F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 13, 2006 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 05-3445 Plaintiff-Appellee, v. District of Kansas THOMAS W. WALES, (D.C. Nos. 05-CV-3347-RDR & 03-CR-40151-RDR) Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY , SEYMOUR , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
Thomas W. Wales, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se , seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal the district court’s order
denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(B). Because we conclude that Mr. Wales has failed to make “a
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request
for a COA and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
I. Background
Mr. Wales was indicted for two violations of federal law: possession with
intent to distribute 100 or more marijuana plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1); and possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d). On July 2, 2004, he entered into a plea agreement. In the agreement,
Mr. Wales admitted to cultivating 138 marijuana plants with the intent to derive
money from the plants and to purchasing and possessing an unregistered shotgun.
The plea agreement also included waiver of his rights to appeal and to collateral
attack. It stated:
Waiver of Appeal and Collateral Attack . Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with this prosecution, conviction and sentence. The defendant is aware that Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed. By entering into this agreement, the defendant knowingly waives any right to appeal a sentence imposed which is within the guideline range determined appropriate by the court. The defendant also waives any right to challenge a sentence or otherwise attempt to modify or change his sentence or manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, U.S.C. § 2255 [except as limited by United States v. Cockerham , 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001)] and a motion brought under Title 18, U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In other words, the defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any, the court departs upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline range determined by the court. However, if the United States exercises its right to appeal the
-2- sentence imposed as authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(b), the defendant is released from this waiver and may appeal the sentence received as authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Plea Agreement 9-10. The district court accepted Mr. Wales’s guilty plea and
imposed two concurrent 60-month sentences. The mandatory statutory minimum
for possession of 100 or more marijuana plants is 60 months. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B)(vii).
Despite the waiver provision in his plea agreement, Mr. Wales filed a pro
se direct appeal which this Court dismissed as untimely, without considering the
waiver. On August 24, 2005, Mr. Wales filed a motion in the district court to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. In the motion, he claimed that he was
not in possession of the shotgun; that his attorney was ineffective in failing to
inform him of the time limit for filing an appeal; that he was sick; that he did not
plant the marijuana; and that there was no evidence of intent to distribute. The
district court denied the motion to vacate, finding that Mr. Wales had waived his
right to habeas relief in his plea agreement. The court also found that in his plea
agreement Mr. Wales admitted to the facts he is now contesting and that he was
not prejudiced by any ineffectiveness of counsel. Because the district court did
not act on Mr. Wales’s request for a COA, we deem the district court’s failure to
act a denial of a COA. 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C). Mr. Wales filed an application for a
COA in this Court.
-3- After he filed an application for a COA in this Court, Mr. Wales also filed
a “Motion to Vacate Sentence Under the Constitution and Statu[t]es,” in which he
claimed that the supervised release portion of his sentence was unauthorized and
unlawful. This issue is waived because Mr. Wales did not raise this issue before
the district court. See Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
II. Discussion
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be appealed
only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(B). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order
to make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The district court found that Mr. Wales’s claims are barred by the waiver
on collateral attacks contained in his plea agreement. This Court has held that a
defendant’s waiver of appellate rights is binding if (1) the scope of the waiver
covers the present appeal, (2) the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and (3)
enforcement of the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. United
-4- States v. Hahn , 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The same
standard applies to waivers of collateral review, and Mr. Wales does not argue
otherwise.
We agree with the district court that the language of the plea agreement
supports a waiver that encompasses all of Mr. Wales’s claims. The plea
agreement states that “[d]efendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to
appeal or collateral[] attack.” Plea Agreement 9. The plea colloquy indicates that
Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 13, 2006 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 05-3445 Plaintiff-Appellee, v. District of Kansas THOMAS W. WALES, (D.C. Nos. 05-CV-3347-RDR & 03-CR-40151-RDR) Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY , SEYMOUR , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
Thomas W. Wales, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se , seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal the district court’s order
denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(B). Because we conclude that Mr. Wales has failed to make “a
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request
for a COA and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
I. Background
Mr. Wales was indicted for two violations of federal law: possession with
intent to distribute 100 or more marijuana plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1); and possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d). On July 2, 2004, he entered into a plea agreement. In the agreement,
Mr. Wales admitted to cultivating 138 marijuana plants with the intent to derive
money from the plants and to purchasing and possessing an unregistered shotgun.
The plea agreement also included waiver of his rights to appeal and to collateral
attack. It stated:
Waiver of Appeal and Collateral Attack . Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with this prosecution, conviction and sentence. The defendant is aware that Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed. By entering into this agreement, the defendant knowingly waives any right to appeal a sentence imposed which is within the guideline range determined appropriate by the court. The defendant also waives any right to challenge a sentence or otherwise attempt to modify or change his sentence or manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, U.S.C. § 2255 [except as limited by United States v. Cockerham , 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001)] and a motion brought under Title 18, U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In other words, the defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any, the court departs upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline range determined by the court. However, if the United States exercises its right to appeal the
-2- sentence imposed as authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(b), the defendant is released from this waiver and may appeal the sentence received as authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Plea Agreement 9-10. The district court accepted Mr. Wales’s guilty plea and
imposed two concurrent 60-month sentences. The mandatory statutory minimum
for possession of 100 or more marijuana plants is 60 months. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B)(vii).
Despite the waiver provision in his plea agreement, Mr. Wales filed a pro
se direct appeal which this Court dismissed as untimely, without considering the
waiver. On August 24, 2005, Mr. Wales filed a motion in the district court to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. In the motion, he claimed that he was
not in possession of the shotgun; that his attorney was ineffective in failing to
inform him of the time limit for filing an appeal; that he was sick; that he did not
plant the marijuana; and that there was no evidence of intent to distribute. The
district court denied the motion to vacate, finding that Mr. Wales had waived his
right to habeas relief in his plea agreement. The court also found that in his plea
agreement Mr. Wales admitted to the facts he is now contesting and that he was
not prejudiced by any ineffectiveness of counsel. Because the district court did
not act on Mr. Wales’s request for a COA, we deem the district court’s failure to
act a denial of a COA. 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C). Mr. Wales filed an application for a
COA in this Court.
-3- After he filed an application for a COA in this Court, Mr. Wales also filed
a “Motion to Vacate Sentence Under the Constitution and Statu[t]es,” in which he
claimed that the supervised release portion of his sentence was unauthorized and
unlawful. This issue is waived because Mr. Wales did not raise this issue before
the district court. See Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
II. Discussion
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be appealed
only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(B). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order
to make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The district court found that Mr. Wales’s claims are barred by the waiver
on collateral attacks contained in his plea agreement. This Court has held that a
defendant’s waiver of appellate rights is binding if (1) the scope of the waiver
covers the present appeal, (2) the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and (3)
enforcement of the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. United
-4- States v. Hahn , 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The same
standard applies to waivers of collateral review, and Mr. Wales does not argue
otherwise.
We agree with the district court that the language of the plea agreement
supports a waiver that encompasses all of Mr. Wales’s claims. The plea
agreement states that “[d]efendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to
appeal or collateral[] attack.” Plea Agreement 9. The plea colloquy indicates that
Mr. Wales understood the terms of the plea agreement, and Mr. Wales does not
contend that the waiver was invalid. Finally, enforcing the waiver will not result
in a miscarriage of justice: the district court did not rely on an impermissible
factor in accepting the plea agreement, Mr. Wales was sentenced to the mandatory
minimum under the statute, the waiver is not otherwise unlawful, and Mr. Wales
does not claim that counsel was ineffective in negotiating his plea agreement. See
Hahn , 359 F.3d at 1327.
Nor does Mr. Wales overcome his waiver of collateral review by arguing
that counsel was ineffective in failing to notify him of the time limit for filing an
appeal. This Court will not enforce a waiver of collateral review when a
defendant was deprived of the opportunity for direct appeal because defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by ignoring a defendant’s request to
perfect an appeal. United States v. Garrett , 402 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir.
-5- 2005); see also Campusano v. United States , --- F.3d ---, No. 04-5134, 2006 WL
751360, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2006). But Mr. Wales has presented no evidence
that he asked his lawyer to file an appeal. If a defendant does not request that
counsel file an appeal, defense counsel is constitutionally obligated to consult
with a defendant about an appeal “when there is reason to think either (1) that a
rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are
nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Roe v. Flores-
Ortega , 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000). In making this determination, it is relevant
“whether the conviction follows a trial or a guilty plea . . . because such a plea
may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings[,] whether
the defendant received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea[,] and
whether the plea expressly reserved or waived some or all appeal rights.” Id. Mr.
Wales has presented no evidence that he informed his attorney of his interest in
appealing. The facts known to defense counsel—that Mr. Wales pleaded guilty,
received the sentence bargained for, and waived all appeal rights—reasonably
suggested to counsel that a rational defendant would not want to appeal, and more
specifically that Mr. Wales was not interested in appealing his conviction or
sentence. Counsel was therefore not constitutionally deficient in failing to perfect
-6- a direct appeal, and we enforce Mr. Wales’s waiver of his right to collateral
review.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we DENY Thomas W. Wales’ request for a COA and
DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell Circuit Judge
-7-