BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:
William Charles Eppinette, Jr. appeals from a judgment of conviction for failure to keep his selective service registration certificate and classification notice in his personal possession. We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal because nonpossession of these forms is not a crime punishable under § 12(b)(6) of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(6) (1970).
On December 13, 1971, Eppinette returned his registration certificate and notice of classification to his local selective service board as a protest against the Vietnam War. In response, the board sent Eppinette a letter advising him that the law required him to keep the cards in his personal possession. The board also enclosed a form for requesting new cards. When Eppinette advised the board that he did not want any new cards, he was indicted for violating § 426(b)(6),1 convicted, and sentenced to two concurrent one year prison terms.
The section of the Act that the government accused Eppinette of violating provides:
“Any person . . . who knowingly violates or evades any of the provisions of this title or rules or regulations promulgated persuant thereto relating to the issuance, transfer, or possession of [a Selective Service] certificate, shall, upon conviction, be fined not to exceed $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.” 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(6) (1970).
The United States does not contend that Eppinette violated any of the specific prohibitions in the Act. Instead, it asserts that Eppinette violated § 462(b) (6) by failing to comply with selective service regulations that require a registrant to have his registration certificate and notice of classification in his [367]*367personal possession at all times.2 The government claims that the statute makes failure to comply with these regulations a crime punishable by imprisonment or fine. In support of this contention, it cites recent decisions upholding similar convictions based on indictments brought under § 462(a).3 We decline to follow the decisions on which the government relies because they do not accord with our interpretation of the statutes and the regulations. See generally Dranitzke, Possession of Registration Certificates and Notices of Classification by Selective Service Registrants, 1. Sel.Serv.L.Rptr. 4029 (1968).
Section 462(b) (6), as the general clause which follows the description of five specific crimes, must be construed in light of the statute of which it is a part. See Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 600, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1963); Jarecki v. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). This canon of -statutory construction is particularly applicable to § 462(b)(6) because the section is part of a criminal statute that must be strictly construed. [368]*368Cf. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S.Ct. 471, 30 L.Ed. 2d 457 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1972). The first five subsections of § 462(b) outlaw fraudulent transfers of registration certificates, fraudulent possession of a certificate that has not been duly issued to the person possessing it, alteration or destruction of a certificate, fraudulent printing of a likeness of a certificate, and knowing .possession of a forged or altered certificate.4 All five of the subsections are concerned with the destruction or fraudulent use and possession of certificates; none of them mention any requirement that a registrant possess certificates that have been duly issued to him. Therefore, the natural construction of the sixth subsection is that it reaches frauds which the statute did not expressly cover, but it does not punish the nonpossession of a validly issued certificate when no fraud has been committed.
This construction of § 462(b) (6) accords with the congressional intent as expressed in the legislative history. Statutes enacted prior to the Selective Service Aot of 1948 contained no statutory provisions analogous to § 462 (b). The Senate Report of the 1948 Aet explains the new provision as follows.
“False certification. — This subsection does not appear in the 1940 act. It establishes a fine of not to exceed $10,000, or imprisonment not to exceed 5 years, or both, as the penalty for the false use of selective-service certificates and related papers.” S. Rep.No.1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S.Cong.Serv. 1989, 2008 (1948).
There is no suggestion in the report that the Senate intended the Act to punish simple nonpossession of draft cards when no fraudulent conduct is involved. The House version of the Act did not have a provision similar to § 462(b), but the conference committee accepted the Senate version. The conference managers of the House explained the conference bill as follows:
“The Senate bill provided specific penalties for those forging or altering certificates issued under the act and for persons possessing or using any such forged or altered certificates. The House amendment contained no comparable provisions. The conference agreement adopts the provisions of the Senate bill with respect to this matter.” Conf.R.No.2438, auth Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S.Cong.Serv. 2011, 2017 (1948).
[369]*369We attach particular importance to this legislative history because the Act contains no language expressly making the nonfraudulent failure to possess validly issued draft cards a crime. Only a strained construction of the Act, inconsistent with its legislative history, would countenance Eppinette’s punishment for his simple failure to retain in his personal possession the draft cards that were issued to him. “But when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.” United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952). We, therefore, hold that Congress did not intend § 462(b) (6) to punish nonpossession of validly issued Selective Service documents in the absence of fraud.
