PER CURIAM.
Obeli “Butch” Vanover and Barbara “Barb” Vanover, husband and wife, appeal their drug trafficking and firearm convictions. The Vanovers allege there is insufficient evidence to support their convictions and the district court1 crafted an erroneous jury instruction. Butch also ar[1111]*1111gues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts and accepting all reasonable inferences in support thereof, see, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 570 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir.2009), the facts are these:
A. Detective Wagner Investigates the Vanovers
Detective Mesha Wagner serves on the Mid-Iowa Narcotics Enforcement (MINE) task force, a cooperative effort among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in Central Iowa. The MINE task force focuses on illegal narcotics interdiction in Des Moines and its suburbs.
In August 2007, an anonymous tipster informed Detective Wagner the Vanovers were selling and using methamphetamine in their Des Moines home. In October 2007, Detective Wagner searched the Van-overs’ curbside garbage. In the Vanovers’ trash, Detective Wagner found letters addressed to the Vanovers, Ziploc baggies with torn corners (so-called “corner baggies”), and a small jeweler’s baggy containing methamphetamine residue. As expert witnesses would later attest at the Van-overs’ trial, drug dealers commonly package small quantities of illegal narcotics in baggies similar to those found in the Van-overs’ garbage.
B. Unrelated Investigation Leads to the Vanovers
On December 19, 2007, members of the MINE task force were conducting surveillance of Debra Dale in a then-unrelated investigation. Law enforcement officers suspected Dale was selling methamphetamine. One officer gave a confidential informant (Cl) $540 to buy a quarter ounce of methamphetamine from Dale. The officer also put a secret listening device on the CI.
The CI went to Dale’s house and tried to buy methamphetamine from her. Dale told the CI she needed to use the $540 to buy the methamphetamine from her supplier. Dale took the $540, left the CI at her house, and drove away. Law enforcement officers, including Detective Wagner, followed Dale to the Vanovers’ home while the CI waited at Dale’s house.
Dale went into the Vanovers’ home to buy the methamphetamine. Barb was home, but Butch was not. Barb took Dale to the master bathroom, opened a drawer, and they discussed how much methamphetamine Dale needed. Dale asked for a quarter ounce. Barb took some methamphetamine, a scale, and baggies out of the drawer. Because there was not enough methamphetamine in the drawer for the relatively large quantity Dale had requested, Barb told Dale to wait. Barb then went to the Vanovers’ garage to obtain more methamphetamine.
Shortly thereafter, Barb returned to the bathroom with another baggie of methamphetamine. Barb sold Dale a quarter ounce of methamphetamine in a baggie for $540. Barb then gave Dale a small “bonus” of methamphetamine in a second baggie for arranging the sale with the CI.
Dale left and drove towards her home. Several blocks away from the Vanovers’ home, law enforcement officers stopped Dale for a minor traffic violation. The law enforcement officers asked Dale for permission to search her person, and Dale consented. The officers found the two baggies of methamphetamine in Dale’s brassiere. Dale admitted she had just bought the methamphetamine from Barb.
C. Raid of the Vanovers’ Home
Later that afternoon, Detective Wagner obtained a warrant to search the Vanovers’ [1112]*1112home. Around 4:50 p.m., ten MINE task force members executed the warrant. Upon arrival, they found a Hispanic man outside the Vanovers’ home in a car bearing Nebraska license plates. Officers detained the man while they knocked and announced their presence. Barb answered the door and let the officers inside the home. The officers brought the man inside and assembled all persons, including a large number of children,2 into the Van-overs’ living room.
1. Miranda Warnings
Around 5:00 p.m., Detective Wagner read Barb her Miranda3 rights. Barb indicated she understood her Miranda rights and waived her right to remain silent. Detective Wagner took Barb upstairs to a bathroom and interviewed her. At first, Barb insisted there were no illegal narcotics in the home and she did not deal drugs, but admitted she used methamphetamine. Eventually, however, Barb admitted she had sold methamphetamine “in the past” and there was a small quantity of methamphetamine in one of the bathrooms. When the interview concluded, Detective Wagner brought Barb downstairs into the living room.
