United States v. W. T. Rawleigh Co.

267 F.2d 180, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 3862
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedMay 18, 1959
Docket12394
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 267 F.2d 180 (United States v. W. T. Rawleigh Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 267 F.2d 180, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 3862 (7th Cir. 1959).

Opinions

KNOCH, Circuit Judge.

Defendants were indicted in two counts. Count I charged conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to violate Secs. 2800(a)(1), 3072, 3111, 3115(a) and 3116 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C. §§ 2800(a)(1), 3072, 3111, 3115(a), 3116 and Title 26, Code of Federal Regulations (1949) See. 182.864 by obtaining and use of specially denatured alcohol in the manufacture and sale of two liquid medicines for internal use, and defrauding the United States of the tax due. Count II charged the corporate defendant and five of the individuals named in Count I with withdrawal and use of specially denatured alcohol in the manufacture of liquid medicines for internal use1 without payment of the tax due.

On motion of the defendants, the District Court dismissed the indictment. The appeal is taken by the Government pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3731.

The motion to dismiss was based primarily on the ground that the fundamental criminal statute Section 3072, and the statute it implements, Sec. 3070(a), do not apply to the denatured alcohol defendants are charged with using and conspiring to. use, and. that Regulation 182.864 is invalid.2

[182]*182We need not discuss the other sections allegedly violated as these are dependent on a showing of violation of Sec. 3072 or Regulation 182.864.

In dismissing the indictment, the District Judge referred to a similar case which had been settled on a civil basis. The government lists, as a contested issue in this case, the question whether the action of the District Court in dismissing an indictment, against defendants not involved in the instant case, was a sufficient ground for dismissal of this indictment. The District Judge said that this was a criminal action to collect civil damages. As we agree with the District Court that the indictment fails to charge a crime, we do not reach that question.

There is no element here of misuse of dangerous or poisonous ingredients, but merely of alleged evasion of tax.

Alcohol when produced is “unadulterated”. Denatured alcohol may be rendered poisonous and thus be “completely denatured”, or merely distasteful and nauseating, and thus be “specially denatured”. We are here concerned only with specially denatured alcohol.

Section 3072, as indicated, provides penal sanctions in connection with Sec. 3070(a) of the Code. A violation of Sec. 3072 must involve alcohol denatured under Sec. 3070(a).

It is axiomatic that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. United States v. Wiltberger, 1820, 5 Wheat. 76, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37.

A brief historical review of the legislation before us may be helpful.

As early as 1868, laws were designed to protect the tax on distilled spirits, which becomes due immediately the spirits come into existence. These laws, controlling the production, storage, and withdrawal of distilled spirits, developed words of art. The Act of 1868 (15 Stat. 125) permitted production of alcohol only in “registered” distilleries which had to be identified by a displayed sign (15 Stat. 132).

Prior to 1906 we also had “fruit” distilleries which were limited to distilling from specified fruits, unlike the “registered” distilleries which could distill from grain, starch, molasses, sugar, etc., and which were authorized to produce spirits of any kind and proof, including “alcohol”, defined as having a proof of 160 degrees or more.3

The tax on distilled spirits was not paid until the spirits were withdrawn from storage — a “distillery warehouse” in which they were placed immediately after production, under government lock from which they could not be taken or “withdrawn from bond,” without payment of the tax. Taney v. Penn Nat. Bank, 1914, 232 U.S. 174, 34 S.Ct. 288, 289, 58 L.Ed. 558. The product of [183]*183“fruit” distilleries went into a “special bonded warehouse.”

In 1906 (34 Stat. 217) Congress permitted tax free withdrawal of alcohol from bond for industrial use provided that after withdrawal from the distillery warehouse, it be mixed with a denaturing material which destroyed its character as a beverage and rendered it unfit for liquid medicinal purposes. The mixing was to be done on application of any registered distillery in denaturing bonded warehouses specially set apart for denaturing purposes only. This provision (Sec. 1) later became Sec. 3070(a). Sec. 2 providing criminal sanctions for its violation became Sec. 3072. At that time only registered distilleries could produce alcohol for denaturation.

In 1907, Congress provided for a new type of distillery: the “industrial distillery” and the “central denaturing bonded warehouse.” These were separate and distinct from the “registered” distilleries, and were limited in capacity.

In 1913, Congress created (38 Stat. 199) industrial distilleries of unlimited capacity, and “central distilling and denaturing plants.” This legislation required that the denatured alcohol be rendered, not unfit for liquid medicinal purposes, as in the 1906 Act which still applied to “registered” distilleries, but only “unfit for use as an intoxicating beverage.” The Commissioner’s annual report to Congress apprised that body that he was permitting use of denatured alcohol for liquid medicinal preparations under the 1913 Act.

In 1919 the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305) 27 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., was adopted, which in Title III created a new class of distillers: “industrial alcohol plants” which were permitted to produce and denature alcohol free of tax provided it was rendered unfit for use as an intoxicating beverage,4 the standard used in the 1913 Act.

Registered distillers ceased operation during Prohibition until 1936, when Congress authorized them to produce distilled spirits, but only those of insufficient proof to constitute “alcohol”,5 so that their product might not be used competitively in the industrial alcohol market.6

When the registered distilleries were prohibited from producing alcohol, Sec. 3070(a) was rendered inoperative with respect to denaturation of alcohol. With Sec. 3070(b), Sec. 3070(a) still governed denaturation of rum. In 1942 to alleviate the shortage of alcohol, because industrial alcohol plants could not meet the wartime demand, Congress permitted registered distilleries to produce alcohol,7 but in 1950 specifically prohibited withdrawal of such alcohol for denaturation,8 thus again rendering Sec. 3070(a) inoperative with respect to denaturation of alcohol.

The 1913 Act was not expressly repealed, but it was not embodied in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. As indicated, Secs. 1 and 2 of the 1906 Act became Secs. 3070(a) and 3072 of Part I, Subchapter C. Title III of the 1919 Act became Part II of the 1939 Code.

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267 F.2d 180 (Seventh Circuit, 1959)

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Bluebook (online)
267 F.2d 180, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 3862, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-w-t-rawleigh-co-ca7-1959.