Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 25, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-7056 (D.C. No. 6:24-CR-00143-RAW-1) GABRIEL LEE WILLIAMS, II, a/k/a Chi- (E.D. Okla.) Chi,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
court, therefore, honors appellant’s request and orders the matter submitted without
oral argument.
Gabriel Lee Williams, II, appeals from the district court’s judgment accepting
his guilty plea to one count of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm, see
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sentencing him to a 140-month term of imprisonment.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 2
Williams’s counsel has filed an Anders brief, 1 asserting she could find no meritorious
basis for appeal and simultaneously moving to withdraw as counsel. For those
reasons set out below, this court grants counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismisses
this appeal.
A federal grand jury indicted Williams on one count each of possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C), and on one count of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). Officers spotted Williams walking
with a red and black backpack. Williams had previously been convicted of multiple
felonies and had two active arrest warrants. When Williams saw the officers, he fled
on foot. Although officers lost Williams, they recovered the backpack. Inside the
backpack, officers found two firearms and a substance that tested positive for
methamphetamine. Several days later, Williams was arrested at a nearby motel, at
which officers also found suspected narcotics.
Williams entered a notice of intent to plead guilty to the felon-in-possession
count of the indictment. There was no plea agreement. As Williams’s trial counsel
explained, “We have an agreement with the government that the first count will be
dismissed at sentencing, but [there is] no formalized plea agreement as far as a plea
contract.” The court accepted Williams’s guilty plea and a presentence investigation
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2 Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 3
report (“PSR”) was created. The PSR calculated Williams’s total offense level at 29
and his criminal history category at V, resulting in an advisory sentencing range of
140 to 175 months’ incarceration. Williams proceeded to sentencing. Trial counsel
did not raise any objections to the PSR. When given the opportunity to speak,
Williams indicated he entered his plea because trial counsel told him he was facing a
sentence of 84 to 108 months. Williams stated, “I was believing [trial counsel] told
me my guidelines would be nine to seven years, and that’s when I plead guilty to this.
That’s why I plead guilty because I thought I was getting nine to seven years.”
Williams did not, however, move to withdraw his plea on this basis. The district
court sentenced Williams to the lowest possible within-guideline sentence,
140 months’ incarceration. Williams appealed.
Appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief advising the court that this appeal
is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, counsel seeks permission to withdraw. Pursuant to
Anders, counsel may “request permission to withdraw where counsel conscientiously
examines a case and determines that any appeal would be wholly frivolous.” United
States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005). Counsel is required to submit
an appellate brief “indicating any potential appealable issues.” Id. Once notified of
counsel’s brief, the defendant may then submit additional arguments to this court. Id.
We “must then conduct a full examination of the record to determine whether
defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous.” Id. This court notified Williams of
counsel’s Anders brief, but Williams did not file a response. The government
declined to file a brief. Thus, our resolution of the case is based on counsel’s Anders
3 Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 4
brief and this court’s independent review of the record. That independent review
confirms counsel’s assertion that this appeal is meritless.
Counsel’s Anders brief sets out two potential issues that could be raised on
appeal, but attests each is unsupported by a good faith basis for reversal. First,
counsel notes it could be questioned whether the district court reversibly erred in
accepting Williams’s guilty plea. As counsel recognizes, however, because the issue
was not raised below, it is subject to review only for plain error. United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). Any assertion the district court erred, let alone did so
plainly, is frivolous for those reasons set out in the helpful chart at pages six to nine
of counsel’s Anders brief. The district court carefully complied with the dictates of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Williams’s guilty plea. There is no doubt Williams’s
plea was knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
Second, counsel’s Anders brief recognizes Willliams could seek to challenge
the district court’s sentencing decision. Again, however, any challenge to the
procedural reasonableness of Williams’s 140-month sentence is subject to plain error
review because no relevant objections were lodged in the district court. United States
v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2007). For those reasons set out in
the chart at pages ten to twelve of counsel’s Anders brief, however, it would be
frivolous to argue the district court erred, let alone plainly, in calculating Williams’s
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Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 25, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-7056 (D.C. No. 6:24-CR-00143-RAW-1) GABRIEL LEE WILLIAMS, II, a/k/a Chi- (E.D. Okla.) Chi,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
court, therefore, honors appellant’s request and orders the matter submitted without
oral argument.
Gabriel Lee Williams, II, appeals from the district court’s judgment accepting
his guilty plea to one count of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm, see
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sentencing him to a 140-month term of imprisonment.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 2
Williams’s counsel has filed an Anders brief, 1 asserting she could find no meritorious
basis for appeal and simultaneously moving to withdraw as counsel. For those
reasons set out below, this court grants counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismisses
this appeal.