Butch then arrived home from work. Officers handcuffed Butch, escorted him to the living room, and sat him down on a couch next to Barb and the unidentified Hispanic man. Officer Justin Song, a MINE task force member from the Ankeny Police Department, then read Miranda warnings aloud to all three suspects as they sat on the couch. Butch verbally acknowledged to Officer Song that he understood his Miranda rights and agreed to an interview.
Deputies Lonnie Peterman and Tom Griffiths, MINE task force members from the Polk County Sheriffs Office, led Butch down to the basement where they interviewed him for about an hour. Detective Wagner came downstairs mid-interview, and Butch then admitted he had recently started selling methamphetamine and there was methamphetamine in the home. Butch insisted he did not use methamphetamine.
2. Search of the Vanovers’ Home
Members of the MINE task force searched the Vanovers’ home. In the garage, officers found four Ziploc bags containing 119 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. The four bags of methamphetamine were found inside a large plastic bag atop a shelf. In the basement, officers found empty Ziploc baggies with the number “1,000” written on them.
In the master bathroom, task force members found unused Ziploc baggies, a Ziploc baggie with a mixture or substance containing 6.55 grams of methamphetamine in it, and several corner baggies in the trash. Scattered around the master bedroom, officers found Barb’s purse, which contained .4 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine inside a Ziploc baggie, and envelopes addressed to the Vanovers, including an utility bill addressed to Butch. Within a dresser in the master bedroom, officers found .51 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, a digital scale, and related drug paraphernalia. In the Vanovers’ bed in the master bedroom — lodged between the mattress and the box spring — officers found (1) a High Point Model C9 9 mm Luger pistol; (2) unused Ziploc baggies; and (3) four Ziploc baggies containing a total of $4,000 in cash. The High Point was fully operational, loaded with Remington Peters 9 mm ammuni[1113]*1113tion, and placed near the edge of the head of the bed. In a safe in the master bedroom, officers found a Taurus PT-22.22 caliber pistol, .22 and .38 ammunition, 12-gauge shotgun slugs, some Ziploc baggies with white residue inside, a scale, a 100-gram weight, a small spoon, and other drug paraphernalia.
Including the methamphetamine found in Dale’s brassiere, officers found a total of 142 grams of mixtures or substances containing methamphetamine attributable to the Vanovers during their investigation. The law enforcement officers never found the $540 the Cl gave Dale to buy the quarter ounce of methamphetamine from Barb. Further, a fingerprint expert who examined the firearms and ammunition did not find the Vanovers’ fingerprints. The expert did find the fingerprints of two unidentified persons on the High Point’s magazine. There is no evidence either firearm had been fired. The Taurus firearm was not functional.
D. Prior Proceedings
In September 2008, a grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indictment against the Vanovers. Only Counts 1 through 5 are relevant to this appeal.4 Count 1 charged the Vanovers with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846. Count 2 charged the Vanovers with distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count 3 charged the Vanovers with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count 4 charged the Vanovers with “Use or Carry [sic] a Firearm in Furtherance to [sic] a Drug Crime,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)®. Count 5 charged Butch with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
In June 2009, the district court held a three-day jury trial on the superseding indictment. The jury found the Vanovers guilty as charged in Counts 1 through 5. In response to a series of interrogatories, the jury also found the Vanovers conspired to distribute, distributed, and possessed with intent to distribute “at least 50 grams of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine.”
The district court sentenced Butch to 420 months of imprisonment and Barb to 181 months of imprisonment. The Van-overs appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Before our court are six issues, which fall into three categories. The first category consists of Butch’s arguments concerning the denial of his motion to suppress. The second category includes the Vanovers’ arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support their various convictions on Counts 1 through 5. The third category is comprised of the Vanovers’ arguments about the district court’s marshalling instruction for Count 4.
