United States v. William Sims

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 4, 2025
• Docket: 23-4034
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0123n.06

Case No. 23-4034

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 04, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff - Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN ) DISTRICT OF OHIO v. ) ) WILLIAM SIMS ) OPINION ) Defendant - Appellant. )

Before: McKEAGUE, KETHLEDGE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. William P. Sims was convicted and sentenced to 195

months in prison for drug and firearm offenses after a jury trial. He raises two issues on appeal.

First, he argues that the evidence obtained from a search of his residence should have been

suppressed because the search warrant lacked probable cause. Second, he claims that the district

court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by limiting his ability to cross-examine a witness during

trial. Because Sims’s arguments lack merit, we AFFIRM.

I.

Sims appeared on law enforcement’s radar after an informant, whom detectives used in the

past, claimed to have purchased crack cocaine and heroin from Sims for a “long time.” Affidavit,

R. 30-1 PageID 130. The informant identified Sims in photographs, stated that Sims drove a red

Ford Fusion with a temporary tag, provided detectives with Sims’s cell phone number, and claimed No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

to have purchased drugs at Sims’s residence on 3211 W. 121st Street (“the residence”).

Upon receiving other general complaints of possible drug sales at the address, detectives decided

to investigate further.

A. The Investigation

Detective Robert Jorgenson surveilled the residence. He observed that it had two entrances:

the front door (west-facing) and a side door (south-facing). Jorgenson witnessed Sims go in and

out of the residence through the side door. He did not witness anyone else use that entrance.

Jorgenson also observed the same red Ford Fusion with the temporary tag parked on the street in

front of the residence. Furthermore, an anonymous “concerned citizen” confirmed that Sims lived

in the upstairs unit of the residence. Affidavit, R. 30-1 PageID 131. This citizen also stated that

they witnessed “heavy vehicle and foot traffic coming from that address at all hours of the day”

which in the detectives’ experience was consistent with drug trafficking. Id.

With the help of a paid informant—one they had successfully used in the past—the

detectives organized two controlled buys. Both buys followed the same pattern: Detective Ryan

McNamara met the informant at a predetermined location where he searched the informant and

the informant’s car to ensure they were free of drugs or money. He then gave the informant marked

money to purchase drugs from Sims. Using the number the detectives previously received, the

informant called Sims to agree on a meeting location. McNamara confirmed that the informant

used the correct phone number, overheard the conversation, and noted the location where the

transaction was to occur. He then followed the informant to the location and observed the

transaction from a distance. In the meantime, Jorgensen would remain parked outside of the

residence to observe and report on Sims’s movements. After each buy, McNamara followed the

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informant back to the predetermined location to retrieve the purchased drugs. According to the

affidavit, detectives observed the following during the buys:

First Buy. Shortly after the informant placed the call, Sims drove1 to the residence and

entered it through the side door. A few minutes later, Sims exited the building through the side

door and walked north towards the buy location, where the informant was already waiting in a car.

Shortly after, Sims approached and entered the informant’s car. The informant then drove towards

the residence before Sims got out and walked back to the apartment. McNamara retrieved crack

cocaine from the informant.

Second Buy. Detectives conducted the second buy within a week of the first. After the

informant placed the call, Sims exited the residence through the side door and drove away in the

same red Ford Fusion that was parked by the residence during detectives’ initial surveillance.

Several minutes later, Sims arrived at the buy location. The informant entered Sims’s car and

exited after approximately thirty seconds. Sims returned to the residence and entered through the

side door. This time McNamara retrieved crack cocaine and heroin from the informant.

Within two days of the second controlled buy, detectives obtained a warrant to search the

upstairs unit of the residence, which they executed two days later. The search unearthed narcotics,

firearms, and drug paraphernalia.

