Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
[697]*697ROGERS, Circuit Judge:
The critical issue at Talib Watson's second trial on narcotics-related charges was whether Watson had a connection to a large stash of cocaine base and heroin found inside a burgundy Subaru automobile.1 Watson did not own the Subaru, nor did any witness or fingerprint evidence place him in the vehicle. To prove his connection to the car, the government relied on a key to the Subaru that the police found on Watson when he was arrested, a Shaw's jewelry bag containing nearly 100 grams of cocaine base that the police found in the car, and a receipt from a Shaw's store that the police found in Watson's home. Defense witnesses, however, placed Watson in church for part of the evening in question and disputed a police officer's testimony that Watson had the car key at the time of his arrest. Instead, defense witnesses connected Everett Hawkins to the Subaru and the car key on the day and evening in question. To strengthen the evidence of Watson's connection to the Subaru, the government attempted to prove that the owner of the car was his girlfriend. The attempt was fumbled, however, when the prosecutor asked a defense witness a compound question assuming a fact not otherwise in evidence, namely that the registered owner of the car was Watson's girlfriend, and then eliminated the ambiguity in the witness' response by purporting to quote the witness' testimony during closing argument to the jury. Because credibility was hotly disputed and the evidence connecting Watson to the car was not weighty, we conclude that the standard jury instructions that the arguments of counsel and counsel's questions are not evidence were insufficient to mitigate the substantial prejudice arising from the prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
I.
Between 5:30 and 6 p.m. on September 27, 1995, the police received an anonymous telephone call advising that an unidentified person wearing a black baseball cap, blue jeans, and a blue jean jacket had been selling drugs all day near 18th and D Streets, N.E, operating out of a burgundy Subaru with temporary Maryland tags. Around 9 p.m., five plainclothes police officers arrived at the scene. According to three officers, Watson handed a "dark object" to Theodore Ford, who dropped the object, later determined to be a gun, into a trash can. When the police attempted to arrest Watson, two officers testified that he dropped five ziplock bags to the ground that contained about one gram of cocaine base. A third officer testified that he removed from Watson's person a key, a pager, and $57 in United States currency. The key opened the burgundy Subaru.
Upon searching the Subaru, the police found in the glove compartment a Shaw's jewelry bag that contained nearly 100 grams of cocaine base, about a half gram of heroin, as well as a gray sponge, a scale, and empty ziplock bags. According to the police, when Watson saw that the police had found the jewelry bag, he attempted to run. The police grabbed him; Watson hit one of the officers with a police flashlight; and then as other officers held Watson to the ground he yelled to the crowd for help. Gun shots erupted from the crowd. When the area was secure, the police transported Watson and Ford for processing. Upon executing a search warrant of Watson's home, the police found an [698]*698August 8, 1995, receipt for a purchase at a Shaw’s jewelry store.
Watson’s defense was part alibi and part mistaken identification. The president and a minister of God’s Healing Temple both testified that Watson arrived at church for a recital between 6 and 7 p.m., around the time the police received the anonymous tip, and he did not leave until 8 p.m. Other defense witnesses testified that another man had been selling drugs out of the Subaru all day and ran, discarding various items, when the police arrived in response to the anonymous tip. Leonard Butler, a bystander at the scene, testified that he saw Everett Hawkins standing in the alley near the trash can where the gun was found, and that upon seeing the police, Hawkins ran down the alley discarding objects. Raymond Thomas testified that he saw Hawkins in the area that day wearing a jeans outfit and a hat and that Hawkins left the area when the police arrived. Three other defense witnesses testified that the police initiated the brawl with Watson, beating him with the b.utt of a gun, their fists, and flashlights.
Defense witnesses also disputed the government’s evidence regarding the Subaru. Anthony Shank, another bystander, testified that he saw an officer remove Watson’s shoe laces and belt, but not the Subaru key, from his person. Raymond Thomas put Everett Hawkins in the Subaru on the night in question. A sixteen-year-old high school student testified that the Subaru belonged to Hawkins, that Hawkins was in the car on the day in question (and on other occasions), and that the key introduced into evidence by the government was the key Hawkins used to open the Subaru. To corroborate his version of events, the student testified that on the afternoon of the day in question he left his school books in the Subaru; the government stipulated that the police found his books inside the Subaru.
II.
On appeal Watson contends that he is entitled to a new trial on three grounds: first, the district court abused its discretion under Rule 403 in admitting his 1988 conviction for drug trafficking inasmuch as possession was the only contested issue and there was ample other evidence to show knowledge and intent; second, the district court plainly erred in allowing expert witness testimony in the form of mirroring hypotheticals suggesting personal knowledge of Watson’s intent to distribute; and third, the district court erred in denying his motion in limine to restrict the prosecutor from misstating evidence during closing argument and the prosecutor’s subsequent misstatement of the evidence during closing, argument substantially prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Because we conclude that Watson’s third ground requires reversal of his conviction, we limit our comments on his first two grounds to matters that are likely to arise upon retrial.
A.
During closing argument to the jury the prosecutor misstated a defense witness’ testimony on a critical point and did so while purporting to quote the witness’ testimony. The unfortunate sequence of events arose when the prosecutor cross-examined defense witness Raymond Thomas about whether Tyra Jackson, the registered owner of the Subaru where the drugs and contraband were found, was Watson’s girlfriend. In asking the question, however, the prosecutor presented the witness with a compound question assuming a key fact not in evidence&emdash;namely, that Jackson was Watson’s girlfriend&emdash;with the result that the witness’ response was ambiguous on the critical point the prosecutor sought to establish. Yet in closing argument the prosecutor, pur- porting to quote the defense witness, told the jury that Jackson was Watson’s girlfriend, thereby establishing a strong- er connection of Watson to the Subaru than the disputed evidence regarding the disputed evidence regarding [699]*699the Subaru key and the seven week old sales receipt from Shaw’s jewelry store. Otherwise the Subaru had been connected only to Jackson as the owner and to Hawkins as the user of her car. We review the record to emphasize both the significance of the evidence at issue and the context in which the prosecutor’s error occurred.
On cross examination during the defense case, the prosecutor asked Raymond Thomas about his knowledge of Tyra Jackson. The prosecutor asked, “Mr. Thomas, you believe that you know Watson’s girlfriend, Tyra Jackson, right?” Thomas replied: “I never testified I knew her or not.” The prosecutor then asked, “You believe that you may have met her once or twice, right?” Thomas’s response: “Maybe.” Thus, the witness’ reference to “her” might have been simply to Tyra Jackson as an individual rather than as Watson’s girlfriend; the form of the question rendered the response ambiguous.
Prior to closing argument, Watson’s counsel moved in limine to exclude from the prosecutor’s closing argument any reference to Tyra Jackson being Watson’s girlfriend. Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor’s question had assumed a fact not in evidence, namely that Tyra Jackson was Watson’s girlfriend. As defense counsel recalled, somewhat inaccurately, the prosecutor had asked Thomas “Have you ever met Mr. Watson’s girlfriend, Tyra Jackson?,” and Thomas responded “I think I have.” The district court stated that it thought that the witness had answered ‘Yes,” and that any ambiguity about whether she was Watson’s girlfriend should have been taken care of on redirect; the court ruled that the witness’ answer placed the fact in evidence and denied the defense motion.
In his initial closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:
have the car, Subaru. I[t] is in the name of Tyra Jackson. It’s not in the name of ... Everett Hawkins. It’s in the name of Tyra Jackson. The only evidence we have about Tyra Jackson is Thomas’s answer, one of the defense witnesses, “Do you think you met Tyra Jackson?” “Well, I think I met her once or twice. think I’ve met Watson’s girlfriend, Tyra Jackson once or twice.” Tyra Jackson’s car, the registration to the Subaru.
In rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor reiterated the point: “We’ve got the evidence from [Watson’s] witness that he thinks he knows Tyra Jackson, his [Watson’s] girlfriend, and the title to the car, the registration to the car.” After closing arguments, the district court gave the standard instructions that counsel’s questions, statements, and arguments are not evidence. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Instr. 1.07, 2.05.
Although a prosecutor’s statements in closing argument will rarely warrant a new trial, see United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10-11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1243 (D.C.Cir.1993), Watson’s is such a case. It is error for counsel to make statements in closing argument unsupported by evidence, to misstate admitted evidence, or to misquote a witness’ testimony. In the instant case the prosecutor’s remarks were error to the extent that they misstated and misquoted Raymond Thomas’s testimony. See United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1025 (D.C.Cir.1998). We do not decide whether the district court erred in denying Watson’s motion in limine, but focus solely on the prosecutor’s misquotation and misrepresentation of the witness’ testimony during closing arguments to the jury.2
[700]*700A misstatement of evidence is error when it amounts to a statement of fact to the jury not supported by proper evidence introduced during trial, regardless of whether counsel's remarks were deliberate or made in good faith. See Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1025; United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 432-33 (D.C.Cir.1996); United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276, 1280-81 (D.C.Cir.1996); United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 360-61 (D.C.Cir.1988); Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079-80 (D.C.Cir.1969). The misstatement constituting error is demonstrated here by comparing the witness’ testimony with the statements made by the prosecutor in closing arguments. See Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1025; Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 360; Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1078. The government does not dispute that the prosecutor purported to quote Thomas’s testimony. Yet the quote was inaccurate; the error is apparent on the face of the record.
That Watson is entitled to a new trial by reason of the error is demonstrated by application of this circuit’s test designed to determine whether a defendant has suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial. See Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1026. The test consists of three factors:
“the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” We have also framed the test for prejudice in terms of the severity of the prosecutor’s misconduct, the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty of conviction absent the improper remarks.
Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1026 (quoting United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 895, superseded in part on other grounds, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.Cir.1990)). This test applies regardless of whether our'review is for harmless error or plain error.3 Id. The court determines how the prosecutor’s misstatements prejudiced Watson in light of the evidence presented, asking not whether evidence was sufficient to convict notwithstanding the error, but rather whether the court can say that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict; if in “grave doubt,” the court cannot affirm Watson’s conviction. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), cited in Lane v. United States, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986); United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1391-92 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
Each of the relevant factors points to substantial prejudice in Watson’s case. First, the case was close, and credibility was key. A parade of eyewitnesses for the government and the defense recounted different versions of what occurred at critical points, from Watson’s whereabouts at the time the tip was received, to what he was doing when the police apprehended him, to where Everett Hawkins fit into the picture, and most importantly to Watson’s connection to the Subaru. Even though three police officers testified that Watson handed co-defendant Thomas something that turned out to be a gun, the jury discredited that testimony. See supra n. 1. Only one officer claimed he took the car key off Watson’s person and although another officer testified that he may have seen the key taken off Watson, the testimony about the key was disputed by defense witnesses. Police testimony otherwise linking Watson to the Subaru was disputed by defense witnesses who placed [701]*701Everett Hawkins in a jeans outfit in the Subaru at relevant times and otherwise connected him to the car and the key. There was no fingerprint evidence linking Watson to either the key or the Subaru. Aside from Raymond Thomas’s ambiguous testimony, the government’s evidence connecting Watson to the Subaru consisted of the disputed testimony that the key was recovered from Watson’s person and a Shaw’s jewelry bag found in the car that the government sought to link to Watson through a seven week old receipt, which at best showed that he had purchased something from a Shaw’s store.