A. Motion to Suppress
1. Standard of Review
Our standard of review is narrow with respect to Butch’s appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress. Although we review the district court’s ultimate legal conclusions de novo, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. [1114]*1114See United States v. Ingram, 594 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir.2010). We “will affirm the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear a mistake was made.” United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Hogan, 539 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir.2008)).
2. Legal Framework
In Miranda, the Supreme Court created prophylactic procedural rules that must be followed before a custodial interrogation commences to ensure the Fifth Amendment’s mandate that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” U.S. Const, amend. V. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The Supreme Court held a suspect in custody “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. In general, any statements elicited from a suspect in violation of these rules are inadmissible in the government’s case-in-chief. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam). Further, in order for a confession obtained during a custodial interrogation to be admissible at trial, the government must show the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
3. Analysis
i. First Issue: Did Detective Song read Butch his Miranda rights?
Butch argues the district court clearly erred in finding Detective Song read Butch his Miranda rights and, as a consequence, should have suppressed the incriminating statements Butch made in the basement. Butch highlights various minor inconsistencies in the law enforcement officers’ testimony at his suppression hearing. Butch lodges a credibility challenge, opining the district court should have (1) credited Butch’s testimony that no law enforcement officer read Miranda rights to him; (2) credited Barb’s testimony that she never saw Butch until after he came out of the basement; and (3) discredited the law enforcement officers’ testimony that Detective Song read the Miranda warnings to Butch.
Butch’s argument is not well taken. “A credibility determination made by a district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to suppress is ‘virtually unassailable on appeal.’ ” United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. GueUContreras, 468 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir.2006)). We do not detect clear error in the district court’s credibility findings. The district court was forced to choose between the testimony of the Vanovers or the law enforcement officers, and the district court credited the testimony of the officers.
Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that Detective Song read Butch his Miranda rights. Detective Song and Deputy Peterman each testified Detective Song read Butch his Miranda rights in the Vanovers’ living room and Butch then acknowledged he understood such rights. On cross-examination, Deputy Peterman emphatically stated, “There’s no question in my mind that it occurred because I was there.” While there were some inconsistencies among the officers’ stories — especially regarding the timing and sequence of the events inside the Van-overs’ home during the execution of the search warrant — the district court noted [1115]*1115these inconsistencies in a thoroughly written order. The district court aptly pointed out (1) the officers, as professionals experienced with high-stress environments, would ordinarily remember the facts better than nervous suspects; (2) Miranda warnings are routine; and (3) the officers had less incentive to lie than the Vanovers.
ii. Second Issue: Did the district court err in finding Butch waived his Miranda rights?
Butch opines “there was certainly police coercion” in his interrogation and concludes the district court erred in finding he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Butch argues his statements do not pass muster under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b), which purports to set forth factors a finder of fact should consider when deciding whether a Miranda waiver is valid. Section 3501(b) provides:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession ..., (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense ... of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel, and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
In accordance with the implicit assumption of the parties, we assume without deciding the district court was required to weigh the § 3501(b) factors. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431, 120 S.Ct. 2326,147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (discussing § 3501(b) and stating “Miranda and its progeny ... govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation”). Even so, the district court did not clearly err when it found Butch voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Once again, Butch attacks the district court’s credibility findings even though such findings are “‘virtually unassailable on appeal.’ ” Frencher, 503 F.3d at 701 (quoting Guek-Contreras, 468 F.3d at 521). For example, Butch points us to his own testimony that (1) Detective Griffiths told Butch, “if you talk to me, I can probably help you out”; (2) Detective Song did not read Butch the Miranda warnings; and (3) Butch was cowed into confessing because he lacked experience with interrogations.