B. Procedural History

Based on the controlled buys and the evidence obtained during the search, a grand jury

indicted Sims for distribution of and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances

under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c) (counts 1, 2, 6, and 7), possession with the intent to

1 The search warrant affidavit states that Sims arrived in a red Ford Focus, Affidavit, R. 30-1 PageID 131, but during his trial testimony, Jorgenson claimed to have observed a red Ford Fusion. Trial Tr. Vol 1, R. 99 PageID 790.

3 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (counts 3, 4, and 5),

being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and

924(a)(2) (count 8), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (count 9). The controlled buys formed the basis for the distribution

charges in counts 1 and 2.

Sims filed several pretrial motions with the district court, three of which are relevant here.

First, Sims moved to compel the government to disclose the identity and contact information of

the informants referenced in the search warrant affidavit. The government refused, claiming that

disclosing the identity would endanger the informant. The district court agreed with the

government and denied the motion but also held that if the government proceeded to trial on counts

1 and 2, it would have to disclose the informant’s identity to facilitate cross-examination.

Next, Sims moved to suppress all the evidence seized from the residence, claiming that the

affidavit did not establish probable cause. He disputed the affidavit’s characterization of the

controlled buys and argued that the government failed to corroborate any of the information in the

search warrant affidavit, and without the identity and ability to interview the informant involved

in the buys, there was no way for Sims to refute the affidavit. The district court denied the motion

during a suppression hearing explaining that Sims failed to provide any reasons to doubt the

information in the affidavit. The court explained that the affidavit established probable cause and

additional corroboration, although helpful, was not necessary in this case.

Finally, Sims moved to exclude all evidence of the controlled buys. He argued that if the

government dropped counts 1 and 2, evidence of the controlled buys was no longer relevant to the

remaining counts, and any testimony on the buys without the opportunity to cross-examine the

informant would unduly prejudice Sims. The government eventually dropped counts 1 and 2. But

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the court denied Sims’s motion explaining that it would allow evidence of the controlled buys

because they occurred less than a week before the search and were relevant to show Sims’s

knowledge of the charged crimes under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).2

C. The Trial

The case proceeded to trial on the remaining counts, and both Jorgenson and McNamara

testified. Jorgenson was the first to testify, but before he could get to the controlled buys Sims

objected citing the same reasons he offered in his motion in limine. The court overruled the

objection but gave a limiting instruction to the jury explaining that they were to use the information

for the sole purpose of evaluating Sims’s knowledge or intent for the crimes he was charged with.

Jorgenson testified as to the details of how the controlled buys were set up and his personal

observations during the controlled buys. Sims thoroughly cross-examined Jorgenson on the lack

of any surveillance recordings, the reliability of the informants used in the investigation, and

Jorgenson’s observations during the controlled buys.

During McNamara’s testimony, Sims objected again when the government began

questioning McNamara on the controlled buys. The court warned the government that it did not

want a reiteration of the controlled buys because Jorgenson already described them in detail. But

the court did allow “very limited” inquiry into McNamara’s observations of the controlled buys.

Trial Tr. Vol. 4, R. 102 PageID 1350–52. On cross-examination, Sims questioned McNamara

about events that occurred on November 10—six days before the first controlled buy—at which

2 “Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character . . . [but] may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)–(2).

5 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

point the government objected, the court called for a sidebar with Sims’s counsel and the following

colloquy took place:

The Court: All right. Mr. Bryan [Sims’s trial counsel], I limited over your -- it was because of your objection I limited this witness’s testimony about things he did -- Mr. Bryan: Judge, I’m just -- The Court: -- before the search warrant, so you’re opening the door to a whole lot of stuff that you wanted to keep out. Mr. Bryan: No, I’m not -- I’m just trying to set up the search warrant -- The Court: You don’t need to set up the search warrant unless you want to open the things to the stuff that I left out. Mr. Bryan: Okay, Your Honor. The Court: All right. Mr. Bryan: That’s fine. I’m not going to talk about the controlled buys or -- The Court: You’re bringing out on November 10th. Mr. Bryan: Right. That was an interview of a witness. The Court: Well, I mean, if you want to go there, I’ll let [the government] put in whatever [it] wants. And I don’t think you want that, and I don’t think Mr. Sims wants that. So let’s focus this, please. Mr. Bryan: Okay, Your Honor.

Trial Tr. Vol. 4, R. 102 PageID 1382–83. After this interaction, Sims refrained from questioning

McNamara about the events prior to the execution of the search warrant altogether.

The jury found Sims guilty on all counts and the court sentenced him to 195 months in

prison. This appeal followed.

II.

Sims presents two issues on appeal. First, he claims that the district court erred in denying

his motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant. He argues that the

affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause because it did

not provide the requisite nexus between the trafficking activity and the place to be searched; failed

6 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

to establish the reliability of its sources; and lacked particularity as to the premises to be searched.

Second, he claims that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by

limiting his ability to cross-examine McNamara during trial. We address each of these arguments.

A.

Probable Cause. Sims appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress arguing

that the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause. “We

review de novo the district court’s determination that the . . . affidavit in support of the warrant did

not support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Jones, 817 F.3d 489, 490 (6th Cir. 2016).

The Fourth Amendment states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause for a search warrant exists

“when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The judge issuing the warrant “make[s] a

practical, common-sense decision whether” the information in the affidavit supports such a

finding. Id. We afford “great deference” to such decisions, and as a reviewing court, we only ask

“whether, under a totality of circumstances” the issuing judge “had a substantial basis for

concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” United States v. King, 227 F.3d

732, 739 (6th Cir. 2000). We reverse only if we find that the issuing judge “arbitrarily exercised

his or her authority.” United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2013).

We find no such arbitrary exercise of authority here. The simple question is whether the

affidavit gave the issuing judge a “substantial basis” to conclude there was a “fair probability” that

a search of the residence would uncover evidence of drugs, drug-dealing, or firearms. It did.

According to the affidavit, for each controlled buy, Jorgenson witnessed Sims leave the residence

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shortly after the informant placed the call; McNamara witnessed Sims arrive at the buy location

and conduct a transaction with the informant; McNamara retrieved drugs from the informant after

each transaction; and Jorgenson witnessed Sims return to the residence immediately after

completing the transaction. Such stops at the residence “immediately before or after a drug

transaction” support the “common-sense” conclusion that there was a “fair probability” that drugs

were located at the residence. United States v. White, 990 F.3d 488, 490, 492 (6th Cir. 2021). The

fact that Sims had to briefly stop at the residence before meeting the informant during the first

controlled buy only strengthens the inference that Sims had drugs stored there. See id. at 490. Put

together, “[t]his evidence alone would end the matter.” United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455,

463 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc).

We do not break new ground with this conclusion. In Sanders we found probable cause to

search an apartment under similar circumstances. Id. There, as here, in a span of a week, officers

arranged for two controlled buys between an informant and the defendant. Id. For each buy,

officers searched the informant and his car before the buy, gave the informant buy money, and

observed the informant during the purchase at a predetermined meet location. Id. at 459. For the

first purchase, officers witnessed the informant enter the defendant’s car and exit moments later

with heroin and fentanyl. Id. After the buy, officers tailed the defendant and saw that he drove

straight to the apartment. Id. For the second buy, officers watched the defendant leave the

apartment, drive to the buy location, sell drugs to the informant, and return straight to the

apartment. Id. We found that these facts established probable cause to search the apartment. Id. at

463.

So too in White. There, an undercover agent—after asking the defendant where he could

buy cocaine—watched the defendant walk into an acquaintance’s house and emerge with three

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grams of cocaine. 990 F.3d at 489. Over a month later, the agent again asked the defendant for

cocaine, this time the defendant dropped the agent at a nearby alley and drove himself to the same

house. Id. Another detective observed the defendant approach the house, exit his car, enter the

house through the back, reemerge from the house, get back into the car, and travel back to the

agent, where he completed the sale. Id. We found probable cause based on these facts. Id. at 490.

Other cases likewise support this conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 923 F.3d 450,

457 (6th Cir. 2019) (finding probable cause where detectives setup three controlled buys of cocaine

and observed defendant drive directly from his condo to the site of the buy); Jones, 817 F.3d at

491 (finding probable cause after officer witnessed defendant leave the property, drive to the

location of the controlled buy, and then sell cocaine to the confidential informant).

Sims arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, he repeatedly claims that the search

warrant affidavit here did not establish that detectives continuously observed Sims between his

home and the meeting location. Appellant Br. 23–25. This argument misses the forest for the trees.

Probable cause only requires “reasonable grounds to believe that contraband will be located on the

property to be searched.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 461 (citation omitted). And “evidence that one

leaves a residence, engages in a drug transaction, and then returns into the residence plainly

demonstrates a sufficient nexus with the location.” Id. at 463 (cleaned up). Regardless of whether

Sims was constantly within the detectives’ view, the affidavit establishes that for each controlled

buy, Sims went straight to the buy location from the residence and returned immediately after the

transaction, thereby supplying the required nexus with the residence. The mere possibility that

detectives might not have had eyes on Sims for a brief period while Sims was headed towards or

returning from the buy location does not take away from this common-sense conclusion. Overall,

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the affidavit undeniably provides “reasonable grounds” to conclude that Sims had drugs stored at

the residence. Id. at 461.

Sims next challenges the reliability of the sources. He argues that the affidavit lacked

probable cause because detectives relied on information from several informants whose reliability

the affidavit failed to establish. Appellant Br. 21–22. Sims’s argument fails because it assumes the

detectives “conducted a search based on [the] informant’s tip alone.” Jones, 817 F.3d at 492. But

in reality, “the warrant was based on [the detectives’] own observations more than it was the

informant[s’].” Id. According to the affidavit, detectives received the following information from

the informant: Sims sold drugs at his residence; Sims drove a red Ford Fusion with a temporary

tag; and Sims accepted drug orders using his cell phone. The detectives’ investigation sufficiently

corroborated this information. Detectives made an informant initiate the buys by calling the phone

number they previously received. They observed the red Ford Fusion parked on the street in front

of the residence and witnessed Sims use it during the second controlled buy. For each buy, they

observed Sims leave the residence, complete the transaction, and return to the residence. Because

of these corroboration efforts, the detectives’ observations alone would have established probable

cause. Id. at 491.

Particularity. Sims also challenges the warrant’s particularity but frames the argument as

a challenge to probable cause. He argues that the warrant lacked probable cause because it did not

describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. Appellant Br. 14–18. Since Sims did

not raise particularity at the district court, we review for plain error.3 United States v. Blair, 214

3 A quick note on the standard of review is in order. Normally, “[w]e review [a] warrant’s particularity de novo.” United States v. Kirtdoll, 101 F.4th 454, 456 (6th Cir. 2024). However, a defendant who fails to argue particularity as a basis for suppression at the district court, waives the right to raise it on appeal, and we review the issue for plain error. Blair, 214 F.3d at 697 (citing United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1094 (6th Cir. 1995)); United States v.

10 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2000). To prevail on plain error, Sims must show that there was an “obvious

or clear” error that affected his “substantial rights” as well as “the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Crawford, 943 F.3d 297, 308 (6th Cir.

2019) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). This is a “difficult” standard to meet. United States v.

Jackson, 918 F.3d 467, 482 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). And we reverse only when the

district court was “derelict in countenancing” the error. United States v. Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d

955, 960 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).

The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to “particularly describ[e] the place to be

searched.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To satisfy this requirement, a warrant must include enough

detail to allow executing officers to “locate and identify” the search premises with “reasonable

effort.” King, 227 F.3d at 750. When dealing with a multi-unit structure, as here, the warrant must

provide enough information to prevent a search of any units for which there is no probable cause.