Second, Raymond Thomas’s testimony concerned a central issue in the case, namely Watson’s connection to the Subaru. Although the police found five ziplock bags near Watson, the bags contained a relatively small amount of cocaine base, and the drugs in those bags were of a different concentration than the drugs recovered from the Subaru. Only the 100 grams of cocaine base, heroin, and drug paraphernalia found in the glove compartment of the Subaru permitted a reasonable inference of knowledge and intent to distribute, see, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 23 F.3d 553, 555-58 (D.C.Cir.1994), and triggered heightened penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(iii)(1994). Yet Watson was not found in the car, nor did any witness or fingerprint evidence place him there. Connecting Watson to the Subaru was essential to the government’s distribution case and its evidence in that regard was disputed. These circumstances highlight the prejudicial nature of the prosecutor’s error.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s question reflects his understanding that connecting Watson to the drugs in the Subaru was critical to the government’s distribution case. Yet at the time he cross-examined Raymond Thomas, the prosecutor had yet to establish that the owner of the Subaru was Watson’s girlfriend. The lack of clarity in Raymond Thomas’s testimony stemmed directly from the prosecutor’s use of a compound question and his assumption of a key fact not in evidence. The defense, of course, had no obligation to object to the prosecutor’s question, much less to perfect the government’s case by clarifying the witness’ response on reexamination, but could rest satisfied with the response, which did not produce damaging testimony. Instead, defense counsel could properly move in limine to restrict the prosecutor’s closing arguments, thus avoiding highlighting before' the jury whether Jackson was Watson’s girlfriend. Of course, once the district court denied defense counsel’s in limine motion, assuming for purposes of this appeal no error in the district court’s ruling, the prosecutor could properly use the witness’ testimony in closing argument to show that Jackson was Watson’s girlfriend. But the prosecutor was not thereby relieved of the obligation to ascertain the testimony with accuracy, much less the obligation to quote it accurately. The in limine motion placed the prosecutor on notice that at least defense counsel thought the prosecutor had not elicited a true admission from the witness that he knew Tyra Jackson was Watson’s girlfriend. The prosecutor also knew that his compound question made a clear response doubtful. Nevertheless, rather than simply shrewdly characterizing or merely paraphrasing the witness’ testimony, the prosecutor presented an inaccurate direct quotation of Thomas’s testimony to the jury, eliminating the ambiguity on a central point. So far as the record reveals, no effort was made, either during argument on the in limine motion or before closing arguments, to check the court reporter’s notes on Raymond Thomas’s testimony; the absence of a transcript was irrelevant in this regard and cannot excuse prosecutorial carelessness.
Finally, the government can point to nothing by way of mitigation of the prejudice beyond the standard instructions that the opening statements and closing arguments of counsel are not evidence and that a lawyer’s question is not evidence. See [702]*702Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Instr. 1.07, 2.05. Although the ameliorative effects of jury instructions are not to be underestimated, see Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), there are limits when, as here, the instructions did not address the prosecutor's error in closing argument, and the error affected a central issue. Consequently, the instructions given could neither undo the error nor mitigate its prejudicial effects under these egregious circumstances. See United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1089 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1993); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 512-13, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 507 (D.C.Cir.1996); cf. Small 74 F.3d at 1284.
In smu, the error was not harmless. "This circuit has long made clear that the government must take care to ensure that statements made in opening and closing arguments to the jury are supported by evidence introduced at triaL" Small 74 F.3d at 1280. Faced with only minimal evidence on a key element in its case-Watson's connection to the Subaru-the prosecutor sought to make the critical link by purporting to quote a defense witness to state that Tyra Jackson, the owner of the car, was Watson's girlfriend. The government does not dispute that the prosecutor purported to quote this testimony, nor that a check of the court reporter's notes could have avoided the error. Moreover, the quote was completely wrong. Particularly where a defendant has filed an anticipatory motion `in limine, the prosecutor was alerted to the fact that the existence of any evidence supporting this alleged relationship was di~puted. The prosecutor's closing argument, then, cannot be absolved as no more than a shrewd characterization of testimony; it was wrong and based on no evidence in the trial record. Moreover, the prosecutor repeated his misstatement: once in his initial closing argument by direct quotation and again on rebuttal by reference. There can be no doubt that the error was significant, for it went to the heart of the government's case on a matter with respect to which the government had no other weighty evidence. Given the centrality of the government's misstatements to the jury and the hotly contested other evidence of Watson's connection to the car, Watson has demonstrated substantial prejudice warranting a new trial.