The district court did not credit Butch’s testimony, and the court’s credibility findings were not clearly erroneous. Detective Wagner testified she never promised Butch any type of leniency or threatened him. Deputy Peterman and Deputy Griffiths testified no one made any promises of leniency to Butch. When asked whether he made such a promise, Deputy Griffiths stated:
[Ajbsolutely not. I never make that type of a statement to anybody. I’m not a judge. I’m not an attorney. I’m a police officer. I can’t make promises like that to anyone.
It is undisputed Butch has a long criminal history and is not unfamiliar with law enforcement officers. Further, as the district court recognized, Butch admitted Detective Griffiths told him before the in[1116]*1116terrogation that he “was in trouble for the guns and drugs that were found” in the house. Butch thus knew the nature of the subject offenses.
Under the totality of the circumstances, there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that Butch voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The officers holstered their firearms after securing the premises; no one raised their voices or argued; Butch was not under the influence of alcohol or any narcotics; and the officers wore plain clothes. Although handcuffed and without counsel during the interview, Butch was in his own home. Deputy Peterman testified Butch was “calm, nice, pleasant, concerned.” Detective Wagner testified Butch was “very calm” and there was no tension or conflict in the air. Officer Song testified “[tjhere wasn’t anything specific about [Butch’s] demeanor that would indicate ... he was under any kind of emotional distress.” Deputy Griffiths testified Butch was “relaxed.” Interestingly, Butch knew Deputy Griffiths from their days selling cars together at a Des Moines car dealership in the 1970s. Deputy Griffiths knew Butch well enough to call him “Butch” and not “Obeli.” Butch replied, “hi, Tom.”
The record adequately reflects the officers gave Butch Miranda warnings, and Butch waived his rights by thereafter answering the officers’ questions.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 1. Legal Standard
With respect to the Vanovers’ various sufficiency of the evidence arguments, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of those verdicts, and reverse “only if no reasonable jury could have found [the Vanovers] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 964 (8th Cir.2010). “[0]ur role is not to reweigh the evidence or to test the credibility of the witnesses,” because “ ‘[questions of credibility are the province of the jury.’ ” United States v. Dugan, 238 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2000)).
2. Analysis
i. Third Issue: Is there sufficient evidence to support Butch’s drug trafficking convictions?
Butch appears to concede, if the district court did not err in failing to suppress his incriminating statements, sufficient evidence supports his drug trafficking convictions. Because the district court did not err in denying suppression, Butch’s sufficiency argument is a non-starter.
In any event, sufficient evidence supports Butch’s drug trafficking convictions on Counts 1, 2, and 3. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. Even if we ignore Butch’s incriminating statements in the basement — arguably explicit confessions to distribution of methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine — other evidence in the record is sufficient to establish Butch’s guilt.5 Butch’s home was filled with indicia of drug dealing, including a relatively large quantity of methamphetamine, weapons, drug paraphernalia, and $4,000 in cash. Detective Griffiths explained methamphetamine is a powerful [1117]*1117narcotic and 142 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine is “definitely” a distribution amount. Detective Griffiths described how firearms, Ziploc baggies, scales, and the other paraphernalia further the drug trade. Dale testified she and her husband bought methamphetamine from the Vanovers at least fifty times between 2005 and 2007, in amounts ranging from a quarter of a gram (in exchange for $20-$25), a gram ($80— $100), and a quarter of an ounce ($250-$540).6
Dale characterized the Vanovers as working together to sell their methamphetamine. For example, immediately before the methamphetamine sale resulting in their arrests, Butch made arrangements over the telephone for Dale to buy methamphetamine from Barb. Dale testified the Vanovers’ methamphetamine business was so successful that, on several occasions, Dale had to wait in line behind as many as five to ten other methamphetamine buyers at the Vanovers’ home. Onterio Taylor testified, while incarcerated with Butch after Butch’s arrest, Butch admitted arranging the methamphetamine sale to Dale and told Taylor the unidentified Hispanic man was Butch’s supplier. The Hispanic man had fronted Butch the methamphetamine, and had come to the Vanovers’ home to collect $4,000 — the exact amount of cash found underneath the Vanovers’ mattress.
