United States v. Troy Huff

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: August 12, 2024
• Docket: 23-5428
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0353n.06

No. 23-5428

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Aug 12, 2024 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY TROY D. HUFF, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )

Before: SILER, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

At the scene of a controlled drug buy, police searched Defendant Troy Huff’s truck without

a warrant and found drugs and a gun. Huff moved to suppress that evidence, arguing a lack of

probable cause for the search. The district court denied Huff’s motion, concluding that the totality

of the circumstances—including two tips from known informants, Facebook messages from Huff

setting up the proposed drug sale, and Huff’s arrival at the agreed-upon location for the drug sale—

established probable cause. We agree and affirm.

I.

In July 2021, an incarcerated informant told Lake Cumberland Area Drug Task Force

Director Wayne Conn that Huff was selling large amounts of methamphetamine and other

illegal drugs. She also reported that Huff often drove rented vehicles and kept his drugs in a safe

within the car. No. 23-5428, United States v. Huff

Two months later, a paid confidential informant told Wayne County Sheriff’s Deputy

Derek Dennis that Huff was dealing drugs and that he wanted to sell her an ounce of

methamphetamine. The confidential informant had a reliable track record—she previously had

provided accurate information leading to criminal convictions and drug seizures, and she had made

undercover drug buys for law enforcement. So Director Conn and Deputy Dennis decided to set

up a “buy-bust” operation. They asked the confidential informant to arrange the purchase of

methamphetamine from Huff.

Using Facebook Messenger, the confidential informant communicated with Huff and came

to an agreement: he would sell her an ounce of methamphetamine in the parking lot of Hicks

Grocery. Huff stated he would arrive in a white Hyundai. The confidential informant

contemporaneously relayed the conversation to Deputy Dennis, sending him text messages about

and screenshots of her communications with Huff. Because Huff’s Facebook account was in his

own name, the screenshots showed that the conversation was with “Troy,” and Huff’s picture

accompanied his messages.

After arriving at Hicks Grocery, the confidential informant waited for Huff while Director

Conn surveilled the parking lot in an unmarked car. From his vantage point, Director Conn could

see any vehicles entering or exiting the parking lot, and he had a copy of Huff’s driver’s license

with him to identify Huff. Deputy Dennis waited close by in another vehicle with his K-9, Dunya.

Huff arrived when expected, though he was driving a gray pickup truck instead of a white

Hyundai. As anticipated, he parked alongside the confidential informant’s car, positioning his

truck so that the driver’s side windows were next to one another. Director Conn testified that, in

his law-enforcement experience, he had “seen several drug transactions take place with the cars in

that” otherwise unusual position.

-2- No. 23-5428, United States v. Huff

Recognizing Huff, Director Conn pulled his unmarked car behind Huff’s truck and

activated his emergency lights. Both Director Conn and Huff exited their vehicles as Deputy

Dennis approached and began speaking with Huff. Huff told Deputy Dennis that he did not know

the driver of the car next to which he had just parked and explained that the truck he was driving

was a rental.

Huff declined to consent to a search, so Deputy Dennis deployed Dunya to sniff around

Huff’s truck. Dunya alerted at the driver’s side door, and Deputy Dennis then searched the truck.

Inside, he found illegal drugs and a loaded gun.

After Huff was charged with drug and gun offenses, he moved to suppress the evidence

recovered from the search and “the fruits thereof” (including incriminating statements he made at

the scene). The district court denied Huff’s motion following an evidentiary hearing. Huff then

conditionally pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances (in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense (in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)), preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression

motion. The district court sentenced him to 300 months in prison. This appeal followed.

II.

When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we review the district court’s legal

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477,

480 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of probable cause is a legal conclusion reviewed de novo.

United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1994). We may affirm on any basis supported

by the record, United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 417 (6th Cir. 2008), and we must view the

evidence “in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision,” Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 480

(citation omitted).

-3- No. 23-5428, United States v. Huff

The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures” by police.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Its protection extends to searches of vehicles. United States v. Brooks,

987 F.3d 593, 599 (6th Cir. 2021). Generally, for a search to be reasonable, police must have

obtained a judicial warrant authorizing it. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).

Without a warrant, “a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant

requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). One such exception—the automobile

exception—allows officers to search a car and containers within it if they have probable cause to

believe that each contains evidence of a crime. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991);

United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2001).

An officer has probable cause when there is a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime

will be found in the place to be searched based on the totality of the circumstances. Florida v.

Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (citation omitted). This is a “flexible,” “practical,” and

“common-sensical” standard, focused on assessing “probabilities in particular factual contexts.”

