United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 18-1503
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
RICHARD VALENTINI,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Selya, and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Seth Kretzer for appellant. Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
December 10, 2019 LYNCH, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Richard
Valentini on December 18, 2017, of one count of conspiracy to
commit Hobbs Act extortion and one count of aiding and abetting
the same. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951. The defendant and his cohorts,
ostensibly members of an organized crime organization in the
Springfield, Massachusetts area, tried to extort money from Craig
Morel, the owner of an interstate towing company, through means
such as threatening Morel with death, striking Morel in the face,
and telling Morel his access to towing contracts for his business
with state and municipal governments depended on his making the
extortion payments.
The defendant primarily challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence. The evidence was more than sufficient to support
the verdict on both crimes. We also reject two legal arguments
he makes, which misinterpret the Hobbs Act. We stress again that
the "obtaining of property" element of the Act does not require
the government to prove that the defendant personally benefitted
or took possession of the property. We affirm.
I.
We recite the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict. See United States v. Pena, 910 F.3d 591, 597 (1st
Cir. 2018).
- 2 - A. The Extortion Scheme
Morel owns and operates CJ's Towing, a vehicle towing
and storage company in Springfield, Massachusetts. CJ's Towing
has had state and municipal contracts (for example, for the
Massachusetts Turnpike and Massachusetts State Police ("MSP")) and
contracts with private automobile clubs, such as Allstate
Roadside. CJ's Towing also tows and services vehicles out of
state and transports individuals whose vehicles have broken down
around Springfield across state lines to Connecticut, New York,
New Hampshire, and Vermont.
In September 2000, CJ's Towing purchased another towing
company and assumed its contracts with the MSP and Springfield
police. After that purchase, a local organized crime figure,
Frank Depergola, told Morel he would have to pay the mob to provide
kickbacks to city officials to ensure that Morel and his company
retained these contracts. Morel complied and paid. Nearly a year
later, Morel learned the kickbacks he paid went to Al Bruno, the
leader of the New York-based Genovese crime family's "crew" in
Springfield. Fearing reprisal if he stopped, Morel continued
paying the kickbacks. In October 2003, Morel stopped making those
payments after CJ's Towing lost its City of Springfield towing
contract, as it was apparent that Depergola and Bruno could not
deliver on their promises to see the contracts continued.
Attempts to collect the unpaid kickbacks from Morel ceased when
- 3 - Bruno was murdered a month later and law enforcement arrested
Anthony Arillotta, one of Bruno's associates.
Almost a decade later, in August or September of 2013,
Morel was told that a new crew, headed by Ralph Santaniello and
comprised of at least Albert Calvanese, Valentini, and John Basile,
would soon begin demanding extortion payments from him. On
September 30, 2013, Santaniello and Giovanni "John" Calabrese
approached Morel at Morel's secluded Hampden, Massachusetts home
and demanded both back payments they claimed Morel owed to Bruno
and money for future protection.1 They also threatened Morel's
life if he failed to cooperate or if he contacted law enforcement,
and Santaniello struck Morel in the face. Santaniello initially
demanded $50,000 in arrears and $4,000 per month in ongoing
payments but, after some resistance by Morel, reduced his demand
to $20,000 in arrears and $2,000 per month.
Morel then sought help from his best friend, an MSP
trooper, who referred him to another MSP officer. On October 4,
2013, the MSP fitted Morel with a hidden recording device and gave
Morel $5,000 to give as an extortion payment to the new crew and
to see how they would react to an insufficient payment. Later
1 We add that there is no evidence state and local governments knew of or participated in such extortion, only that organized crime figures in Springfield represented that they could influence the grant or termination of contracts with state and local governments.
- 4 - that day, Calabrese brought Valentini with him to collect the money
from Morel at Morel's house. Valentini is a big, strong man,
bigger than Morel, and, after Morel expressed concern about being
extorted, Valentini told him to "relax." Valentini then
guaranteed that, in return for continued payments, Morel would be
"all set" with a City of Springfield contract and would win a
Massachusetts Turnpike contract. When Morel stated he would pay,
Valentini stated that Morel was "going to get treated just as good
as Al [Bruno] . . . treated [him]." Valentini then stated that
Morel was "never going to have a problem with anybody." Calabrese
asked Morel to tell them if he had any issues with anyone, and
Valentini said: "[I]t's going to end. I guarantee you it will
end." Valentini and Calabrese told Morel they would help him in
"certain areas," e.g., help Morel obtain towing contracts in
exchange for continued payments. Specifically, Valentini stated:
"If you need help in certain areas, we can help you out." Later,
Valentini stated: "And the only time you gotta see us is when you
have a problem. . . . [Y]ou don't want to hang around with us like
every day." At Calabrese's demand, Morel then gave him $5,000.
Morel stated he could only pay the rest "piecemeal" over the next
few weeks. Calabrese responded that paying over the next week or
few weeks was acceptable, but the first payments would need to
total $20,000 and then Morel would need to pay $2,000 every month
- 5 - going forward. During this exchange about the payments, Valentini
was "nodding and kind of participating in the conversation."
Morel complained about how "steep" the payments were and
said he needed more time to pay the entire arrears sum. Valentini
said this was acceptable, so long as Morel did not take too long,
stating: "Yea. I mean, you know, not a marathon but you know you
can . . . you can do, you know." (Ellipsis in original.)
Calabrese told Morel that either Calabrese or Valentini would
return to Morel's home the following Wednesday at 4:00 p.m. for
the next payment. Valentini was part of this discussion about the
next meeting. The October 4 meeting was the only meeting with
Morel in which Valentini participated.
There were multiple additional meetings in October and
November 2013 during which the crew demanded that Morel pay the
remaining $15,000 of the agreed-upon arrears amount. At an
October 9 meeting, at the request of the MSP, Morel gave Calabrese
only $500 instead of the $5,000 he had promised. Later that day,
Calabrese and Santaniello visited Morel and angrily threatened him
with implied death and other violence. Santaniello then
aggressively opened Morel's shirt (looking for, and failing to
find, recording devices). Both Calabrese and Santaniello
threatened to "get rid of" Morel's towing contracts if Morel did
not pay the remaining portion of the $15,000 by the next Friday.
A similar incident, in which Morel intentionally did not pay as
- 6 - much as promised and Santaniello threatened Morel at a coffee shop
in East Longmeadow, occurred on October 15.
On October 16, Morel met with Depergola to confirm that
Santaniello and the others actually ran the Springfield organized
crime crew. Santaniello and Calabrese attended that meeting
unannounced. Shortly after, law enforcement observed Depergola,
Santaniello, Calabrese, and Valentini sitting at a West
Springfield restaurant and speaking in low tones.
At a meeting on October 22, 2013, at the East Longmeadow
coffee shop, Morel once more told Calabrese he would not pay the
money. This resulted in an October 23, 2013 encounter at the same
coffee shop among Morel, Depergola, Santaniello, and Calabrese, in
which the crew tried to get Morel to say that they had never struck
or threatened him. On November 8, 2013, Morel met Depergola, at
the MSP's request, and Depergola stated that Morel's ordeal would
end if he paid the remainder of the $20,000 arrears sum. Morel
left the meeting and, minutes later, MSP troopers observed that
Valentini arrived, briefly spoke with Depergola, and left.
After Morel agreed to pay the remaining sum, he met with
Depergola three more times. At a November 20, 2013 meeting, Morel
stated "four different people," including Valentini, had demanded
money from him. Depergola in turn stated that Valentini would be
at the meeting at which Morel would pay the remaining sum. On
November 25, 2013, Morel gave the remaining arrears payment to
- 7 - Depergola, Santaniello, and Calabrese, who all assured Morel they
would not seek more money from him. Valentini was not present at
the meeting.
The FBI arrested Valentini, Santaniello, Depergola, and
Calabrese on August 4, 2016.
B. Procedural History
A federal grand jury indicted Valentini, Santaniello,
Depergola, and Calabrese for conspiracy to interfere with commerce
by threats or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and
interference with commerce by threats or violence and aiding and
abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951. Valentini
went to trial. The other defendants entered into plea agreements
with the government and pleaded guilty. None of these co-
defendants testified at Valentini's trial, as none of them had
been sentenced and all had invoked their rights against self-
incrimination.
At the close of the government's case in chief, Valentini
moved for judgment of acquittal but asked the district court to
defer ruling on the motion. The jury convicted Valentini on both
counts. At a post-trial hearing, Valentini raised his pending
motion for judgment of acquittal and specifically argued that he
had not participated in the conspiracy because he had attended
only one meeting with Morel, and that the crime did not affect
interstate commerce because the money obtained belonged to law
- 8 - enforcement, not Morel. The district court denied the motion and
sentenced Valentini to a 20-month term of imprisonment. This
appeal followed.
II.
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a preserved challenge to a denial of
judgment of acquittal. See United States v. George, 761 F.3d 42,
48 (1st Cir. 2014). We make "all reasonable inferences and
credibility choices in the government's favor" and then determine
whether a rational jury could have convicted the defendant. Id.