United States v. Crumpton, 824 F.3d 593, 614 (6th Cir. 2016). Such a warrant is “void” if it

describes an entire building when probable cause exists to search only one unit. United States v.

Votteller, 544 F.2d 1355, 1363 (6th Cir. 1976). Even so, the particularity requirement does not

“mandate perfection” but merely ensures that the warrant does not create a “reasonable

probability” that officers could mistakenly search the wrong premises. Kirtdoll, 101 F.4th at 456.

And mere “technical inaccuracies” do not render searches pursuant to the warrant unconstitutional.

Knott v. Sullivan, 418 F.3d 561, 569 (6th Cir. 2005).

Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417, 436 (6th Cir. 2014). Sims does not deny he did not challenge particularity at the district court. Instead, on appeal, he argues that his motion to suppress included a particularity challenge because particularity is “part and parcel” of probable cause. Reply Br. 6. Contrary to Sims claim, the probable cause and particularity requirements have distinct roles. While probable cause establishes the basis for a search, particularity curbs its breadth. United States v. Nester, No. 23-1727, 2024 WL 4615777, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2024).

11 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

Here, the warrant and the supporting affidavit describe the place to be searched with

sufficient particularity. Begin with the warrant’s description of the building. It describes it as a

“Two-Story, Multi unit Dwelling” located at “3211 W.121st St (Up)” and notes that it is on the

“East side of W 121 St, North of Triskett Ave.” Warrant, R. 30-1 PageID 127. It also describes the

building as having “White Vinyl siding and brown trim with the numbers 3211 marked vertically

to the right of the west facing front door.” Id. Detectives would have no difficulty locating and

identifying the building based on this information.

The affidavit, which was fully incorporated into the search warrant, further narrows the

search area. First, it directs the detectives to only search the upstairs unit by stating that the unit to

be searched is “more particularly described as 3211 W.121st St (Up).” Affidavit, R. 30-1 PageID

129. It also states that anonymous sources confirmed that Sims lived in the upstairs unit of the

building. It also provides that an informant, who purchased crack and heroin from Sims at this

location, observed Sims “coming and going from the side door of the house” during the purchases.

Id. at PageID 131. Furthermore, it explains that Jorgenson witnessed Sims entering the residence

through the side door during his brief stop at the residence before the first buy. Id. He also

witnessed Sims leave and return to the residence through the side door before and after the second

controlled buy. Put together, this information directs the detectives to search only the upstairs

unit—where Sims allegedly kept evidence of drug crimes—and instructed that they could access

this unit through the side door of the building. This conclusion is only strengthened by the fact that

McNamara was both the warrant’s affiant and the executing officer, ensuring that detectives would

not search the wrong premises. See United States v. Durk, 149 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 1998). Since

the warrant and supporting affidavit sufficiently describe the place to be searched, the district court

did not commit any error, plain or otherwise.

12 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

We find Sims’s counterarguments unconvincing. He argues that the affidavit fails the

particularity requirement because it does not specify what a person would encounter after entering

the side door. Appellant Br. 18. He states that since an informant claimed to have bought drugs at

the apartment, detectives should have inquired and included more information from the informant

regarding the layout. Id. at 19. The problem with this argument is that it focusses on what the

affidavit lacks. True, additional information about the layout and what exactly the detectives would

have encountered upon entering the side door would only strengthen the affidavit, but a “line-by-

line scrutiny” of the affidavit almost always tends to reveal unanswered questions and unresolved

issues. United States v. Thomas, 605 F.3d 300, 309 (6th Cir. 2010). We therefore judge the

adequacy of an affidavit on “what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or on what a critic might

say should have been added.” United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 975 (6th Cir. 2000). In this

case, we need not dwell on what the warrant lacked, because it contained enough detail for

detectives to “locate and identify” Sims’s upstairs unit with “reasonable effort” which is all that is

required for particularity. King, 227 F.3d at 750.