Id. To determine whether probable cause exists, we examine the “objective facts known to the

officers at the time of the search.” United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 648 (6th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted). We analyze those facts from the objective perspective of a reasonable police

officer, see United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391–92 (6th Cir. 1993), but we also recognize

the relevance of officers’ “experience and specialized training” that may help them draw

conclusions from “the cumulative information available to them,” United States v. Shank, 543 F.3d

309, 315 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Among the sources of information that can support probable cause are tips police receive

from informants. Tips “come in many shapes and sizes” and “may vary greatly in their value and

reliability.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Thus, as we do with the probable-cause

-4- No. 23-5428, United States v. Huff

inquiry generally, we apply a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determine whether a tip

was reliable enough to support probable cause. Id. at 238–39.

Tips from known informants are “entitled to far greater weight than those of an anonymous

source” because known informants are subject to prosecution if they provide false information.

United States v. May, 399 F.3d 817, 824–25 (6th Cir. 2005). And information from sources who

have provided reliable information in the past counts “appreciably more” than information from

an informant whose reliability is untested. United States v. Stokes, 742 F. App’x 947, 951 (6th

Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Martin, 526 F.3d 926, 937 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, when it

comes to tips bearing such “hallmarks of reliability,” less independent corroboration is needed to

establish probable cause. See Stokes, 742 F. App’x at 952; see also United States v. Dyer, 580

F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2009)).

Here, the foundation for probable cause began to form two months before the buy-bust

operation, when the known, incarcerated informant told Director Conn about Huff’s

methamphetamine dealing. The information she provided was detailed and specific, noting that

Huff often drove rented vehicles while transporting methamphetamine that he kept in a safe.

Next, the confidential informant—who had a track record of helping law enforcement and

providing accurate information—told Deputy Dennis that Huff wanted to sell her

methamphetamine. The officers set up the buy-bust operation and obtained more information that

corroborated the tips. For instance, they received screenshots of the confidential informant’s

messages with Huff setting up the drug transaction.

Sure enough, Huff arrived at the agreed-upon location for the drug sale. Director Conn

recognized him from his driver’s license picture even though he was driving a different type of

vehicle than expected. Huff proceeded to park his truck next to the confidential informant’s car in

-5- No. 23-5428, United States v. Huff

a position suggesting a drug deal. When the officers confronted Huff, he stated that the truck was

a rental, and he claimed that he did not know the person next to whom he had just parked.

At that point, “an objective observer exercising common sense” would conclude that there

was a fair probability that drugs would be found inside the truck. United States v. Strickland, 144

F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 1998). The totality of the circumstances—including the known informants’

tips, Huff’s communications setting up the drug sale, his arrival at the agreed-upon location of the

drug sale, his suspicious parking position, and his claim that he did not know the driver of the car

next to which he had just parked—established at least a “fair probability” that a search of Huff’s

vehicle would reveal illegal drugs. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Thus, probable cause was established

even before Deputy Dennis deployed Dunya.1

Huff resists this conclusion, arguing that the confidential informants’ tips were

insufficiently corroborated. We disagree.

First, Huff argues that although the Facebook messages stated that he would arrive in a

white Hyundai, he instead arrived in a gray pickup truck. But this detail hardly affects the

probability of whether drugs would be found in whichever vehicle Huff chose to drive to the

agreed-upon location of the drug sale. Director Conn recognized Huff from his photograph when

he pulled into the parking lot, obviating any need to identify him by the type of vehicle he was

driving. And Huff’s arrival in a different type of vehicle fit with what the officers already knew

about Huff’s drug-sale practices—he often used rental vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia,

982 F.3d 844, 845–46 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that an informant’s tip “was consistently

corroborated” even though the suspect arrived in a different vehicle than predicted).

1 Because we conclude that police had probable cause even before the police deployed Dunya, we need not reach Huff’s additional argument that Dunya’s alert was unreliable. -6- No. 23-5428, United States v. Huff

Second, Huff contends that officers lacked probable cause because they neither observed a

drug sale nor heard any mention of drug activity before intervening. But “[t]he law does not

require that an illegal act be completed for sufficient probable cause to develop; it merely requires

the existence of ‘facts that . . . could lead a reasonable person to believe that an illegal act has

occurred or is about to occur.’” United States v. Gill, 685 F.3d 606, 610 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Strickland, 144 F.3d at 416). The police had seen the Facebook messages between Huff and the

confidential informant setting up the drug sale. By the time Huff parked the truck directly beside

the confidential informant in a position suggesting a drug deal, the police had probable cause that

there would be drugs inside Huff’s truck.

Finally, Huff contends that “Director Conn and Deputy Dennis did not believe that they

had probable cause to search Huff’s vehicle based on the ‘buy-bust’ operation alone,” citing

Director Conn’s testimony that Dunya’s alert ultimately provided probable cause to search Huff’s

vehicle. But officers’ subjective beliefs about when probable cause was established are “irrelevant

in determining whether probable cause exists.” United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 457 (6th

Cir. 1991). “Just as a subjective belief by the arresting officer would not establish probable cause

where none existed, a subjective belief by the arresting officer cannot destroy probable cause

where it exists.” Id.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment and denial of the motion to

suppress.

-7-