We assume without deciding that Valentini properly preserved his
arguments and so they are accorded de novo review.2
B. Evidence of Voluntary Participation in the Extortion Scheme
Valentini's first argument on appeal is that the
evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to demonstrate his
voluntary participation in the conspiracy. He contends that the
words he spoke in the October 4 meeting were gibberish and so do
not prove that he was a member of the conspiracy to extort Morel.
He claims that neither his mere presence at the meeting nor the
2 There is some dispute as to whether Valentini failed to properly preserve his "obtaining of property" and "interstate commerce" element claims. If so, they would be accorded review for "clear and gross injustice." United States v. Marston, 694 F.3d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999)). But, as Valentini's arguments lack merit under either standard of review, we need not reach this issue.
- 9 - fact that he drove Calabrese to the meeting is sufficient evidence
for a rational jury to convict him of the conspiracy charge beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The Hobbs Act prohibits "obstruct[ing], delay[ing], or
affect[ing] commerce . . . by robbery or extortion." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a). The Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use
of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color
of official right." Id. § 1951(b)(2). To convict a defendant of
a Hobbs Act conspiracy, the government must prove that the
defendant possessed "an intent to agree and an intent to commit
the substantive offense." United States v. Morales-Machuca, 546
F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Palmer, 203
F.3d 55, 63 (1st Cir. 2000)).
A jury easily could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Valentini conspired to extort Morel. Valentini's argument
on appeal is that he spoke only meaningless gibberish at the
October 4 meeting. Not so. Valentini (1) tried to calm Morel so
he would cooperate with the extortion scheme; (2) said that the
benefits of paying the arrears would equal those Morel had received
from Bruno; (3) stated that, in exchange for the payments, he and
the rest of the crew would "end" any problems Morel experienced;
(4) assured Morel that he and the crew would not seek payments
that would prevent CJ's Towing from operating; and (5) actively
- 10 - participated in the discussion about the next meeting, at which,
according to Calabrese, either Calabrese or Valentini would
collect the next payment. From these facts, a jury could
reasonably infer that Valentini understood and knew of the original
extortion arrangement between Morel and Bruno's crew, what had
happened between Morel and Santaniello four days earlier, and what
could happen between the Springfield crew and Morel in the future
if Morel did not comply with the crew's payment demands. A jury
could conclude that Valentini was promising that he and the rest
of Santaniello's crew would treat Morel just as well as Bruno had
treated him and, in exchange for the extortion payments, they would
provide Morel protection and resolve any of Morel's problems.
Moreover, when discussing the future relationship of
Morel and the Springfield crew, Valentini used the words "we" and
"us" when referring to the crew. And when Morel, Valentini, and
Calabrese were planning when and to whom Morel should make the
next payment, Calabrese repeatedly used the term "we" and stated
that either he or Valentini would pick up the next payment (further
aligning Valentini with the extortion scheme).3 Finally, within
3 Calabrese similarly referred to Valentini's participation in the conspiracy at the October 9 meeting. Calabrese, referring to the October 4 meeting between Morel, Calabrese, and Valentini, stated: "Me and my other friend . . . made you feel so comfortable. . . . [W]e're on your side. We're here to help you, not hurt you." And, at the November 20, 2013 meeting between Morel and Depergola, Depergola stated that he would bring Valentini with him to the meeting at which Morel would pay
- 11 - minutes after a November 8, 2013 meeting between Morel and
Depergola (at which they discussed the extortion payments), the
MSP observed Valentini arrive and meet with Depergola.
This evidence permitted a rational jury to infer that
Valentini was a member of the Springfield crew that was extorting
Morel and that he intended to participate in the extortion. We
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Valentini
not only drove Calabrese to and was present at the meeting, but
also voluntarily participated in the conspiracy to extort Morel.
C. Valentini's "Obtaining of Property" Element Argument
Valentini argues that the word "obtaining" in the Hobbs
Act phrase "the obtaining of property" requires that the defendant
take personal possession of the property. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
He bases this argument on language in Sekhar v. United States, 570
U.S. 729 (2013), Scheidler v. National Organization for Women,
Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003), and United States v. Green, 350 U.S.
415 (1956), and argues that the government must prove he took
actual possession of the property. He then asserts there is no
evidence he directed property to another or received a personal
benefit.
To satisfy the "obtaining of property" element of Hobbs
Act extortion, our law is clear that the defendant need not receive
the remaining extortion payment.
- 12 - any personal benefit or take personal possession of the property4:
directing the transfer of property to a third party is enough.
United States v. Brissette, 919 F.3d 670, 678 (1st Cir. 2019)
(applying United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956), and Sekhar).
