United States v. Warren Forrest

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: September 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-4248
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4248

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WARREN LAMAR FORREST,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (2:22-cr-00256-BHH-1)

Submitted: September 18, 2025 Decided: September 22, 2025

Before THACKER and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Janis R. Hall, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Andrea Gwen Hoffman, Christopher Scott Lietzow, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Warren Lamar Forrest pled guilty to felon in possession of a firearm and

ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); possession with intent to distribute

marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The district

court sentenced Forrest to 144 months’ imprisonment and 4 years’ supervised release. On

appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating

that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the court

complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting the plea and whether the district court erred

in finding Forrest a career offender. Forrest did not file a pro se supplemental brief after

being notified of his right to do so. The Government declined to file a responsive brief.

We affirm.

Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the district court, through a colloquy with the

defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the

charge to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum

possible penalty he faces upon conviction, and the various rights he is relinquishing by

pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The district court also must ensure that the

defendant’s plea was voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis, and did not

result from force or threats, or promises not contained in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(b)(2), (3). In reviewing the adequacy of the court’s compliance with Rule 11, we

“accord deference to the trial court’s decision as to how best to conduct the mandated

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colloquy with the defendant.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 295 (4th Cir.

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because Forrest did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we

review the validity of his guilty plea for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d

621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). To establish plain error, Forrest must establish that “(1) an error

was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In the guilty plea context, a defendant meets his burden to establish that a plain

error affected his substantial rights by showing a reasonable probability that he would not

have pled guilty but for the district court’s Rule 11 omissions. United States v. Sanya, 774

F.3d 812, 815-16 (4th Cir. 2014). We have reviewed the Rule 11 colloquy and, discerning

no plain error, we conclude that Forrest’s guilty plea is valid.

Forrest next challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in

concluding that his South Carolina conviction for possession with intent to distribute

marijuana should not qualify as a predicate offense to determine that he is a career offender.

We have determined that South Carolina drug distribution convictions are controlled

substance offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines.

“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an

abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside,

or significantly outside the [Sentencing] Guidelines range.’” United States v. Nance, 957

F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552

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U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). In performing that review, we must first determine whether the district

court “committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines

range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen

sentence.” Id. If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Our substantive reasonableness review

“takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing

court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards

set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any sentence that is within

or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively]

reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted). “Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is

unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

We are satisfied that Forrest’s sentence of imprisonment is procedurally reasonable.

The district court correctly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range, adequately

considered the § 3553(a) factors, and provided a meaningful explanation for the sentence

that it chose. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51. We find that the district court properly found

Forrest a career offender. See United States v. Davis, 75 F.4th 428, 442-45 (4th Cir. 2023)

(holding that South Carolina distribution of controlled substances statute qualified as a

controlled substance offense); United States v. Jackson, 127 F.4th 448, 450, 455 (4th Cir.

2025) (holding that “a distribution conviction under South Carolina’s statute is a controlled

substance offense as defined by the Guidelines” and “does not reach attempted

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distribution”). We also conclude that nothing in the record rebuts the presumption of

substantive reasonableness afforded to Forrest’s 144-month sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We thus affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Forrest, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Forrest requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Forrest.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED