United States v. William Taylor Caudill

43 F.3d 1484, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 39935, 1994 WL 702339
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedDecember 16, 1994
Docket93-2308
StatusPublished

This text of 43 F.3d 1484 (United States v. William Taylor Caudill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. William Taylor Caudill, 43 F.3d 1484, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 39935, 1994 WL 702339 (10th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

43 F.3d 1484

NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further order.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William Taylor CAUDILL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 93-2308.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Dec. 16, 1994.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1

Before ANDERSON and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS, District Judge.2

Defendant William Taylor Caudill appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of mail theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1708. On appeal he argues that (1) postal authorities lacked probable cause to arrest him; (2) postal authorities violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they searched him after the arrest; (3) he has standing to challenge the search of the Mesa Airlines office; and (4)his confession was obtained in violation of his right to counsel and was tainted by postal inspector misconduct.

In reviewing denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. The ultimate determination of reasonableness, however, is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir.1992).

* Following a series of lost express mail pieces from the Gallup, New Mexico, Post Office, United States Postal Service inspectors initiated an investigation. The inspectors determined that the lost items had been routed from the post office to the Gallup Airport where Mesa Airlines routinely transported express mail to Phoenix. Postal inspectors determined that defendant, a Mesa Airlines employee, had signed the manifests or bills of lading accepting approximately six express mail packages since February 1, 1993, all of which were subsequently reported lost. Although other Mesa Airlines employees also accepted delivery of express mail, none of those items had been lost; thus, the inspectors focused their investigation on defendant.

The inspectors prepared two express mail pouches for shipment through the Gallup Airport from the Gallup Post Office. Each pouch contained a number of express mail pieces, including one control piece equipped with a battery-operated electronic monitoring device and containing a $50 bill. An inspector initialed the batteries to facilitate later identification and recorded the serial numbers of the money. The monitoring device transmitted an intermittent beep that allowed the inspectors to monitor its location; if opened, the intermittent beep became faster, indicating alarm status.

The postal inspectors placed these express mail pouches into the mail stream on March 15, 1993. Defendant was scheduled to be the only Mesa Airlines employee on duty that evening. His responsibilities included receiving express mail, and closing and locking the terminal office. A post office employee delivered the pouches to the airport, and the inspectors followed. Postal inspectors set up surveillance at the airport, watching at least four possible exits.3 They observed various airport employees turn off the lights in their work areas and leave the terminal building. Finally, the only lights on in the terminal building were in the Mesa Airlines area and the FAA office at the opposite end of the building.4

Thereafter, one of the monitors briefly went into alarm status. The transmitter was then disabled, apparently by removing the battery. Within a short time, the lights went out at the Mesa Airlines office and defendant left the terminal building. As he got into a car and started to drive away, the inspectors blocked his exit and arrested him.

II

The threshold issue is whether the postal inspectors had probable cause to arrest defendant as he attempted to leave the airport parking lot. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 95-97 (1964) (warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause). "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." United States v. Maher, 919 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir.1990) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (other citations omitted)). Probable cause is a fact-driven inquiry that takes into account the "totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).

We review the information and observations available to the postal inspectors at the time of defendant's arrest within this framework. The following facts are uncontested: defendant signed the manifest for the lost express mail packages; he had a criminal record; he was working alone at Mesa Airlines that night with responsibility to close the office; all other persons (except FAA personnel) who worked in the terminal building had left when the monitor went into alarm mode; shortly thereafter the lights in the Mesa Airlines office went out and defendant left the terminal building.

Defendant argues that because the postal inspectors did not know what he looked like and did not surveil all the exits, they lacked probable cause to arrest him. He contends that it is conceivable that another person actually opened the express mail pouches, set off the control mail monitor, and surreptitiously exited from the unattended door.5 However, "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment." Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) (reasonable but mistaken identity); see also United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1190 (1992).

We agree with the district court that all of these facts taken together would have led "a prudent, cautious, trained police officer" to conclude there was probable cause to arrest the person leaving the Mesa Airlines office. Maher, 919 F.2d at 1485-86.

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Related

Brinegar v. United States
338 U.S. 160 (Supreme Court, 1949)
Beck v. Ohio
379 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1964)
Hill v. California
401 U.S. 797 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Rakas v. Illinois
439 U.S. 128 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Illinois v. Gates
462 U.S. 213 (Supreme Court, 1983)
United States v. Patrick Lynn Maher
919 F.2d 1482 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Rodney Lee Morgan
936 F.2d 1561 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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43 F.3d 1484, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 39935, 1994 WL 702339, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-william-taylor-caudill-ca10-1994.