief), for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Vincent L. Briccetti, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
James Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on July 1,
2022, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Briccetti, J.). After trial, a jury found Williams guilty of conspiring to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B), and using and carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or possessing a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
2 facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to
explain our decision to affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction on either count. We review his challenge de novo, viewing the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” and we will uphold the
conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 113
(2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Williams has not
met this “heavy burden.” United States v. Landesman, 17 F.4th 298, 319 (2d Cir.
2021) (quotation marks omitted).
With respect to Williams’s conspiracy conviction, the Government
presented evidence that Williams, following his arrest on state drug charges,
directed Ajah Hodges and Blessing Rogers, among others, to transport and store
drugs, including 42 grams of crack cocaine contained in a gym bag. Both
Hodges and Rogers testified that they were aware that Williams was dealing
crack cocaine and that they were aware that the gym bag contained drugs. The
jury could have reasonably found that Williams’s references during his calls to 3 the bag’s contents were code for drugs. App’x 113, 175, 264. This evidence was
thus sufficient for the jury to find a conspiracy to possess and distribute 28 grams
or more of cocaine base. United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2008).
Williams also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
§ 924(c) conviction. Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for
a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams’s conduct
violated § 924(c)(1)(A), we reject the challenge. As for Williams’s possession of
the guns, Rogers testified at trial that Williams’s brother acknowledged that the
guns in the gym bag belonged to Williams. And keeping in mind that
“[c]onstructive possession exists when a person has the power and intention to
exercise dominion and control over the contraband in question,” United States v.
Willis, 14 F.4th 170, 181 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted), there was also
evidence that Williams controlled his gym bag, which contained guns as well as
drugs, by directing how and where it would be transported and stored, see
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 677 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is of no moment that
other individuals also may have exercised control over the weapons.”). A
rational juror could also have found that the evidence showed “some nexus
between the firearm[s]” recovered by the police “and the drug selling operation.”
4 United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2001). The guns at issue in this
case were stored together with the drugs, and Williams repeatedly emphasized
the need to keep them together. This evidence was sufficient for a rational juror
to find that the guns “afforded some advantage (actual or potential, real or
contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes of drug trafficking.” United States v.
Lewter, 402 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2005).
II. Motion to Suppress
Williams also appeals the District Court’s denial of his pretrial motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of the police’s search of the gym bag,
arguing that the evidence was the fruit of a prior illegal search conducted by a
confidential informant (“CI”). In considering this argument, we note that the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment do not apply “to a search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as
an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
governmental official.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)
(quotation marks omitted). Here, Williams failed to show that the CI’s initial
search of the gym bag was requested by a government official. To the contrary,
during the suppression hearing, the Government adduced testimony, which the 5 District Court credited, that police were not even aware of the bag until the CI
told them what was in it. “We . . . pay special deference to the district court’s
factual determinations going to witness credibility.” United States v. Jiau, 734
F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s
denial of Williams’s suppression motion.
III. Motion in Limine
Finally, Williams argues that the District Court erred in admitting
evidence that he sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer in January 2018 and
possessed crack cocaine and $11,000 in cash when he was arrested in May 2018.
We disagree. A key issue at trial was whether Williams directed associates to
transport cocaine and firearms after his May arrest. During his recorded calls
from jail, Williams spoke with others in coded language and referred to his
January sales, the seizure of his $11,000, and the May arrest. The challenged
evidence was permissibly admitted as direct evidence to “complete the story of
the crime on trial,” United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quotation marks omitted), and provide “background of the conspiracy
charged,” United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 33‒34 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, the District Court mitigated any risk of unfair 6 prejudice by instructing the jury that it could consider the evidence only for the
limited purpose of interpreting Williams’s calls from jail. See United States v.
Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2006). We thus conclude that the District
Court did not act “arbitrarily and irrationally” in admitting the challenged
evidence. United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation
marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Williams’s remaining arguments and conclude that
they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Cathrine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court