United States v. United States Steel Corp.

223 F. 55, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1428
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJune 3, 1915
DocketNo. 6214
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 223 F. 55 (United States v. United States Steel Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1428 (D.N.J. 1915).

Opinions

BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.

We may say in advance that all the members of this court are in agreement as to the decree that will be entered in this case, although we are not in complete accord concerning every step by which that result is reached.

[58]*58The subject-matter of the litigation is of such magnitude and complexity, and the record is of such size, that the effort to set bounds to this discussion has not been easy. So many questions, large or small, were laid before us in the oral argument, and so many are considered in the extended briefs of counsel, that we cannot hope to give them all a-place in such discussion. But we trust that one or other of the two following opinions will pay adequate attention to the most_ important, with the result of avoiding repetition as far as possible, while presenting somewhat different aspects of the controlling principles by which the case must be decided. Without a needless expansion of the discussion, it would scarcely be practicable to take up each detail for the purpose of pointing out just where we are in complete agreement, and where certain divergencies of view exist. We have thought it best, therefore, to adopt the course referred to, believing that the two opinions will cover the whole case, and will also sufficiently indicate the reasons that have led us to a common conclusion.

This case — a proceeding under the Sherman Anti-Trust Taw — is largely one of business facts. The construction of that statute has been settled by the Supreme .Court. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619, 34 T. R. A. (N. S.) 834, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United States, v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663. That construction has been applied in this circuit in the Keystone Watch Case (D. C.) 218 Fed. 502, and the Powder Trust Case (C. C.) 188 Fed. 127. It follows, therefore, that our duty is largely one of finding the facts and to those facts applying settled law. The act in question provides:

“Section 1. Every contract, combination in the .form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract, or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.” Comp. St. 1913, § 8820.
’“See. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.” Section 8821.
“Sec. 4. The several Circuit Courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition, the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.” Section 8823.
“Sec. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any Circuit Court of the United [59]*59States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Section S829.

When the Constitution of the United States conferred on Congress the right “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states,” its purpose was not to fetter, but to further and foster, trade. This constitutional purpose to promote lawful trade by protecting it from unlawful restraint is avowed in the title of the act, viz., “An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,” and, as held by the Supreme Court (Standard Oil Case, supra), “one of the fundamental purposes of the statute is to protect, not to destroy, rights of property.”

[1] Now unlawful restraints of trade are of three kinds, past, present, and future. As to present and future restraints, Congress by section 4 empowered “the Attorney General to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations,” and to that end invested the courts “with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act.” The jurisdiction here conferred is the chancery power of injunction, a power which is used to restrain present wrongs or prevent threatened ones. This is shown by the act providing even for temporary preliminary restraining orders while the case is being heard. “The function of an injunction is to afford preventive relief, not to redress alleged wrongs which have been committed already.” Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U. S. 119, 12 Sup. Ct. 659, 36 L. Ed. 368, cited in Black v. Jackson, 177 U. S. 360, 20 Sup. Ct. 648, 44 L. Ed. 801. Applying that general principle, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Standard Oil Case, supra, citing Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, on page 377, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518, said:

“It may be conceded that ordinarily, where it was found that acts had been done in violation of the statute, adequate measure of relief would result from restraining the doing of such acts in the future.”

In view of what was held by this court: in the Powder Case, supra, it scarcely need be again said by us that where the evil effects of past undue restraint or monopoly continue to he effective and harmful when the proceeding is begun — that is, where “the inherent nature of the contemplated acts” is such as to bring about their continuance and repetition, or where, to use the expressive language of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil Case, 221 U. S. 75, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 834, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734, a “perennial violation” of the act exists — the jurisdiction to restrain present and prevent future violations vests under this section, and if, to prevent continuance of such continuing wrongs, a dissolution of the unlawful combination is necessary to make the relief effective, the original combination will be dissolved.

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Bluebook (online)
223 F. 55, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-united-states-steel-corp-njd-1915.