United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc.

761 F. Supp. 713, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20976, 32 ERC (BNA) 2029, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3633, 1991 WL 42117
District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided March 22, 1991·No. C89-214M, C83-252M and C89-224M·Published·Cited by 16 cases

Opinion

ORDER DENYING GATX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING BOEING’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST GATX

McGOVERN, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

The issues addressed in this order arise from several motions.

First, GATX moved for summary judgment. Boeing then responded by filing its own cross-motion for partial summary judgment against GATX. GATX then filed its reply in support of its own motion and responding to the arguments made in Boeing’s Response/Cross-Motion. Boeing then filed its reply.

GATX then filed its motion to strike exhibits to Boeing’s reply brief, or alternatively for leave to file supplemental pleading, i.e., the memorandum in support of the motion to strike.

The Court will first summarize the arguments presented then proceed with its analysis and conclusion.

MOTION OF GATX

GATX seeks dismissal from this lawsuit, dismissal of the claims against it with prejudice, and judgment pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 54(b). This summary judgment is sought based on GATX’s contention that petroleum was the only GATX-generated waste that ended up at Western Processing, and the Comprehensive Environmental *716 Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) specifically excludes such waste from its coverage.

GATX contends that the sludge consisting of petroleum residue, sand, and rust from its petroleum storage tanks, which was removed by Ryan & Haworth, a tank cleaning company, and disposed of at Western Processing, is excluded from CERCLA coverage by the “petroleum exclusion.”

The exclusion of petroleum is found in the definition section where the term “hazardous substance” is defined:

... The term [hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance....

42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).

GATX argues that the petroleum exclusion applies to petroleum and all of its components and additives, citing Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.1989). The Wilshire court analyzed the plain meaning of the statute, post-enactment legislative history, and the EPA’s interpretation to arrive at its conclusion:

We rule that the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA does apply to unrefined and refined gasoline even though certain of its indigenous components and certain additives during the refining process have themselves been designated as hazardous substances within the meaning of CERCLA.

881 F.2d at 810. The Court reasoned that, pursuant to the standards of statutory construction,

the petroleum exclusion requires us to exclude gasoline, even leaded gasoline, from the term “hazardous substance” for purposes of CERCLA. Any other construction ignores the plain language of the statute and renders the petroleum exclusion a nullity.

881 F.2d at 804. The court also noted that the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), created a separate response program for petroleum leaking from underground storage tanks.

Thus, under these authorities, argues GATX, since it only produced petroleum waste that was deposited at Western Processing, it should be dismissed from this case. After dismissing the federal claims, the court will then lack jurisdiction over the pending state claims, and they should be dismissed as well.

MOTION OF BOEING

Boeing argues that GATX’s motion should be denied because GATX’s wastes were sludge and rinse water containing hazardous substances, and not petroleum; GATX’s wastes are thus not subject to the petroleum exclusion.

While the Wilshire Westwood court may have reasoned that gasoline was included in the petroleum exclusion, even though it contained components that are designated hazardous substances under CERCLA, Boeing argues that

neither the Ninth Circuit in Wilshire Westwood nor any other court has ever applied the petroleum exclusion to a substance that was not primarily a useable petroleum product such as fuel or oil. In fact, even useable petroleum products that have some market value, such as waste oil, have been found to fall outside of the exclusion. See Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F.Supp. 529, 532 (W.D.Wash.1988).

Boeing contends that GATX’s wastes were not useable petroleum products and that they contained certain hazardous substances. Ken L. Haworth, the former president of the company that transported GATX’s wastes to Western Processing testified that the sludge and washwater were not useable products. (Haworth dep. at 18, 28.)

Boeing points to an EPA interpretation in a Final Rule published April 4, 1985 stating:

EPA interprets the petroleum exclusion to apply to materials such as crude oil, petroleum feedstocks, and refined petroleum products, even if a specifically listed or designated hazardous substance is present in such products. However, EPA does not consider materials such as waste oil to which listed CERCLA sub *717 stances have been added to be within the petroleum exclusion.

50 Fed.Reg. 13,460, attached as Exhibit B to Starrs affidavit.

Boeing cites two cases where courts have found the petroleum exclusion inapplicable to oil-related wastes containing hazardous substances: New York City v. Exxon Corp., 744 F.Supp. 474, 31 Env’t Rep.Cas. (BNA) 1963 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (oil/water emulsion that averaged roughly 5% oil and contained lead, cadmium, and chromium. Id., at 477, 489-90, 31 Env’t Rep.Cas. (BNA) at 1964, 1976); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 17 Chem. Waste Lit.Rep. 667, 1988 WL 136530 (E.D.Pa.1988) (residue from a process involving the refining of fuel oil to produce synthetic gas; Court concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the presence of hazardous substances in part because the generator’s waste may have been mixed with other hazardous substances. Id. at 669).

Boeing argues that even if GATX’s wastes could be considered petroleum, which they are not, they would not fall within the petroleum exclusion because they contained hazardous substances that (a) are not normally found in gasoline and (b) are in concentrations higher than normally found in gasoline.

Boeing points to a memorandum dated July 31, 1987 wherein the EPA’s Office of General Counsel concluded that “contaminants” in petroleum are not within the petroleum exclusion.

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United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 761 F. Supp. 713, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20976, 32 ERC (BNA) 2029, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3633, 1991 WL 42117 (W.D. Wash. 1991).

761 F. Supp. 713 (United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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