Our interpretation of § 462(b) (6) is also consistent with the regulations that the government accused Eppinette of violating.5 At the outset, we observe that the provision that a registrant “must” have in his personal possession certain documents does not require us to interpret the regulations as mandatory. Dependent upon the context, verbs that ordinarily denote the imperative sometimes should be construed as directory only.
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BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:
William Charles Eppinette, Jr. appeals from a judgment of conviction for failure to keep his selective service registration certificate and classification notice in his personal possession. We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal because nonpossession of these forms is not a crime punishable under § 12(b)(6) of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(6) (1970).
On December 13, 1971, Eppinette returned his registration certificate and notice of classification to his local selective service board as a protest against the Vietnam War. In response, the board sent Eppinette a letter advising him that the law required him to keep the cards in his personal possession. The board also enclosed a form for requesting new cards. When Eppinette advised the board that he did not want any new cards, he was indicted for violating § 426(b)(6),1 convicted, and sentenced to two concurrent one year prison terms.
The section of the Act that the government accused Eppinette of violating provides:
“Any person . . . who knowingly violates or evades any of the provisions of this title or rules or regulations promulgated persuant thereto relating to the issuance, transfer, or possession of [a Selective Service] certificate, shall, upon conviction, be fined not to exceed $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.” 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(6) (1970).
The United States does not contend that Eppinette violated any of the specific prohibitions in the Act. Instead, it asserts that Eppinette violated § 462(b) (6) by failing to comply with selective service regulations that require a registrant to have his registration certificate and notice of classification in his [367]*367personal possession at all times.2 The government claims that the statute makes failure to comply with these regulations a crime punishable by imprisonment or fine. In support of this contention, it cites recent decisions upholding similar convictions based on indictments brought under § 462(a).3 We decline to follow the decisions on which the government relies because they do not accord with our interpretation of the statutes and the regulations. See generally Dranitzke, Possession of Registration Certificates and Notices of Classification by Selective Service Registrants, 1. Sel.Serv.L.Rptr. 4029 (1968).
Section 462(b) (6), as the general clause which follows the description of five specific crimes, must be construed in light of the statute of which it is a part. See Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 600, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1963); Jarecki v. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). This canon of -statutory construction is particularly applicable to § 462(b)(6) because the section is part of a criminal statute that must be strictly construed. [368]*368Cf. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S.Ct. 471, 30 L.Ed. 2d 457 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1972). The first five subsections of § 462(b) outlaw fraudulent transfers of registration certificates, fraudulent possession of a certificate that has not been duly issued to the person possessing it, alteration or destruction of a certificate, fraudulent printing of a likeness of a certificate, and knowing .possession of a forged or altered certificate.4 All five of the subsections are concerned with the destruction or fraudulent use and possession of certificates; none of them mention any requirement that a registrant possess certificates that have been duly issued to him. Therefore, the natural construction of the sixth subsection is that it reaches frauds which the statute did not expressly cover, but it does not punish the nonpossession of a validly issued certificate when no fraud has been committed.
This construction of § 462(b) (6) accords with the congressional intent as expressed in the legislative history. Statutes enacted prior to the Selective Service Aot of 1948 contained no statutory provisions analogous to § 462 (b). The Senate Report of the 1948 Aet explains the new provision as follows.
“False certification. — This subsection does not appear in the 1940 act. It establishes a fine of not to exceed $10,000, or imprisonment not to exceed 5 years, or both, as the penalty for the false use of selective-service certificates and related papers.” S. Rep.No.1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S.Cong.Serv. 1989, 2008 (1948).
There is no suggestion in the report that the Senate intended the Act to punish simple nonpossession of draft cards when no fraudulent conduct is involved. The House version of the Act did not have a provision similar to § 462(b), but the conference committee accepted the Senate version. The conference managers of the House explained the conference bill as follows:
“The Senate bill provided specific penalties for those forging or altering certificates issued under the act and for persons possessing or using any such forged or altered certificates. The House amendment contained no comparable provisions. The conference agreement adopts the provisions of the Senate bill with respect to this matter.” Conf.R.No.2438, auth Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S.Cong.Serv. 2011, 2017 (1948).
