United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc.

457 F. Supp. 661, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16057
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedAugust 11, 1978
DocketCr 77-00142 L
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 457 F. Supp. 661 (United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 661, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16057 (W.D. Ky. 1978).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALLEN, Chief Judge.

On July 22, 1977 an indictment was returned against Ashland Oil, Inc., Cargill, Inc., Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., Reliance Universal, Inc., Arthur K. Klobe, and Lyle J. Rockenbach, charging them with conspiracy to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act as amended. Defendant Klobe is Vice President and General Manager of the Chemical Products Division of Cargill and defendant Rockenbach is Vice President of Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.

Defendants, Ashland Oil, Inc., Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. and Reliance Universal, Inc., have entered pleas of nolo contendere to the indictment and sentences have been imposed upon them. Defendant Cargill is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Minneapolis; defendant Klobe is a resident of Minnetonka, Minnesota; and defendant Rockenbach is a resident of White Plains, New York.

On June 23, 1978 defendant Klobe moved to transfer this action to the District of Minnesota and filed, in support thereof, an affidavit by a general physician, Dr. Nelson, which recited that Klobe was suffering from hypertension in December, 1976, and has been under treatment since that time with anti-hypertensive drugs. Dr. Nelson alleges that, in his opinion, a lengthy trial in Louisville with the added stress of travel *663 and absence from the Klobe home and community would be more detrimental to his health than would a trial in Minnesota.

Rule 21(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:

“Transfer In Other Cases. For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the court upon motion of the defendant may transfer the proceeding as to him or any one or more of the counts thereof to another district.”

This rule has been construed as being, in essence, the same as former Rule 21(b) which was interpreted in Platt v. Minnesota Mining Company, 376 U.S. 240, 84 S.Ct. 769, 11 L.Ed.2d 674 (1964). See Jones v. Gasch, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 404 F.2d 1231 (1967).

In Platt, supra, the court noted that the parties and the Court of Appeals both agreed that the following factors should be considered:

1. Location of corporation defendants.
2. Location of possible witnesses.
3. Location of events likely to be an issue.
4. Location of documents and records likely to be involved.
5. Disruption of defendant’s business unless case is transferred.
6. Expense to the parties.
7. Location of counsel.
8. Relative accessibility of place of trial.
9. Docket condition of each district or division involved.

These nine factors are pertinent to our decision. In addition, we will comment on the question of the health of defendant Klobe, and the fact that this Court has had this action pending before it for a year, and also has pending before it two potential civil class actions which name the four corporate defendants in the criminal action as defendants, as well as many other corporations.

First, we will dispose of the United States’ contention that the motion to transfer under these rules may be made only on or before arraignment or at such other time as the Court or these rules may prescribe. While technically, the time for the defendants to move for transfer has long gone by, the reason for the delay is obvious and justifiable. When the indictment was returned and the pleas of not guilty were entered by all defendants, two of the corporate defendants were Kentucky corporations, although one of them, Ashland Oil, Inc., conducted its chemical business through a corporation located in Ohio. When these two Kentucky corporations and the New York corporation, Reichhold, changed their pleas to nolo contendere, there were left in the case a Minnesota defendant, Klobe; a corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota, Cargill, Inc.; and a defendant living in White Plains, New York, Rockenbach. We believe that the motion under these circumstances is timely made.

The second factor which requires discussion is the condition of defendant Klobe’s health. From an examination of the cases, it seems that federal courts have not been liberal in granting a change in venue or continuances to defendants who allegedly are suffering from ill health. See United States v. West Coast News Company, 216 F.Supp. 911 (W.D.Mich.1963); petition for mandamus dismissed and stay denied sub nom. Aday v. United States District Court for Western District of Michigan, 318 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1963). See, also, United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427 (2nd Cir. 1967), and Wellman v. United States, 227 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1955), vacated on other grounds, 354 U.S. 931, 77 S.Ct. 1403, 1 L.Ed.2d 1535, on remand, 253 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1958), and United States v. Sweig, 316 F.Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y.1970).

In the instant case, it does not appear to this Court that defendant Klobe’s health is so severely impaired that he cannot stand trial in Louisville. He apparently is not incapacitated from carrying on his duties on behalf of Cargill in Minnesota, duties which involve heavy responsibilities. He is not bedridden nor has he been hospitalized. He would be standing trial in a city which is well known for having the oldest medical school West of the Alleghenies and for its many excellent practitioners of medicine. *664 The Court always has in mind the physical well-being of litigants who are attending trial and has not hesitated to continue actions which have already started where there is a bona fide showing of any illness which would prevent a defendant from attending the trial. See United States v. Kaye, et al., CR 77-00087 (W.D.Ky.1978).

Coming now to the criteria set out in Platt, supra, we have already discussed the location of the parties and in that connection note that Minnesota is some 700 rail miles from Louisville and approximately some 1,350 rail miles from New York, whereas, Louisville is approximately 860 rail miles from New York. In a similar vein, the Court notes that Cleveland, where the Antitrust Division of the United States, which is prosecuting this case, is located is some 725 rail miles from Minnesota and 375 rail miles from Louisville. The Court realizes that in each instance cited the distance by airplane would be somewhat smaller.

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Bluebook (online)
457 F. Supp. 661, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16057, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-ashland-oil-inc-kywd-1978.