United States v. Uvino

590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 2008 WL 5218004
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedDecember 19, 2008
Docket1:07-cv-00725
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 590 F. Supp. 2d 372 (United States v. Uvino) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 2008 WL 5218004 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER ON USE OF FBI REPORTS TO IMPEACH UNAVAILABLE WITNESSES

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge:

In the course of preparation for trial, it became clear that two alleged victims of assault will not be called to testify for either party because they would invoke the Fifth Amendment. The court recognizes its power to call the individuals under Federal Rule of Evidence 614(a), but prefers to avoid the unnecessary spectacle of their invoking the Fifth Amendment in the jury’s presence.

•Both the individual’s voices have been heard by the jury through the govern *374 ment’s evidence, consisting of a tape taken from a recording device worn by a confidential informant during the alleged assault. The individuals are hearsay de-clarants whose excited utterances and statements have been admitted via the tape. The defendants maintain that they should be allowed to attack the credibility of the two individuals, in part because their screams of pain were feigned.

The government offered to stipulate to the admission by one of the individuals contained in an FBI agent’s report (“Form 302”) that he had faked a seizure during the course of the taped assault. The court informed the parties that it would consider admitting other portions of the 302s as evidence that would bear on the credibility of the two individuals. See Fed.R.Evid. 104(a) (“[plreliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court”).

Federal Rule of Evidence 806 provides: When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declar-ant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declar-ant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the de-clarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain.

By permitting any impeachment evidence that would be admissible had the declarant testified, “Rule 806 renders Rule 608’s impeachment rules applicable to a declarant’s out-of-court statements.” United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir.2000), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). See, e.g., United States v. Delvi, 275 F.Supp.2d 412 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (after admitting statements of victim as “excited utterances” under Rule 803(2), the court permitted defendants to impeach him under Rule 806 through evidence of the victim’s criminal history, his drug use prior to making the admitted statement, and his later inability to identify a defendant from a photo array).

Federal Rule of Evidence 608 permits impeachment by introduction of evidence of the character for untruthfulness of a witness. While Rule 608(b) ordinarily does not permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct for such purposes, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested that extrinsic evidence of specific instances may be admissible through Rule 806, since that rule applies only “when the declarant has not testified and there has by definition been no cross-examination, and resort to extrinsic evidence may be the only means of presenting such evidence to the jury.” United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 570 n. 8 (2d Cir.1988).

The defendants prepared a list of sixteen selections from the 302s covering FBI interviews of the two individuals, requesting that they be admitted in order to attack the credibility of the alleged victims under Federal Rule of Evidence 806. The government objected to some selections and argued that some should be expanded to include necessary context. See Gov’t’s Letter of Dec. 4, 2008, Docket Entry No. 217. At a conference, the parties finalized the portions of the 302s to be entered in evidence, the court having ruled on objections and included additional portions of the 302s necessary for completeness. See Fed.R.Evid. 106 (“When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or record *375 ed statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it”).

Had the government applied in the first instance to introduce material from the 302s, the request would have been denied. The government’s offering of the 302s directly would constitute a violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Cf also Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) (declaration against penal interest hearsay exception) (statement of criminal liability was not one “that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made ... unless believing it to be true” because declarants had reason to curry favor and obtain governmental protection). The government agent creating the documents may have had reason to slant the facts in the government’s favor, reducing the reliability of the evidence if introduced by that party. The government also had the option to make these witnesses available by granting them immunity.

Admission of statements from the 302s at the request of the defendants is appropriate here. There is no Cratvford problem, because the evidence will not be offered against the defendants, but rather by the defendants. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In admitting evidence under Rule 806, “[sjpecific issues of whether a declarant’s past conduct may actually cast doubt on the credibility of [his] statements must be determined by comparing the circumstances of the past conduct with those surrounding the hearsay statements admitted into evidence. Such assessments, like determinations of relevance and rulings as to the proper scope of cross-examination, must be left to the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Friedman, 854 F.2d at 570 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 2008 WL 5218004, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-uvino-nyed-2008.