B.
Insofar as Watson's evidentiary contentions are likely to arise upon retrial, we offer two observations.
First, the admission of Watson's 1988 drug trafficking conviction under Rule 403 undoubtedly presents a close question. As Watson points out, in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), the Supreme Court emphasized the appropriateness of the contextual approach in considering the probative value of prejudicial evidence under Rule 403. See 117 S.Ct. at 652. While Old Chief reinforces the prosecutor's right to tell the story with "descriptive richness," id. at 653, Watson's 1988 conviction seems, at best, remotely probative of non-contested issues. Even assuming, as in United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1204-05 (D.C.Cir.1998) (in banc), `Watson's prior drug involvement was of a similar type or conducted in a similar place,4 its relevance to intent and knowledge is limited to establishing that Watson knows how to sell drugs. Cf. United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1324 (D.C.Cir.1998). The prior conviction is inadmissible to prove the contested is[703]*703sue, namely, possession. Yet the prejudicial effect of the evidence is strong because it invites the jury to infer that Watson has a propensity for drug offenses and therefore the drugs and paraphernalia found in the Subaru must be his. It is this inference that Rule 404(b) intends to preclude, and the danger has been recognized by this and other courts. See, e.g., United States v. (Dennis) Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 776-77 (D.C.Cir.1995); United States v. (Timothy) Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. (Michael) Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 912-14 (D.C.Cir.1992). At a new trial, the district court can consider anew its Rule 403 balancing, considering as well whether a limiting instruction like those in the prior trials, distinguishing between “act” and “intent,” is sufficient to overcome the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction. See Crowder, 141 F.3d at 1210.
Second, there is no basis in the record before the court on which to conclude that there was error, much less plain error by the district court in admitting the expert’s testimony because, contrary to Watson’s contention, there were no proscribed “mirroring hypotheticals” that in tandem with the form of the prosecutor’s questions and the expert’s responses im-permissibly gave an opinion on Watson’s state of mind. See, e.g., United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1385-89 (D.C.Cir.1996); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 670-72 (D.C.Cir.1995); United States v. (Keith) Mitchell, 996 F.2d 419, 421-22 (D.C.Cir.1993). If some questions may have come close to the line of questioning that the court has found objectionable, see, e g., Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, expert testimony regarding the modus operandi of drug dealers, even if elicited through mirroring hypotheticals, does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).5 See United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 184-86 (D.C.Cir.1998). Rather, what is proscribed is questioning that produces responses suggesting some special knowledge of the defendant’s mental processes. See Toms, 136 F.3d at 185. Examples of what is proscribed include expert testimony that the hypothetical person’s conduct “met the elements” of the charged offense, Smart, 98 F.3d at 1385, that the hypothetical individual’s possession was “consistent with intent to distribute,” Boyd, 55 F.3d at 672, and that the hypothetical person’s intent “was intent to distribute,” Mitchell, 996 F.2d at 422. Here, by contrast, the prosecutor asked the expert about drug trafficking generally in the District of Columbia. He also asked how many “dosage units” would be contained in 100 grams of cocaine base, to which the witness responded “700,” and concluded that “[m]y experience easily tells me that if any one individual possesses what’s equivalent to 700 bags of crack cocaine [sic] is in the business of making money selling drugs in the streets of Washington, D.C. or whatever.” Although the prosecutor did ask the expert whether he was familiar with the case, risking that the jury might be led to think that the expert had first-hand information about Watson, this reference did not indicate any familiarity with Watson’s mental processes. See United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242-43 (7th Cir.1994).
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.