United States v. Watkins

Eleventh Circuit

United States v. Watkins

120 F.3d 254, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22678, 1997 WL 467165

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedAugust 27, 1997

Docket94-4948

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 120 F.3d 254 (United States v. Watkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Watkins, 120 F.3d 254, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22678, 1997 WL 467165 (11th Cir. 1997).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Willie Watkins appeals the denial of his motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) for return of property ($2,471.91) seized by federal officers at the time of his arrest on drug charges. The money was not used as evidence at Watkins’s criminal trial, in which he was convicted. In the Rule 41(e) proceedings, the government represented to the district court that the money had been administratively forfeited by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

When property is retained pursuant to civil forfeiture, instead of for use as evidence, a Rule 41(e) motion is not available. United States v. Castro, 883 F.2d 1018, 1019 (11th Cir.1989). When the government, in its written response to a Rule 41(e) motion, admits its position is that, by forfeiture, the movant has already permanently lost his right to the pertinent property, the government’s judicial admission is enough to deprive the court of the authority to grant the Rule 41(e) motion. Put differently, when the government says in court that the property (at least, where it is money — a fungible *256 item ** ) has been, in fact, forfeited to it (that is, has been taken in fact), the issue for adjudication then becomes whether the government has acted wrongfully in taking the property. We do not understand Watkins to have argued to the district court or to us that his money had not, in fact, been taken, but understand him to say it was taken without due process.

Equitable relief beyond Rule 41(e), if it was asked for in district court, was unavailable. Equitable jurisdiction to review a forfeiture is extremely limited and does not lie where the claimant has an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., In re $67,470.00, 901 F.2d 1540, 1544-45 (11th Cir.1990). Watkins could seek money damages through a lawsuit—see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (the Tucker Act) — against the United States if the government has wrongfully converted his property; for example, if appropriate administrative procedures were not followed. The dismissal of the Rule 41(e) motion, in itself, does not adjudicate the lawfulness of the forfeiture.

The district court’s denial of Mr. Watkins’s motion is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

**

We do not address cases in which the property taken by the government is something other than money, but we do not mean to hint that the law would necessarily be different if some other kind of property were involved.

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PER CURIAM:

Willie Watkins appeals the denial of his motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) for return of property ($2,471.91) seized by federal officers at the time of his arrest on drug charges. The money was not used as evidence at Watkins’s criminal trial, in which he was convicted. In the Rule 41(e) proceedings, the government represented to the district court that the money had been administratively forfeited by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

When property is retained pursuant to civil forfeiture, instead of for use as evidence, a Rule 41(e) motion is not available. United States v. Castro, 883 F.2d 1018, 1019 (11th Cir.1989). When the government, in its written response to a Rule 41(e) motion, admits its position is that, by forfeiture, the movant has already permanently lost his right to the pertinent property, the government’s judicial admission is enough to deprive the court of the authority to grant the Rule 41(e) motion. Put differently, when the government says in court that the property (at least, where it is money — a fungible *256 item ** ) has been, in fact, forfeited to it (that is, has been taken in fact), the issue for adjudication then becomes whether the government has acted wrongfully in taking the property. We do not understand Watkins to have argued to the district court or to us that his money had not, in fact, been taken, but understand him to say it was taken without due process.

Equitable relief beyond Rule 41(e), if it was asked for in district court, was unavailable. Equitable jurisdiction to review a forfeiture is extremely limited and does not lie where the claimant has an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., In re $67,470.00, 901 F.2d 1540, 1544-45 (11th Cir.1990). Watkins could seek money damages through a lawsuit—see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (the Tucker Act) — against the United States if the government has wrongfully converted his property; for example, if appropriate administrative procedures were not followed. The dismissal of the Rule 41(e) motion, in itself, does not adjudicate the lawfulness of the forfeiture.

The district court’s denial of Mr. Watkins’s motion is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

**

We do not address cases in which the property taken by the government is something other than money, but we do not mean to hint that the law would necessarily be different if some other kind of property were involved.

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120 F.3d 254, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22678, 1997 WL 467165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-watkins-ca11-1997.

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