Sims also notes a purported structural discrepancy in the warrant. He points out that the

warrant initially describes the search premises as “3211 W.121st St (Up)” but goes on to authorize

a search of “3211 W.121st St.” See Warrant, R. 30-1 PageID 127–28. He claims that the omission

of “(Up)” creates a general warrant authorizing a search of the entire structure. Appellant Br. 15–

16. We disagree because when “[r]ead as a whole” the warrant indicates that the detectives could

only search the upstairs unit of the building. United States v. Castro, 881 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir.

2018) (holding that the warrants at issue satisfied the particularity requirement because when read

as a whole, they limited officers’ search to evidence related to aggravated burglary). The omission

is a technical inaccuracy at best and does not render the warrant “so flawed” as to create a

13 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

“reasonable probability” that detectives would search the entire structure. Kirtdoll, 101 F.4th at

456.

***

Because we find that the search warrant complies with the Fourth Amendment, we need

not reach the applicability of the good faith exception. Durk, 149 F.3d at 466.

B.

We now turn to Sims’s second claim: whether the district court’s limitation of Sims’s cross-

examination of McNamara violated Sims’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Appellant Br.

41. Sims argues that by limiting his cross-examination, the district court prevented his ability to

elicit facts that would have allowed the jury to conclude that the controlled buys never happened.

Appellant Br. 46. We review a district court’s limitation on cross-examination for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 916 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v.

Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 623 (6th Cir. 2015)).

Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a criminal defendant has the right “to

be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right to confront

includes the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,

678 (1986). Importantly, this is “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-

examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”

Id. at 679. And judges have “wide latitude” to “reasonabl[y] limit[]” cross-examination to avoid

“harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, . . . or interrogation that is repetitive or only

marginally relevant.” Id. Such limits do not compromise the Sixth Amendment as long as “cross-

examination elicits adequate information to allow a jury to assess a witness’s credibility, motives,

or possible bias.” Callahan, 801 F.3d at 624 (citation omitted). “The key issue is whether the jury

14 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

had enough information to assess the defense’s theory of the case despite the limits placed on

cross-examination.” Id. (citation omitted).

The district court’s limitations did not deprive the jury of information necessary to assess

Sims’s theory of the case. The court allowed the government to question Jorgenson about the

controlled buys for the limited purpose of showing Sims’s knowledge of the other crimes with

which he was charged. Thereafter, the court allowed Sims to cross-examine Jorgenson. The court

also gave the jury a limiting instruction explaining that they were supposed to use the information

for the sole purpose of evaluating Sims’s knowledge or intent. Similarly, when McNamara got on

to the stand, the court offered the government the “very limited” opportunity to question

McNamara about his observations of Sims’s interactions with the informant during the controlled

buys, explaining that there was no need to go through the details of the controlled buys again. Trial

Tr. Vol. 4, R. 102 PageID 1351–52.

The only arguable limitation on cross-examination came when the court interrupted Sims’s

questioning of McNamara. Read out of context, the district court’s statements could be seen as

excluding core impeachment evidence—McNamara’s personal observations of the controlled buy.

But the court did not tell Sims he could not ask his question. It merely warned him that probing

the circumstances of the pre-search-warrant investigation would allow the government to present

its own, hitherto excluded evidence regarding that investigation. And more to the point of Sims’s

argument on appeal, this warning was in response to Sims’s question about a witness McNamara

interviewed on November 10, six days before the first controlled buy. Nothing in the court’s

admonition prevented Sims from questioning McNamara about his observations during the later

controlled buys. Sims did not even attempt such a line of questioning after the ruling. Since the

15 No. 23-4034, United States v. Sims

district court’s warning did not preclude any information from which the jury could have assessed

McNamara’s credibility, we find no abuse of discretion. See Ralston, 110 F.4th at 917–18.

IV.

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.