Although Butch contends Dale’s testimony was untrustworthy because, among other things, (1) she is a confessed methamphetamine addict; (2) she was not cooperating with the MINE task force on December 19, 2007; and (3) law enforcement officers never recovered the $540, the jury apparently found Dale’s testimony to be credible. We will not disturb the jury’s verdicts. See Dugan, 238 F.3d at 1045 (leaving credibility questions for the jury); see also United States v. Gaona-Lopez, 408 F.3d 500, 505 (8th Cir.2005) (“[W]e do not sit as [a] second jury, and we are completely [u]nwilling to usurp the jury’s unique role in judging the credibility of witnesses. The jury is free to believe the testimony of any witness in its entirety, or to reject that testimony as untrustworthy.” (quotations omitted)).
ii. Fourth Issue: Is there sufficient evidence to support Butch’s felon in possession of a firearm conviction?
Sufficient evidence supports Butch’s felon in possession of a firearm conviction. To convict Butch under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as set forth in Count 5, the government was required to prove: “ ‘(1) [Butch] had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) [Butch] knowingly possessed a firearm; [and] (3) the firearm [was] in or ... affected interstate commerce.’ ” United States v. Clayboume, 415 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir.2004)). Butch only challenges the second element.
In denying Butch’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court observed “[t]he case is a little thin on the knowledge” element, but held a reasonable jury could find Butch knowingly possessed the High Point underneath his mattress. The district court did not err. It is not fatal that, as Butch stresses, there is no direct evidence he possessed the firearm, because proof of joint constructive possession is sufficient to sustain a conviction under [1118]*1118§ 922(g)(1). Id. “ ‘Constructive possession ... is established if the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located, or control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm itself.’ ” Id. at 795-96 (quoting United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir.1993)).
Here, a reasonable jury could find Butch knowingly possessed the High Point with Barb jointly under a constructive possession theory: (1) Butch lived in the home in which the firearm was found; (2) Butch slept on the bed in which the firearm was hidden; (3) documents addressed to Butch were found in the same bedroom as the firearm; and (4) Butch admitted to Taylor he owed $4,000 to his methamphetamine supplier, and the firearm was hidden next to $4,000 in cash. As Detective Griffiths testified at trial, drug dealers commonly use firearms for intimidation and protection. Butch, a confessed drug dealer, was more likely to possess a firearm and, as a consequence, use a firearm to protect his methamphetamine, cash, and family. See, e.g., Boykin, 986 F.2d at 274 (holding there was sufficient evidence to support § 922(g)(1) conviction, where firearms were seized in the defendant’s master bedroom, including one between the mattress and box spring, a room the defendant shared with his wife).
iii. Fifth Issue: Is there sufficient evidence to support the Vanovers’ convictions for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime?
Butch and Barb each argue the evidence was insufficient to support their § 924(c) convictions. Count 4 alleged Butch and Barb “knowingly and intentionally possessed] one or more firearms, including [the] High Point ... and ammunition, in furtherance of to [sic][the] drug trafficking crimefs set forth in Counts 1 through 3].”7
“To secure a conviction under [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c)(1)(A), the government must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find a ‘nexus’ between the defendant’s possession of the charged firearm and the drug crime, such that this possession had the effect of ‘furthering, advancing or helping forward’ the drug crime.” United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 461 F.3d 939, 946 (8th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). “Accordingly, evidence that the defendant simultaneously possessed drugs and a firearm, standing alone, would not warrant submitting the charge to the jury.” Id. (citation omitted). “Instead, the jury must be able to infer that the defendant’s possession of the firearm facilitated the drug crime, through evidence that the firearm was used for protection, was kept near the drugs, or was in close proximity to the defendant during drug transactions.” Id. at 946-47 (citation omitted).
United States v. Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir.2009).
Sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find the Vanovers each, “in furtherance of [a felony drug trafficking crime], possesse[d]” the High Point. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). As previously indicated, sufficient evidence shows Butch constructively possessed the firearm jointly with Barb. The same analysis applies with equal, if not greater, force to Barb. Barb lived in the same home as Butch and slept in the same bed, and mail addressed to Barb was found near the High Point. Barb also sold Dale [1119]*1119methamphetamine in an adjoining bathroom next to the concealed firearm, and admitted she knew about the High Point.
The remaining element is whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the Vanovers each possessed the High Point in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The evidence is sufficient. As we have repeatedly recognized — and as an expert witness testified at the Vanovers’ trial — drug dealers such as the Vanovers often use firearms for personal protection, intimidation, and to safeguard drugs and cash. See, e.g., Boy-kin, 986 F.2d at 274. Here, the High Point was placed underneath a mattress in close proximity to a large quantity of cash and packaging materials and in the same room as methamphetamine, ammunition, and drug paraphernalia. The High Point was placed near the edge of the bed for easy access. In other cases, we have found sufficient evidence to support § 924(c) convictions under less damning circumstances. See, e.g., Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d at 910 (holding sufficient evidence supported a § 924(c) conviction, where the defendant resided in the home in which firearms were found “in a closet in the bedroom across the hallway from [the defendant’s] bedroom where cocaine was found” and “in the kitchen, fifteen to twenty feet away from the bedrooms, with drug trafficking paraphernalia and a baggie with cocaine residue”); United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 461 F.3d 939, 942-44, 946-47 (8th Cir.2006) (holding there was sufficient evidence to support a § 924(c) conviction, where the firearm was identified to be the defendant’s, an expert witness testified to the link between drug dealing and firearms, and “saleable quantities of drugs and drug packaging paraphernalia” were found in a kitchen adjacent to a bedroom where the firearm was found on a closet shelf). The evidence is even stronger with respect to Barb, because Dale testified that Barb sold Dale methamphetamine in the adjacent master bathroom.
C. Jury Instruction
The Vanovers criticize the district court’s use of Instruction 20. Because the Vanovers did not object to this instruction in the district court, we review only for plain error. See Rushr-Richardson, 574 F.3d at 910. To show plain error, the Vanovers must establish
(1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected [the Vanovers’] substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Marcus, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (quoting Puckett v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009)). With respect to the third element, an error only affects substantial rights if it is prejudicial, i.e., the defendant proves there is “a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (quotation omitted). The Vanovers must “satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (quotation omitted).
2. Sixth Issue: Does Instruction 20 require reversal?
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), a defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum [1120]*1120five-year sentence of imprisonment if he or she (1) used or carried a firearm “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime or (2) possessed a firearm “in furtherance of’ a drug trafficking crime. The superseding indictment charged the Van-overs under the second prong of § 924(c).
In Instruction 20 — tracking Eighth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 6.18.924C (2007), which was later amended — the district court defined “in furtherance of’ as follows:
The phrase “possessed in furtherance of’ means the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the crime of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine or possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. The firearm must facilitate or have the potential to facilitate the offense of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine or possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute!!]
In United, States v. Kent, 531 F.3d 642 (8th Cir.2008), we concluded that a materially similar instruction was erroneous. We reasoned that such a definition of “possession in furtherance of’ was almost identical to the Supreme Court’s definition of “in relation to.” Id. at 654-55. Because this court had concluded in a prior case that “in furtherance of’ is a slightly higher level of participation than “during and in relation to,” see United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 810 (8th Cir.2006), we concluded that an instruction modeled on Eighth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 6.18.924C (2007) was erroneous because it “would allow the jury to convict on the lesser finding of ‘in relation to.’ ” 531 F.3d at 655. We nonetheless affirmed the conviction, because the defendant did not challenge the jury instruction in the district court or on appeal, and leaving the conviction in place under those circumstances would not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 656-57. It was unnecessary for the Kent opinion to decide whether the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, a question that the panel thought was “close.” Id. at 656. (A later decision that cites this dictum in reaching a holding in the subsequent decision, see Rushr-Richardson, 574 F.3d at 912, does not convert the dictum in Kent to a holding in Kent. Kent was decided on the fourth prong of plain-error analysis, plain and simple. Cf. post at 1122-23.)
