United States v. William DeSantis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 16, 2024
• Docket: 23-4421
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4421

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM THOMAS DESANTIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (2:22-cr-00010-TSK-MJA-1)

Submitted: June 27, 2024 Decided: July 16, 2024

Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Harry A. Smith, III, JORY & SMITH, LC, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Stephen Warner, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

William Thomas DeSantis appeals his conviction entered pursuant to a conditional

guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 846. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s

denial of his motion to suppress the contraband seized from his vehicle during a traffic

stop. For the following reasons, we affirm.

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review factual

findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d

370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government and “must also give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by

resident judges and law enforcement officers.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated

exceptions.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (internal quotation marks

omitted). One exception to the warrant requirement concerns automobiles because of their

inherent mobility and the risk that contraband inside the vehicle could disappear while

officers obtain a search warrant. California v. Carney 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985).

Accordingly, “[p]olice officers do not need a warrant to search an automobile if they have

probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity.” United States v.

Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 690 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,

809 (1982)); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam) (“If a car

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is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth

Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Probable cause to search exists if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, there

is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Whether the warrantless search is of

an automobile or of a closed container within an automobile, the limitation is the same:

the scope of the search is “defined by the object of the search and the places in which there

is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 824. Thus, “[i]f

probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of

every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Id. at

825.

As the district court concluded, upon observing DeSantis following too closely to

another vehicle, Ohio State Trooper Seth Jones had probable cause to believe a traffic

violation had been committed and therefore lawfully stopped the vehicle. See Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). After discovering that DeSantis was driving with

a suspended license, Jones conducted an inventory search of DeSantis’ vehicle pursuant to

a uniform department policy prior to delivering possession of the vehicle to a towing

company.

During the inventory search, Jones found a vial of suspected contraband. Based on

his experience investigating other drug crimes, Jones believed that this vial contained

methamphetamine and concluded that he had probable cause to search other areas of the

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vehicle for additional contraband, including areas that exceeded the scope of the inventory

search policy. During Jones’ probable cause search, he found several butane torches, an

empty magnetic box under the front passenger seat, and two magnetic boxes under the car.

The magnetic boxes discovered under the car each contained several ounces of

methamphetamine.

Under the totality of the circumstances, including Jones’ discovery of the vial of

suspected contraband, his experience with drugs and corresponding belief that the

substance in the vial was methamphetamine, and DeSantis’ behavior both before and

during the traffic stop, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Jones had probable

cause to conduct a search of DeSantis’ vehicle that exceeded the scope of the initial

inventory search. See United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding

“[p]robable cause to search a vehicle exists when reasonable officers can conclude that

what they see, in light of their experience, supports an objective belief that contraband is

in the vehicle” (internal quotation marks omitted)). These facts also supported Jones’

decision to open the magnetic boxes discovered beneath the vehicle. See Acevedo, 500

U.S. at 580 (“The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they

have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”).

DeSantis argues that the district court failed to consider the effect of Arizona v.

Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), in its analysis. Gant authorized the warrantless search of a

vehicle “incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and

within reaching distance of” the vehicle or “when it is reasonable to believe evidence

relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Id. at 343 (internal quotation

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marks omitted). Because DeSantis was not under arrest, the rule announced in Gant does

not apply. To the extent DeSantis suggests that Gant replaced the probable cause

automobile exception, we have clarified that “Gant addressed only the rule permitting

warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest, as applied in the context of vehicle

searches, leaving unaltered other exceptions to the warrant requirement that might be

relevant in that context.” Baker, 719 F.3d at 319. These exceptions include the probable

cause exception—“in contrast to Gant’s rule, this exception permits police officers to

search a vehicle for evidence of any crime, not just the crime of arrest, but only on a

showing of probable cause rather than a mere reasonable belief.” Id. We therefore

conclude that the district court did not err in denying DeSantis’ motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED