USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-13647 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cr-00024-CEM-EJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VORARUT VORASIANGSUK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(August 10, 2021)
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 2 of 6
Vorarut Vorasiangsuk appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress and his 168-month sentence for receiving and possessing child
pornography. First, he argues he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without
a Miranda1 warning. Second, he argues the district court gave undue weight to
improper sentencing factors, namely his family support and occupation.
I.
The denial of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and law. United
States v. Thomas, 818 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016). We review questions of
law de novo and questions of fact for clear error, construing the facts in the light
most favorable to the party that prevailed before the district court. Id.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Miranda
established that statements made during a custodial interrogation are not admissible
at trial unless the defendant was first advised of his rights, including the right against
self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
An individual is considered to be “in custody” for Miranda purposes where
there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest.” United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks omitted). This test is from the perspective of a reasonable innocent
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 3 of 6
person, and “the actual, subjective beliefs of the defendant and the interviewing
officer on whether the defendant was free to leave are irrelevant.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). And in this determination, we consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the location and “whether the officers brandished weapons,
touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with
the officers could be compelled.” United States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881
(11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
An interviewee’s “status as a suspect, and the ‘coercive environment’ that
exists in virtually every interview by a police officer of a crime suspect, [does] not
automatically create a custodial situation.” United States v. Muegge, 225 F.3d 1267,
1270 (11th Cir. 2000). The location of the interview is not necessarily dispositive,
but courts are much less likely to find a custodial encounter when the interrogation
occurs “in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, such as the suspect’s home.”
Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, we conclude that the district court did not err by finding Vorasiangsuk
was not in custody for Miranda purposes based on the totality of the circumstances.
Supporting the conclusion that a reasonable innocent person would not have
believed he was restrained as if formally arrested, the agents did not physically
touch, threaten, point their guns at, handcuff, or even raise their voices to
Vorasiangsuk. See Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881; Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347. The
3 USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 4 of 6
district court found the interview was calm and cordial. Further, Vorasiangsuk stated
in the recording that no one compelled him to do anything and that he was trying his
best to cooperate. Although he was escorted out of his apartment, the conversation
took place at Vorasiangsuk’s residence, which also bolsters the conclusion that he
was not in custody. See Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347.
Because Vorasiangsuk was not in custody when he admitted to downloading
child pornography, the agents were not obligated to advise him of his Miranda rights
and no Fifth Amendment violation occurred. Accordingly, the district court properly
denied the motion to suppress, and we affirm.
II.
When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of
the circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden
of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the § 3553(a)
factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). We will
reverse for abuse of discretion only if we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the [§] 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Kirby, 938
F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
4 USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 5 of 6
The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the factors and purposes” in § 3553(a), which include “the
need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide
just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public.”
United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 957 (11th Cir. 2016). The district court must
also consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable
guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the
need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution
to the victim.” Id.
The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is “committed to the sound
discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.
2007) (quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a district court can abuse its
discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant
weight; (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight; or (3) commits
a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. United
States v.
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USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-13647 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cr-00024-CEM-EJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VORARUT VORASIANGSUK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(August 10, 2021)
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 2 of 6
Vorarut Vorasiangsuk appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress and his 168-month sentence for receiving and possessing child
pornography. First, he argues he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without
a Miranda1 warning. Second, he argues the district court gave undue weight to
improper sentencing factors, namely his family support and occupation.
I.
The denial of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and law. United
States v. Thomas, 818 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016). We review questions of
law de novo and questions of fact for clear error, construing the facts in the light
most favorable to the party that prevailed before the district court. Id.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Miranda
established that statements made during a custodial interrogation are not admissible
at trial unless the defendant was first advised of his rights, including the right against
self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
An individual is considered to be “in custody” for Miranda purposes where
there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest.” United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks omitted). This test is from the perspective of a reasonable innocent
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 3 of 6
person, and “the actual, subjective beliefs of the defendant and the interviewing
officer on whether the defendant was free to leave are irrelevant.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). And in this determination, we consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the location and “whether the officers brandished weapons,
touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with
the officers could be compelled.” United States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881
(11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
An interviewee’s “status as a suspect, and the ‘coercive environment’ that
exists in virtually every interview by a police officer of a crime suspect, [does] not
automatically create a custodial situation.” United States v. Muegge, 225 F.3d 1267,
1270 (11th Cir. 2000). The location of the interview is not necessarily dispositive,
but courts are much less likely to find a custodial encounter when the interrogation
occurs “in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, such as the suspect’s home.”
Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, we conclude that the district court did not err by finding Vorasiangsuk
was not in custody for Miranda purposes based on the totality of the circumstances.
Supporting the conclusion that a reasonable innocent person would not have
believed he was restrained as if formally arrested, the agents did not physically
touch, threaten, point their guns at, handcuff, or even raise their voices to
Vorasiangsuk. See Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881; Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347. The
3 USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 4 of 6
district court found the interview was calm and cordial. Further, Vorasiangsuk stated
in the recording that no one compelled him to do anything and that he was trying his
best to cooperate. Although he was escorted out of his apartment, the conversation
took place at Vorasiangsuk’s residence, which also bolsters the conclusion that he
was not in custody. See Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347.
Because Vorasiangsuk was not in custody when he admitted to downloading
child pornography, the agents were not obligated to advise him of his Miranda rights
and no Fifth Amendment violation occurred. Accordingly, the district court properly
denied the motion to suppress, and we affirm.
II.
When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of
the circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden
of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the § 3553(a)
factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). We will
reverse for abuse of discretion only if we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the [§] 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Kirby, 938
F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
4 USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 5 of 6
The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the factors and purposes” in § 3553(a), which include “the
need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide
just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public.”
United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 957 (11th Cir. 2016). The district court must
also consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable
guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the
need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution
to the victim.” Id.
The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is “committed to the sound
discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.
2007) (quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a district court can abuse its
discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant
weight; (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight; or (3) commits
a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Although we do not
presume that a sentence falling within the guideline range is reasonable, a sentence
imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of
5 USCA11 Case: 19-13647 Date Filed: 08/10/2021 Page: 6 of 6
reasonableness. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.
2008).
Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
sentenced Vorasiangsuk. It considered his history and characteristics, along with
the other § 3553(a) factors, as required. See Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 957. Balancing
§ 3553(a) factors is within the district court’s discretion, and Vorasiangsuk has not
shown that the district court committed a clear error of judgment and improperly
weighed those factors. See Kirby, 938 F.3d at 1257; Clay, 483 F.3d at 743. The
district court did not, as Vorasiangsuk suggests, weigh his family support and
occupation against him. Instead, the district court simply found that they were not
reason enough to vary downward, noting that it “desperately looked for a way to
vary downward” but could not find one. Additionally, a sentence 42 months below
the top of the guideline range and 72 months below the statutory maximum indicates
reasonableness. See Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion as the
168-month sentence was substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.