United States v. Williams

Opinion

21-2966-cr United States v. Williams

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 3 City of New York, on the 17th day of April, two thousand twenty-three. 4 5 PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 6 GERARD E. LYNCH, 7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 8 Circuit Judges. 9 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 12 Appellee, 13 14 v. No. 21-2966-cr 15 16 MICHAEL WILLIAMS, 17 18 Defendant-Appellant. 19 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: JAMES I. GLASSER (Ariela C. 2 Anhalt, on the brief), Wiggin 3 and Dana LLP, New Haven, 4 CT 5 6 FOR APPELLEE: SOPHIA M. SUAREZ, Assistant 7 United States Attorney (David 8 C. James, Assistant United 9 States Attorney, on the brief), for 10 Breon Peace, United States 11 Attorney for the Eastern 12 District of New York, 13 Brooklyn, NY

14 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

15 District of New York (Ann M. Donnelly, J.).

16 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

17 AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

18 Michael Williams appeals from a December 1, 2021 judgment of conviction

19 entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

20 (Donnelly, J.) after he pleaded guilty to one count of arson in violation of 18

21 U.S.C. § 844(i). Following the Government’s request for “a significant term of

22 imprisonment above the applicable Guidelines range” of 60 to 63 months’

23 imprisonment, the District Court sentenced Williams principally to 96 months’

2 1 imprisonment. Joint App’x 69, 112, 116-17. Williams argues, for the first time on

2 appeal, that the Government breached the plea agreement when it requested an

3 above-Guidelines sentence. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

4 underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as

5 necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

6 Because Williams failed to argue in the District Court that the Government

7 breached the plea agreement, we review for “plain error.” See United States v.

8 Taylor, 961 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2020). “To establish plain error, a defendant must

9 demonstrate: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id.

10 (quotation marks omitted). “If all three conditions are met, we will then exercise

11 our discretion to rectify this forfeited error only if (4) the error seriously affects

12 the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

13 (quotation marks omitted).

14 Williams fails to establish plain error. “To determine whether a plea

15 agreement has been breached, a court must look to what the parties reasonably

16 understood to be the terms of the agreement.” United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d

17 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotations marks omitted). Here, nothing in the plea

3 1 agreement restricts either party’s right to argue for a non-Guidelines sentence.

2 See United States v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that where

3 there is “no stipulation as to what position the government will take,” the

4 government is “free to take the position of its choice”). Moreover, the plea

5 agreement unambiguously stated that the Guidelines estimate is “not binding on

6 the [Government].” Joint App’x 15; see United States v. MacPherson, 590 F.3d

7 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding “no plain error” on account of effectively identical

8 language in the plea agreement, where the District Court adopted a higher-than-

9 estimated Guidelines level upon the Government’s request). During his plea

10 allocution, Williams affirmed that the Guidelines estimate in the plea agreement

11 “could be wrong,” that “there is no way . . . to know what [his] ultimate sentence

12 will be,” and that no one “promised [him] that [he is] going to get a particular

13 sentence.” Joint App’x 34-35, 37. Therefore, “the precise terms of the plea

14 agreement and [] the parties’ behavior” demonstrate that Williams would have

15 reasonably understood that the Government could request an above-Guidelines

16 sentence. United States v. Wilson, 920 F.3d 155, 163 (2d Cir. 2019).

4 1 Williams also argues that the Government “deprived [him] of the central

2 benefit of his plea” when it “relied in substantial part on the witness-tampering

3 context of Mr. Williams’s arson offense” to ask for an above-Guidelines sentence.

4 Appellant’s Br. 43. We disagree. Even though the Government agreed not to

5 bring “further criminal charges . . . against [Williams] for his commission of []

6 witness tampering,” Joint App’x 16, Williams “points to no evidence in the

7 record that he bargained for or requested that the government not raise the

8 [witness-tampering motive] at sentencing.” United States v. Helm, 58 F.4th 75,

9 86 (2d Cir. 2023). In fact, the plea agreement anticipated that Williams’s motive

10 would play a role in sentencing: the base offense level estimate accounted for a

11 two-point enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(b)(1) because the “offense

12 [was] committed to conceal another offense.” Joint App’x 14, 34. We therefore

13 conclude that Williams would have reasonably understood that the Government

14 could raise the witness-tampering motive at sentencing.

5 1 We have considered Williams’s remaining arguments and conclude that

2 they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

3 the District Court.

4 FOR THE COURT: 5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court