[369]*369We attach particular importance to this legislative history because the Act contains no language expressly making the nonfraudulent failure to possess validly issued draft cards a crime. Only a strained construction of the Act, inconsistent with its legislative history, would countenance Eppinette’s punishment for his simple failure to retain in his personal possession the draft cards that were issued to him. “But when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.” United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952). We, therefore, hold that Congress did not intend § 462(b) (6) to punish nonpossession of validly issued Selective Service documents in the absence of fraud.
Our interpretation of § 462(b) (6) is also consistent with the regulations that the government accused Eppinette of violating.5 At the outset, we observe that the provision that a registrant “must” have in his personal possession certain documents does not require us to interpret the regulations as mandatory. Dependent upon the context, verbs that ordinarily denote the imperative sometimes should be construed as directory only. Because the administrative history of the regulations evidences an intent to limit criminal penalties to fraudulent use or possession of certificates, we believe the requirement that registrants have their draft cards in their personal possession is directory, not mandatory. Cf. United States v. Reeb, 433 F.2d 381, 383 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912, 91 S.Ct. 1391, 28 L.Ed.2d 654 (1971); Thompson v. Clifford, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 351, 408 F.2d 154, 158 (1968).
The administrative purpose is most explicit with regard to the regulation requiring possession of registration certificates, which provides:
“Effect of failure to have unaltered registration certificate in personal possession.
Every person required to present himself for and submit to registration must, after he has registered, have in his personal possession until his liability for training and service has terminated his Registration Certificate . . . The failure of any person to have his Registration Certificate ... in his personal possession shall be prima facie evidence of his failure to register. . . .” 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1972).
The regulation on its face refutes any intention to make nonpossession a criminal violation. The title, indicates that the regulation is designed to explain the effect of nonpossession of a registration certificate, and the second sentence of ■the regulation says that nonpossession is prima facie evidence of failure to register. There is no warning that nonpos-session is a violation of the regulations punishable by criminal penalties. The omission of an explicit statement that nonpossession is a violation is especially significant because a predecessor regular tion contained a provision making non-possession a violation,6 but this portion of the regulation was later repealed7 Moreover, a parallel regulation, which prohibited fraudulent use of certificates, contained a “violation” clause,8 and the current regulations expressly make fraudulent use of a notice of classification a violation.9
[370]*370The service’s explanation for adopting the regulation supports our interpretation :
“In the early stages of the 1940-47 operation, it was found most difficult to affirmatively establish that a person required to do so, had not registered. To avoid this difficulty Selective Service provided by regulation that all registered persons must have with them at all times their ‘registration cards.’ It was a far simpler matter to ask a man for this certificate than to establish that he had not registered in any of the 120,000 places where he might have registered.” Selective Service System, Evaluation of the Selective Service Program 122 (Special Monograph No. 18, 1967).
We hold, therefore, that the regulation should be read as it is written. The effect of the failure to have an unaltered registration certificate in one’s personal possession is prima facie evidence of one’s failure to register. There is no justification for judicially engrafting a provision that the omission is also a crime punishable by imprisonment. The nation’s youth are entitled at the very least to have their selective service obligations stated with clarity.
The service’s regulatory framework compels a similar interpretation of the notice of classification regulation, which provides:
“Persons required to have Notice of Classification ... in personal possession.
Every person who has been classified by a local board must have in his personal possession until his liability for training and service has terminated a valid Notice of Classification . . . issued to him showing his current classification.” 32 C.F.R. § 1623.5 (1972).
The regulation omits any statement that nonpossession is a violation of the regulation. In contrast, the following regulation prohibiting fraudulent possession or use of classification notices, expressly says that this conduct “shall be a violation of these regulations.” 32 C.F.R. § 1623.6 (1972).10
In sum, the texts of the statute and of the regulations and the relevant legislative and administrative history convince us that Congress did not intend § 462(b)(6) to make nonpossession of a registration certificate or of a notice of classification a criminal offense in the absence of fraud. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal11