BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Cecil Ferguson appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress a firearm and evidence of drug trafficking found, following a traffic stop, in a car in which he was a passenger. Ferguson argues that the district court erred in finding that the traffic stop was not unlawfully pretextual and in not suppressing the evidence because of the unlawful stop. For the reasons discussed below, we adopt a new test in this Circuit for determining when a traffic stop should be deemed unlawfully pretextual. Applying this test to the stop of defendant Ferguson, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
I.
At 1:30 a.m. on October 18, 1990, police officer Ernie Writesman of the Memphis Police Department was making a routine check on the parking lot of the Royal Oaks Motel in Memphis, Tennessee, in a marked patrol car. As Writesman was talking to a security guard, defendant Ferguson pulled into the parking lot in a 1977 blue Lincoln. He was followed by Leonard Lester, who was driving a 1977 Ford. Ferguson and Lester parked opposite each other near room 203. Ferguson got out of the Lincoln and began walking down the sidewalk abutting a row of rooms, toward the back of the parking lot. As Ferguson approached Writesman and the security guard, the security guard asked Ferguson if he could help him. Ferguson said that he was looking for room 212. The guard gave Ferguson directions, and Ferguson proceeded on.
Officer Writesman then got into his patrol car and drove toward the front of the motel, passing by the Ford, which was still sitting in the parking lot. Writesman observed Lester, who was still in the Ford, lie down across the front seat of the car in an apparent attempt to hide. His suspicions aroused, Writesman went across the street and positioned his patrol car so that he could observe the two individuals.
Writesman saw Ferguson get into the Ford with Lester and drive to a spot in front of a room other than room 212. Ferguson went into room 410 and came out about five to seven minutes later. The two then drove back around to the Lincoln. Ferguson took a gray briefcase from the Lincoln and got back into the Ford, and the men drove back to room 410. Ferguson went back into room 410 with the briefcase, came out about two to five minutes later still carrying the briefcase, and got back into the Ford. The two left the parking lot and drove down the street, leaving the Lincoln behind.
[387]*387Officer Writesman followed the Ford and upon noticing that there was no visible license plate on the car — a violation of a Memphis traffic ordinance — Writesman pulled the car over. Lester, who was driving, got out of the Ford and approached Writesman. Writesman first asked Lester for his driver’s license, which Lester gave him, and then Writesman asked what the two men were doing. Lester explained that he had been at a motel with a young lady for about an hour, and he asked why Writesman was stopping him. The record does not reflect whether Writesman answered Lester’s question. Apparently, Writesman did not ask about the license plate or issue any citation for failure to display a license plate, but instead put Lester into the back of his squad car and called for a back-up. After the back-up arrived, Writesman approached the Ford, where he saw Ferguson, still sitting in the passenger seat, with a .22 automatic pistol lying next to him on the front seat of the car. Writesman then arrested Ferguson. In searching the car and the briefcase incident to Ferguson’s arrest, police found drug notes, plastic bags, scales with white powder on them, and a plastic bag containing envelopes of cocaine. It was’not until later that Writesman discovered that the license plate for the car had been lying on the rear shelf of the car, although it was not visible from the outside of the car unless one were standing next to the rear window.
Ferguson was indicted by a grand jury for possession with intent to distribute about 33.5 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and carrying or using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He filed a motion to suppress the firearm and the evidence of drug trafficking, claiming that the stop was pretextual and therefore illegal. At the hearing before a magistrate judge, Officer Writesman testified that the “number one” reason he stopped the car was because of the individuals’ activity at the motel, although he stated that he also stopped it for the license plate violation. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied, and the district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation over Ferguson’s objections.
The district court found that Ferguson was seized when Officer Writesman pulled him over and that the activities observed by the officer at the motel were enough to support a stop and detention based on reasonable suspicion. The court also found that the stop was not pretextual, noting that a pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person or place in connection with an unrelated crime as to which they lack reasonable suspicion. The district court held that pretext must be determined through an objective assessment of the officer’s actions and that this stop was not pretextual under either of the approaches that courts have employed to make this assessment. Under the first approach, Writesman was authorized to stop the vehicle for a license tag violation and had probable cause to believe that such a violation had occurred. Under the second approach, Writesman routinely stopped cars that did not have visible license plates, and there was no evidence that a reasonable officer would not have stopped the car. Therefore, it denied the motion to suppress.
The district court then accepted a negotiated plea agreement that permitted Ferguson to enter a conditional plea of guilty to the drug charge, while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Pursuant to the agreement, the government dismissed the firearm charge. Ferguson was sentenced to 168 months of imprisonment.
Ferguson appealed his conviction and sentence, and a panel of this Court reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence because it found that the traffic stop was unlawfully pretextual. We vacated the panel’s decision in order to address en banc this issue: “Where an officer has probable cause to make a traffic stop, and also has motivations that are unrelated to the traffic stop such as an intent to investigate suspicious activity, may the stop be deemed unconstitutional because it is pretextual?”1
[388]*388II.
A.
Whether a traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment must be evaluated in the same manner as other alleged violations of that Amendment: by undertaking “an objective assessment of an officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him. The language of the Amendment itself proscribes only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723 (1978). And “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Id. at 138, 98 S.Ct. at 1723.
The circuits have generally taken two approaches to the required objective assessment of the officer’s actions. One of those approaches, commonly referred to as the “would” test, requires a determination of “whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation.” United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.1986). The Tenth Circuit has followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit and adopted the “would” test, holding that Smith’s reasoning that a court should ask
“not whether the officer could validly have made the stop, but whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose” ... properly preserves the Supreme Court’s requirement of an objective inquiry into Fourth Amendment activity and provides meaningful judicial review of discretionary police action.
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1612, 1517 (10th Cir.1988) (citations omitted) (quoting Smith, 799 F.2d at 709).
The courts that use the “would” test have held that the officer’s subjective intent is not relevant to the objective assessment of his actions. These courts have found relevant to that assessment such factors as the kind of duty the arresting officer was on at the time he made the stop; the words and actions of the officer both before and after he made the stop, see Smith, 799 F.2d at 710 (“[W]e ... therefore are not concerned with [the officer’s] subjective intent.... What turns this case is the overwhelming objective evidence that [the officer] had no interest in investigating possible drunk driving charges: he began pursuit before he observed any Veav-ing’ and, even after he stopped the car he made no investigation of the possibility of intoxication.”); and the general police practice or routine for enforcing the violation for which the stop was made, see Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1618 (“If police officers in New Mexico are required to and/or do routinely stop most cars they see in which the driver is not wearing his seat belt, then this stop was not unconstitutionally pretextual at its inception. ... Conversely, if officers rarely stop seat belt law violators absent some other reason to stop the car, the objective facts involved in this stop suggest that the stop would not have been made but for a suspicion that could not constitutionally justify the stop.”).
In contrast to these circuits’ “reasonable officer test,” several circuits have taken the view, often characterized as the “could” test, that a stop is valid if the officer “could” have stopped the car in question for a suspected traffic violation. See United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir.) (comparing cases), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 351, 121 L.Ed.2d 266 (1992). “[S]o long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to so [sic], [the resulting stop or] arrest is constitutional.” United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.1989) (on interlocutory appeal); see also United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir.1991) (it is enough that officer had probable cause to arrest and lawfully effectuated the arrest), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 449 (1991); United States v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir.1991) (officer’s [389]*389engaging in ongoing surveillance of car did not prohibit him from stopping car for traffic violation); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir.1990) (“stop remains valid even if the officer would have ignored the traffic violation but for his other suspicions”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448 (1991); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir.1987) (“so long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry”); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.1987) (“legality of stop must be judged by the objective facts known to the seizing officers rather than by the justification articulated by them”; pretext irrelevant if stop otherwise valid), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987); cf. Rusher, 966 F.2d at 876 (saving for another day whether to apply Smith “reasonable officer” test or “legally authorized” test because stop met both tests), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 351, 121 L.Ed.2d 266 (1992).
Most eases applying the “could” test have turned on the fact that the officer in that case was authorized by law to make a traffic stop and in fact did make the stop at least in part because of a suspected traffic violation. And, while eases such as Guzman and Smith might appear to portray it differently, the “could” test has not been interpreted by any circuit as meaning that a stop can be justified merely by an after-the-fact determination that the officer theoretically could have stopped the car for a traffic violation, although he had not noticed at the time of the stop that the violation had occurred.
B.
This Circuit has repeatedly maintained that the test to be utilized in determining whether a stop is pretextual is the “would” test as set out by the Eleventh Circuit in Smith, 799 F.2d at 709.2 However, the facts in the Sixth Circuit cases that deal with claims that a stop was pretextual are more like the facts in Guzman, where the traffic violation that precipitated the stop was not disputed. And a review of the Sixth Circuit cases demonstrates that each time we have been confronted with a traffic stop made on the basis of probable cause, unlike the Guzman court, we have found that the stop was not unconstitutional.
In United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.1988), amended to add concurrence, 866 F.2d 147 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1160, 107 L.Ed.2d 1063 (1990), the first of several Sixth Circuit cases in which a traffic stop was attacked as pre-textual, we distinguished the facts but relied on the reasoning of Smith. There, we addressed a situation in which a Tennessee state trooper traveling along an interstate highway spotted a rental car with Florida license plates, which he knew to be common among drug couriers. Pino, 855 F.2d at 358. When the driver saw the police ear, he braked and swerved onto the shoulder (almost hitting the guardrail), swerved back onto the highway without signalling, drifted partially into the left lane, and then slowed down in an obvious attempt to avoid passing the trooper. The trooper arrested the driver for an illegal lane change, and the stop and arrest led to the discovery of cocaine. We affirmed the district court’s finding that the stop was not pretextual, holding that the trooper’s observation of the swerving gave him probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated a motor vehicle statute:
There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that the district court’s factual finding that [the trooper’s] observations gave him probable cause to believe that Pino had committed a traffic offense and that this was the reason for the stop is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we need not decide the question whether, if there is adequate reason for a stop based on a [390]*390traffic violation, it is necessary that it also be shown that this was in fact the reason for the stop.
Id. at 361.
Since Pino, this Court has addressed the question of pretextual stops in several cases, but no clear picture has emerged as to what factors should be considered in determining whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop in question. In United States v. Crotinger, 928 F.2d 203 (6th Cir.1991), a case in which an officer operating a speed trap stopped a car going 66 in a 55 m.p.h. zone, the officer approached the car and noticed pills on the floor of the car and the aroma of marijuana. Despite the fact that there was no evidence that the officer was engaged in any activity other than catching speeders, we nonetheless addressed, in terms of the reasonable officer test from Smith and Pino, the defendant’s claim that the stop was pretextual. We held that the stop was “objectively reasonable” and not pretextual because the speeding violation clearly constituted probable cause for the stop and there was no evidence that the car in which defendant was riding was stopped for any reason other than the speeding. Crotinger, 928 F.2d at 206.
United States v. Dunson, 940 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1488, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 (1992), involved the stop of a speeding vehicle by a police officer strictly enforcing the traffic laws in order to interdict drug traffickers. It is not entirely clear what test we applied in Dun-son. However, we cited and distinguished Smith, and held that a speeding violation, albeit a minor one, had been committed in the presence of the officer. Because the defendant had not shown that the officer was using questionable criteria in deciding which speeders to stop, we found that the stop was not constitutionally “unreasonable.” Dunson, 940 F.2d at 993.
In United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1012, 122 L.Ed.2d 160 (1993), we again used the language of objective reasonableness in finding valid and non-pretextual the traffic stops of a rental truck and a car that a Memphis police officer suspected were traveling in tandem with a third vehicle on an interstate highway.3 An officer of the Tennessee Highway Patrol eventually stopped the car on the basis of the report of the Memphis police officer that it was speeding. A different officer of the Highway Patrol, who was aware of the Memphis police officer’s suspicions that the vehicles were traveling in tandem but was not aware that the police officer had observed the vehicles speeding, stopped the truck after observing it operating erratically. We held that under these circumstances both stops were objectively reasonable: the truck was stopped because the Highway Patrolman had seen a traffic violation when he saw the truck operating erratically, and the car was in fact speeding and thus “it could have been objectively reasonable for an officer to stop the vehicle to issue a ticket to the operator.” Id. at 691. The fact that the officers stated that they were partially motivated by suspicions of drug activity did not make the traffic stops pretextual because
the officers had a reasonable belief, considering in totality the observations made by individual officers, that the [car] was trav-elling in linkage, with the truck and that the occupants were somehow acquainted or associated together. We also find that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner because the [car] was, in fact, speeding.
Id. at 692.
In each of these cases, we have cited to the reasoning in Smith and used the trappings of the reasonable officer, but have concluded, not that a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the particular circumstances of that case, but that the officer in question had probable cause to make the traffic stop and, therefore, the stop was not illegal. The unavoidable inference to be drawn from our cases is that an officer who makes a traffic stop based on probable cause acts in an objectively reasonable manner. As [391]*391a result, there is no Sixth Circuit case helpful to the police or- the courts in determining what, if anything, is necessary to validate a traffic stop if probable cause is not enough under the “would” test. Because we conclude that probable cause is enough, we adopt a new test for this Circuit.
C.
We address today only the issue of whether a traffic stop, which is supported by probable cause but motivated — at least in part— by suspicions inadequate to support a stop, may be held to be unconstitutional because it is pretextual. We find that neither the Smith test of whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the car for a traffic violation but for the invalid motive (or its variations as found in the pretextual stop eases decided in this Circuit), nor the language of the standard set out by other circuits of whether the police officer could have stopped the car for a traffic violation is satisfactory in determining this issue. At least insofar as the “would” test might be applied to the circumstances of a stop based upon probable cause, we find it difficult to distinguish, for example, between the officer’s subjective intent and the “objective evidence” of the officer’s actual interest in investigating the kind of offense for which he made the stop. See Smith, 799 F.2d at 710-711. We also suspect that Guzman’s focus on the “objective evidence” of the general police practice is simply an aggregation of the subjective intentions of officers in the regions. As for the “could” test, as we have indicated, no circuit adopting that test has expressly said that a stop can be justified merely by an after-the-stop determination that the officer theoretically could have stopped the car for a traffic violation, although he did not notice at the time of the stop that a violation had occurred. However, in our view, some of the language utilized by the courts that subscribe to the “could” test is sufficiently imprecise to leave it susceptible of such a reading.
We hold that so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not unlawful and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir.) (it is enough that officer had probable cause to arrest and lawfully effectuated the arrest), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448 (1991). We focus not on whether a reasonable officer “would” have stopped the suspect (even though he had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred), or whether any officer “could” have stopped the suspect (because a traffic violation had in fact occurred), but on whether this particular officer in fact had probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had occurred, regardless of whether this was the only basis or merely one basis for the stop. The stop is reasonable if there was probable cause, and it is irrelevant what else the officer knew or suspected about the traffic violator at the time of the stop. It is also irrelevant whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine according to the general practice of the police department or the particular officer making the stop.
We note that this probable cause determination, like all probable cause determinations, is fact-dependent and will turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop. Under this test, it is clear that the courts may not determine whether there was probable cause by looking at events that occurred after the stop. If an officer testifies at a suppression hearing that he in fact did not see the traffic violation or did not have probable cause to believe a violation had occurred, but only discovered after the stop or the arrest that the suspect had committed a traffic violation, a court could not find that probable cause existed. Such a stop would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, if the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop were sufficient to constitute probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred, a reviewing court may not look at the officer’s ordinary routine, or his conduct or conversations that occurred before or after the stop to invalidate the stop as pretextual.
We believe that by using this standard, we will better achieve the objective assessment of the officer’s actions required by the Supreme Court. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 [392]*392L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (objective assessment of officer’s actions necessary); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2577 n. 3, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983) (fact that officers acted on tip about drugs did not make boarding boat for inspection of documents unlawful); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (subjective intent not relevant). We also will avoid some of the problems inherent in the “would” and “could” tests. By adopting this standard, we make explicit that which was simply an inference under our prior cases: traffic stops based on probable cause, even if other motivations existed, are not illegal.
We accomplish several things by holding that a traffic stop, supported by probable cause, of a vehicle as to which the officer also has suspicions of more nefarious activity, is not unreasonable because it is based at least in part upon other motivations. We ensure that the validity of such stops is not subject to the vagaries of police departments’ policies and procedures concerning the kinds of traffic offenses of which they ordinarily do or do not take note. We ensure as well that those who are engaged in more nefarious activity are not insulated from criminal liability for those activities simply because a judge determines that the police officer who executed the traffic stop, had he been the mythical reasonable officer, would not have stopped them for the traffic offense that they in fact committed. We ensure that law enforcement officers who see actual violations of the law, even minor ones, are not left to ponder whether their actions in enforcing the law are appropriate. Finally, we ensure that the courts leave to the legislatures the job of determining what traffic laws police officers are authorized to enforce and when they are authorized to enforce them.
D.
In applying this standard to this case, the only question is whether Officer Writesman had probable cause to stop Ferguson and Lester based on the traffic violation. We find that clearly he did.
Probable cause is defined as “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir.1990). As this Court noted in United States v. Barrett, 890 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.1989):
The establishment of probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2335 n. 13, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). As noted in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983):
[Pjrobable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ ... that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be correct or more likely true than false. A “practical, nontechnical” probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required, (citations omitted).
Moreover, the existence of probable cause should be determined on the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). This totality of the circumstances analysis includes a realistic assessment of the situation from a law enforcement officer’s perspective.
Id. at 861.
Driving with no visible license plate is a violation of Memphis City Ordinance § 21-269. Officer Writesman testified that he noticed before he stopped the car that it did not have a visible license plate and that he recognized that this was a violation of law. Therefore, Officer Writesman clearly had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the traffic violation of driving with no visible license plate. It is irrelevant that the vehicle in fact had a drive-out tag lying on the back shelf of the car, because the ordinance makes it an offense to drive without a “visible” license plate, and the vehicle did not have a visible license plate. It is also irrelevant what a reasonable officer would have done, what Of-[393]*393fieer Writesman did before or after the stop, or what other reasons Writesman gave for the stop. It likewise is immaterial that Writesman testified that he normally stops vehicles that do not display a license plate or drive-out tag. Because Writesman had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred, the stop was not unlawful. We need not inquire any further into the circumstances surrounding the stop. Therefore, we must affirm the denial of Ferguson’s motion to suppress and affirm Ferguson’s conviction.
III.
Because we have found that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and that the conviction must be affirmed, we must address Ferguson’s second argument on appeal: the district court erred in sentencing him as a career offender because his prior convictions resulted from guilty pleas that were not voluntarily entered and were therefore constitutionally invalid.
Sitting en banc, we recently held that a district court may permit a federal criminal defendant to attack at a sentencing hearing the validity of previous state court convictions that will enhance the defendant’s sentence under the Guidelines. See United States v. McGlocklin, 8 F.3d 1037 (6th Cir.1993) (en banc). However, as was the case in McGlocklin, we find that the defendant has failed to establish that his prior convictions were constitutionally infirm.
The district court indicated at sentencing that it believed that the burden of showing voluntariness was on the government and that the Guidelines did not authorize it to permit collateral attacks on state convictions as part of the sentencing proceedings. Nonetheless, the court permitted defendant Ferguson to attack his prior state convictions collaterally and gave him the opportunity to present whatever evidence he had to support those attacks. Ferguson presented nothing at the hearing except to read his objections concerning his prior convictions and to respond to his counsel’s leading questions about his understanding of his rights at the time he entered the pleas. The judge made it abundantly clear on the record that he did not believe Ferguson’s testimony concerning the claimed constitutional infirmities of those convictions and that he would find that the government had met the burden of demonstrating that the guilty pleas in those state prosecutions were voluntary.
The presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments dictates that Ferguson had the burden to produce credible evidence that the prior pleas were involuntary. Parke v. Raley, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 517, 524, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). The district court discredited Ferguson’s testimony at sentencing about the nature of his prior convictions. Thus, Ferguson did not carry his burden. Although the district court was incorrect in its allocation of the burden, we find no error in the court’s finding that the government would have carried its burden of demonstrating that the pleas were voluntarily entered. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in sentencing Ferguson as a career offender.
IV.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, AFFIRM Ferguson’s conviction, and AFFIRM the district court’s sentencing of Ferguson as a career offender.