A federal grand jury indicted Williams on one count each of possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C), and on one count of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). Officers spotted Williams walking
with a red and black backpack. Williams had previously been convicted of multiple
felonies and had two active arrest warrants. When Williams saw the officers, he fled
on foot. Although officers lost Williams, they recovered the backpack. Inside the
backpack, officers found two firearms and a substance that tested positive for
methamphetamine. Several days later, Williams was arrested at a nearby motel, at
which officers also found suspected narcotics.
Williams entered a notice of intent to plead guilty to the felon-in-possession
count of the indictment. There was no plea agreement. As Williams’s trial counsel
explained, “We have an agreement with the government that the first count will be
dismissed at sentencing, but [there is] no formalized plea agreement as far as a plea
contract.” The court accepted Williams’s guilty plea and a presentence investigation
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2 Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 3
report (“PSR”) was created. The PSR calculated Williams’s total offense level at 29
and his criminal history category at V, resulting in an advisory sentencing range of
140 to 175 months’ incarceration. Williams proceeded to sentencing. Trial counsel
did not raise any objections to the PSR. When given the opportunity to speak,
Williams indicated he entered his plea because trial counsel told him he was facing a
sentence of 84 to 108 months. Williams stated, “I was believing [trial counsel] told
me my guidelines would be nine to seven years, and that’s when I plead guilty to this.
That’s why I plead guilty because I thought I was getting nine to seven years.”
Williams did not, however, move to withdraw his plea on this basis. The district
court sentenced Williams to the lowest possible within-guideline sentence,
140 months’ incarceration. Williams appealed.
Appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief advising the court that this appeal
is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, counsel seeks permission to withdraw. Pursuant to
Anders, counsel may “request permission to withdraw where counsel conscientiously
examines a case and determines that any appeal would be wholly frivolous.” United
States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005). Counsel is required to submit
an appellate brief “indicating any potential appealable issues.” Id. Once notified of
counsel’s brief, the defendant may then submit additional arguments to this court. Id.
We “must then conduct a full examination of the record to determine whether
defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous.” Id. This court notified Williams of
counsel’s Anders brief, but Williams did not file a response. The government
declined to file a brief. Thus, our resolution of the case is based on counsel’s Anders
3 Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 4
brief and this court’s independent review of the record. That independent review
confirms counsel’s assertion that this appeal is meritless.
Counsel’s Anders brief sets out two potential issues that could be raised on
appeal, but attests each is unsupported by a good faith basis for reversal. First,
counsel notes it could be questioned whether the district court reversibly erred in
accepting Williams’s guilty plea. As counsel recognizes, however, because the issue
was not raised below, it is subject to review only for plain error. United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). Any assertion the district court erred, let alone did so
plainly, is frivolous for those reasons set out in the helpful chart at pages six to nine
of counsel’s Anders brief. The district court carefully complied with the dictates of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Williams’s guilty plea. There is no doubt Williams’s
plea was knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
Second, counsel’s Anders brief recognizes Willliams could seek to challenge
the district court’s sentencing decision. Again, however, any challenge to the
procedural reasonableness of Williams’s 140-month sentence is subject to plain error
review because no relevant objections were lodged in the district court. United States
v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2007). For those reasons set out in
the chart at pages ten to twelve of counsel’s Anders brief, however, it would be
frivolous to argue the district court erred, let alone plainly, in calculating Williams’s
advisory guidelines range, in considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or in
announcing sentence. Nor could it be asserted in good faith that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. United
4 Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 5
States v. Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th 1174, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 2025) (“We review a
district court's sentencing decision for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-
discretion standard, looking at the totality of the circumstances. . . . We apply this
standard with substantial deference to the district court.” (quotations omitted));
United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“[A] within-Guidelines sentence is entitled to a presumption of substantive
reasonableness on appeal.”).
Williams may seek to argue he entered his plea because trial counsel told him
he was facing 84 to 108 months’ imprisonment, when his advisory guideline
sentencing range ultimately ended up being 140 to 175 months’ imprisonment. Such
an argument does not present a nonfrivolous issue in the context of this direct appeal
because it is grounded in ineffective assistance of counsel. Such claims must be
pursued in collateral proceedings. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240
(10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims
brought on direct appeal are “presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be
dismissed”).
Pursuant to the Anders mandate, this court has undertaken an independent
review of the entire record in this case. Calderon, 428 F.3d at 930. That review
demonstrates the potential appellate issues identified by counsel in her Anders brief
are undeniably frivolous. Likewise, that review reveals no other potentially
5 Appellate Case: 25-7056 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 6
meritorious issues. Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and
DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy, Circuit Judge