United States v. Undray Lowery

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: April 29, 2026
• Docket: 25-13332
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13332 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 1 of 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13332 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

UNDRAY LAMOND LOWERY, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:25-cr-00208-RAH-KFP-1 ____________________

Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Undray Lowery appeals his 120-month sentence after plead- ing guilty to one count of felon in possession of a firearm and am- munition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lowery argues on USCA11 Case: 25-13332 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 25-13332

appeal that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court clearly erred in finding that he possessed the fire- arm in question in connection with another felony offense, and thus, it erred in imposing a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Lowery also argues that his sentence is substan- tively unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer- ential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Cabezas-Mon- tano, 949 F.3d 567, 605 (11th Cir. 2020). This standard “allows a range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). Under this standard, “[w]e will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable ‘if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies out- side the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’” Id. (quoting Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190). “A district court does not have to give all the factors equal weight, and it has discretion ‘to attach great weight to one factor over others.’” United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015)). In general, a district court need not state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors, nor discuss those factors. United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, USCA11 Case: 25-13332 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 3 of 5

25-13332 Opinion of the Court 3

1265 (11th Cir. 2023). Rather, it is enough that the record reflects that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and the par- ties’ arguments. Id. “A district court’s failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that the court erroneously ignored or failed to consider the evidence.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotations and citation omitted). Fi- nally, “[a] sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2014). We held in United States v. Keene that we will not rule on the validity of a disputed guideline adjustment if (1) the district court stated it would have given the same sentence regardless of the out- come of the disputed guideline provision; and (2) assuming that there was an error, the sentence is still reasonable. 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). We have described this concept in later de- cisions as “a species of the harmless error doctrine.” Olson, 127 F.4th at 1275 (“If the asserted error did not matter to the result in the district court, whether there was error doesn’t matter in the appeal.”). Stated more simply, we will generally not vacate a de- fendant’s sentence where “‘(1) the district court states it would have imposed the same sentence, even absent an alleged error, and (2) the sentence is substantively reasonable.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2020)). At the sec- ond part of the analysis, we must decide whether the defendant’s sentence is still substantively reasonable if the guideline dispute “ha[d] been decided in the way the defendant argued and the advi- sory range reduced accordingly.” Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349. USCA11 Case: 25-13332 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 25-13332

Here, the district court expressly stated at Lowery’s sentenc- ing hearing that even if it had “sustained the defendant’s objec- tion[],” it would have imposed the same 120-month sentence. As such, this Court will not vacate and remand for resentencing so long as Lowery’s sentence would be substantively reasonable if the contested four-level § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement “ha[d] been de- cided in the way [Lowery] argued and the advisory range reduced accordingly.” Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349. The district court calculated Lowery’s total offense level to be 23, so without the four-level § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, his offense level would have been 19. As Lowery argues, a total offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of IV would have yielded a guideline range of 46-57 months. U.S.S.G. § 5A. Because Lowery’s 120-month sentence would still be substantively reasonable with a guideline range of 46-57 months, we affirm his sentence. See Olson, 127 F.4th at 1275. To begin, the district court expressly stated that it consid- ered the parties’ arguments and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors. See Oudomsine, 57 F.4th at 1265. The district court relied heavily on Lowery’s lengthy and violent criminal history. It recounted Low- ery’s convictions for threatening to kill his own grandmother twice, pouring gasoline on the front porch of a house and threat- ening to set it on fire, threatening to kill law enforcement officers, choking a woman, and stabbing a woman. The district court stated that it considered this criminal history alongside the need to protect the public and the need to deter Lowery from committing future USCA11 Case: 25-13332 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 5 of 5

25-13332 Opinion of the Court 5

crimes. It also imposed its sentence to promote respect for the law, finding that Lowery demonstrated “a lack of acceptance” and “a lack of remorse.” The district court was permitted to attach greater weight to these sentencing factors over others, and it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Olson, 127 F.4th at 1276. Lowery argues that the district court failed to adequately consider mitigating evi- dence such as the temporal remoteness of his criminal convictions, but the fact that the district court may not have explicitly explained its consideration of Lowery’s mitigating evidence “does not indi- cate that the court erroneously ignored or failed to consider the evidence.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356 (quotations and citation omit- ted). The record indicates that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments, which was sufficient. Id.; Oudomsine, 57 F.4th at 1265. Finally, Lowery’s 120-month sen- tence is well below the statutory maximum of 180 months, another indicator of its reasonableness. Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1362. In sum, Lowery’s 120-month sentence, imposed after nu- merous convictions for violent acts against others, does not “‘lie[] outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of th[is] case.’” Riley, 995 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190). Because Lowery’s 120-month sentence is substantively reasonable even without the application of the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) en- hancement, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.