Since then, we have decided four more cases involving similar erroneous jury instructions based on the former model instruction for § 924(c). In each case, the defendant failed to object at trial, but raised the error on appeal, and we considered the instruction under a plain-error standard of review. In two cases, we reversed convictions, holding that the erroneous instruction affected the defendant’s substantial rights and that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Rushr-Richardson, 574 F.3d at 910-13; United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 766-68 (8th Cir.2009). In two more recent decisions, we held that the erroneous jury instruction did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant, given the strength of the evidence in those cases and the narrow circumstances in which a firearm would be possessed “during and in relation to” drug trafficking but not “in furtherance of’ drug trafficking. United States v. Mashek, 606 F.3d 922, 931-32 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Coleman, 603 F.3d 496, 501-02 (8th Cir.2010). While the concurring opinion finds it “not surprising” that these precedents are “irreconcilable,” and characterizes them as “a tangle of conflicting prior panel opinions,” post at [1121]*11211125, we believe they can and should be harmonized. The Mashek and Coleman panels both discussed Rush-Richardson, which in turn discussed Broum, and we presume that the later panels followed the prior panel rule in good faith. Where, as here, there is a reasonable basis to reconcile decisions that have come before, that is the proper course for a panel of a multimember court.
We think the evidence against the Vanovers is comparable to the evidence in Mashek and Coleman, and that the error in this case did not affect the substantial rights of the Vanovers. In Mashek, police found loaded firearms in the defendant’s house in the same room with methamphetamine manufacturing equipment and surveillance equipment. 606 F.3d at 932. In Coleman, police seized a loaded firearm and distribution quantities of cocaine and ecstasy from a glove box directly in front of the defendant in a vehicle. 603 F.3d at 501. In this case, police found a loaded High Point pistol under a mattress in the Vanovers’ bedroom, positioned near the edge of the bed for easy access, in the same room with a saleable quantity of drugs, $4000 in cash, packaging materials, a scale, and other drug paraphernalia, and adjacent to a room in which Barbara sold methamphetamine. Under those circumstances, we see no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had been instructed correctly on the meaning of “in furtherance.”
The evidence here is stronger than in Rush-Richardson and Brown, where we held that a comparable instructional error affected a defendant’s substantial rights. In Rush-Richardson, the seized firearms were located in different rooms from measurable quantities of drugs — one in a bag in a bedroom closet and two others in a bag on top of kitchen cabinets. 574 F.3d at 912. (The opinion in Rushr-Richardson made much of the absence of fingerprints on the firearms, id., but none of these five cases involved evidence of the defendant’s fingerprints, so the point is immaterial when comparing the cases.) In Broum, one seized firearm was found along with a large amount of cash and a scale in a vehicle belonging to the defendant, but the gun and vehicle were stored at a warehouse, there is no indication that the gun was loaded, and the only controlled substance found in the vicinity was a small amount of marijuana. 560 F.3d at 761. Another firearm was found with 35 pounds of marijuana, a bullet proof vest and ammunition, but this gun was located in a storage unit rented by a co-conspirator, rather than by the defendant, and there is no indication that it was loaded.8 Id. The inference that the defendant in Broum possessed these firearms “in furtherance of’ a drug trafficking offense, while strong enough to convince some that the instructional error should have been deemed harmless, see post at 1123-24, was not as powerful as the inference in this case, [1122]*1122where the defendants kept a loaded and readily-accessible pistol in their bedroom with saleable drugs, drug trafficking material, and a substantial amount of cash. We therefore conclude that the Vanovers have failed to demonstrate a plain error warranting relief.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.