United States v. United States Steel Corporation

233 F. Supp. 154, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8984, 1964 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,214
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 12, 1964
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 233 F. Supp. 154 (United States v. United States Steel Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 233 F. Supp. 154, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8984, 1964 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,214 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

Opinion

WEINFELD, District Judge.

This is a motion joined in by all defendants, eight corporations and two individuals, for an order pursuant to Rule 21(b) 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure transferring this case to the Western District of Pennsylvania at Pittsburgh. One of the individual defendants, in addition to reliance upon matters advanced generally by all defendants to support the transfer, moves separately on a ground singular to him.

The indictment charges that the defendants and others, over a six year period, from 1955 to 1961, were participants in a conspiracy to eliminate price competition in the sale of carbon steel sheets in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 The details of the indictment are summarized in the opinion filed this day denying the defendants’ motion for its dismissal and need not be repeated here. The “Jurisdiction and Venue” allegation of the indictment sets forth that the conspiracy was carried out in part in this district. The indictment specifically alleges that the defendants and the co-conspirators effectuated the alleged conspiracy by means specifically enumerated therein at meetings at hotels in New York City within this district, among other places. In addition to these indictment allegations government counsel has submitted an affidavit wherein he states that most of the trial evidence will relate to acts and conduct of the defendants, corporate and individual, and other alleged co-conspirators which occurred in this city and that in other respects this district is intimately connected with the offense charged in the indictment. The Govern *156 ment proposed that the Court examine the grand jury minutes in camera, but the defendants objected unless the minutes were disclosed to them. Without passing upon the validity of the defendants’ objection, the Court has decided not to inspect the minutes and for the purposes of this motion accepts the Government’s statement that most of the acts upon which it relies to sustain the indictment charge were committed in this district. The Government concedes that venue also could lie in the Western District of Pennsylvania, as well as many other districts throughout the country. Accordingly Rule 21(b) is properly invoked and the remaining question is whether sufficient cause has been shown to satisfy the Court that the proposed transfer is “in the interest of justice”- — a determination which rests upon the facts of each case. 3

Pittsburgh, the seat of the proposed transferee court, is the site of the principal place of business of three defendants, National Steel, Jones & Laughlin and United States Steel Corporation. 4 The other five corporate defendants have their principal offices in other districts: Great Lakes Steel at Detroit, Michigan (Eastern District of Michigan) ; Armco Steel at Middletown, Ohio (Southern District of Ohio); Republic Steel at Cleveland, Ohio (Northern District of Ohio); Wheeling Steel at Wheeling, West Virginia (Northern District of West Virginia), and Bethlehem Steel at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (Eastern District of Pennsylvania). All eight corporate defendants maintain offices in this district for one purpose or another.

The two individual defendants reside in the Pittsburgh area, but one, the President and Chief Operating officer of Jones & Laughlin, is a comparatively recent resident there, since March 1962. During the indictment period, 1955 to 1961, while employed by Bethlehem Steel Company, he lived at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

To set forth the minutiae of detail contained in the voluminous affidavits submitted by each defendant not only would prolong this opinion but serve no purpose since, in urging the transfer, each relies upon general grounds which fall within fairly well defined categories. These include principally: (1) the location of the principal place of business and the focus of sheet mill operations; (2) the location of files, records and correspondence; (3) the location of executives and personnel of defendants, as well as potential witnesses; and (4) easier accessibility to the proposed transferee court. However much the factual details have been elaborated by the defendants, the nub of their claim is that a transfer is commanded “in the interest of justice,” not only because the greater convenience of the defendants would be served, but to refuse it would impose an undue and onerous burden upon them in the preparation and presentation of their defense, seriously hamper and disrupt the functional operation of each corporation and harshly interfere with the normal daily habits and activities of the *157 individual defendants, key personnel and other employees who may be called upon to participate either in defense preparation or at the trial.

The claims are broad but the facts fail to sustain them. At the outset it must be recognized that every litigation, particularly a criminal prosecution, imposes burdens upon a defendant and brings in its wake dislocation from normal occupational and personal activities. The burdens imposed and inconvenience suffered vary from ease to case and from defendant to defendant within a case; it is a matter of degree depending upon a variety of circumstances. In this respect this case is no different from any other. The Court is satisfied that no matter where this trial is conducted, there will be inconvenience to the parties, their executives, their counsel and their witnesses. But mere inconvenience, interference with one’s routine occupational and personal activities, and other incidental burdens which normally follow when one is called upon to resist a serious charge do not ipso facto make the necessary showing that a transfer is required in the interest of justice. 5 As a general rule a criminal prosecution should be retained in the original district. To warrant a transfer from the district where an indictment was properly returned it should appear that a trial there would be so unduly burdensome that fairness requires the transfer to another district of proper venue where a trial would be less burdensome; and, necessarily, any such determination must take into account any countervailing considerations which may militate against removal.

The fact that three of the defendants maintain principal offices in the proposed transferee district furnishes no ground, in and of itself, for granting the motion; indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that this factor has no independent significance. 6 Nor is the defendants’ position bolstered by the bare fact that these three defendants direct their carbon steel sheet operations from Pittsburgh. The other five defendants, located at varying distances from Pittsburgh, can make no such claim but contend that their headquarters where such activities are centered are sufficiently close to Pittsburgh to make it a more desirable and convenient forum than New York. So too the circumstance stressed by the defendants that carbon steel sheet is manufactured in and about the Western District of Pennsylvania and not in this district is without substantial importance on this motion.

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Bluebook (online)
233 F. Supp. 154, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8984, 1964 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-united-states-steel-corporation-nysd-1964.