Further, this court said in United States v. Tkhilaishvili, 926
F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __ (2019):
In their view, the government had to show that the defendants sought to take possession of the extorted property for themselves or, at the very least, that they somehow sought to benefit from the extortionate transfer. This contention is simply wrong. As we recently explained, a defendant may "obtain" property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act by bringing about its transfer to a third party, regardless of whether the defendant received a personal benefit from the transfer.
Id. at 10. Valentini's proffered interpretations of Green,
Sekhar, and Scheidler are simply wrong, and we refer the reader to
Brissette and Tkhilaishvili for the reasons why.
Valentini attempts to distinguish Brissette on the
ground that it concerned the sufficiency of an indictment and not
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. But this
argument fails. Brissette did not cabin its holding to the
sufficiency of an indictment. Instead, the Brissette court
interpreted the phrase "'obtain[s] . . . property' within the
4 Accordingly, Valentini's argument that the government was required to prove that he took possession of Morel's payment(s) is without merit.
- 13 - meaning of the Hobbs Act extortion provision" and then applied
that interpretation in a sufficiency of an indictment analysis.
919 F.3d at 672, 680 (alteration and omission in original).
Valentini provides no argument why the interpretation of the Hobbs
Act differs between analyses of the sufficiency of an indictment
and of the evidence supporting a conviction. Moreover, in
Tkhilaishvili, we applied the Brissette rule to a sufficiency of
the evidence argument. 926 F.3d at 10–11.
Valentini's reliance on the rule of lenity to support
reading the "obtaining of property" element to require that the
defendant obtain actual possession of the property is similarly
unavailing, as the Hobbs Act is unambiguous as to this provision.
The rule of lenity applies "only when, after consulting traditional
canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous
statute." See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009)
(quoting United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994)). We
analyzed the text of the "obtaining of property" element in detail
in Brissette and found no ambiguity in the statute. See 919 F.3d
at 676–78. Valentini's invocation of the rule of lenity is
therefore misplaced.
A rational jury could have found that Valentini
conspired in, and aided and abetted, a scheme that brought about
the transfer of property (i.e., the arrears payments) from Morel
to third parties (i.e., members of the Springfield crew) and so
- 14 - that the government satisfied its burden with respect to this
element.
D. Valentini's "Interstate Commerce" Element Argument
Valentini separately argues that the government failed
to meet a "heightened standard" of an effect on interstate commerce
because, in his view, the criminal charges involved Morel as an
individual, not a business.
If the government proves "a realistic probability that
the attempted extortion [would have had] some slight impact on
[interstate] commerce," the Hobbs Act applies. United States v.
Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 293 (1st Cir. 1990). We have said that we
apply a "heightened standard" of scrutiny to cases involving the
extortion of an individual, rather than a business, but our close
review of the facts does not alter the de minimis "quantum of
proof" for showing the requisite effect on interstate commerce.
Tkhilaishvili, 926 F.3d at 11–12 (quoting United States v.
Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 37 n.3 (1st Cir. 2007)). Although "a
court must be 'more cautious' in applying the standard to criminal
acts directed at individuals as such acts 'often have a less
obvious effect on interstate commerce' than acts directed at
businesses," the government still only needs to show a "de minimis
impact." Id. at 12 (quoting United States v. Rodríguez-Casiano,
425 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2005)). We address two separate
questions here: (1) whether Valentini was extorting an individual
- 15 - or a business; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to
satisfy the interstate commerce element.
First, there was sufficient evidence to show that
Valentini and the Springfield crew targeted Morel as the owner of
a business. To obtain the extortion payments, Santaniello,
Calabrese, Depergola, and Valentini used both the promise of
obtaining new contracts for, and the threat of eliminating existing
contracts of, CJ's Towing, Morel's business. In consequence, we
need not address Valentini's "heightened standard" argument.
Second, there was sufficient evidence to show that
targeting Morel as the owner of CJ's Towing affected interstate
commerce. To satisfy this element, the government need only show
"that the defendant's activity 'minimally deplete[d] the assets of
an entity doing business in interstate commerce." United States
v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 337 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. Nguyen, 246 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 2001)); see also id.
("To establish a Hobbs Act violation, the government need not show
an actual deprivation of assets, but only that a deprivation of
the victim's assets would have occurred had the defendant succeeded
in the extortion."). CJ's Towing routinely operated across state
lines and serviced out-of-state customers. A rational jury could
find that successfully extorting money from Morel, in his capacity
- 16 - as the owner of CJ's Towing, could deplete the assets of CJ's
Towing and impact interstate commerce.5
Affirmed.
5 We briefly note that, although Valentini mentions in passing that the money that Morel paid to the Springfield crew came from law enforcement, he has waived the argument that he made in the district court that the origin of these funds means that the extortion could not have affected interstate commerce. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
- 17 -